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
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THE WAR CABINET

HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

EMBRACING A COMPLETE REVIEW OF
OUR RELATIONS WITH SPAIN

BY
HENRY WATTERSON

Illustrated

*WITH NUMEROUS ORIGINAL ENGRAVINGS AND COLORED PLATES,
ACCURATELY PORTRAYING THE SCENES DESCRIBED*



THE WERNER COMPANY
NEW YORK AKRON, O. CHICAGO

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C. B. DENAPLE

IN PIOUS HOMAGE
TO THE
Memory of the Heroic Dead
WHO FELL IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN, THIS
VOLUME IS INSCRIBED
TO
THEIR LIVING KINDRED
AS SOME RECOGNITION OF THE SACRIFICES MADE BY THEM
UPON THE
ALTARS OF FREEDOM AND HUMANITY.



PREFACE



THE war between the United States and Spain was like no other war of ancient or modern times. Begun at once as a protest of civilization and as a plea for humanity, it ended as an act of unpremeditated national expansion; and, from first to last, it abounded in surprises. In its inception, the public men of America were generally opposed to it, as they are apt to be opposed to everything either very original or very decisive; and, if the controlling members of the cabinet at Madrid favored it—as there are some reasons for believing that they did—theirs was rather a choice between two dangers, foreign and domestic, which menaced them, than any deliberate preference for war. In Spain all popular impulse seems to have been wanting. In the United States the declaration of war was forced upon the President and the Congress by the people.

Thus, the war with Spain was essentially a people's war. The destruction of the *Maine* in the harbor of Havana undoubtedly quickened the pulse of the nation and hurried the action of its official representatives. But, long before, the patience of public opinion in the United States had been exhausted by Spanish misrule in Cuba. The time was come to make an end of an intolerable situation. When we consider not merely the oppression and corruption which had marked a cruel despotism existing in sight of us, and exploiting itself in spite of us, but its actual cost to us in the treaty obligation of policing our coasts against the filibusters and in its consequent and constant injury to our commerce, it seems a matter of wonder that the day of reckoning should have been delayed so long.

to the Infanta Eulalia; and the idea of going to war with a nation so weak as we knew Spain to be, was repugnant to every brave and honorable man. There were two circumstances that, among intelligent Americans, weighed far more than the world will ever give us credit even for conceiving. As no orator since Patrick Henry, not excepting Gambetta, Señor Castelar had delivered those principles of civil liberty which are dear to all our hearts. That meant a great deal. It alternately appealed to our republicanism and stirred our enthusiastic admiration. Then there was set before our eyes the figure of a noble woman, with her boy king, in spite of our republicanism, appealing to our manhood. All in all, it cost us a great sacrifice of sensibilities to go to war with Spain.

But what could we do? The situation was inexorable. It was either ruthlessly to beat down, or be ignominiously humiliated. When nations can do nothing else they can fight, and fight we did. And so did the Spaniard. But centuries of moral poison, percolating through the veins of the body politic of Spain, had done their work. The obsolete Spaniard was no match for the alert and enterprising American. The war was quickly over. It might not have been so quickly over in the case of Germany and France; but its end would have been the same. Spain has no reason to be ashamed of her part in it. Throughout the United States, at least, the Spanish character stands higher to-day than it did before the war, though the Spaniards have Admirals Montojo and Cervera and General Toral to thank for the maintenance of the national credit.

On our own side, the war has surely paid us back far more than it cost us, at the same time that it has brought us many things not contemplated in the beginning.

It annihilated sectional lines and solidified the Union. It proclaimed us a nation among the nations of the earth; no longer a huddle of petty sovereignties held together by a rope of sand. It dissipated at once and forever the notion that we are a race of mercenary shopkeepers, worshipping rather the brand upon the dollar than the eagle on the shield. It announced the arrival upon the

scene of the world's action of a power which would have to be reckoned with by the older powers in determining the future of civilization. It rescued us from the turbulent discussion of many misleading questions of domestic economy, uplifting and enlarging all our national perspectives. Above all, it elevated, broadened, and vitalized the manhood of the rising generation of Americans. In the heroes who fell in battle, as in those who survived to tell the tale of surpassing endurance and valor, examples of priceless value were set before it; and in such illustrations as Dewey and Hobson, Shafter and Wheeler, coming from extremes of North and South, notice was served upon Christendom of the existence of a homogeneous race of soldiers and sailors destined to carry the flag of the Great Republic to lands perhaps as yet unknown, and certainly able to hold it against all who might dispute its right of way.

The United States engaged in the war with Spain under many disadvantages. It was supposed that the Spanish navy outclassed our navy. It was known that we had no organized army. Europe was rife with evil prognostications. Although the continental nations officially declared their neutrality, the ruling elements, social and political, were all against us. In spite of the millions of Germans among us, the trend of German opinion as delivered by the newspapers of Berlin and Frankfurt and Köln was surprisingly hostile. Though France is a Republic, and our ancient ally besides, the Parisian journals, reflecting on the one hand the interests of the Spanish bondholders and on the other hand the prejudices of polite society,—perhaps also goaded by the avowed friendship of the English,—made haste to open upon us a cross-fire of the most fantastic billingsgate. It was on all sides freely predicted that the raw militia of America could not stand against the trained veterans of Europe, and that the American navy, overmatched in ships by the navy of Spain, and manned by a riff-raff of foreign adventurers, would become the easy prey of such Admirals as Cervera, Montojo, and Camara. There were admissions in some quarters that the superior resources and power of the United States would in the end prevail; but nothing was allowed the Yankees except

grudgingly, and even then rendered in a tone of apology. In Spain it was given out that the South, still mourning the loss of the Southern Confederacy, was ripe for revolt, and that the landing of a Spanish army somewhere on the Gulf coast was only necessary to draw to it a host of rebels waiting for a chance to rise and eager for revenge.

The war dispelled all these illusions. The United States went into it even in its own eyes something of a riddle as to the matter of martial equipment, resources, and capacity. It came out of it a conceded, self-confident world power. The victories of Dewey and Sampson settled forever all question as to the navy. The rapid mobilization of the army proved the wonder of mankind; and, although the army had less opportunity than the navy to show the stuff it was made of, the operations in front of Santiago were sufficient to establish its claim to the respect of the military establishments of Europe and to earn for it and its leaders the admiration of their own countrymen. From Miles, the able and gallant commanding General, to the humblest subaltern, the exhibitions of intrepidity and fortitude and skill were never exceeded by any band of officers or any body of troops of which the history of warfare gives us an account.

The purpose of the pages which follow is to tell the story of these soldiers and these sailors as they themselves revealed it from time to time during the war with Spain. No notice is here taken of any controversy incident to or growing out of the events attempted to be impartially set forth. This history has nought to do with disputing or disputed claims among ambitious rivals. As Admiral Schley observed, there was "glory enough to go round." Having no other aim than to render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, its author has sought to make a simple, lucid narrative of an episode, short indeed, but not too short to glorify American arts and arms. Although written concurrently with the progress of the events it describes, sufficient time was allowed in every instance to ascertain from official and other sources the actual facts of every transaction; and it is believed that it has omitted no essential feature of the operations on land and sea, or failed to give to each of them its fair proportion. An abundance

rather than a scarcity of material for its composition, ready-made by the newspaper correspondents, to whom the author's first and chief acknowledgments are due, has attended its progress toward completion; and his would be but an imperfect account if it failed to mark the daring, energy, and skill, along with entire fidelity to justice and truth, which characterized the part played by these important and inseparable companions of the soldiers in the field. Assuredly nothing has been set down either in wanton praise or blame, so that the whole is submitted to the public with the confident belief that it embraces what, indeed, it purports to be, a complete and authentic account of the war between the United States and Spain.

HENRY WATTERSON.

COURIER-JOURNAL, LOUISVILLE.

October 1, 1898.



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CHAPTER THE FIRST.

THE CAUSES AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN—THE VISIT OF COURTESY BY THE AMERICAN BATTLE-SHIP TO HAVANA—DESTRUCTION OF THE "MAINE" IN HAVANA HARBOR—INDIGNATION AND EXCITEMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE—THE NAVAL BOARD OF INVESTIGATION—ITS REPORT—SENATOR PROCTOR'S SPEECH AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE COUNTRY—MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENT AND ACTION OF CONGRESS—THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM—MINISTER BARNABE DEMANDS HIS PASSPORTS—SPAIN REFUSES TO RECEIVE THE ULTIMATUM AND SENDS HIS PASSPORTS TO MINISTER WOODFORD—THE QUEEN-REGENT BEFORE THE CORTES—A SIMULTANEOUS APPEAL TO ARMS—THE FINAL DECLARATION OF WAR.


THE morning of Wednesday, the 16th of February, 1898, the world was startled by the report that an American battleship had been destroyed in the harbor of Havana. This proved to be the *Maine*, an armored cruiser of the second-class, but one of the staunchest afloat, and often described as "the pride of the navy of the United States." Under orders from Washington, the *Maine* had proceeded to Havana upon "a visit of courtesy." Of this visit it was officially stated that it meant "simply the resumption of friendly naval relations with Spain," and was known and approved by the Spanish authorities. The *Maine* steamed out of Key West the evening of the 24th of January, and entered Havana harbor the morning of the 25th, being saluted by all the forts and war vessels, and conducted to her place of mooring by the regular pilot of the port. She was commanded by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, an officer of experience, upon whose discretion the President and the Secretary of the Navy placed entire confidence. This confidence was fully vindicated by succeeding events.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
"MAINE"

The relations between Spain and the United States had been much disturbed by the state of affairs in Cuba. For the most part during

quite thirty years an insurrection, sporadic in character, and more or less active, had been going on in the island. As a general thing, and in a general way, the people of the United States sympathized with those uprisings of the Cubans, and not infrequently filibustering expeditions eluded the vigilance of our coast guards. Naturally the Spaniards were kept in constant irritation, although it does not appear that there was any lack of energy or of good faith on the part of the American Government in repressing overt manifestations of friendship for the insurrectionists. Finally, however, public opinion in the United States, grown more concentrated and intense, had forced the McKinley administration to take official cognizance of Cuban affairs and to open diplomatic negotiations with Madrid, looking to the cessation of what had become a war of extermination, ruinous to Cuba and injurious to American interests. As an incident to these negotiations a private letter of the Spanish minister, De Lome, at Washington, had been intercepted by a secret agent of the Cuban Junta and had not only found its way into the newspapers, but was placed in possession of the State Department. This letter grossly reflected upon the President of the United States. Señor De Lome, having acknowledged its genuineness, was promptly given his passports, and, as promptly, a disavowal was demanded from the Spanish Government, which, in spite of the strained relations then existing, the Cabinet at Madrid was not slow to make, first personally and then officially, in very emphatic terms.

Thus far all seemed well. It was known that the administration at Washington sincerely desired peace with Spain, and, as there could not be two opinions touching the character of the De Lome letter and the warrant of the Department of State in requiring a public apology, there was no reason to apprehend that the affair, being amicably closed, would, however disagreeable in itself, have any further consequences. Hence it was that the destruction of the *Maine*, following quickly upon the enforced exit of the Spanish minister, and the controversy which had led up to that exit, not merely came to the people of the United States like a flash of lightning out of a clear



U. S. BATTLESHIP MAINE
DESTROYED IN HAVANA HARBOR, FEB. 15, 1898

sky, but fell upon a public opinion already sensitive to ill impressions from that particular quarter, and prepared to believe almost any evil of Spain and the Spaniards.

There was nothing in the circumstances attending the destruction of the *Maine* calculated to diminish the prejudice thus preconceived. On the contrary everything tended to increase it. In spite of Captain Sigsbee's plea for a suspension of judgment, the people, with few exceptions, leaped at the conclusion of treachery. This did not fix any direct responsibility upon the Spanish Government, but it did arraign the Havana authorities, accusing them at the very least of gross neglect of duty. As will be seen from the sequel there is reason to suspect a yet greater crime and to trace this to agencies which could not have existed outside the military establishment at Havana.

At exactly forty minutes after nine o'clock the evening of Tuesday, the 15th day of February, 1898, without any warning, the battleship *Maine* was blown out of the water and totally wrecked by appliances the exact nature of which yet remains a mystery. All accounts agree that there were two distinct explosions, followed as some declare, by several additional detonations. "On that dreadful night," says Captain Sigsbee, "I had not retired. I was writing letters. I find it impossible to describe the sound or shock, but the impression remains of something awe-inspiring, terrifying, of noise—rending, vibrating, all-pervading. There is nothing in the former experience of any one on board to measure the explosion by. . . . After the first great shock—I cannot myself recall how many sharper detonations I heard, not more than two or three—I knew my ship was gone. In a structure like the *Maine*, the effects of such an explosion are not for a moment in doubt. . . . I made my way through the long passage in the dark, groping from side to side, to the hatchway and thence to the poop, being among the earliest to reach that spot. As soon as I recognized the officers, I ordered the high explosives to be flooded, and then directed that the boats available be lowered to the rescue of the wounded or drowning. . . . Discipline in a perfect measure prevailed. There was no more confusion than

a call to general quarters would produce—not as much. . . . I soon saw, by the light of the flames, that all my officers and crew left alive and on board surrounded me. I cannot form any idea of the time, but it seemed five minutes from the moment I reached the poop until I left, the last man it was possible to reach having been saved. It must have been three-quarters of an hour or more, however, from the amount of work done. . . . I remember the officers and men worked together lowering the boats, and that the gig took some time to lower. I did not notice the rain of débris described by Lieutenant Blandin or others who were on deck at the time of the first explosion, but I did observe the explosion of the fixed ammunition, and wonder that more were not hurt thereby. . . . Without going beyond the limits of what was proper in the harbor of a friendly Power, I always maintain precautions against attack, and the quarter-watch was ordered to have ammunition for the smaller guns ready so that in the improbable event of an attack on the ship it would have been found ready. It was this ammunition which exploded as the heat reached it.”

Captain Sigsbee's story is supplemented by many others, varying in personal experience, but agreeing in all the essential features of the catastrophe. The narrative of Lieutenant Blandin is especially graphic. “I was on the watch,” the Lieutenant tells us, “and when the men had been piped below I looked down the main hatches and over the side of the ship. Everything was absolutely normal. I walked aft to the quarter-deck behind the rear turret, as is allowed after 8 o'clock in the evening, and sat down on the port side, where I remained for a few minutes. Then, for some reason I cannot explain to myself, I moved to the starboard side and sat down there. I was feeling a bit glum, and, in fact, was so quiet that Lieutenant Hood came up and asked laughingly if I was asleep. I said: ‘No; I am on watch.’ . . . Scarcely had I spoken when there came a dull, sullen roar. Then succeeded a sharp explosion, some say numerous explosions. I remember only one. It seemed to me that the sound issued from the port side forward. Then followed a perfect




CHARLES D. SIGSBEE
IN COMMAND OF THE MAINE WHEN DESTROYED IN HAVANA HARBOR

rain of missiles of all kinds, from huge pieces of cement to blocks of wood, steel railings, fragments of gratings and all the débris that would be detachable in an explosion. . . . I was struck on the head by a piece of cement and knocked down, but not hurt, and got to my feet in a moment. Lieutenant Hood had run to the poop and I supposed, as I followed, he was dazed by the shock and about to jump overboard. I hailed him and he answered that he had run to help lower the boats. When I got there, though scarce a minute had elapsed, I had to wade in water to my knees, and almost instantly the quarter deck was awash. On the poop I found Captain Sigsbee, as cool as if at a ball, and soon all the officers except Jenkins and Merritt joined us. The poop was above water after the *Maine* settled to the bottom. Captain Sigsbee ordered the launch and barge lowered and the officers and men, who by this time had assembled, got the boats out and rescued a number in the water. Captain Sigsbee ordered Lieutenant Commander Wainwright forward to see the extent of the damage and if anything could be done to rescue those forward or to extinguish the flames which followed close upon the explosion and burned fiercely as long as there was any combustible above water to feed them. . . . Lieutenant Commander Wainwright on his return reported the total and awful character of the calamity, and Captain Sigsbee gave the last sad order, 'Abandon ship,' to men overwhelmed with grief indeed, but calm and apparently unexcited. . . . Meantime, four boats from the Spanish cruiser *Alfonso XII.* arrived, to be followed soon by the two from the Ward Line steamer *City of Washington*. The two boats lowered from the *City of Washington* were found to be riddled with flying débris from the *Maine* and unfit for use. Captain Sigsbee was the last man to leave his vessel and left in his own gig."

Whilst these dreadful scenes were passing upon the ill-fated battleship, the city of Havana, not yet gone to bed, was roused as it had never been roused before. The shock and flash, coming almost instantaneously the one upon the other, admonished every one of some dire calamity. Quickly the streets were filled with excited people.

Naturally, the first impression of these was that the rebels had effected a successful descent and were entering through some break they had made in the fortifications. The next was that Morro Castle had been blown up. All doubt, however, was soon dispelled by the direction from which the reverberation came, as well as the flames that began to rise above the sinking and burning ship, lighting the heavens far and near, and the eager multitude rushed *en masse* to the water's edge, where the character and extent of the tragedy was at once apparent. "On Tuesday evening," says an eye witness of the explosion, "I strolled down to the river front for a breath of fresh air. I was about two or three hundred yards from the *Maine*. The first intimation I had of an explosion was a crunching sound. Then there came a terrible roar, and immense pieces of *débris* flew skyward from the *Maine*. Some of them must have been thrown at least three hundred feet. It looked as though the whole inside of the ship had been blown out. Many persons on the pier were nearly thrown from their feet by the force of the explosion. The air became stifling with smoke."

Another account contributed to the history of this tragic night by a guest of the Grand Hotel, related how, sitting in front of that hostelry, he was startled by a peculiar noise, as of the fall of some gigantic edifice, followed by another and a much louder and more distinct report. "We thought the whole city had been blown to pieces," says this authority. "Some said the insurgents were entering Havana. Others cried out that Morro Castle was blown up." Continuing his description of the panic which followed the explosion, he said: "On the Prado is a large cab-stand. The minute after the explosion was heard the cabmen cracked their whips and went rattling over the cobblestones like crazy men. The fire department turned out and bodies of cavalry and infantry rushed through the streets. There was no sleep in Havana that night. The Spanish officials were quick to express their sympathy and acted very well as a whole, but I think their expressions of regret lacked the warmth which would have been characteristic of an American city, had such a disaster occurred under similar circumstances."



CENTRAL PARK, ENGLAND HOTEL, AND TACON THEATRE, HAVANA


As has been stated the Ward Line steamer *City of Washington* was moored near the battle-ship *Maine* the night of the disaster. One of the passengers on board the *City of Washington* tells this story: "A party of us," says he, "were sitting in the cabin engaged in idle conversation. It was, as nearly as I can recall, between nine and ten o'clock. Suddenly we were startled by a loud report. As by a single impulse our little group rushed to the portholes and saw an immense flash shoot up in the air with a horrible, grinding, hissing noise that might have been an earthquake or a cyclone. Débris of all kinds and a large number of bodies were thrown upward. It was at first believed that the *Maine* was being fired upon, but afterward, as the *City of Washington* was struck by what turned out to be falling débris and she careened, it was thought she was being fired upon. A second explosion took place, and following it we heard groans and cries of 'Help,' 'Help us.' The boats of the *City of Washington* and those of the Spanish cruiser *Alfonso XII.* were hurriedly launched and went to the rescue. I went into one of the boats of the *City of Washington*, and the scenes I witnessed were heartrending beyond description. . . . Two of the small boats on board the *City of Washington* were stove in by the débris from the *Maine*. The battle-ship sank even with the water in about thirty minutes after the explosion. The *City of Washington* was converted into a hospital. Many of the rescued men were brought on board almost nude, and the passengers gave them clothing. The officers of the *City of Washington* did all in their power to make the rescued men comfortable. . . . About half an hour after the explosion Consul-General Lee, the Civil Governor of Havana, and Captain-General Blanco's chief of staff came on board. General Lee remained with us all night.

When all was over, and the casualties were estimated, it was found that 266 seamen, including two commissioned officers, had lost their lives.

In the beginning there was some effort on the part of the Spanish authorities at an ostentatious display of sympathy; but soon this gave

way to a kind of official indifference. Sad, indeed, was the funeral of those of our brave men whose bodies were recovered from the wreck. With every mark of honor they were laid to rest in the beautiful cemetery of the Cuban capital. But there was a striking contrast between the conduct of the native Cubans and the Spaniards on this mournful occasion. The Cuban women in the streets were almost all dressed in mourning, while the Spanish women wore colors. "The only flags I saw in the procession," says one who witnessed the pageant, "were two small ones about three by six inches." This writer continues: "I went aboard the *Alfonso XII.*, and was received politely. The single expression of regret I heard there was from an officer who complained that the force of the *Maine* explosion had broken his toilet bottles. There can be no mistaking the indifference of the Spaniards in Havana over the loss of the war-ship and those aboard. On Thursday, while driving to the cemetery with two American friends, I was assailed with jeers and some one threw a large stone at our carriage. In fact, one or two children yelled after us that they had blown up the 'Americano,' and that they were glad of it. I did not hear one expression of regret for the terrible loss of life from any Spaniard during the time I was in Havana."

There is ample testimony to the truth of this lack of general or spontaneous feeling among the Spaniards, and some evidence that the under-currents of popular sentiment were those of rejoicing. Meanwhile, in spite of the complete annihilation of the battle-ship, there remained in the harbor a ghastly and constant reminder of the tragedy, in the heap of flame-charred wreckage that still showed above the surface of the water. "The huge mass," writes one who reached the scene next day, "looks as if it had been thrown up from a subterranean storehouse of fused cement, steel, wood, and iron. Further aft, one military mast protrudes at a slight angle from the perpendicular, while the poop, on which gathered the band, offers a resting place for the workmen or divers. Of the predominant white which marks our vessels not a vestige remains. In its place is the blackness of desolation and death."



LA FUERZA, HAVANA, ERECTED 1573

Such is, in brief, a résumé of the events of the night of Tuesday the 15th of February, 1898, destined to play so momentous a part in the record of the world's progress. They constitute a fitting prelude to the imperial theme of war which they foreshadowed, for nothing in marine history during peaceful times, not even the famous catastrophe to the *Royal George* in Spithead roadstead toward the close of the last century, nor the Samoan disaster, nor the running down of the *Victoria* by the *Camperdown* in the latter part of this,—though resulting in greater loss of life,—can be brought into comparison, in point of horror and of far-reaching consequences, with the destruction of the *Maine*.

The first intelligence received in the United States seemed to daze the public mind. But the civil and naval authorities acted with rare prudence. Immediately upon reaching shore, and with all the dread reality of an untoward calamity cruelly palpable on every hand, Captain Sigsbee cabled the following message to the Secretary of the Navy:—

“*Maine* blown up in Havana harbor at 9:40 and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed and drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for crew and few pieces of equipment still above water. No one had other clothes than those upon him. . . . Public opinion should be suspended till further report. All officers are believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, are now with me and express sympathy.”


II.

THE appeal of Captain Sigsbee for a suspension of judgment did not fall upon deaf ears. Whilst the trend of public opinion was not long shaping itself, and falling into the theory of treachery, the more thoughtful among the people of the United States could not bring themselves to believe this possible. That murder upon such a scale, and at once so cold-blooded and wanton, could be deliberately planned and executed at the very high-noon of modern civilization and during a period of

THE OFFICIAL
REPORT OF THE
NAVAL COM-
MISSION

profound peace seemed inconceivable. The Government at Washington took its cue from the self-respecting and at the same time the wise and heroic moderation of Captain Sigsbee. It refused to entertain the idea of conspiracy, the Secretary of the Navy going the length of publicly rejecting it. But it was at once resolved by the President and Cabinet that there should be investigation prompt and thorough, and that this investigation should be conducted exclusively by United States officials. To the proposal of the Spanish authorities to unite in the work of fathoming the mystery, a polite negative was returned, and, within forty-eight hours after the tragedy in Havana harbor, a commission, under the presidency of Captain W. T. Sampson, with Lieutenant Commander Adolphe Marix as judge advocate, both naval officers of distinction, were named to proceed to the scene of the disaster and to investigate all the facts, with the purpose of reaching an impartial conclusion and reporting this to the Government.

No limit was set upon the powers of this commission, and its investigation was exhaustive. It began its sittings at Havana and continued them at Key West, but it did not complete its report until the 21st of March, embracing twenty-three days of continuous labor from the date of its organization. Through every means at its command, by the aid of expert divers and wreckers, and innumerable witnesses among the survivors of the tragedy, as well as eye-witnesses of the disaster, and all persons who could throw any light upon the affair, Captain Sampson and his associates sought to penetrate and to bring to light the truth concerning it. But one conclusion stared them in the face from the very outset of their inquiry. The *Maine* was destroyed by means of some explosive outwardly applied by parties unknown. The report declares that the state of discipline on board and the condition of the magazines, boilers, coal bunkers, and storage compartments were excellent, and that no indication of any cause for an internal explosion existed in any quarter. At 8 o'clock in the evening of February 15 everything had been reported secure and all was quiet. At forty minutes past 9 o'clock the vessel was suddenly destroyed. The report goes on to say: "There were two distinct



THE TACON MARKET, HAVANA

explosions, with a brief interval between them. The first lifted the forward part of the ship very perceptibly; the second, which was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the court to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. The evidence of the divers establishes that the after-part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the explosion. The forward part was completely demolished." Then the report continues: "At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship and six feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water; therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured.

"The outside bottom plating is bent into a reverse V-shape, the after wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward.

"At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel is bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plates. The break is now about six feet below the surface of the water and about thirty feet above its normal position.

"In the opinion of the court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship."

These are the conclusions of the court:—

"That the loss of the *Maine* was not due in any respect to negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew.

"That she was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines, and that no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons."

Without any comment, or the expression of any sentiment calculated to arouse public feeling, President McKinley submitted this report to Congress as late as the 29th of March, a week after it was completed

at Key West and returned to Rear-Admiral Sicard, in command of the Gulf squadron. Every means was employed to procure delay and to prevent rash judgment in the public mind and precipitate action by Congress. The President had been employing the intervening time with a most persistent and earnest attempt to arrive at some amicable adjustment of all the questions at issue with Spain through the medium of diplomatic negotiation. The Spanish Cabinet at Madrid seemed to be playing a waiting game, a game for time, holding our minister, General Stuart L. Woodford, in a state of helpless abeyance with all sorts of subterfuges, whilst casting about amongst European Powers for help in the event of war, which it anticipated, and otherwise seeking to embarrass the United States and to compromise us in the estimation of other nations. These things, however secretly done, had not escaped the rapt attention of the American people. They had awaited patiently the report of their commission. No more than the President did they wish to perpetrate any injustice against Spain. But the public mind was made up that, if it should be clearly shown that the *Maine* was destroyed by external agencies, nothing short of war should be the forfeit. Within an hour after the finding of the report was known to our country, no one doubted that war was inevitable. All well-meaning sophistries were brushed aside by the rude hand of a popular demand for reprisal, and Congress was admonished that it disobeyed the summons at its peril.

III.

WHILST the country waited upon the investigation of the Naval Commission, the course of events was slowly but, as we now know, surely drifting toward war. The unanimous adoption by the two houses of Congress of a joint resolution creating an emergency fund of fifty millions of dollars, and placing this enormous sum at the absolute discretion of the President, was significant as an exhibition both of national unity and of warlike purpose. The rapid completion of unfinished battle-

SENATOR
PROCTOR'S
STARTLING
REVELATIONS



FRUIT STAND IN HAVANA

ships in our own ship-yards, and the purchase of others from foreign governments, pointed in the same direction. So, too, did the passage by Congress of an act increasing the artillery arm of the regular service. On the other hand, the demand by Spain for the recall of General Fitzhugh Lee, our Consul-General at Havana, greatly incensed the American idea of fair play, and, although this demand was withdrawn, it left a sting in the popular mind. But a circumstance at first rather private than public in its character, and little noted at the time, was destined to cut a very great figure, indeed, in the ultimate disposition of the event of peace or war. This was the visit of Senator Redfield Proctor, of Vermont, to the island of Cuba.


It was said by the newspapers that the Senator went at the request of the President. Be this as it may, Senator Proctor disclaimed official character, and gave out that he was merely seeking, as a Senator and a private gentleman, the satisfaction of his own judgment as to the real state of affairs in Cuba. He went about freely, and, as was thought, incautiously, over the island, and on his return he made a statement in open Senate which created the widest and profoundest impression both upon those who heard it and upon the people at large.

Senator Proctor was known to be one of the least imaginative and most just-minded of men, a hard-headed Yankee, who all his life had shown himself incapable of being lured or bullied out of any purpose to which he had once enlisted his interest and energies. He rose from his place in the Senate Chamber the 16th of March, and, reading from manuscript, with no attempt at display, delivered a speech, which, for its effect upon results, has never been surpassed in that or in any other deliberative body. From every point of view the statements embraced by this speech were remarkable. It had been most carefully prepared. Every element of sensationalism had been eliminated from it, and, except as far as the facts recited were sensational, it bore not the slightest evidence of an effort to arouse the public mind, already keenly alive to the condition of affairs on the island of Cuba. Every statement was made with the clearness and precision which characterize the accurate demonstration of a problem in mathematics.

Calm and dispassionate, the utterances of the Senator aroused breathless interest. Every person who heard him was convinced that he was putting his observations into exact terms, lest he might subject himself to the charge of being emotional. One of the best characterizations of the speech was made by Senator Frye, of Maine, a few minutes after its delivery. "It is," said he, "just as if Proctor had held up his right hand and sworn to it." That, indeed, was the impression it made upon the Senate. But it made a still greater impression upon the country. It constituted America's highest and best justification for going to war and had more influence in determining public opinion than any other single agency.

The limits of a narrative such as this do not admit of the incorporation of the speech of Senator Proctor entire. But a few salient extracts will serve to show its character and to account for its effect. Having described the city of Havana as showing little evidence of a state of war the Senator said:—

"Outside Havana all is changed. It is not peace, nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village is surrounded by a *trocha* (trench), a sort of rifle-pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown upon the inside and a barb wire fence on the outer side of the trench. These *trochas* have at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called forts, but which are really small block-houses, many of them more like a large sentry-box, loop-holed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each. The purpose of these *trochas* is to keep the *reconcentrados* in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people have been driven into these fortified towns, and held there to subsist as they can. They are virtually prison-yards and not unlike one in general appearance, except the walls are not so high and strong, but they suffice, where every point is in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor *reconcentrado* women and children. Every railroad station is within one of these *trochas* and has an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight car, loop-holed for musketry, and filled with soldiers and with, as I observed usually and was informed is always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent block-houses inclosed by a *trocha*, and with a guard along the railroad track. . . . With this exception there is no human life or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among the hills, where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings, I saw no house or hut in the 400 miles of



NATIVE FRUIT SELLER, HAVANA

railroad rides from Pinar del Rio province in the west across the full width of Havana and Matanza provinces, and to Sagua La Grande, on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos, on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas. There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures except such as are under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four western provinces just what their army sits on. Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns have reached, is under guard and within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and desolation."

These dreadful conditions were brought about by the famous and brutal order of Captain-General Weyler, the first clause of which Senator Proctor quoted and which is here repeated. It reads:—

"I order and command first, all the inhabitants of the country or outside of the line of fortification of the towns, shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the town so occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel, and tried as such."


The other three sections forbid the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military authority, direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns, prescribe that the eight days shall be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the principal town of the municipal districts, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which can be made use of it will serve as a "recommendation."

This was nothing less than an artfully planned scheme to exterminate by starvation and disease the native population. As a consequence, within a single year over four hundred thousand innocent human beings, mostly old men, women, and children, actually perished. Of its operations Senator Proctor gives us this picture. Again we quote:—

"Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no notice and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerillas. When they reached the

towns they were allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas and left to live if they could. Their huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor but the ground, and no furniture, and after a year's wear but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporize. With large families or with more than one in this little space the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. . . . Conditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half have died, and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved. A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chest terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless. . . . Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that they have been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market surrounded by food. These people were independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They are not beggars even now."

Later on, that is the 24th of March, another notable speech was made in the Senate by Senator Thurston, of Nebraska, who, like Senator Proctor, had gone to Cuba for the purpose of seeing and judging for himself. Senator Thurston's speech differed from that of Senator Proctor in being considerably more rhetorical and emotional. The Senator from Nebraska is a finished orator and a man of culture and fancy, and on this occasion his appearance was attended by the incident of a most grievous personal bereavement, which had touched all hearts and was still fresh in the memory of those who listened to him. Mrs. Thurston had accompanied her husband on his voyage, and, although apparently in the best of health, she had suddenly died on ship-board. She was deeply enlisted in the cause of Cuba, and it was in answer to her last wishes that the Senator delivered this speech. Despite its eloquent and glowing words, however, it could add nothing to the stubborn facts given out with mathematical precision by Senator Proctor, and served rather as oil to keep the lamp which the Vermonter had lighted burning bright in the minds and hearts of the people. Indeed, although Senator Gallinger, of New Hampshire,



AVENUE OF PALMS, HAVANA

another senatorial excursionist to Cuba, had preceded Senator Proctor with a narrative hardly less vivid, it was the statement of the ex-Secretary of War, which, coming at the opportune moment, riveted the public attention and gave it definite direction and purpose. It awakened the conscience of the nation and formulated in the popular mind a proclamation of war.

IV.

As a means of obtaining some stay of warlike proceedings, the Spanish Cortes had adopted an alleged measure of autonomy for the Cubans and a pretended election had been held in those parts of the island of Cuba still controlled by Spain. The farce deceived no one. It failed wholly to arrest the course of events. Seeing its futility, the Cabinet at Madrid proposed to the insurgents an armistice, which it had refused when proposed by us. The insurgents would not listen to this. With them it was independence or nothing. All that came of Spain's attempt to enlist the Powers of Europe in her scheme to hold the United States, while Spanish rule in Cuba continued intact and unabated, was an offer of mediation simultaneously made at Washington and Madrid by the ambassadors of England, Germany, France, Russia, Austria, and Italy, and in both capitals dismissed with polite common-places, neither Government feeling itself in a position to assume publicly any positive attitude. Recourse was had by the Queen-Regent to the Pope of Rome. But his Holiness, having no temporal power, could only throw the influence of his prayers upon the side of humanity and peace.

THE MESSAGE
OF THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE
ACTION OF
CONGRESS AS
TO CUBA

Throughout this prolonged tension, the Minister of the United States at Madrid, General Woodford, was making concessions to Spain which the public temper in America would hardly have confirmed, whilst Señor Sagasta, the head of the Spanish Cabinet, was temporizing, if not double-dealing, with our representative. Congress, feeling the spur of the popular impulse, was restive and at times turbulent,

held in check only by the hands of the President and the Speaker of the House. The two weeks intervening between the 29th of March, when the report of the *Maine* investigation was submitted to Congress, and the 12th of April, when the President sent in a message relegating to the two Houses the final responsibility of the issue of peace or war, the country was kept in a state of excitement, not merely by the uncertainties of the situation, but by the harassing character of passing events.

Under the order of his Government, General Fitzhugh Lee, Consul-General of the United States at Havana, had, the 9th of April, closed his office, turned over to the English consul the care of American interests and, with a number of other Americans, had embarked for Key West, reaching there the next day. The withdrawal of the Consul-General was the signal for some explosions of popular feeling among the Spanish citizens of Havana, but barring these expressions of ill-will, and the refusal of Captain-General Blanco personally to receive the farewell visit of General Lee, the exodus of the Americans was uneventful. By this time, however, Congress would brook no further delay and on the Tuesday following the safe arrival of General Lee on American soil, that is the 12th of April, Mr. McKinley sent in his message. It reviewed the situation with minute particularity, but with exceeding forbearance. The President repeated the thrice-told tale of Spanish barbarism in Cuba; recounted the friendly efforts of the United States to attain a better state of affairs in the island; related the tortuous course of Spanish diplomacy; cited precedents of international law, with liberal quotations from Presidents Jackson, Grant, and Cleveland in support of his present position; and ended a very able and admirable document, which yet failed to meet the exactions of public opinion, by asking Congress "to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens, as well as our

own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes."

As justification for this demand, the President, with clearness and precision, rested the case of the United States upon the following four propositions:—

First—In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is especially our duty—for it is right at our door.

Second—We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection—and indefinitely—for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

Third—The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth—And which is of the utmost importance, the present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined—when our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to repress altogether and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

The war party in Congress was in an overwhelming majority, and to this majority the message of the President proved a disappointment. The efforts of Mr. McKinley at delay had been received with undisguised impatience, and, joined to his pacific intentions, which were well known, had created a question in the public mind whether in case the decision should be left with him, he could be relied on to carry out the now set purpose of the people to allow no further equivocation, but to proceed at once by force of arms to compel Spain to withdraw from Cuba. Without debate the message was

referred to the appropriate committees; but, when Congress adjourned that afternoon, no doubt was anywhere entertained that—a state of war already existing—a formal declaration of war was but the matter of a few days or hours.

The very next day, the 13th of April, Congress began to act. Each of the two committees, to which the President's message had been referred made its returns, each consisting of two reports, one of the majority and the other of the minority. Objections from a senator carried the two reports of the Senate Committee over for a day; but in the House immediate consideration was had. The minority report, offered by the Democrats and recognizing the insurrectionary Cuban government, was voted down, 147 to 190. Then the House by a vote of 322 to 19 adopted the resolutions reported by the majority of its Committee on Foreign Affairs, denouncing Spain's methods in Cuba as inhuman and uncivilized, holding Spain responsible for the destruction of the *Maine*, and directing the President "to intervene at once" for the restoration of order in Cuba, and for the establishment of "a stable and independent government" in the island, for which intervention "he is empowered to use the land and naval forces of the United States." In the Senate, where objection delayed immediate consideration, a majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations reported resolutions declaring that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent, denouncing Spanish misrule in the island as "cruel, barbarous, and inhuman," demanding that Spain at once withdraw her forces from the island and empowering and directing the President to intervene with the army and navy of the United States to drive Spain from Cuba. The minority of the Senate Committee, consisting of the Democratic members and Senator Foraker, brought in resolutions definitely recognizing the independence of the insurgent Cuban government. On the 16th, after a debate of three days, the Senate adopted resolutions similar to those adopted by the House, but embracing no recognition of the insurgent government. Thus matters rested over Sunday the 17th, when, after many and prolonged consultations beginning the morning of the



INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S PALACE, HAVANA

18th and extending far into the night of the 19th, the Conference Committee agreed upon a final report. This declared that the people of Cuba "are, and of right ought to be, free and independent," demanded that Spain at once withdraw from Cuba, directed the President of the United States to use the army and navy if necessary to enforce this demand, and pledged the United States to leave the people of Cuba free, after the expulsion of Spain, to establish their own form of government. Concessions were made by both House and Senate to this agreement, though as the resolutions were at last adopted they proved to be those reported to the Senate by the majority of its Foreign Relations Committee, with the addition of the amendment pledging liberty to Cuba to establish its own government. The conference reported was promptly adopted by the Senate by a vote of 42 to 35. The House, however, did not get through its roll call for more than an hour later, finally adopting the report by a vote of 310 to 6.

Thus was the Congress a unit; and behind it an overwhelming majority of the people.

V.

THE Joint Resolution, as it was finally adopted by the two Houses of Congress and was signed by the President, read as follows:—

WHEREAS, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore,

FINAL DECLARATION OF WAR

Resolved, By the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

1. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

2. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

3. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

4. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

The discretion asked by the President was withheld partly because, as was claimed, Congress should not surrender to the Executive its war-making prerogative, and partly because the war party thought the President was not sufficiently aggressive in temper and purpose. There appeared, however, no reason to find fault with the conduct of the President in the emergency created by the action of Congress. Minister Woodford, at Madrid, was promptly instructed to lay the ultimatum of the United States before the Government of Spain and to demand an answer by the following Saturday, the 23rd of April, it then being Wednesday the 20th. Spain, however, did not wait to be officially advised. Señor Barnabe, who had succeeded Signor De Lome as Spanish minister at Washington, demanded and received his passports at once, taking the train that same evening and, without event of any kind, going through to Toronto, Canada. The instructions from the State Department, sent in cypher, did not reach Minister Woodford at Madrid in time to be translated and delivered to the Spanish premier, Señor Sagasta, that same Wednesday evening, and the action of Congress, being already known, was deemed by the Premier all-sufficient, so that before Minister Woodford had time to present the ultimatum of his Government next day, he was given his passports and told that Spain considered the congressional proceeding of the previous day a declaration of war. Minister Woodford, although furnished an escort to the Spanish frontier, was not so fortunate in the circumstances of his departure from Madrid as Signor



VILLAGE SCENE IN HAVANA PROVINCE

Barnabe had been in his departure from Washington. There was much excitement among the populace, who assembled in noisy crowds about the railway stations, and at Valladolid a mob collected, demanding the surrender of a member of the Minister's official staff and otherwise menacing General Woodford and his party. Without serious accident, however, the frontier was reached, and on Friday evening the Americans arrived in Paris. Thus, although there had been no formal declaration of war on either side, actual war was at hand, a tension little short of a state of war having existed from the day when the *Maine* report had been submitted to Congress.

In the United States the tone of public sentiment was resolute rather than turbulent or embittered. Conscious of their power, and sustained by a sense of intolerable outrage, the people had taken matters into their own hands and had freed the hands both of the Congress and the President. Except upon the immediate seaboard, and in the leading centres of commerce, there had been little thought of a peaceful solution or desire for it. The manhood, as well as the humanity, of the country was thoroughly aroused, and for the moment even party rancor was silenced.

In Spain the response of the ruling classes was, if possible, still more animated. It was vehement and defiant. The Cortes had been assembled in extraordinary session. Even whilst the Congress at Washington was framing the ultimatum to Spain, a scene, both impressive and pathetic, was passing at Madrid. The Queen-Regent with her son, the youthful King of Spain, appeared in the Spanish Senate Chamber, where were assembled not only the Legislative Bodies, the Cabinet, and the great officials, civil and military, but all the wealth and beauty of the capital, gorgeously attired and arrayed. The spectacle was truly magnificent. When Queen Christina and the little King Alfonso appeared, the enthusiasm knew no bounds; though there must have been many among that brilliant throng, who, seeing this stately and noble lady, and reflecting upon the true character and meaning of hurrying events, could not but feel more of sadness than of exaltation. The Queen-Regent read her speech

from the throne, the boy King standing on her right, Señor Sagasta on her left. It described the menaces and insults of America as intolerable provocations which would compel her Government to sever relations with the Government of the United States. She expressed her gratitude to the Pope and Powers, and hoped the "supreme decision of parliament" would sanction the unalterable resolution of her Government to defend the rights of Spain. She appealed to the Spanish people to maintain the integrity both of the dynasty and the nation. "I have summoned the Cortes," she said, "to defend our rights, whatever sacrifice they may entail. Thus identifying myself with the nation, I not only fulfill the oath I swore in accepting the regency, but I follow the dictates of a mother's heart, trusting to the Spanish people to gather behind my son's throne, and to defend it until he is old enough to defend it himself, as well as trusting to the Spanish people to defend the honor and the territory of the nation." Her brave words found their answer in all hearts, and were echoed and re-echoed throughout the Senate Chamber and the nation.

It was not until the 25th of April that Congress passed a bill formally declaring war to exist, and dating this from the preceding 21st of April, though the President had already called out 125,000 volunteer soldiers. Meanwhile, the entire north coast of Cuba, including Havana, had been blockaded, and several Spanish prizes had been captured and brought into Key West by the naval vessels operating in that quarter.

At last after fifty years of unsuccessful but continuous revolution, of heroic sacrifices on the one hand, and oppression incalculable on the other hand, were the Cubans about to feel the friendly hand of the great Republic mailed and stretched out across the Gulf of Mexico to save them from the barbarism and corruption of Spanish domination; and at last after thirty-three years of peace were the patriotism and the manhood of America to be again tested on land and sea, not now, as formerly, in civil strife or in resistance to foreign aggression, but as an aggressive and progressive force, and in direct answer to the call of liberty and humanity.

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

THE MAKING OF ARMIES AND NAVIES.

FIRST ACTS OF THE WAR AND A COMPARISON OF THE COMBATANTS—THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE NAVY—THE PRESIDENT CALLS FOR 125,000 VOLUNTEERS AND THE COUNTRY ANSWERS WITH 750,000 APPLICATIONS FOR ENLISTMENT—APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF, INCLUDING EX-FEDERALS AND EX-CONFEDERATES—OUTBURSTS OF PATRIOTIC RIVALRY AND FRATERNIZATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH—UNIFICATION OF NATIONAL SENTIMENT.

I.

ON Tuesday, April 19, the American Congress had declared its ultimatum to the Spanish Government, and the same day, as if intended to be an answering act of defiance, a strong squadron composed of the flower of the swift armored cruisers of the Spanish navy sailed out of the port of Cadiz, westward, with Havana as its ostensible port of destination. The squadron consisted of the first-class armored cruisers *Vizcaya*, *Almirante Oquendo*, *Maria Teresa*, *Cristobal Colon*, and a complement of three torpedo boats and three destroyers. It was under the command of Admiral Cervera, a Spanish officer of high character, who had been naval *attaché* of his government with the United States, and who was well informed of the spirit and strength of American determination.


FIRST ACTS OF
WAR

The news of this reached Washington immediately by cable, and the President issued orders to Acting Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, commanding the North Atlantic squadron of the United States navy, directing a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, particularly the city of Havana, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast. A squadron consisting of the two first-class battleships, *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the armored cruiser *New York* (flagship), the *Wilmington* and *Cincinnati*, and a number of gunboats and converted auxiliaries, sailed

from Key West before daylight and at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of April 22 an effective and close blockade had been established over the harbor of Havana, and the northern coast was under patrol.

These events and movements so quickly passing turned all expectation upon a decisive naval engagement in Cuban waters or an attack by the Spaniards upon one or more of the American coast cities. Feeling leaped to a high pitch of excitement. "Remember the *Maine*" became the war-cry, despite the protests of church societies and ethical bodies against public expression of a desire for vengeance. The belief that the Spanish navy was stronger than our own in fast ocean-going offensive cruisers and in the torpedo-boat arm, at once made the capacity and skill of the American seamen qualities to be counted upon in advance and to be extolled by popular admiration. The fact that 266 such seamen had been done to death by treachery in Havana harbor kindled resentment in the popular heart, and the ominous legend "Remember the *Maine*" expressed what statesmen, diplomats, and religionaries might try to cover up in vain. The long and vexatious controversies over Cuban wrongs were concentrated and merged into an irresistible desire to punish a distinct and atrocious crime against civilization and American sailors. It was this feeling that justified to the public the appropriation of \$50,000,000 to be used by the President in his discretion for the purpose of strengthening our coast defenses and of adding to the effectiveness of the naval establishment. A large portion of the appropriation had been used in the purchase of steel steamships and their conversion into auxiliary war vessels. From Brazil the newly completed protected cruiser, *Amazonas*, of 3,600 tons, had been purchased and rechristened the *New Orleans*. From the same friendly government the dynamite cruiser *Nichteroy* was afterward obtained and named after the city of Buffalo. This was the result of six weeks of urgent operations by the Navy Department anticipating the course of events. It had, indeed, accomplished much more than this.

When the destruction of the *Maine* occurred the Government, hitherto confident of avoiding war, was without a war supply of



U. S. ARMORED CRUISER NEW YORK

powder, new explosives, and projectiles. These it was necessary to provide suddenly and with secrecy, and upon their purchase and manufacture the President was forced to wait, deferring action in the face of popular impatience which he was estopped from placating by openly avowing the unpreparedness of the Government. It was not until the blockade of Cuba was well established and prolonged that the sources of continuous supply were perfected.

Under these circumstances the people of the United States witnessed the sailing of Admiral Sampson's squadron and waited for collision with the Spanish ships. Four days later the American squadron on the Asiatic station, under command of Commodore George W. Dewey, sailed from Hong Kong under orders to "capture or destroy" the Spanish squadron under Admiral Montejó at Manila, in the Philippine Islands. Then came ten days of wearying uncertainty and doubt. The Spanish ships of Cervera put in at Port St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Islands, and became enveloped in mystery. They were reported as intending to descend upon the North Atlantic coast, and a flying squadron under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley was kept on waiting orders at Hampton Roads to repel such an attempt if made. Atlantic harbors were placed in a state of defense and the old single-turreted monitors used in the Civil War were overhauled, manned, and put in active commission. Ten days were thus passed in tiresome suspense, relieved only by the occasional capture of Spanish merchant vessels as prizes of war, some twenty of which were taken into the harbor of Key West.

II.

DURING a week of waiting, interrupted only by trivial incidents that seemed to be momentous because of the tension, the administration at Washington began a work of hurried organization of the army and navy, the ultimate completion of which demonstrated before the other powers of the world the unequalled resources and celerity of the Americans. There was no question of the disparity between the two nations in wealth,

MAKING AN
ARMY AND
NAVY

population, and the means of conducting an aggressive war. But the effective condition of each at the moment of beginning the struggle was involved in doubt. Europe looked on with interest and compared the possibilities.

The regular army of Spain consisted of an apparent force of 150,000 men in Cuba, under the command of General Blanco; of about 60,000 in garrison in the fortresses and principal cities of the mother country, and some 30,000 more scattered through the Philippines, Porto Rico, the Canaries, and other colonies. In round numbers the whole was estimated at about 250,000 troops. These could be increased by calling out the first reserves, numbering about 160,000, consisting of Spanish subjects undergoing instruction by performing compulsory military service—a better organized and more advanced militia than that maintained by the States of the United States. The general reserves, that is the capable fighting material left in Spain, numbered about 1,000,000. The total Spanish military strength in men was therefore about 1,410,000. These numbers could be enlarged by the volunteers of the colonies, but the ineradicable spirit of revolution rendered the loyalty of these colonial volunteers unreliable. They were intractable and the constant source of uneasiness to Spanish governors and commanders.

As against the Spanish military fighting strength, the United States had a regular army that was limited by law to 25,000 men, but which had been depleted by lack of recruitment to about 18,000 men, of which one-third or more were colored regiments. The regular army of the United States, notwithstanding thirty-three years of general peace, had been kept in a state of high efficiency in discipline by the Indian outbreaks in the West, in which courage, skill, endurance, and ingenuity had been developed.

The next military resource was in the militia organizations of the various States, numbering between 150,000 and 200,000 men. The instant mobilization of the State militia was hampered by sentiments growing out of our political institutions. That they could be ordered into the service of the National government at home was not ques-

tioned, but assent to the authority of the President to order them on service out of the United States was not conceded by tradition. To that extent the militia was not so ready an arm as the reserves of Europe, so differently constituted. There was no question of the readiness of the militia of the various States to go out of the country and fight. On the contrary, the patriotic spirit of these organizations flamed up at the prospect of war and they were prepared as a single man to march against Spain. The question was one merely of procedure, and in order that no controversy might interrupt thorough unity of purpose, the President concluded to call for enlistments in the volunteer army of the United States, announcing a preference for the militia regiments of the States as completed organizations.

The third resource, the body of men of fighting age in the United States, could yield at least 10,000,000 men. As against Spain's limit of 1,410,000, the preponderance of the United States was, of course, overwhelming.

In the naval establishment of each country the number of ships constructed for war was nearly equal, but of greatly differing character, both in purpose and condition. The Spaniard possessed but one battleship of the first-class, the *Pelayo*, of 9,900 tons and moderate speed power. Of armored cruisers of the first-class he possessed six, each about 7,000 tons and having a speed estimated at 20 knots per hour. Of torpedo boats and swift torpedo-boat destroyers there were 28, and of smaller torpedo and gunboat craft for harbor service, about 100. The Spanish navy footed up 153 boats of all sorts, but it was in the modern armored cruisers of high speed, carrying great battery power, strongly protected by steel armor, and in the yet untested and mysterious torpedo machines, that its strength was concentrated.

The navy of the United States, before war approached, presented every opposing feature of purpose. The four sea-going battleships of the first-class, the *Oregon*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Indiana*, with the second-class battleship, *Texas*, were regarded more as coast-defenders than as open-sea fighters and sailers. In an organized battle, however, their enormous gun power and low freeboard exposures to the

enemy's fire would have found them more than a match for all the large ships Spain possessed. We had but two armored cruisers, the *Brooklyn* and *New York*, each with lighter armor than their adversaries of the corresponding class. There were fourteen protected cruisers of high speed, four double-turreted monitors, and twelve torpedo boats, besides a number of gunboats and antiquated craft for harbor protection. Untried experiments were the dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius* and the ram *Katahdin*, the product of American inventive ideas.

The *Vesuvius* was expected to be more effective in battle than any of the torpedo craft, but her practical efficiency had been so stubbornly questioned that the government had not duplicated her. She was small, swift, and easily handled, and carried three pneumatic guns, each of which could discharge 500 pounds of nitroglycerin every five minutes. Nitroglycerin has five times the explosive power of gun cotton and twenty-five times the explosive power of ordinary powder. The *Katahdin* was designed to destroy the enemy by ramming under the water-line.

Such is a brief summary of the appraised and recorded forces of the adversaries at the moment when the destruction of the *Maine* made war imminent. Beneath this open page of the governmental ledger on each side, however, were concealed congenital differences of national and racial character that were to render the instruments of war a mere item of record. It was not the armor, the fortification, or the gun that was to decide the contest; but the man behind the gun and the institutions behind the man.

[Every boy in America is born a machinist, and the instinct of mechanical genius has found enlargement in the competition for inventions and in the acceptance and use of all mechanical contrivances. The esteem in which labor is held, the scorn that is felt for ignorance and indolence, the entire freedom of education, of religion, of political contention—all these have made the average American a responsible individual, self-reliant, skillful with his hands, with his head, and cool of heart and mind in moments of trial. This natural

and acquired skill and familiarity with mechanical appliances was required to make the old Springfield rifle and grain powder superior to the Mauser rifle and smokeless powder on battlefields. It was to be relied upon to turn slow battleships into racers that could pursue fleet cruisers, and to take an enormous vessel such as the *Oregon* a flying voyage of 15,000 miles in sixty-six days without hurt to her machinery or equipment, so that she could go into actual battle without needing repairs. When to such type of man is given an implement he adds to its effectiveness and preserves its capacity.] Self-poised, openly confident of his resources to the point of boasting, the American has been regarded by Europeans as a vain braggart, and his direct manner of thrusting aside the conventionalities of diplomatic and governmental etiquette—the Circumlocution Office rules of international relations—drew upon him the Spanish epithet of “the Yankee Pig.”

England alone, of all the European nations, understood the resolute intelligence, practical skill, and patriotism of the Americans.* The Continent would not believe that we could make out of raw

* Mr. Henry Norman, a distinguished English journalist of great experience, who visited Washington during the opening weeks of the war, wrote to the London *Chronicle* concerning certain features of the American character under the stress of the crisis. After some amusing comments upon “spread-eagle enthusiasm,” he said of the army: “After admitting every reasonable criticism, it is a triumph of organization. I doubt if so much, from so little, has ever been accomplished so expeditiously and so uneventfully before. And look at the display of American patriotism. [When the volunteers were summoned by the President they walked on the scene as if they had been waiting in the wings. They were subjected to a physical examination as searching as that of a life insurance company. A man was rejected for two or three filled teeth. They came from all ranks of life. Young lawyers, doctors, bankers, well-paid clerks are marching by thousands in the ranks. The first surgeon to be killed at Guantanamo left a New York practice of \$10,000 a year to volunteer. As I was standing on the steps of the Arlington Hotel one evening, a tall, thin man, carrying a large suit-case, walked out and got on the street car for the railway station, on his way to Tampa. It was John Jacob Astor, the possessor of a hundred millions of dollars. Theodore Roosevelt’s rough riders contain a number of the smartest young men in New York society. A Harvard classmate of mine, a rising young lawyer, is working like a laborer at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, not knowing when he may be ordered to Cuba or Manila. He is a naval reserve man and sent in his application for any post ‘from the stoke-hole upward.’ The same is true of women. When I called to say good-bye to Mrs. John Addison Porter, the wife of the Secretary to the President, whose charming hospitality I had enjoyed, she had gone to Tampa to ship as a nurse on the Red Cross steamer for the coast of Cuba. And all this, be it remembered, is for a war in which the country

recruits efficient soldiers that could face the Spanish regulars. They sneered at the conglomerate American population as composed of sordid mercenaries, the scum and refuse of the world, or emigrants intent alone upon making fortunes with which to return home—having no loyalty or patriotism, and no courage against a trained army of the European standard.

The American people understood their strength and at the same time the weakness of their adversary. They did not make the mistake of estimating the Spaniards as cowards. But they rated Spanish courage as that of desperation rather than of cool tenacity and hope. While the Spaniard believed that Republican institutions rendered the volunteer soldier of America insubordinate under discipline, the American knew that his adversary was a servile dependent upon caste leadership;* that his final courage must depend upon his officers, since they, alone, were informed and intelligent, though corrupted by national degeneration. Caste placed an impassable barrier between the Spanish officer and the line. Under rigid censorship of the printing press, and through religious intolerance, the masses were

is not in the remotest danger, and when the ultimate summons of patriotism is unspoken. Finally, consider the reference to the war loan. A New York syndicate offered to take half of it at a premium which would have given the Government a clear profit of \$1,000,000. But the loan was wisely offered to the people, and the small investor gets all he can buy before the capitalist is even permitted to invest. And from Canada to the Gulf, from Long Island to Seattle, the money of the people is pouring in. As I write, it is said the loan will be all taken up in small amounts.

"Here, then, is the new America in one aspect—armed for a wider influence and a harder fight than any she has envisaged before. And what a fight she will make! Dewey, with his dash upon Manila; Hobson and his companions going quietly to apparently certain death, and ships offering the whole muster-roll as volunteers to accompany him; Rowan, with his life in his hand at every minute of his journey to Gomez and back, worse than death awaiting him if caught; Blue, making his 70-mile reconnoissance about Santiago; Whitney, with compass and note-book in pocket, dishwashing his perilous way round Porto Rico—this is the old daring of our common race. If the old lion and the young lion should ever go hunting side by side —!"

* Major De Grandprey, military *attaché* to the French embassy in Washington, who was present at the battles fought about Santiago early in July, observing the army operations for his government, made this statement to the Associated Press on July 12, after returning: "I have the most complete admiration for your men. They are a superb body, individually and as an army, and I suppose not throughout the world is there such a splendid lot of fighting men. It is the fighting characteristic of the men which is most

in dense ignorance of their adversaries, without practical resources, skillful only in the cunning of cruelty and deception, such as has marked the race since the time of Philip II.

The administration at Washington, representing the type of the practical American, who only needed tools with which to fight, had begun to make the army and navy even before war was declared. While Spain, with a bankrupt treasury, was ostentatiously searching in all European countries to purchase ships of war, the United States obtained three abroad and constructed out of our own merchant marine a squadron of eleven steel cruisers. The American line furnished four steamers, the *St. Louis*, *St. Paul*, *New York*, and *Paris* (the latter two rechristened *Yale* and *Harvard*); and the Morgan line provided four, whose Spanish names were altered to *Dixie*, *Yankee*, *Prairie*, and *Yosemite*. Many private yachts were converted into scout fighters, and within two weeks after war began there were eighty-eight effective fighting ships in commission, mostly assembled in Atlantic waters. Six weeks later Congress made appropriations for building fifty-one new ships, the largest authorization in the history of the country.

The making of the army was pushed with equal activity. Promptly on April 22 a bill was adopted for calling out the volunteers, and on the 23d the President issued his proclamation calling for 125,000 men, distributed pro-rata among the several States. Within ten days there were 750,000 applications for enlistment. A few days later a bill was adopted authorizing the President to recruit the regular

apparent. They are aggressive; eager for action, never needing the voice of an officer to push them forward. Another marked characteristic is the self-reliance of each man; what we call the character of 'initiative.' It is almost unknown in European armies, where every movement and the move to meet each action of the enemy awaits the initiative of an officer. But with your men they fight to the front, meeting each emergency as it arises, overcoming obstacles by their own initiative. Such self-reliant fighting men make an exceptionally impetuous army, for every unit contributes to the irresistible onward movement. The Spanish troops do not have this same characteristic. They are more passive, more cautious. Besides the impetuosity of such fighting material, it has the effect of inspiring a *morale* among the troops, making them feel that success is assured, and at the same time carrying disorder and depression to the ranks of the enemy."

army to an effective strength of 60,000 officers and men, whenever in his judgment it should be needed to place the regular army on a war footing; and the work of recruiting immediately began. Camps of instruction and recruitment for the volunteers were opened in every State, from which regiments, after mustering, were mobilized at Chickamauga National Park, Tennessee, at Camp Alger, Virginia, and Tampa, Florida. The regular troops were collected at New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa.

On May 4 the President appointed the army staff, including the following as Major-Generals: Promoted from the regular army—Brigadier-Generals Joseph C. Breckinridge, Elwell S. Otis, John J. Copinger, William R. Shafter, William M. Graham, James F. Wade, Henry C. Merriam. Appointed from civil life—James H. Wilson, of Delaware; Fitzhugh Lee, of Virginia; William J. Sewell, of New Jersey, and Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama.

Of the civilians, General Wilson and General Sewell had been distinguished Federal commanders during the Civil War, and General Fitzhugh Lee and General Joseph Wheeler had served with corresponding distinction upon the Confederate side. General Sewell did not accept the appointment, however. He was serving as United States Senator from New Jersey, and it was held that his acceptance of a commission in the army would vacate his seat in the Senate. General Wheeler, who was representing his Alabama district in the lower house, entered the service immediately without regard to the point.

As soon as practicable a second call for 75,000 volunteers was issued, and before Spain could land a regiment of reinforcements in Cuba or place a portion of her fleet in Cuban waters, the United States had provided a sufficient and powerful navy and had in service camps on the southern watershed about 150,000 troops, of which 30,000 were efficient enough to force a landing in Cuba within six weeks of enlistment, and 16,000 had been mobilized at San Francisco and transported to Manila under Major-General Merritt to destroy Spanish authority in the Philippines. It was, indeed, a triumph of practical Americanism.

III.

THE declaration of war by the Congress, followed by the proclamation of the President calling for volunteers, proved signals for an extraordinary outpouring of national sentiment. As in 1812 and in 1846, the response of the people was enthusiastic and spontaneous. In each of the forty-five States of the Union there was a generous rivalry for the opportunity to rally around the flag and to serve the country. In Georgia, Alabama, and Texas, no less than in Vermont, Michigan, and Illinois, in Massachusetts and in South Carolina, in Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana, and Wisconsin, in the crowded centers of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York, as in the more isolated regions of New Hampshire, Arkansas, and Oregon, the drum-beats and the heart-beats kept time to the music of the nation's anthem and made a cause common to all men. If there had been question anywhere about the wisdom or the justice of the war with Spain, it ended with the call to arms.

THE
UPRISING OF
THE PEOPLE

During thirty-three years, except upon the Indian frontier, not a hostile shot had been heard in the United States. An entire generation had grown to manhood since the close of the Civil War in 1865. [The wounds of prolonged and embittered sectional controversy were healed indeed, and there had been many evidences that the restoration of the Union was complete, both in spirit and in fact; but there was wanting some great occasion to proclaim to the world the thorough reconstruction of the States, the thorough rehabilitation of the people in the restored, and, in a sense, in the regenerated Union.] There was something exhilarating and at the same time pathetic in the promptitude with which party distinctions were dropped by the men who rushed to the national standard, and in the mingling of regiments, without regard to States or sections, into army divisions and brigades. In camp, Tennessee touched elbows with Connecticut, and Mississippi and Maine fraternized as one family, whilst such terms as Republican, Democrat, and Populist were unknown and unheard.

The fathers of the men now enlisted to fight side by side had fought bravely against one another during four years of deadly battle. In many cases veterans of the Union army and survivors of the Confederate army, divided in the former war, were brought together in this as comrades and colleagues. The appointment of the gallant Confederate Generals, Joseph Wheeler and Fitzhugh Lee, followed by that of other distinguished Southern soldiers, was everywhere hailed with the liveliest acclaim; and very soon upon the assembling of the forces, North and South were given an object lesson of rare impressiveness and value in the exploits of Dewey, the Vermonter, at Manila, and of Hobson, the Alabamian, at Santiago, illustrating the union of skill and daring which was now assured to American arms. In 1861 the country had been divided. Now it was united. Then the sections stood in opposing battle. Now they stood shoulder to shoulder and heart to heart. [The world was to witness at last what this union truly means. It was to see arise from the ashes of old and dead and buried controversies, a power undreamed of by itself before; a vast world-power, with which henceforward the nations of the earth must reckon. The swaddling clothes of National babyhood were gone. The giant stood forth in all the pride of his manhood, armed cap-a-pie and, arrayed on the side of humanity and liberty, ready, willing, and able to give battle to all comers who might challenge his supremacy, wherever he might plant the star-spangled banner or set up the standards of free government.]



CHAPTER THE THIRD.

DEWEY AND MANILA.


EXTENT AND CONDITION OF THE SPANISH COLONIES OF THE PHILIPPINES—THE NAVAL PROBLEMS OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE IN THE PACIFIC—THE MOVEMENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF MANILA—EXTRAORDINARY APPEAL OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO RESIST THE AMERICANS—COMMODORE DEWEY SAILS TO "FIND THE SPANIARD AND SMASH HIM"—THE EXTRAORDINARY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY IN WHICH THE SPANIARDS WERE ANNIHILATED BY COMMODORE DEWEY'S SQUADRON—THE EFFECT OF THE VICTORY UPON THE UNITED STATES, SPAIN, AND ALL EUROPE.

I.

DURING the first ten days of the war attention was centered upon the naval field of operations in Cuban waters or upon the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, the great cities along which, it was expected, would invite swift attack from the Spanish ships.

THE SPANISH
PHILIPPINE
COLONIES

Meanwhile in Asiatic waters an event was preparing that was to fill the world with wonder and admiration, and to render American arms glorious in the very first collision with the enemy. This was the enterprise of the American squadron on the Asiatic station against the city of Manila, the capital of the Philippine Islands, colonies of Spain in the Pacific not less valuable and productive than Cuba and Porto Rico in the Atlantic. The Philippines had been first discovered by Spanish adventurers and had been in the possession of the Spanish crown for more than four hundred years, during all of which time the cruelty and rapacity of the sovereigns and of the Governors sent out to administer colonial affairs, had provoked many revolutions and uprisings. The archipelago, which consists of from 1,200 to 1,800 separate islands, only a few of which are of considerable size, contains mixtures of the most savage and intractable populations in the world. These occupy the principal islands of Luzon, Mindanao, Samar,



NATIVE HOUSES IN THE PHILIPPINES

home churches or by the court favorites who returned to Spain to dazzle the supporters of the crown with the glories of a short term abroad in the service of their country. The trying climate of the Philippines, which is tropical, subjected to violent monsoons, seasons of drenching rains, and an almost intolerable heat lasting from March to July, has made it necessary to change continually the Spanish administrators. From the Governor-General down to the private soldier, five years was the average length of service possible, so that the native population, estimated at from 8,000,000 to 15,000,000 in numbers, was always under the rule of transient strangers, having no continuing interest in their welfare. There have been, of course, individual instances of honorable and just governors. Among these recognized in recent times was General Blanco, who was afterwards selected to establish the weak experiment of autonomistic government in Cuba. It was, however, the rule, under the very nature of the colonial system, that temptation to oppress, rob, and enslave the natives was held out to every administration in succession, and such temptations are not long resisted by those appointed over uncivilized and ignorant people.


The population of the Philippines was especially difficult to hold in orderly government. Naturally a heterogeneous mass, the problem of assimilating the different tribes and races would have been one difficult to accomplish by the most patient and industrious government, with years of application. The fiercest and most primitive savages inhabit the scattered islands, sometimes two or more antipathetic races occupying the same island and ceaselessly waging war against each other and the government alike. The Aborigines are called "Negritos," or little Negroes, dwarfs, rarely exceeding five feet in stature, intractable and wary mountaineers, indulging in the cruelest pagan rites of sacrifice, including cannibalism, and who have resisted conquest by retiring to mountain fastnesses, where they have been slowly diminishing in numbers by self-extinction.

The Manthras, an equally wretched but more contemptible tribe, are nearly as great in numbers as the Negritos. They are a cross

between the Negritos and Malays, and are more degenerate, after being at one time warlike and aggressive. The great body of the population is Malayan, with some Chinese and a few Japanese.

A historical writer in the French *Revue des Deux Mondes* has described the most recent condition of the endless conflict in the archipelago in a manner to exhibit the spirit of Spanish colonial government as it is displayed in the capital, Manila, and in the restless and unconquered provinces. There, as in Europe and America, Spain set upon every locality she occupied the indelible mark of her sinister and unchanging intolerance and pride. In Manila, as well as in Mexico, Panama, and Lima, was the severe and solemn aspect, the feudal and religious stamp, which the Spaniard impresses upon his monuments, his palaces, his dwellings in every latitude. Manila appeared like a fragment of Spain transplanted to the archipelago of Asia. On its churches and convents, even on its ruined walls, time has laid the sombre, dull-gold coloring of the mother country. The ancient city, silent and melancholy, stretches interminably along gloomy streets, bordered with convents whose flat façades are only broken here and there by a few narrow windows. It still preserved all the austere appearance of a city of the reign of Philip II. But there was a new city within the ramparts of Manila, sometimes called the Escolta, from the name of its central quarter, and this city is alive with its dashing teams, its noisy crowd of Tagal women, shod in high-heeled shoes, and every nerve in their bodies quivering with excitement. They are almost all employed in the innumerable cigar factories whose output inundates all Asia. The city contained 260,000 inhabitants of every known race and color.

From Manila throughout the archipelago the religious fanaticism of the Spaniards radiated and came into collision with manners, traditions, and a fanaticism fully as fierce as those of Spain—the immovable fanaticism of the Mussulman. At a distance of 6,000 leagues from Toledo and Granada, the same ancient hatreds have brought European Spaniard and Asiatic Saracen into the same relentless antagonism that swayed them in the days of the Cid and Ferdinand the



GENERAL VIEW OF MANILA


Catholic. The island of Sulu, on account of its position between Mindanao and Borneo, was the commercial, political, and religious center of the followers of the Prophet, the Mecca of the extreme Orient. From this center they spread over the neighboring archipelagoes. Merciless pirates and unflinching fanatics, they scattered everywhere terror, ruin, and death, sailing in their light proas up the narrow channels and animated with implacable hatred for those conquering invaders, to whom they never gave quarter and from whom they never expected it. Constantly beaten in pitched battle, they as constantly took again to the sea, eluding the pursuit of the heavy Spanish vessels, taking refuge in bays and creeks where no one could follow them, pillaging isolated ships, surprising the villages, massacring the old men, leading away the women and the adults into slavery, pushing the audacious prow of their skiffs even up to within 300 miles of Manila, and seizing every year nearly 4,000 captives.

Between the Malay creese and the Castilian carronade the struggle was unequal, but it did not last the less long on that account, nor, obscure though it was, was it the less bloody. On both sides there was the same bravery, the same cruelty. It required all the tenacity of Spain to purge these seas of the pirates who infested them, and it was not until after a conflict of several years, in 1876, that the Spanish squadron was able to bring its broadsides to bear on Tianggi, a nest of Suluan pirates, land a division of troops, invest all the outlets, and burn the town and its inhabitants, as well as the harbor and all the craft within it. The soldiers planted their flag and the engineers built a new city on the smoking ruins. This city was then protected by a strong garrison.

For a time, at least, piracy was at an end, but not the Moslem spirit, which was exasperated rather than crushed by defeat. To the rovers of the seas succeeded the organization known as *juramentados*. One of the characteristic qualities of the Malays is their contempt of death. They have transmitted it, with their blood, to the Polynesians, who see in it only one of the multiple phenomena and not the supreme act of existence, and witness it or submit to it with

profound indifference. Travelers have often seen a Kanaka stretch his body on a mat, while in perfect health, without any symptom of disease whatever, and there wait patiently for the end, convinced that it is near, and refuse all nourishment and die without any apparent suffering. His relatives say of him: "He feels he is going to die," and the imaginary patient dies, his mind possessed by some illusion, some superstitious idea, some invisible wound through which life escapes. When to this absolute indifference to death is united Musulman fanaticism, which gives to the believer a glimpse of the gates of a paradise where the excited senses revel in endless and numberless enjoyments, a longing for extinction takes hold of him and throws him like a wild beast upon his enemies. The *juramentado* kills for the sake of killing and being killed, and so winning, in exchange for a life of suffering and privation, the voluptuous existence promised by Mohammed.

The laws of Sulu make the bankrupt debtor the slave of his creditor, and not only the debtor, but the debtor's wife and children are enslaved also. To free them there is but one means left to the husband—the sacrifice of his life. Reduced to this extremity, he does not hesitate—he takes the formidable oath. From that time forward he is enrolled in the ranks of the *juramentados*, and has nothing to do but await the hour when the will of a superior shall let him loose upon the Christians. Meanwhile the *panditas*, or Mohammedan priests, subject him to a system of excitement that will turn him into a wild beast. They madden his already disordered brain, they make still more supple his oily limbs, until they have the strength of steel and the nervous force of the tiger or panther. They sing to him their impassioned chants, which show to his entranced vision the radiant smiles of intoxicating houris. In the shadow of the forests, broken by the gleam of the moonlight, they evoke the burning and sensual images of the eternally young and beautiful companions who are calling him, opening their arms to receive him. Thus prepared, the *juramentado* is ready for everything. Nothing can stop him, nothing can make him recoil. He will accomplish prodigies of valor, borne along



VIEW OF MANILA SHOWING CATHEDRAL

by a buoyancy that is irresistible, until the moment when death seizes him. He will creep with his companions into the city that has been assigned to him; he knows that he will never leave it, but he knows, also, that he will not die alone, and he has but one aim--to butcher as many Christians as he can.

When to such natural antipathies of race and religion are added the iron oppression which Spain has always laid upon peaceful commerce and production, it will be seen that the colonies were in perpetual unrest and that the colonial authorities had little sympathy from even the most peaceful classes. The native Spaniards resident in the country never exceeded 10,000 in number, except on a few rare occasions when large bodies of troops were sent out for specific service. There are about one hundred thousand mixed descendants of Spaniards, who were held in contempt by the natives of Spain as Spaniards of Cuban birth were regarded in Cuba. These 10,000 Spaniards were the civil servants and religious orders, and the favored owners of concessions in manufacturing and planting that conferred monopolies; about 4,000 were soldiers garrisoning Manila and the arsenal forts at Cavité, situated upon a point eight miles south of Manila in the bay and intended to render the defense of the city unquestionable. In addition to the soldiers there were 2,000 sailors and marines, manning a squadron of fourteen warships and gunboats. When war with America was begun these forces were just recovered from the hardships of a fierce revolution, headed by General Emilio Aguinaldo, a native half-breed of great popularity and activity. After bloody uprisings for independence, without money, arms, or supplies, the Spanish had resorted to their usual tactics of bribing the leaders and massacring the disordered followers, duped into surrender by promises of amnesty. The hatred of the natives was still fierce and only awaited opportunity and leadership to blaze with renewed fury.

II.

WHEN Congress issued its ultimatum to Spain on April 19, the condition of our Pacific defenses and naval force was such as to cause uneasiness. San Francisco, San Diego, and other sea-ports were nominally in a state of defense, but no more. The United States naval squadron in Asiatic waters, commanded by Commodore George Washington Dewey, was assembled at Hong Kong. In preparation for events it had been well supplied with ammunition, stores, and coal. It consisted of six ships, as follows: The Commodore's flagship *Olympia*, protected cruiser of 5,900 tons, of high speed and with heavy armament, regarded as one of the best fighting cruisers among the navies of the world; the protected cruisers *Baltimore*, 4,400 tons, *Raleigh*, 3,200 tons, *Boston*, 3,000 tons; the gunboats *Concord*, 1,700 tons, *Petrel*, 890 tons. The dispatch boat *McCulloch* and the steamers *Zafiro* and *Nanshan*, used for supply and collier, were attached to the squadron. The six fighting ships were 7,000 miles from the nearest American port base, since the United States possessed no coaling station in the Pacific nearer than California available for purposes of war. On the California coast were the first-class battleship *Oregon*, the gunboat *Marietta*, and the monitors *Monterey* and *Monadnock*, all purely coast defenders and all unable to cross the Pacific upon their own coal supply. The lack of American merchant steamers in the Pacific rendered it difficult to obtain transports and auxiliary vessels if they should be needed.

The Spanish naval force available at Manila bay, under command of Admiral Montojo, consisted of fourteen ships and gunboats. Four were protected cruisers, one, the flagship *Reina Cristina*, well armed and equipped, though of only 3,500 tons displacement. The *Castilla*, *Don Juan de Austria*, and *Velasco* were smaller cruisers, and the remaining eight were gunboats. While the Spaniards had more vessels, they were not as powerful in size or armament combined as the six ships of the American squadron. They were, however, assembled in Manila harbor, under the guns of the forts at Manila and Cavité,

with batteries on Corregidor Island, at the entrance to Manila Bay, a position apparently impregnable if properly maintained, especially as the approaches could be covered with mines to render entrance dangerous.


If the Spanish fleet remained at Manila the safety of our Pacific coast against attack was assured, but if declaration of war should be made the American fleet would be forced to leave the neutral harbor of Hong Kong, and, with its supply of coal, stores, and ammunition limited, its effectiveness would also be limited to the period of consumption of these articles without any available source of fresh supply. It was plain that the American squadron must sail for American waters and act upon the defensive, or seek out the Spaniard in the bay of Manila under the guns of his own fortresses and abide the issue of battle. To Americans, eager to test the enemy, to authorities fully confident of the intelligence, courage, skill, patriotism, and readiness of our sailors, there was but one thing to do.

On April 25, when the declaration of war was formally made, Commodore Dewey received orders by cable from the President to "seek the Spanish fleet and capture or destroy it." The same day the British authorities at Hong Kong, after receiving notice of the declaration of war, notified Commodore Dewey that as Great Britain was neutral in the conflict, his squadron would be expected to leave Hong Kong within twenty-four hours under the rules of international agreement. The Commodore immediately set sail without consuming the time remaining to him under the rule, and rendezvoused at Mirs Bay on the Chinese coast, to strip his ships for action and communicate his plans to the officers of his ships. The plan was simplicity itself. It was to obey orders by seeking the Spaniard, finding him as quickly as possible and, without hesitating a moment, to "smash him" with all the might of projectiles that the American ships could deliver. The details of the line of battle and order of ships were also arranged and the preparations aroused the sailors to great enthusiasm. Commodore George Dewey was born in Vermont of good old Puritan stock. When he was ordered against Manila he was in his sixty-first year. A

graduate of the Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1858, he had served with courage and distinction in the Civil War. He was a junior officer on the *Hartford* under Admiral Farragut when that commander, entering Mobile Bay and finding the bay mined with explosives that had already destroyed a ship ahead of him, had cried out to the ship's captain who seemed to hesitate: "Go right ahead, Captain, damn the torpedoes!" The same laconic spirit of action was in Commodore Dewey's language thirty-three years later when in Mirs Bay he told his men, "we are to seek the Spaniard and smash him as soon as we find him." To sailors imbued with patriotic pride, far from home, and who cherished a determination to "Remember the *Maine*," the promise of quick battle was full of exciting recompense.

But Commodore Dewey's plan went further than one of mere battle. The Philippine revolutionary leader, Aguinaldo, who had found refuge at Hong Kong, had been invited to coöperate. Supplied with money, arms, and ammunition, he and his immediate followers were to be transported to Luzon and landed. In the event of a protracted siege or the miscarriage of plans, the Americans would thus have allies in the rear of the Spanish army and navy, and the revolutionists under the encouragement of new and powerful allies in front, would be able to reduce the Spanish power to impotence for offensive action. These arrangements were perfected in one day, and on Friday, April 29, the American squadron sailed for Manila, distant about 700 miles, requiring three days' steaming.

The Spaniards awaited the approach of the Americans with a display of exultation. Governor-General Augusti announced that after the expected battle Spanish cruisers would be dispatched against San Francisco. The capture of an American trading bark by a Spanish gunboat was made an occasion of popular rejoicing. The means adopted to excite native hatred against the Americans by inspiring dread of them seems incredible and would only be possible in a country where press censorship and general ignorance combine to leave the people at the mercy of unscrupulous rulers. The Governor-



U. S. CRUISER OLYMPIA

General issued a bombastic address in which, after declaring that "the hour of glory had arrived," he reveled in abuse of the Americans:—

"The North American people, constituted of all social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war by their perfidious machinations, their acts of treachery, their outrages against the laws of nations and international conventions. . . .

"Spain, which counts upon the sympathies of all nations, will emerge triumphant from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those United States that, without cohesion, offer humanity only infamous traditions and ungrateful spectacles in her chambers, in which appear insolence, defamation, cowardice, and cynicism.

"Her squadron, manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with ruffianly intention, robbing us of all that means life, honor, and liberty, and pretending to be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable.

"American seamen undertake as an enterprise capable of realization the substitution of Protestantism for the Catholic religion, to treat you as tribes refractory to civilization, to take possession of your riches as if they were unacquainted with the rights of property, to kidnap those persons they consider useful to man their ships or to be exploited in agricultural and industrial labor.

"Vain designs, ridiculous boastings! Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the realization of their designs. You will not allow the faith you profess to be made a mockery or impious hands to be placed on the temple of the true God. The images you adore thrown down by the unbelief of the aggressors shall not prove the tombs of your fathers. They shall not gratify lustful passions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honor, or appropriate property accumulated in provision for your old age.

"They shall not perpetrate these crimes, inspired by their wickedness and covetousness, because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish a base people that is claiming to be civilized and cultivated. They have exterminated the natives of North America instead of giving them civilization and progress."

As if the defense of Manila were a theatrical spectacle the authorities sent daily to Madrid rhetorical assurances of their security and the preparations to destroy the Americans; of the impregnability of their fleet and forts and the patriotism of the Spaniards and volunteers. Yet it was well known at Manila that the forts alone mounted good modern guns, that the fleet was poorly equipped, that

the insurgents beleaguered the city ready to fall on when the American ships arrived, that the harbor contained few if any effective mines to prevent entrance. During these days thousands of refugees left for Hong Kong on passing ships and the price of food increased alarmingly. Terror was felt by the whole population. The Spanish Admiral, Montojo, whose reputation for courage was unchallenged, took his vessels to Subic Bay, a harbor at the northern entrance to Manila Bay, with the intention of assailing the American fleet unexpectedly as it passed. He found only worthless defenses at Subic and brought his ships back under the guns of Cavité, to give battle inside the bay and support the capital defenses. This Admiral, who was called "The Fighting Montojo" by the Spanish sailors, was at one and the same time to prove his dauntless courage and to demonstrate his utter incompetence to provide against surprise or to make adequate preparation for combat.

III.

THE morning of Saturday, April 30, the American squadron was sighted off Cape Bolinao and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon it rounded
THE BATTLE to off Subig Bay on the sea side of the peninsula that
OF encloses the great bay of Manila on the west. The dis-
MANILA tance to the city of Manila was about fifty miles. The
cruisers *Boston* and *Concord* were detailed to search Subig Bay for the enemy, the crews of all ships standing by their guns ready to engage. There was no trace of the Spaniard in Subig. It was then that Commodore Dewey for the first time made known to the commanders of his ships his intention to force the entrance of Manila Bay under cover of night, and to engage the enemy under the fire of the forts. Slow headway was made down the coast and at 11 o'clock at night the squadron entered the Boca Grande, the larger mouth of the two entrances to the bay.

The bay of Manila is one of the largest and deepest harbors of the world. It has an area of 125 square miles, with a depth approximating



ADMIRAL MONTOJO
COMMANDING SPANISH SQUADRON DESTROYED IN MANILA BAY

the ocean itself. The entrance is twelve miles wide on the south and almost midway rise the rocky islands of Corregidor and Caballos. Corregidor was strongly fortified, armed with heavy modern guns and equipped with searchlights that would have enabled competent defenders to render entering it a hazardous feat. The channel to the north of Corregidor is called the Boca Chica, or small mouth, the Boca Grande being on the south.

More than twelve hours earlier the appearance of the Americans at Cape Bolinao had been reported to the Spaniards, yet when the squadron in order, with all lights out, and all ready for action, turned Corregidor and headed up the Boca Grande toward the city of Manila, there was not a Spanish patrol to give warning of its approach, and apparently no watch on Corregidor fortress or tower. On board the American ships every man was at his post, and had been for eighteen hours, as he was to be for eighteen hours longer, except for brief moments of rest. Down in the engine and furnace rooms the heat was from 125 to 160 degrees; but no engineer or stoker left his place, save the engineer of the dispatch boat *McCulloch*, who dropped dead from heart disease superinduced by the heat. This happened as the ships were passing in.

Realizing the preparation that could be made by a warned foe, expecting floating mines, torpedo attacks, and a plunging fire from the lofty fortress on Corregidor, the Americans, hidden only by darkness, slowly and silently as possible filed into the channel, led by the flagship, and began to run the terrible gauntlet of unknown dangers without hesitation.

Half the squadron had passed when sparks escaping from one of the funnels were observed by the watch on Corregidor. Instantly the guns on the fort opened fire upon the squadron, to which the *Boston* and *McCulloch* replied with a few shots, and then silence again reigned. Past the fort the ships slowed down to bare steerway and, all hands resting by their guns, the squadron waited for day to dawn to begin the terrible work that lay before it in the splendid amphitheatre of the mountain-locked bay.

At 5 o'clock in the morning the *Olympia* was five miles from Manila, the spires of whose churches and the towers of whose fortresses could be dimly seen through the glasses of the lookouts. The city lies on the east side of the bay, about twenty-five miles from the entrance, situated upon a low plateau, divided by Pasig River. Volcanic mountains enclose the coasts at varying distances. Eight miles south of Manila, on the same side of the bay, is a low point of land projecting into the water, eked out by the construction of a breakwater, upon which stand the arsenal and fortress of Cavité, commanding the Spanish navy yard. Thus Manila and Cavité were within sea view and gun range of each other, and the theatre of battle was so designed that the combat might be witnessed by the 300,000 people dwelling within range.

The American ships and the Spanish guard at Manila discovered each other at 5 o'clock. As the light increased the Spanish ships were revealed lying under the guns of Cavité, in line of battle almost east and west. At 15 minutes past 5 the light permitted action, and three batteries of heavy guns at Manila and two at Cavité, together with the long range guns of the Spanish ships, opened fire on the Americans. The shots were harmless. Two guns were fired at Manila from our ships, but Commodore Dewey signaled orders not to reply to Manila. It was not his intention to subject the helpless non-combatants of that crowded city to a bombardment, but to "smash the Spanish fleet." So that, while the Manila batteries kept up a continuous fire upon our ships for two hours, without effect, no shells were thrown into the city, which must have been a thing greatly marveled at by those who had described the Americans as pitiless destroyers and cruel cowards.

Under the cross-fire of the enemy Commodore Dewey formed his squadron for attack as coolly as if for target practice. His flagship *Olympia* led, followed at regular distance in line by the *Baltimore*, the *Raleigh*, the *Petrel*, the *Concord*, and the *Boston*, in the order named, which formation was preserved without change. Notwithstanding the furious fire of the enemy, our ships moved steadily without replying

for twenty-six minutes, steaming directly for Cavité, which was some miles distant. Commodore Dewey, with his officers, was on the bridge of the *Olympia*, and Captain Gridley, who was fighting the ship, was in the conning tower. The day was clear and the heat intense. On every ship the sailors were stripped to the waist, waiting with natural impatience for firing orders, and eager for close collision in fighting. As the *Olympia* steamed to the attack in the lead two torpedo mines were exploded in her path by the Spaniards, but too far ahead to affect her. The explosions threw enormous columns of water to a great height. The power was sufficient to have destroyed the vessel if it had been successfully managed. In spite of these dangers, and of more to be apprehended, the *Olympia* kept steadily on. No other mines were exploded, however, if any existed.

At 41 minutes past 5 o'clock Commodore Dewey, the *Olympia* then being bow on, 5,500 yards or about three miles, from the fortress at Cavité, called out to Captain Gridley: "You may fire when ready." A moment later one of the 8-inch guns in the forward turret belched forth flame and steel at the flagship of Admiral Montojo. At this signal to engage the enemy an eyewitness with the squadron reports that from the throats of the Americans on all the ships rose a triumphant cheer and the cry, "Remember the *Maine*." And then, from every ship that could train guns on the enemy, poured a rain of shot and shell directed by men who were as deliberate and cool as if they were at play. The deadly accuracy of American marksmanship was exhibited under circumstances so extraordinary that it was destined to stand without precedent or comparison in all naval history.

Sheltered under the guns of Cavité the Spanish cruiser *Castilla* lay anchored by head and stern, broadside to our fire. On either side Admiral Montojo's flagship, the *Reina Cristina*, the *Don Juan de Austria*, and the *Velasco* moved in action, while the gunboats behind the breakwater were sheltered to some extent. The Americans at 5,500 yards filing in line past the enemy and, countermarching in a

circle that extended closer to the Spaniard at every turn, sent in a crushing rain of fire from each broadside as it was presented.

Lieutenant L. J. Stickney, a former naval officer who was on the bridge of the *Olympia* as a volunteer aide to Commodore Dewey and who wrote an account of the battle as a press correspondent, thus describes the combat after the first fire of the Americans:—

“The Spaniards seemed encouraged to fire faster, knowing exactly our distance, while we had to guess theirs. Their ships and shore guns were making things hot for us. The piercing scream of shot was varied often by the bursting of time fuse shells, fragments of which would lash the water like shrapnel or cut our hull and rigging. One large shell that was coming straight at the *Olympia's* forward bridge fortunately fell within less than one hundred feet. One fragment cut the rigging; another struck the bridge gratings in line with it; a third passed under Commodore Dewey and gouged a hole in the deck. Incidents like these were plentiful.

“Our men naturally chafed at being exposed without returning fire from all our guns, but laughed at danger and chatted good-humoredly. A few nervous fellows could not help dodging, mechanically, when shells would burst right over them, or close aboard, or would strike the water, or pass overhead with the peculiar spluttering roar made by a tumbling rifled projectile.

“Still the flagship steered for the center of the Spanish line, and, as our other ships were astern, the *Olympia* received most of the Spaniards' attention.

“Owing to our deep draught, Commodore Dewey felt constrained to change his course at a distance of 4,000 yards and run parallel to the Spanish column.

“‘Open with all guns,’ he ordered, and the ship brought her port broadside bearing. The roar of all the flagship's 5-inch rapid-firers was followed by the deep diapason of her turret 8-inchers. Soon our other vessels were equally hard at work, and we could see that our shells were making Cavité harbor hotter for the Spaniards than they had made the approach for us.



THE BATTLE OF MINEHEAD

NAVAL BATTLE



MAY 1st, 1898.

"Protected by their shore batteries and made safe from close attack by shallow water, the Spaniards were in a strong position. They put up a gallant fight.

"One shot struck the *Baltimore* and passed clean through her, fortunately hitting no one. Another ripped the upper main deck, disabled a 6-inch gun, and exploded a box of 3-pounder ammunition, wounding eight men. The *Olympia* was struck abreast the gun in the wardroom by a shell, which burst outside, doing little damage. The signal halyards were cut from the officer's hand on the after bridge. A sailor climbed up in the rain of shot and mended the line.

"A shell entered the *Boston's* port quarter and burst in Ensign Dodridge's stateroom, starting a hot fire, and fire was also caused by a shell which burst in the port hammock netting. Both these fires were quickly put out. Another shell passed through the *Boston's* foremast just in front of Captain Wildes, on the bridge.

"After having made four runs along the Spanish line, finding the chart incorrect, Lieutenant Calkins, the *Olympia's* navigator, told the Commodore he believed he could take the ship nearer the enemy, with lead going to watch the depth of water. The flagship started over the course for the fifth time, running within 2,000 yards of the enemy, followed by all the American vessels, and, as even the 6-pounder guns were effective at such short range, the storm of shot and shell launched against the Spaniard was destructive beyond description."

Two small launches were sent out from the *Castilla* and boldly advanced toward the *Olympia*. They were supposed to be provided with torpedoes to be discharged against the flagship. No sooner was their purpose suspected than the small guns of the *Olympia* were turned upon the two boats with deadly effect. One was riddled and sunk at the first fire and the other, badly damaged, turned back and sought safety.

The enemy fought with desperation. Admiral Montojo, with the *Reina Cristina*, sallied forth from his line against the *Olympia*, but was met with a concentrated fire from our ships so frightful that

he could not advance. The *Reina Cristina* turned and made for the breakwater when an 8-inch shell from the *Olympia* was sent whizzing through her stern, penetrating the whole extent of the ship to her engine-room where it exploded with awful destruction, setting fire to the vessel and rendering her unmanageable.

The fire made such headway that Admiral Montojo abandoned his vessel and taking his flag in an open boat, was transferred to the *Isla de Cuba* gunboat, whence he continued to issue his orders. It was an act of personal bravery so marked that it elicited admiration from all the Americans and was especially commented upon by Commodore Dewey in his report of the battle. Captain Cadarso, of the *Reina Christina*, a Spaniard of noble family at Madrid, was mortally wounded with many others on his ship, but refused to be carried off. He remained with his men and went down with his ship. A shell entered the magazine of the *Don Juan de Austria* and that vessel was blown up. The *Castilla* at her moorings was also on fire by this time, but the firing from the other vessels and the forts was maintained with wild desperation.

The heavy guns from Manila were also keeping up their attack. Commodore Dewey sent a flag messenger to the Governor-General bearing notice that if the firing from that quarter did not instantly cease he would attack and shell the city. The message at once silenced the batteries.

It was now 7:35 o'clock and the men had been in suspense or in exhaustive action for nearly thirty hours. During the two hours of fighting they had been served with only a cup of coffee each. Observing the destruction in the enemy's ranks and desiring to give him time for reflection, but mainly to give his own men refreshment and new strength, Commodore Dewey ordered action to cease and the ships to retire beyond range. This they did, the squadron filing past the *Olympia* with triumphant cheers and steaming across the bay followed by the sullen fire of the enemy. The *Olympia* brought up the rear and orders were issued to serve breakfast bountifully on all the ships.

While the men were refreshing themselves, the commanders of the ships were summoned aboard the *Olympia* to make reports of their condition and for conference. It was then the discovery was made—almost incredible—that no material casualty had occurred to the Americans during an engagement filled with such disaster to the enemy. It seemed miraculous to have gone through a hail of fire without one man being killed or a ship disabled. Meanwhile the Spanish had viewed the withdrawal of our ships with exultation. With the fatuity of over-confidence in their own courage they had construed the American pause for rest as a retreat. To that effect they cabled the Spanish Government, where the news caused excited rejoicings. The Minister of Marine cabled a message of bombastic compliments to Admiral Montojo upon the glory of Spanish sailors. While these messages were yet passing under the ocean the second attack was in progress that was to turn exultation to despair and set the Spanish populace at Madrid on fire with angry protests of deception and betrayal.

After three and a half hours of recuperation, the American squadron got under way at a quarter past eleven o'clock and advanced again to attack the enemy. Buoyed up by the early morning results, the gunners aimed with perfect deliberation and, under orders for "close action," the line steamed up as near as the water-depth permitted, and poured a remorseless fire into the enemy's ships that were now replying slowly. But the guns of Cavité were hard at work and the *Baltimore* was ordered to silence the arsenal. The bay was filled with smoke, and into this the *Baltimore* steered straight for the point of attack. When close up she opened all her batteries, and in a moment the powder magazine of the arsenal blew up with a deafening roar, and the battery of Cavité was destroyed.

The *Boston*, *Concord*, and *Petrel* were ordered to enter the bay and destroy the ships there. The *Petrel* being of very light draught was able to penetrate behind the breakwater up to the gunboats. The Spaniards on board made haste to surrender, and their ships were then scuttled and fired. The only ship left was a transport belonging

to the coast survey, and she was taken possession of by our forces. At 40 minutes past 12 o'clock, the Spanish flag had been hauled down from Cavité and the white flag of surrender was flying. The *Olympia* stood off towards Manila, leaving the other vessels to take care of the wounded on shore.

In this battle the Spanish lost the following vessels: *Reina Cristina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, sunk; *Don Juan de Austria*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, *General Lezo*, *Marquis del Duero*, *El Correo*, *Velasco* and *Isla de Mindanao*, burned; the *Manila* and several tugs and launches captured. There were about 1,000 Spaniards killed in the engagement and more than 600 wounded, among the latter Admiral Montojo and his son, a lieutenant, both slightly. The wounded were removed to the arsenal in Cavité, where they were attended by the American surgeons, who gave their skill, science, and labor to succor the unfortunate. Yet while this work of humanity was in progress the Archbishop of Manila was issuing a pastoral letter to his flock in which he called upon all Christians in the island to defend the faith against heretics who designed to erect an insuperable barrier to salvation, intending to enslave the people and forbid the sacraments of baptism, matrimony, and burial, and the consolation of absolution. He declared that if the Americans were allowed to possess the islands, altars would be desecrated and the churches changed into Protestant chapels. Instead of there being pure morality, as then existed, examples of vice only would be inculcated. He closed by appointing May 17 as a day of rejoicing over the renewed consecration of the islands to the sacred heart of Jesus.*

Commodore Dewey sent a message to Governor-General Augusti in Manila proposing to be permitted to use the submarine cable to Hong Kong for the purpose of communicating his reports to the Government at Washington. Augusti refused the permission and Commodore Dewey cut the cable, thus rendering impossible all communication with the world except by mail, by way of Hong Kong, three

* Translation cabled from Hong Kong, May 17, 1898.

days' sail distant. He then sat down before Manila to await reinforcements and orders, the revolutionists under General Aguinaldo cutting off all supplies from the landside, and investing the city in effective siege.

IV.

THE impression made upon the United States and upon Europe by the battle of Manila was in an unexpected degree momentous. The extraordinary nature of the victory won by Commodore Dewey's squadron,—in which the enemy had 1,400 men killed and wounded, lost fourteen ships, valued at millions of dollars, vast stores of coal, supplies, guns, and equipments, together with a great colonial possession of enormous wealth and resources, without the loss of one man or one ship by the victors,—filled the world with amazement and admiration, and caused the United States to ring with enthusiasm for the cool and intrepid commander and his brave sailors. The first news received was through distorted sources at Madrid, where reports came from Manila speaking of glorious action by the Spaniards and confessing Spanish losses by piecemeal. Accustomed to the mendacity of Spanish reports and the duplicity of the officials discharging the function of supervising all information concerning the war, the English-written press of the world eked out from the involved mass of incoherent exultation and evasion the central fact of a sweeping American victory. The moment this was recognized all possibility of obtaining details was destroyed by the cutting of the cable. For a week there was suspense, during which the fact of American victory was confirmed by desperate rioting in Madrid caused by the Spanish people discovering that their losses were greater than Señor Sagasta and his advisers had admitted.

THE EFFECT OF
THE MANILA
VICTORY

On May 8 the dispatch boat *McCulloch* arrived at Hong Kong from Manila with the first official reports from Commodore Dewey. They consisted of two brief messages, but no commander ever conveyed to his country so much information in detail of such wonderful

achievement in fewer words. The first message, dated Manila, May 1, but sent only when the second was forwarded, was as follows :—

“Squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels : *Reina Cristina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, *General Lezo*, *Marques del Duero*, *Correo*, *Velasco*, *Isla de Mindanao*, a transport and a water battery at Cavité. The squadron is uninjured, and only a few men are slightly wounded. Only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate with him.”

The second, dated at Cavité, May 4, completed his record of the action :—

“I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavité and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications at the bay entrance, paroling the garrison. I control the bay completely, and can take the city at any time. The squadron is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known, but very heavy ; 150 killed, including the Captain of the *Reina Cristina*. I am assisting in protecting the Spanish sick and wounded ; 250 sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much excitement at Manila. Will protect foreign residents.”

With these came columns of press reports of the victory. The suspense of a week to Americans accustomed to the procurement and immediate publication of all news at every hazard and at any cost, found relief in a national outburst of praise of the victorious commander and the officers and men of his squadron. In every city and hamlet the news fired the popular imagination. “Dewey day” was set apart in many cities and towns, and school children rehearsed patriotic speeches and songs. Naval authorities of the world testified to the completeness of the demonstration of American fighting ability and to the unprecedented annihilation of an adversary in his own fastness without the slightest loss in return. It was conceded that the name of Dewey was enrolled among the names of immortal naval commanders. The Secretary of the Navy, upon the receipt of Commodore Dewey’s reports, cabled to him and his men, in the President’s name, the thanks of the American people for the “splendid achievement and overwhelming victory,” in recognition of which he appointed Commodore Dewey an Acting-Admiral. On the following Monday

the President sent a message to Congress recommending the adoption of a vote of thanks. "The magnitude of this victory," said the President in his message, "can hardly be measured by the ordinary standards of naval warfare. Outweighing any material advantage is the moral effect of this initial success. With this unsurpassed achievement, the great heart of our nation throbs, not with boasting or with greed of conquest, but with deep gratitude that this triumph has come in a just cause, and that by the grace of God an effective step has thus been taken toward the attainment of the wished-for peace. To those whose skill, courage, and devotion have won the fight, the gallant commander and the brave officers and men who aided him, our country owes an incalculable debt."

To the American people the victory at Manila was indisputable proof of the superiority of American training, discipline, intelligence, mechanical skill, and courage over the ignorant and undisciplined bravery of the Spaniard. The capacity of the free volunteer in the regular branches of armed science as against the forced conscription of the continental systems was again established, and the people looked now confidently to see the same spirit exhibited in the army organizing to occupy Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. To those countries that believed the American navy to be manned by foreigners and mercenaries disinclined to stand up at the critical moment, the lesson was startling.

The practical results of the combat at Manila were thus stated by Mr. Beach, an engineer officer on the *Baltimore* during the battle. In writing home after the event he said:—

"We feel that we have had a great victory here, which we ascribe to several causes. First, the Spaniard is always behind the times. He knew that an American fleet was expected and was so sure of his tremendous superiority that he took absolutely no precaution. The night we ran by the forts (in the early morning of the engagement) the Spanish officers were all at a grand ball. The entrance to the harbor was planted with torpedoes; he thought that was enough, and had no patrol, picket boats, or torpedo boats on watch. The result is that we ran by their magnificent guns guarding the entrance to Manila Bay, and were out of range inside before the Spaniards knew it.

"Another reason for our success was due to Commodore Dewey's orders. Not one of the ships had any intimation that we would run by the forts as we did until thirty miles away. We were by the Spanish forts and at the fleet by 5:30 A. M. on Sunday, May 1. They were ten fighting ships strong, carrying 116 modern guns, to which we opposed a superior fleet of six ships carrying 135 guns. Two of their ships were over 3,200 tons displacement, and the rest were modern gunboats. This fleet was assisted by batteries on shore armed with modern guns, which made their guns superior in number to ours. In number of men engaged, they were undoubtedly far superior to us. The Spaniards were absolutely confident of victory. No other outcome was anticipated by them; no preparation was made for a different result. I think that their ships, combined with their forts, made them equal to us, so far as powers of offense and defense were concerned. They had as many modern guns approximating to the same size as we had, and more men to fire them. They should have been able to have fired as much weight of shot in a specified time as we did.

"The whole result, in other words, lay in the fact that it was the American against the Spaniard. Every shot fired from our fleet was most deliberately, coolly, and pitilessly aimed. The Spaniards fired an enormous number of times, but with apparently the most impracticable aim. Shells dropped all around our ship; we were in action for over four hours; hundreds of shot and shell fell close to us. Only five or six pierced us, and they did no damage.

"The damage done by our ships was frightful. I have visited all of the sunken Spanish ships, and, had I not seen the effects of American marksmanship, I would hardly give credit to reports of it. One smokestack of the *Castilla*, a 3,300-ton Spanish ship, was struck eight times, and the shells through the hull were so many and so close that it is impossible that a Spaniard could have lived on her deck. The other large ship, the *Reina Cristina*, was perforated in the same way. We did not employ much tactics because there wasn't much need for them. There were the enemy, and we went for them bullheadedly and made them exceedingly sick.

"The lesson I draw from the fight is the great utility of target practice. The Spaniard has none; we have it every three months. Strengths of navies are compared generally ship for ship; the personnel is just as important. I am confident that had we manned the Spanish ships and had the Spaniards manned our fleet, the American side would have been as victorious as it was. The Spaniard certainly was brave, for he stuck to his guns to the last."

The effect of such a crushing defeat upon Spain was correspondingly disheartening. The riots that ensued in her principal cities compelled the government to proclaim martial law in several provinces. In the Cortes the opposition taunted the Government with



DEPARTURE OF UNITED STATES TROOPS FOR MANILA

incapacity and supineness, and recrimination became both bitter and loud. The government had not counted upon nor made plans in the event of defeat any more than had its officials in the Philippines. Yet, with the usual methods of influencing the Spanish people through its power of suppressing or manipulating information in the press, the Cabinet turned to Admiral Cervera's squadron, yet lingering at the Cape Verde Islands, and made ostensible preparations for reprisal.

The threat of sending to the Philippines a new Spanish fleet, much stronger in fighting power than Commodore Dewey's, awoke the Americans to immediate action. The President assigned General Wesley Merritt to the command of an army corps of occupation to proceed at once to the support of our fleet at Manila. The forces were to consist of 4,000 regulars and 16,000 volunteer troops, to be accompanied by the cruiser *Charleston*, and the monitors *Monterey* and *Monadnock*. Upon General Merritt was conferred also the supreme power of Military Governor of the Philippines, and an establishment of aides was created to seize and administer the government of those islands under the military laws of the United States as applied to conquered territory. The preparations were carried forward with utmost speed and in a few weeks the first division of the new army was upon the Pacific, preceded by the *Charleston* with supplies of ammunition and stores in convoy.

The step toward holding the Philippines as a conquered territory was not less momentous than the actual destruction of the enemy's forces at Manila. It intimated the acquirement by America of colonies in Asiatic waters, so rich, so potential of power and development, that it injected into the Oriental questions occupying European diplomacy a shock of vital change so startling that the purposes of the United States at once became the absorbing problem of the world's great chancelleries. For that moment the fate of Spain was dwarfed in interest beside the question: What will the United States do with the Philippines? The progress of this question, the most novel and far-reaching that had come upon the country, must, however, be treated in its proper place.

CHAPTER THE FOURTH.

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.

FIRST WORK OF ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S SQUADRON—HOW THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA WAS RECEIVED BY THE TWO WARRING NATIONS AND IN HAVANA—THE PROBLEMS OF WAR IN THE ATLANTIC—SPANISH SPIES DISCOVERED AND CAPTURED—THE BOMBARDMENT OF MATANZAS—"THE MATANZAS MULE" ENTERS INTO HISTORY—THE AMERICAN BAPTISM OF BLOOD AT CARDENAS—DEATH OF ENSIGN BAGLEY AND THE REPULSE OF THE WINSLOW—UNIMPORTANT EVENTS OF THE WAR.

I.

THE magnificent victory of Dewey's squadron at Manila was won at exactly the opportune moment. The intrepidity, no less than the unexampled skill, of American gunners and sailors so gloriously demonstrated, gave patience for the hard labor of war that was to be undertaken in the work of driving the Spaniards out of Cuba. The first step was taken when, on April 22, part of the squadron under Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson began the blockade of Havana and other Cuban ports. The destruction of Spain's power in Cuba was the chief object of the war, and in the Atlantic Ocean and on Cuban soil the naval and military spirit of both countries could be exhibited upon a larger scale than elsewhere. The blockade of Havana and its tributary ports was therefore an act to challenge at once the vitality of Spanish power. Havana was the keystone of this power in the West Indies. Its large population and vast commerce made it the seat of opulence, and the strongest fortifications and largest garrisons were to be found there. If Spain intended to hold Cuba, she must hold Havana. She could only hold Havana by sending constant reinforcements of troops, with fresh supplies of food and ammunition to maintain them. The first object of the United States, therefore, was to prevent at all hazards the landing of troops and supplies by Spain.

For this reason Sampson's squadron was ordered to blockade Havana as the initial act of war, on April 22.

The following day the President issued a proclamation declaring the blockade to be enforced against all ports on the north coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, including Havana, and of the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast. From these ports there were railways to Havana that would enable Spain, by landing supplies at any one of them, to succor the capital. If supplies were landed elsewhere it would be difficult, if not impossible, to transport them to Havana on account of a lack of railway facilities and because the Cuban insurgents could be depended upon to intercept them. The closing of Havana harbor and the harbors of its tributary towns at once put the Spanish army in Cuba upon its own resources for maintenance, or rendered it necessary for Spain to force her way into Havana by the aid of her navy, then in home waters. .

The problems of the Atlantic were easily apparent. If Spain sent her navy with troops and supplies to the assistance of Cuba, a great decisive naval battle must be fought in Cuban waters. If she divided her naval force and sent one squadron to Havana and the other to attack the American coast cities on the north, she would divide the American naval force by the necessity of repelling each movement. The Flying Squadron of Spain was that under Admiral Cervera at the Cape Verde Islands; her heavily armored squadron was in Spanish harbors under the command of Admiral Camara. The latter squadron was not in readiness for action, but, by strict censorship of all telegraph and mail channels of communication, the Spanish Government at first succeeded in concealing this fact.

To meet the problem, therefore, Admiral Sampson was sent to blockade Havana, while Commodore Schley, with a small number of battleships and cruisers, waited in Hampton Roads, ready to sail north or south, to aid Sampson, or to repel any descent that might be attempted upon the northern coasts by the Spanish ships.


The uneasiness of the American authorities was great, and it was skillfully promoted by Spanish artifice. The Spanish minister, Señor

Polo y Bernabe, on leaving Washington had gone to Canada, accompanied by his secretary, Señor Dubosc, and his naval *attaché*, Lieutenant Carranza. There the two latter succeeded in arranging an ingenious system of spies and manufacturers of false intelligence, aided by Spanish representatives abroad, by which the press was kept excited with reports of Spanish cruisers and other war vessels on the North Atlantic steamer chart line and off the Canadian and eastern coasts.

One of Carranza's spies, George Downing, who had been employed as a steward on the United States cruiser *Brooklyn*, and who had been discharged for causing trouble, was arrested in Washington and his papers seized. The next day he committed suicide by hanging himself in prison, but his papers enabled the secret service officers to entrap Carranza and obtain a private letter which he had written to a friend in Spain, criticising the acts and personal characters of Spanish leaders, admitting that he was engaged in Canada perfecting a spy system, and confessing that Downing had been in his pay. This, although it occurred several weeks after war began and is in this place an anticipation of events, caused the Canadian Government to send Dubosc and Carranza out of the Dominion. But their activity for three or four weeks served to keep the newspapers filled with false rumors and kept the cities of the eastern coast excited with fears that had no real cause. It also deterred the Navy Department from concentrating its vessels for a descent upon Cuba in overwhelming force.

The vital problem remained unaltered by all the incidental possibilities: Spain must relieve and rescue Havana if she meant to retain possession of Cuba.

The sailing of Sampson's squadron on the morning of April 22 was, therefore, of profound significance to America, to Spain, and to Cuba. In Washington the excitement and satisfaction were unceasing and all over the country the stars and stripes were unfurled, municipal bodies, associations and crowds of people assembling in the streets to give expression to their patriotism and to emphasize their approval of the first act of the war. Business corporations and firms allowed leave of absence to employees, upon full salary, to go



MORRO CASTLE
COMMANDING THE ENTRANCE TO HAVANA HARBOR

with their militia organizations to fight for the freedom of Cuba. Similiar outbursts of national feeling occurred in the cities of Spain.

That evening in Havana all factions of the Spanish loyalists united in a great demonstration of fealty to the crown. The newspaper *El Correo* issued the call in a flaming article full of denunciation of "the treacherous perfidy of a country that does not deserve to be called civilized, because its base and cowardly crimes are the shame of mankind." It called on all faithful Spaniards to unite in the war-cry "down with the foreigner!" The theatres were crowded, patriotic plays were performed and patriotic songs were sung until the singers were hoarse. But Cuban families were leaving by every ship that could clear, and thousands of refugees hurried out of the citadel of Spanish power in Cuba. A number of Spanish officials also deserted their posts and sought safety in flight. This caused great indignation and in all the patriotic shops articles of women's apparel were displayed in the windows placarded "for sale to men who wish to run away like women."

Captain-General Blanco issued an address urging all Cubans, without regard to past differences, to rally against the invader. "If the United States," he said, "wish the island of Cuba, let them come and take it. Perhaps the hour is not far distant when these Carthaginians of America will meet their Zama in this land of Cuba, which Spain discovered, settled, and civilized, and which can never be anything but Spanish. To arms, then! Fellow-citizens, to arms! There will be room for all in the fight. Let all contribute and coöperate with like firmness and enthusiasm to resist the eternal enemies of the Spanish name."

At night he addressed the crowds asking them to resist to the death. The populace answered with cheers and shouts. He continued, holding the national flag in his hand: "I swear to die before I will abandon Cuba, leaving this flag dishonored. The hour has come for us to avenge the wrongs and insults of sixty years. If they want Cuba, let them come and take it. We will kick them into the sea!"

This was the spirit in which Havana received the announcement of the sailing of the American fleet.

Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson had been chosen by the President to command the squadron operating in Cuba, over the heads of several officers his superior in rank and in length of service. The selection was made because of Sampson's reputation as a careful and safe strategist and his qualities as an executive commander. Bred to the navy he had been in the Civil War and had served at Annapolis Academy as head of the department of chemistry and physics. He was recognized as a master of ordnance, as well as a serious, accurate, and just man, having a sterling sense of responsibility and unflinching readiness to bear it. His task was to isolate Havana from reinforcement by Spain and from supplies from any source outside its own provinces.

About sunset on Friday, April 22, part of the American squadron arrived before Havana. It consisted of the flagship *New York*, the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, and four smaller vessels. From all the forts of Havana three warning shots were fired to notify the citizens of the arrival of the enemy. The streets were instantly crowded with people, and with soldiers going to quarters, and the excitement of expected attack was at the highest pitch. General Blanco and his staff made the rounds of the defenses, animating the soldiers, reassuring the citizens.

In this beautiful and ancient city of America, filled with all the luxury and squalor characteristic of Spanish civilization, there was much that was sacred to the memories and traditions of the people of the United States—much that had stirred their resentment and indignation. There was the Cathedral in which the bones of Columbus had lain so long, the very cradle of our infancy; there were magnificent public and private buildings, the institutions of those arts that spring naturally from the hearts of the Latins. There were 50,000 regular troops to defend it, besides the splendid fortresses at Morro Castle, at Cabanas, and at Santa Clara. These had been deemed impregnable for nearly a century. In the beautiful



TOMB OF COLUMBUS, IN THE CATHEDRAL, HAVANA

harbor was concealed a forest of dynamite mines, such as that one which had wrought international and unpardonable murder on the *Maine*. Havana, the beautiful, the luxurious, the romantic, the squalid, and the tyrannous, was defended by the concentrated courage and ingenuity of the flower of Spanish strength.

The possible bombardment of such a capital was indeed momentous to its inhabitants.

An eyewitness of the scenes that night has reported what the Havanese saw and felt when the American ships stood off the entrance to the harbor:—

“The sky and the shore line were pierced with great light beams of the search-lights that swept to and fro and up and down. Now they rested on the stone walls of Morro, now on ships in the harbor, and then on the buildings ashore. The surface of the water was always alight with them, and there was not an object afloat that was not covered by them. There were five of these light beams, and at the end of each could be made out the dim outlines of a ship. What ships they were no one could tell, but their purpose could not be mistaken. They stood well out to sea, and they passed constantly up and down before the entrance to the harbor. Never for an instant did the light beams disappear, and never was the surface of the water unlighted by them.

“Again and again during the night the guns of Morro and Cabanas blazed out the warning, and each signal was greeted in the city with renewed excitement. From the moment of the firing of the first guns the streets were alive. Squads and companies of soldiers marched and countermarched in the squares. The roll of the drum was almost continuous, and was accompanied by the bugle call to arms. The people were wild, some of them with fear, but most of them with patriotism. The frightened ones hid in cellars and in attics. Some of them fled the city, preferring to trust themselves to the insurgent bands that swarm about the province rather than to chance it in a bombardment by the American fleet that they were sure would follow the dawn of day.

“As the night wore on the excitement increased. At the forts every soldier was working at the big guns, getting them in shape to withstand the attack of the morning. The volunteers were there in such crowds that the regular soldiers fell over them in their work, and they cursed and swore at each other as they damned the ‘pigs’ of Yankees and told each other what they would do when day broke.

“All night long the people swarmed the streets and the river fronts. They crowded the roofs of buildings as well. They demanded impatiently that the forts should open fire and sink the ships, though they knew that the squadron was beyond the reach of the guns.

"Dawn came at last, and at the first sign of it the big light beams went out and the ships that could now be plainly seen steamed off to the east. Why they left or where they were going no one knew, but the Spaniards said the commanders were cowards, and that they were fleeing because they knew that with the light the big guns of the forts would sink them.

"The excitement and apprehension of the night changed to joy and men hugged each other and laughed and shouted at what they thought an evidence of fear. Some of them went home satisfied that there would be no more seen of them.

"The morning wore away and noon came. There was still no sign of the boats. But at three o'clock this afternoon the lookouts at the forts saw the black smoke of five ships on the horizon to the east. They reported to the Captain-General. A few minutes later it was plainly seen that the smoke came from the visitors of the night before, and again the warning guns sounded. People again crowded into the streets, women and children as well as men. Workingmen and business men left their work and seized their guns and rushed again for the forts. The water front was lined and jammed in less time than it takes to tell it. The rolling of the drums and the bugle calls began again, and the marching and countermarching of the soldiers went on.

"The ships loomed up on the horizon bigger and bigger. They seemed headed straight for the big guns of Morro, and the soldiers manned the guns and prepared for an assault. But the chance never came. By 5 o'clock all five of the ships were directly off the entrance to the harbor, but they were still out of gunshot and they resumed their pacing up and down of the previous night.

"As darkness came the big beams of light shone again. But one ship came into the harbor after the warships were sighted. She was the Italian warship *Giovanni Bausan*. When she was still some distance out the roaring of guns could be heard and puffs of smoke could be seen coming from near the bow of the ship. There were answering puffs from one of the five ships. This all added to the excitement, and the report started and went through the city like wildfire that the boat, which had not then been identified, was a Spanish warship and was giving battle to the fleet. But the sound of the guns and the puffs of smoke died out quickly, and as the strange boat approached the Italian flag was run up and the people learned what she was and that she had merely been saluting, but they wouldn't believe it. They were sure she had fired on the fleet. They prepared to give her a welcome. As she passed the fortifications her sailors yelled, 'Long live Spain,' and cheered the Spanish flag. This set everybody wild with enthusiasm. It led to a demonstration on the French cruiser *Fulton*, which was in port, and the Frenchmen cheered for Spain, too.

"The crowds continued in the streets all night and the excitement kept up. By the moving of the beams of light it could be seen that the warships were constantly shifting their position. Up in the top of the foremast of each signal lights could be seen changing constantly from red to white or blue, and it was evident

that the commanders of the ships were continually communicating with each other, but of course the signals could not be read, though the officers at the forts tried to decipher them."

It was not the purpose of the United States, however, to wage a war of destruction against either the lives or the property of non-combatants in Cuba. Havana was not to be bombarded, unless all other means of bringing Spain to reason proved fruitless. But the blockade established was rigidly maintained, and no troops, supplies, or food could reach Havana.

This blockade soon became monotonous and the crews grew restless. The only incidents were prize captures of Spanish vessels. The *New York* had taken one, the *Pedro*, just as the squadron reached Havana. The fine Spanish merchantman took the desperate chance of attempting to escape to Spain at the very moment of investment, but was run down and sent to Key West as a prize.

An incident that served to excite popular expectation of trouble with France grew out of the capture of the French steamer *La Fayette*, which was bound from Spanish ports with passengers and food for Havana. She left the Spanish port of Corunna two days after war began, and while she was crossing the French Government requested the American Government to permit her to discharge her passengers at Havana, promising that none of the cargo should be taken off. Our authorities consented to the arrangement and sent notice to that effect to Admiral Sampson. By miscarriage the notice did not come to Admiral Sampson until after the *La Fayette* appeared and steamed towards the harbor. The Frenchman was warned by several blank shots, but he paid no attention until a solid shot crossed his bows and a shell whistled dangerously near his bridge. Then he hove to and made vigorous protest. He had not heard of the blockade. His ship was sent under a prize crew to Key West where its arrival caused a sensation. As soon as the news reached Washington the ship was released by order of the Secretary of the Navy and permission was granted to her to proceed to Havana under the original agreement. The Frenchman landed his passengers at Havana and was so greatly


impressed with the quiet release given to him that he ascribed it to American fear of France. He was proceeding to discharge his cargo, also, in which event he would have been seized as he came out, but the French consul interfered and compelled him to restore all cargo and leave port according to agreement. There was no ill feeling between the two governments over this comedy of errors, but for two or three days there was excited gossip over the possibilities.

II.

**THE FIRST
HEROES
THROUGH
DEATH** A WEEK of suspense and inaction was passed by the blockading squadron. Not a hostile gun had been fired, not even target practice was achieved. Admiral Sampson had been directed to keep his ships at a sufficient distance from the Havana fortifications and others of a formidable character, in order that the efficiency of his squadron might not be impaired while the Spanish naval force under Cervera remained intact at St. Vincent and Cadiz. But it was not intended that Admiral Sampson should remain silent against the barking of Spanish coast defense guns. Such a policy would make the enemy confident that the American vessels could be shot at without fear of receiving a shot in return, and, besides, it would probably cause the excellent state of discipline now maintained on the blockading squadron to deteriorate. The men were already restless, when, on April 27, the flagship *New York*, the monitor *Puritan*, and the *Cincinnati* steamed off Matanzas Bay to reconnoitre the fortifications and works that were being strengthened and constructed.

Matanzas is fifty-two miles east of Havana, on the San Juan River, and is the most important commercial point in Cuba after the capital. It has a population of about 35,000, and the city, situated up the bay and protected by forts on the small bluffs on the coast, is built of stone and ornamented with handsome structures.

The point furthest out from Matanzas, where the Spaniards had been building fortifications, was Point Rubalcava. It is to the west



THE INDIAN STATUE IN THE PRADO, HAVANA

of the harbor, and out from the entrance about three miles. The next nearest point was Point Maya, which is four miles from Point Rubalcava, on the east side of the harbor and directly at the entrance, four miles from Matanzas, which is at the head of the bay. The *New York* ran provokingly near to the first of these fortifications, and in a few minutes there was a puff of smoke from Point Rubalcava, followed by the roar of a heavy gun and the whistle of a shell. At the same time there was another puff of smoke to the east, near Point Maya, and the roar of another gun. It was the expected Spanish marksmanship and the shells went ludicrously wide of the mark.

Instantly the three American ships answered with Yankee accuracy. Going in as close as the water depth permitted, they poured in broadsides that demolished the fortifications, while not one shot of the enemy touched a ship. After fifteen minutes of this kind of target practice, during which a number of Spanish soldiers were killed, the signal to cease firing was given, since the work of days on the forts had been knocked down in a few minutes.

As the signal flew up the halyards on the *New York* the perfection of American marksmanship was displayed by a gunner on board the *Puritan*. At the very moment Rubalcava fired her last shot. The *Puritan* was a long distance away, but her marksman saw the smoke puff out and aimed for that spot with one of the big 12-inch guns. The aim was magnificent. The huge 1,000-pound shell of the *Puritan* struck exactly in the centre of the ring of smoke, hit the cannon from which it had come, smashed it, and drove on into the earthworks, carrying destruction even before it exploded. When it exploded it seemed to those who were watching the shot as if about all the fortifications that remained had vanished into dust. A British artillery officer who was present declared, in an account to the press, that it was the most marvelous exhibition of accurate gunnery in the history of gun firing.


The first humor of the war appeared in this action. "The Matanzas Mule" became famous in verse and in simile. The Spanish Government, pursuing its usual policy of concealing all facts, gave

out what purported to be General Blanco's official report of the bombardment of Matanzas, in which it was gravely declared that the American shells did no damage to the city, but that a mule on the beach had been killed. The American sense of humor seized on this and "the Matanzas Mule" became a figure in history.

From this time forward there was "target practice" for all the ships patrolling the coast against fortifications and against Spanish soldiers that were kept on guard to resist any effort at landing parties to carry supplies to insurgents in the interior. Meanwhile the news of the Manila victory had come and the seamen were restive for an opportunity to repeat in Cuban waters the intrepid work that destroyed Montojo at Cavité.

The first American sailors to find in death the baptism of heroism were killed in a battle between small ships in Cardenas harbor, on the north coast, the 11th of May. The gunboat *Machias*, the torpedo boats *Winslow* and *Foote*, and the revenue tug *Hudson* were blockading Cardenas in the harbor of which were three Spanish gunboats. On the 11th the cruiser *Wilmington* arrived off the harbor and Commander Merry of the *Machias* and Captain Todd of the *Wilmington* decided to send the torpedo boats into the harbor and cut out or destroy the Spanish craft which were coming out and menacing our boats. The *Wilmington* could not enter on account of her draught and the presence of mines in the main channel. The *Winslow* entered the harbor at full speed after a Spanish gunboat, and immediately the vessels of the enemy and a shore battery opened a raking fire upon her, to which the *Winslow* and the *Wilmington* both replied. The Spaniards concentrated their whole attention upon the *Winslow*.

There followed forty minutes in which American heroism and courage rose to splendid heights as described by the reports of the fight. The first shot from the enemy fell among the buoys in the harbor. The next tore through the flimsy hull of the torpedo boat, wrecking the steam steering gear forward and rendering the boat unmanageable. The Spanish trap had caught its victim. The decoy gunboat had lured the fierce little fighter to within range of the shore guns.



CORRIDOR IN THE CASINO, HAVANA

The red buoys marked the range. The *Winslow* could not escape, and it was a fight then to the death. Her three little 1-pound guns began to hurl back missiles at the gunboat, which was now adding its share to the firing.

Again and again the shells crashed into the *Winslow*. A splinter flying from the deck struck Lieutenant John J. Bernadou, the brave commander of the little craft, just below the groin in the right leg. He wrapped a towel about it, using an empty 1-pound shell for a tourniquet, and went on with his duty as commander. When he found that his steam steering gear was gone he rushed aft to arrange the hand gear. A shot wrecked that, too. Steam was already pouring out of a perforated boiler below and the men were coming up. Another shot and the port engine was wrecked. Then went the fore-castle gun. But still the brave men kept firing with their two remaining 1-pounders.

Help was coming, for the little *Hudson* was steaming in at full speed, and the *Wilmington's* 4-inch guns were dropping shells all about the murderous battery ashore.

Amidships, near the ammunition stand, was Ensign Worth Bagley calling down to the engineer to back and go ahead with his one remaining engine in his effort to spoil the Spaniards' aim. All the electrical contrivances were wrecked, so the orders went by word of mouth. By the Ensign were working a half dozen of his men. No one had yet been killed, although the craft had been riddled through and through. Then came a shell that struck squarely on the deck and exploded as it fell. The *Hudson* was by this time so close that her crew could hear the words of the men as they went to their death.

"Save me! Save me!" shouted one poor fellow, with his face all torn, as he staggered back and all but fell into the sea. Some one reached an arm to him, caught him by a leg, pulled him back, and laid him on the deck, dead. Ensign Bagley had thrown his hands into the air, tottered forward, and fell against the signal mast, around which he clasped his arms and sank slowly down in a heap. They did not know he was dead until they went to carry him below.


Besides Bagley those killed outright by the shell were two service sailors, and two others, who, mortally wounded, died within an hour.

Now began a spectacle of unrivaled heroism by the *Hudson*. She had come near enough to extend aid to the *Winslow*. A long line was thrown the latter and made fast, but as the revenue cutter backed away this line parted. Another line was made fast after twenty minutes' work. The shells of the enemy were still dropping on every side. The second line held, but the *Winslow* would not tow because she could not be steered, and at last the *Hudson* made fast alongside.

Though crippled, the little torpedo boat was still able to fight, and, with her flag flying and her two remaining guns puffing away at the gunboat, she stuck to the fight. The *Hudson* was fighting, and had been all the time. Her commander, Lieutenant F. H. Newcomb, had kept his two guns firing so rapidly that in the thirty-five minutes she was engaged she fired 120 shots. She escaped with only one shot in her hull, and some insignificant wounds. The bravery of her captain and crew in rescuing the *Winslow* from her perilous position was unsurpassed even by that of the men under Bernadou.

The *Wilmington* meanwhile had played havoc with Cardenas. By the time the smaller vessels were in safety the town along the shore was on fire and the Spanish gunboats had also caught fire, and soon the shore batteries ceased to answer the *Wilmington's* guns. The *Winslow* was badly injured and had to be towed to Key West for repairs. One Spanish gunboat was destroyed, another Spanish steamer was burned, and many of the enemy were killed.

The death of Ensign Bagley and the four sailors brought to the United States the first realization of war. Not a man had been killed at Manila. Bagley was the first to give his life to the cause. He was appointed to the Naval Academy from Raleigh, North Carolina, in 1891, and had been in the service but three years. The five men who were first to lose their lives in the war, fighting against the Spaniards, were buried with martial honors. At the funeral of Ensign Bagley at Raleigh, a great concourse assembled to do honor to




THE PRADO, FROM CENTRAL PARK, HAVANA

his memory. The city was draped in mourning and the first display of patriotic sorrow and homage was equally complete and significant.

During the two weeks that had elapsed since war began, American sailors had achieved glory at Manila and had been baptized with blood at Cardenas. There were several efforts made to land supplies for the insurgents in Cuba, but the first expedition on the steamer *Gussie* was successfully repulsed by the Spaniards without loss to the Americans, but with a loss of ten of their own men killed.

Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan of the Nineteenth Infantry, regulars, made a most hazardous journey into Cuban forests to find General Maximo Gomez, General-in-Chief of the Cuban forces, to communicate to him the plans of the United States Government with regard to co-operation with the Cuban forces. He made the journey successfully and then worked his way to Nassau, N. P., in an open boat with full responses and reports for the War Department.

At this moment a sequence of extraordinary events was preparing for the world that must be described in detail. Skirmishes and collisions were no longer regarded ; marvelous feats of war and of strategy were at hand.



CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

"BOTTLING UP" CERVERA'S SQUADRON.

THE CHASE OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON OF ADMIRAL CERVERA—ITS MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE AND FINAL APPEARANCE IN THE WEST INDIES—THE BATTLESHIP "OREGON'S"
WONDERFUL RACE OF 15,000 MILES AGAINST TIME—A WARSHIP'S UNPARALLELED
RECORD OF ENDURANCE AND CONDITION—CERVERA'S FLEET "BOTTLED UP"
IN SANTIAGO HARBOR—THE HEROIC DEED OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON
AND HIS VOLUNTEER CREW—THE "MERRIMAC" SUNK IN THE
HARBOR ENTRANCE—"THE CORK IN THE BOTTLE."

I.

ON THE very day that the *Winslow* was crippled and the first Americans were killed at Cardenas, began a series of puzzling manœuvres in the game of war that were adroitly conducted on both sides, and were destined to end in astonishing successes to both branches of our arms. On April 20, it must be recalled, a Spanish squadron sailed from Cadiz with the ostensible purpose of proceeding to Havana. The movement was promptly met by the blockade of Havana, so that when Cervera's ships reached Port St. Vincent in the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands, they were met with news of the counter-movement. They remained at St. Vincent, and the explanation was made that they were making repairs and arranging their coal supply. Day after day slipped by and then early in May it was announced that Cervera's ships had sailed west, leaving three of the torpedo boats behind. These returned to Cadiz, but whither Cervera's squadron was bound could not be known. The disappearance of this squadron into the mysteries of the Atlantic waste immediately challenged the ingenuity and the speculations of strategists. It was not considered probable that it was sailing to engage Sampson's forces. The result at Manila had instantly demonstrated the great superiority

A NAVAL GAME
OF CHESS



ADMIRAL CERVERA
COMMANDING THE SPANISH SQUADRON DESTROYED NEAR SANTIAGO

of American naval skill and American gun fighters, and Admiral Sampson's seamen were eager to prove that superiority by another test.

It was intimated from Spanish sources that Cervera, instead of sailing to succor Havana, was on his way to Manila to fall upon Dewey's light ships and transfer the war to the Pacific again. The dropping of the three torpedo craft was cited as proof of his intention to make a long and swift voyage. His four cruisers were faster than any the Americans were supposed to possess, and, with a good start, he could easily reach Manila days in advance of our ships.

Another suggestion that carried with it much uneasiness was that on his way to Manila, around Cape Horn, Cervera could meet and overpower the United States battleship *Oregon*, which had sailed from San Francisco for Florida some weeks before, and was now making her way northward along the South American east coast. In the estuarial Paraguay River in the Argentine a Spanish torpedo boat, the *Temerario*, lying there on the outbreak of war, was waiting. The *Temerario* was invited to leave by the Argentine government, but she claimed that repairs were necessary and consumed much time. If she were waiting to fall on the *Oregon* in the night, and if Cervera should be able to come to her aid, serious loss might ensue.


Promoted by the Spanish system of setting afloat false information, the most surprising and startling rumors appeared. Cervera's ships had been sighted off the coast of Canada, supposed to be making for a descent upon New England and eastern coasts; it had gone back to Cadiz; it was going to sink the *Oregon* and then ravage the California coast, left without ships to defend it.

In the midst of this uncertainty our Government was not alarmed, but wary. It determined to seek Spain in a vital part. On the supposition that Cervera had more reasonable orders than those suggested by the Spanish Government, it secretly sent Sampson with four ships to seek Cervera in the ports of Porto Rico where he might be expected to enter for coal and supplies, and to establish a base.

Suddenly on the morning of May 12, Sampson appeared off the city of San Juan, Porto Rico. His squadron was a magnificent fighting force, consisting of the *New York* (flagship), the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the monitors *Terror* and *Amphitrite*, and the gunboats *Montgomery* and *Detroit*. It was not yet dawn when the ships, with lights out, arrived off the harbor. It was not intended to attack the fortifications unless Cervera's ships were behind them, but as the long black line of ocean monsters crept up close to the entrance, every man was at quarters, the decks were sanded, and destruction was in suspense. The scout *Detroit* was in advance, going as far in as possible in an attempt to reconnoitre the inner harbor. When within a mile of the old fort on the east side of the harbor, the first faint light of dawn sprang up, and in another moment the Spanish gunners in the old fort made out the ships and opened fire at the *Iowa*.

Instantly the battleship's forward guns let fly at the fort, and then swinging around her after guns, she gave the fort a whole broadside. The *Detroit* and *Montgomery* were ordered out of range, and the five armored fighters, steaming in a long ellipse before the forts on either side of the entrance, poured a torrent of shot and shell against the fortifications. The old Morro fort standing on the hill behind which stood the city of San Juan, required a high elevation from our guns, and some of the shells went too high and fell into the city. It was not intended to throw a shot into the town among non-combatants, but the assault having come from the shore, the forts must be chastised.

For three hours the five ships made their death-dealing rounds of the ellipse. The fortifications were irreparably injured. Repeatedly masses of masonry were blown skywards by the shells from the Americans' guns. Fragments from one shell struck the commandant's residence, which was situated near the fortifications, damaging it greatly. The center of the Morro was almost blown away. The shells that passed into the city did not do much damage, and but few persons were killed in the forts, though many were injured. A number of Spanish guns were knocked over and the gunners ran from their



MORRO CASTLE
COMMANDING THE ENTRANCE TO SANTIAGO HARBOR

posts and had to be forced back. One of the Spanish shells exploded on the *New York*, killing one American seaman, and wounding five, but not seriously.

The bombardment was carried on in a hazy fog in which the smoke hung, so that the contestants could not see each other well, but again the American gunners proved their accuracy, while the Spanish shells were wholly wide of the mark, except by accident. The fact was ascertained that Cervera was not at San Juan, and Sampson's fleet sailed out of sight again.

Meanwhile Cervera's squadron had been reported at the French island of Martinique, where it had arrived safe and in search of coal. This island was in the path that the *Oregon* might take on her northward way. Then the squadron disappeared again and, on the day after the San Juan bombardment, conclusive information reached Washington that Cervera's ships were off the Dutch island of Curaçao on the Venezuelan coast, where they had met colliers sent ahead with coal. Instantly Commodore Schley's squadron, the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Minneapolis*, *New Orleans*, and the gunboat *Scorpion*, sailed out of Hampton Roads to seek the enemy.

Where was the *Oregon*, meanwhile?

II.

THE United States battleship *Oregon* was making an ocean race against time that proved to be a performance unparalleled in naval history, demonstrating at once the perfection of American shipbuilding, the unsurpassed competency of American engineers in the care of machinery, and the sustained courage and watchfulness of the American crew that manned her. More than a month before war began, on the 14th of March, the *Oregon* had been ordered to Key West to strengthen the squadron there. The ship was at Puget Sound, but on March 19 sailed from the Golden Horn with a journey of nearly 15,000 miles

A BATTLESHIP'S
OCEAN RACE

to make with all the haste possible. There was at that time no apparent danger in the path to be traversed, which lay down the west coast of South America and up the east coast. But there was reason for haste. And besides there was the case of the *Maine*, known to all the crew.

The *Oregon* is a sea-going coast-line battleship of the first class, 348 feet in length, 69½ feet broad, with a displacement of 10,288 tons, 10,400 horse power in the driving engines, and a speed of nearly 17 knots an hour. The regular complement consisted of 32 officers and 441 men.

A battleship of the first class is intended to be a floating fort of steel armor, carrying the largest guns and the greatest number of batteries of all sizes possible. The interior of this steel fort is, however, the most complex and delicate mechanism that human ingenuity has combined. The guns, weighing many tons, are moved, loaded, aimed, and fired by electrical machinery; the projectiles, ranging from 125 to 1,200 pounds in weight, are brought into turrets and gun rooms by electrical machinery. From "fighting mast" and "conning tower" the range or distance of the target and the speed and direction of the ship are determined by delicate instruments, from which, through electrical connection with the various parts of the ship, the pressing of a button carries orders to fire the gun, steer the ship, or conveys engineer's orders. Such a ship carries from 65 to 160 different engines, every one of which in the hour of battle must move with perfect precision and ease. Such a ship manufactures ice with one machine, distills fresh water from ocean brine with another, and all move and breathe as with life.

Seamen, sailors, such as the old navies had and needed—they have no place upon such a ship. In their stead are scientific machinists and engineers, students of navigation, executives trained to perfectly discipline the various departments, gunners patiently trained to an accuracy of aim practical to attain only within the fifth part of a second,—during which the indicated dot of the range passes the crossed lines upon the lens of the "sight,"—athletic and skilled



U. S. BATTLESHIP OREGON

assistants to the gunners, engineers, and executives, who are responsible for the quick and accurate execution of every detail of the organized operations of the machinery.

A modern battleship is more than a ship and a fort and an army combined: it is the mechanical incarnation of death-dealing power and massed force; it is almost living mechanism of destruction, with the commanding brain in the fighting top, whence, by lines of electricity, all the nerve centers of action from turret to furnace room are controlled and inspired and transformed into parts of one brain. Such a ship probably should not be called "She." Femininity has given way here to the very essence of the masculine, though the old custom of personalizing them may probably continue to prevail.

One does not think of such an engine of force, power, and potential destruction except as typical of man's highest warlike virility. It was so that a poet of the hour saw and pictured the *Oregon*, when she was out on the ocean, making the great and dangerous race of life and death from the Pacific to the Atlantic, fearing no enemy, but rushing to the aid of the fleet—"a mailed knight of the sea."

Thus sang H. J. D. Browne in a poem called "The Voice of the *Oregon*."

"You have called to me, my brothers, from your far-off eastern sea,
To join with you, my brothers, to set a prostrate people free.
You have called to me, my brothers, to join to yours my might,
The slaughterers of our brethren with our armored hands to smite.

"We have never met, my brothers, we mailed knights of the sea;
But there are no strangers, brothers, 'neath the Banner of the Free;
And though half a world's between us and ten thousand leagues divide,
Our souls are intermingled and our hearts are side by side."

The *Oregon*, after leaving San Francisco, sailed to Callao, Peru, without stop, arriving there on April 4, and three days were spent coaling. Ten days later the Straits of Magellan were entered. From spring weather at San Francisco, the ship had crossed the torrid equator, where the furnace room heat of 160 degrees was stifling,

and now the cold of December in the southern zone was encountered, with ice on the decks and wintry blasts in the air.

Here began sleepless watch against the proved treachery of the Spaniard. War had not been declared; nor had it been when the *Maine* was destroyed. Through the narrow straits, marked with many inlets and dangerous places, in which an enemy might waylay, the *Oregon* ran only during daylight, and at highest speed, and then turned the United States shield on the prow northward. At every stopping place, for whatsoever purpose, however brief the stay, two launches were lowered and kept ceaseless round of the ship to make sure no enemy approached. The South American republics were one with us in practical interests in the war, but there were many Spanish-born persons in every port and the perfidy of Havana was not to be repeated with the *Oregon*. The great ship, costing more than three millions, was to be brought home safely.

The Paraguay was passed and no sign of the *Temerario* was seen. The gunboat *Marietta* and the dynamite cruiser *Nichteroy* were picked up on the way, and on April 30 they sailed into Rio Janeiro to coal. There Captain Clark received news of war and of the Cervera squadron's disappearance, and the possibilities of encountering it. Coal was taken on and the *Oregon* put to sea; but not to sail. The great fighter was getting ready to fight, if necessary. Outside the harbor, in the open sea, Captain Clark stopped for target practice with all guns and at varying distances. More than two hundred and fifty rounds were fired with forty-seven misses. The men were up to the mark and ready for work. Then the ship was taken back into the harbor under pretense of "making repairs" and remained there until further orders were received.

On May 3 the ocean was sought and there the battleship left the *Marietta* and *Nichteroy* and hurried on. On May 24 the great ship steamed into Jupiter Inlet, Florida, and Captain Clark reported to Washington that he had arrived safely and was ready to put to sea and fight. The distance had been covered in fifty-five days of actual sailing and sixty-six days actual time, and every part of the delicate

mechanism was in perfect condition and the health and spirit of the crew excellent.

That is what the *Oregon* was doing during the uncertain days when Cervera's squadron was sailing in mystery, and that is where the *Oregon* was, ready for action, a week after Schley had sailed to hunt the enemy.

III.

CERVERA'S squadron was all this time playing hide and seek in the West Indian islands where Spanish sympathizers were many and information doubtful of accuracy. From Madrid came news that Cervera had reported his safe arrival at Santiago de Cuba on the southeastern coast of Cuba, and then came news from the same doubtful source that Cervera had left Santiago. The first statement was true, the latter was fiction; but what was its object? Sampson was covering the Windward Passage and could prevent Cervera from going to Havana by the eastern route. Schley was in the west to close that path.

"BOTTLING UP"
THE SPANISH
FLEET

On May 20 Cervera's squadron entered the harbor of Santiago, and six days later Schley's squadron appeared off the harbor. Commodore Schley had been intent upon preventing the enemy from getting to Havana, and on his way eastward along the southern coast stopped to see if Cervera had, or would attempt to, put into the harbor of Cienfuegos, where two days were lost in doubts. At Santiago Schley got word that Cervera was in the harbor with all his ships, but the high hills at the entrance and the narrow passage prevented him from seeing the Spanish fleet. It was not until May 30 that Schley sent his famous dispatch to the Navy Department saying, "I have seen the enemy's ships in the harbor with my own eyes." By adroitly sailing in small boats at dawn he had got near enough to the passage to be enabled to see the Spanish war ships.

Cervera was "bottled up."

But the Spaniard had chosen the safest and most impregnable harbor in Cuba. If he was "bottled up," our own ships were "bottled out"; for, owing to the narrowness of the entrance, it would be difficult for us to get inside to attack. On the other hand, however, a blockade of that port would be very easy, and we could starve the Spaniards into submission. They could get little or no supplies in Santiago province, for Calixto Garcia had some well-armed men in that province, and he held most of the interior towns. He was then, indeed, holding Santiago city from the rear, and if we blockaded the port the Spanish fleet would be in a bad way.

On the day that Cervera was seen in the harbor, orders were issued to Major-General W. R. Shafter, commanding the Fifth Army Corps at Tampa, to prepare 15,000 or 20,000 troops for embarkation on transports for Santiago. With the Spanish fleet in the trap guarded by Schley, it was determined to attack Santiago at once by land and sea and make it the base of operations in Cuba. It was a decisive proposition.

On May 31 Commodore Schley bombarded the forts at Santiago for the alternate purpose of inviting Cervera out to give battle or to test the effectiveness of the shore batteries. Firing was exchanged for nearly an hour, in which the guns on the Spanish ships inside participated. The forts were damaged and a shell struck the Admiral's flagship in the harbor and set fire to Admiral Cervera's room. There was no injury to the Americans.

The following day Admiral Sampson arrived with his squadron, and all hope of escape was cut off from Cervera. Still no American ships could venture to enter the harbor, the passage to which was not more than two hundred yards in width. The harbor channels were planted with torpedo mines, four land batteries guarded the narrow door, and, inside, a battery moored upon an old war ship faced the entrance, while Cervera's full squadron lay in wait. For days the American ships lay off the harbor, like cats before a rat-hole, varying the suspense with bombardments of the batteries and with feints intended to draw Cervera out.

The situation was ripe for heroism, and the hero appeared. He was Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, an assistant Naval Constructor, upon whom Admiral Sampson called to decide whether it would be possible to sink a ship in the harbor entrance and effectually block it. A stopper was to be put into the mouth of the bottle which held Cervera's ships. Lieutenant Hobson, after several days' consideration, came forward with a plan that he pronounced practicable and begged to be permitted to command the enterprise, which seemed to involve nothing less than sending seven men into the jaws of almost certain death, in order that the navy of Spain might be trapped beyond escape, and the sentinel American ships relieved of the strain of watching.

Lieutenant Hobson's daring plan was to take the big ship *Merrimac* straight into the entrance under the fire of forts and ships and sink her suddenly by the aid of torpedoes. It involved the assistance of six men to sail her in, and these, with the commander, had to expect to escape death only by miracle. Admiral Sampson accepted the plan, rewarded Hobson by granting his request to command the perilous enterprise, and then called for six volunteers, one from each of his fighting ships.

Then a spectacle was witnessed that was to make the world ring with surprise and admiration for American seamen. Our sailors had been described by Europeans of the continent as "mercenaries," "the scum and refuse of the world's navies," as mere hirelings, without patriotism, and without courage.

When these "mercenaries" heard the call for volunteers to face the prospect of almost certain death, practically every man on every ship came forward. They not only offered to go, but many wept and begged for the privilege of going. As only six were needed for special duties the choice was narrowed down, but lots were drawn in some instances and record-ratings resorted to in others, to determine thus fairly who should be taken, and so pacify the eagerness of the intrepid crews.

And when the volunteers were put aboard the *Merrimac*, there were eight men instead of seven to go, because a coxswain of the

New York, who had been at work on the *Merrimac*, concealed himself and when discovered at the last moment became insubordinate and refused to leave her. The officers, rigorous as they were in discipline, saw that there was sublimity in the mutineer, and, in silence, left him at the post he had resolved to occupy.

The *Merrimac* was a big ship, 330 feet in length, and the plan was to run her into the entrance, swing her across the channel, and, by exploding torpedoes attached to the hull below the water line and opening all the water valves, sink her instantly and leave her an immovable obstacle to the passage of ships in or out.

In two days the *Merrimac* was made ready, under Hobson's personal supervision, and then the volunteers were called. The list of these would adorn any page of the world's history. They were:—

Lieutenant RICHMOND PEARSON HOBSON, an Assistant Naval Constructor.

OSBORN DEIGNAN, a coxswain of the *Merrimac*.

GEORGE F. PHILLIPS, a machinist of the *Merrimac*.

JOHN KELLY, a water tender of the *Merrimac*.

GEORGE CHARETTE, a gunner's mate of the flagship *New York*.

DANIEL MONTAGUE, a seaman of the cruiser *Brooklyn*.

J. C. MURPHY, a coxswain of the *Iowa*.

RANDOLPH CLAUSEN, a coxswain of the *New York*—(the heroic mutineer).

Wednesday night, June 1, was selected for the enterprise; but the night was unfavorable. It was about three o'clock on Friday morning that the start was made. The night was beautiful, with the sea bathed in the splendid luster of tropical moonlight. In the city, far inshore, the lights blinked, and the searchlight on Morro tower burned brightly. On all of the big ships of the American fleet every man of the crews was lying on the decks with his rubber blanket under him, waiting to witness the desperate act.

The *Merrimac* headed straight for the western shore of the harbor entrance, followed by the launch of the *New York*, commanded by Naval Cadet Joseph Wright Powell, of Oswego, New York, with five men. Theirs was a duty scarcely less hazardous than that of the men on the *Merrimac*. There was no apprehension that the men on

the *Merrimac* would be killed by the explosion of the torpedoes against her hull. The charges were to be controlled by an electric wire that would ignite a fuse so timed as to allow the heroes to leap into a whaleboat and catamaran towed astern. But in case of miscarriage of concerted action and failure to reach the floats, Cadet Powell's launch was to rescue the survivors if she could.

On board the *Merrimac* Lieutenant Hobson stood on the "bridge" of the ship in full uniform, in command. The other men, stripped to the waist and wearing light under-trousers alone, were at their posts. As noiselessly as possible, with three lights showing rearwards, the ship crept towards the Estrella point, with the intention to drop the bow anchor on that side and thus swing with the flood tide across the channel. She had fairly reached the entrance under the cover of a cloud over the moon, when the sentinels on Morro sighted her and a shot was fired into her. In another moment all the Spanish batteries were busy pouring a torrent of shot and shell into the ship, while from inside the harbor the ships cleared for action and centered their metal upon her sides. In the midst of this torrent the heroes of the *Merrimac* calmly stood at their posts and carried out their plan as they could. Then was added to the roar of cannon the crash of the torpedoes that had been set against the *Merrimac's* hull, and, almost immediately, she sank. Still the batteries poured in their deadly hail of missiles for ten minutes, until the absence of all life on the sunken ship indicated that further attack was useless.

Under this fire Cadet Powell and his crew drove the launch of the *New York* close in and hovered on the spot to await the heroes. None came. All night the launch kept watch and even at daylight ran across the entrance under the fire of the batteries to look for survivors. The *Merrimac* lay across the channel.

When broad day was in the sky and no raft or boat could be observed, Cadet Powell steamed off shore for his ship, pursued by Spanish shots.

"No man came out of that harbor alive," he reported to Admiral Sampson, sorrowfully. It was true, and on all the American war

ships the sailors looked at the sunken vessel in the channel, whose masts and funnels could be seen, and thought of the men who had apparently given up their lives for their country's service—and again “Remembered the *Maine*.”

So the long, hot day wore into afternoon, until a small tug, bearing a flag of truce at the peak, came out of the harbor and the yacht *Vixen* went to meet her. A Spanish officer was taken aboard and conveyed to the *New York*. From the *New York's* mast the signal soon went up to the fleet that the *Merrimac's* whole crew were prisoners of war on Cervera's ships, two slightly wounded only, and “all well.”

The sea off Santiago harbor seemed to roll up cheers with every wave. The same charm that had protected the American fleet in collision with the Spaniards at Manila seemed to be holding good.

Lieutenant Hobson and his crew were safe. They had executed their plan, escaped to the raft, and were carried into the harbor by the tide, where they were picked up and taken before Admiral Cervera. When he learned from Lieutenant Hobson the truth of the heroic deed, he kissed him on the forehead and declared that men capable of such gallant deeds should not be mourned by their comrades. He at once gave orders to prepare a vessel to convey to Admiral Sampson the news that the eight heroes were honored prisoners of war, and soon afterwards took steps to secure their exchange, although the act was much delayed by the Spanish authorities in Cuba and at Madrid. It was a month before the heroes of the *Merrimac* were exchanged. But during their imprisonment they were treated by Admiral Cervera with great kindness and respect, and they were permitted to receive money and food from the American ships.

The Spanish officer who reported the safety of the men, reported also that the *Merrimac* did not close the channel. “You have made it more difficult,” he said, “but we can yet get out.” A fact that was afterwards demonstrated. The rush of the tide into the *Merrimac's* shattered hull sank her before she swung squarely across the channel.

But “the cork had been put into the bottle” that held Cervera and his ships. And the American people ceased from worry on that score



SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC
IN FRONT OF THE ESTRELLA BATTERY, SANTIAGO HARBOR, CUBA

and showered honors on Hobson and his men. The seamen were all promoted to warrant officers, and the President sent a message to Congress eulogizing Lieutenant Hobson and his men, suggesting a vote of thanks and the passage of a special act to enable him to transfer Lieutenant Hobson to the line of the Navy for such promotion as might be determined upon.

Lieutenant Hobson, the hero of the daring enterprise, was not twenty-eight years old when he carried out the action that made his fame world-wide. He was born August 17, 1870, at Greensboro, Hale County, Alabama, and graduated from the university there at the head of his class when he was fourteen. At fifteen he entered the Annapolis Naval Academy. He graduated there at nineteen, the youngest member of his class. His aptitude in mathematics and mechanics was so great that he was sent abroad to take technical courses in construction at French academies, from which he received several medals of distinction. On returning he was placed at the head of the academy course of construction at the Annapolis School, a course he had suggested. He wrote a number of papers upon naval topics, which attracted considerable attention abroad. He, like Admiral Dewey, was so careful of the conventions of dress, manner, and the little amenities of society, that he was esteemed a "dude" among those with whom he enjoyed the relaxations of social life. But, like Dewey, also, the garb of the "dude" covered the clear brain, the cool courage, the quiet heart, and the steel nerves of the dauntless American fighter.

IV.

AFTERWARDS, on the stage of the Metropolitan Opera House in New York, at a great meeting held to assist the Soldiers' and Sailors' Fund, Lieutenant Hobson, who had come home for the purpose of devising means to raise some of the Span-
HOBSON'S STORY
OF
THE FEAT
ish ships, told the story of his feat, and described the heroism of the American sailor and soldier in these glowing terms:—

"It is known to everybody that when the call was made for volunteers to go in on the *Merrimac*, men fell over one another in their

haste to be accepted. On the *New York* alone, 140 men volunteered before the order could be passed that no more volunteers were needed. When a few out of this number had been assigned to stations on the *Merrimac*, all, in obedience to orders, lay flat on their faces. Two were stationed by the anchor gear, others by the torpedoes arranged along the side, two in the engine room. It was agreed by each one that he should not even look over his shoulder, no matter what happened to the ship, to any of his companions, or to himself. If wounded he would place himself in a sitting or a kneeling posture, or whatever posture was necessary, so that when the time for his duty came he could do it to the best advantage. And so they lay, each man at his post, and under what difficulties you may understand when I tell you that, out of the seven torpedoes placed along the side, five had been shot away by the enemy's fire before the order was given for the *Merrimac's* crew to gather at the rendezvous on the quarter deck. Projectiles were coming more as a continuous stream than as separate shots. But, through the whole storm, Jacky lay there ready to do his duty as he had been instructed to do it. There was not only the plunging fire from the forts on both sides, but a terrific horizontal fire from the fleet in the harbor, and it seemed as if the next projectile would wipe all the sailors out of life at once. If ever a feeling of 'each man for himself,' a feeling of 'get away from this,' 'get out of this any way, anyhow,' was to be justified it was justified then. Not a man so much as turned his head.

"Then, later, when we were on the catamaran and the enemy's picket boats came crawling up out of the darkness with their lanterns, the impulse was just as strong to slip off the raft and swim for the shore, or for the entrance of the harbor. The simple order was given: 'No man moves until further orders.' And not a man moved or stirred for nearly an hour.

"On that same afternoon, by the kindness of the gallant Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces, Admiral Cervera, the party was in prison, and the men's clothing was permitted to be brought to them from the fleet. One of the men, as spokesman for the rest, was allowed to come over to my cell with a package for me. He said: 'We would do it over again to-night, sir.'

"The next day, when it seemed uncertain whether or not a remnant of the Inquisition was to be revived, when the enemy did not know whether it was his fault or ours that a ship had been sunk, and rather inclined to the belief that he had sunk an American battleship and that we were the only survivors out of several hundred, the men were taken before the Spanish authorities and serious and impertinent questions put to them. Remember, they did not know what it might cost them to refuse to answer. Spanish soldiers of the guard stood before them, making significant gestures with their hands, thus: [Mr. Hobson passed his hand edgewise across his throat]; our seamen laughed in their faces. Then a Spanish Major questioned Charette, because he spoke French, and asked him this question:—

"‘What was your object in coming in here?’ and so long as I live I shall never forget the way Charette threw back his shoulders, proudly lifted his head and looked him in the eye, as he said:—

"‘In the United States navy, sir, it is not the custom for the seamen to know, or to desire to know, the object of an action of his superior officer.’

"Take this simple incident,—and, after all, in comparison with the whole war, a very simple incident,—the sinking of the *Merrimac*, and make your own deductions as to the quality of manhood in the United States navy. You will have then a more or less complete but certainly not an overestimated idea of Jacky.


"Experience with the soldier has naturally been restricted for me under existing conditions, but recently from my prison window, which was but little in the rear of the Spanish line of intrenchments, I saw the Spaniards fortifying the city for twenty days. I watched them with critical interest. I saw them bring up guns from the ships and place them. Then I saw our men come up and drive the Spaniards into those intrenchments, and when they had driven them into the intrenchments I saw them go on and try to take the intrenchments themselves. It looked to be an impossible thing, but as yet the artillery was silent. The men came on up the hill and the artillery opened, and my heart sank when I saw that it was flanking artillery. For a moment the

American fire ceased, as though the enemy's guns had been a signal. 'Now, then,' said I to myself, 'this is the place where the individuality of the soldier will appear, for each man there knows that he is just as likely as any other man to be struck with that shrapnel.' None of them had ever been under fire before; they could not be put to a harder test; but how did they respond to it? Instantly after the lull a more rapid fire set in, and a more rapid rush of men up to the trenches. In spite of flanking artillery we had taken those fortified trenches with unsupported infantry, a thing that army experts the world over said could not be done. I have nothing further to say. A sailor cannot go out of his experience."

With a few words of appreciation for the spirit of the volunteer soldiers in the camps who had not had a chance to fight, for the men who wanted to volunteer, but did not have the opportunity, Mr. Hobson closed with these words:—

"I can only say that after seeing our soldiers and our sailors as I have seen them, I thank Heaven that it is vouchsafed to me to devote my life, my whole lifework, I trust, to the country."





SHAFTER'S ARMY EMBARKING AT PORT TAMPA FOR SANTIAGO

CHAPTER THE SIXTH.

THE INVASION OF CUBA.

LANDING OF THE MARINES AT CAIMANERA—FIVE DAYS OF ALMOST SLEEPLESS FIGHTING WITH SPANISH FIGHTERS—FIRST OF THE CUBANS—THE MAUSER RIFLE IN ACTION—LANDING OF SHAFTER'S DIVISION AT BAIQUIRI, AND OF WHEELER'S AT SIBONEY—UNITED STATES SOLDIERS AND THEIR TORMENTS WHILE MARCHING—THE ENEMY VANISHES IN RETREAT—FIRST USE OF THE DYNAMITE CRUISER "VESUVIUS" IN WARFARE—RESULT OF THE EXPERIMENTS.

I.

THE hull of the *Merrimac* had scarcely settled at the bottom of the entrance to Santiago harbor when the President instructed Major-General Shafter to proceed with the Fifth Army Corps and effect a landing at or near FIRST LANDING
BY MARINES AT
CAMP McALLA Santiago. There were 15,000 troops ready for service at Tampa, regulars and volunteers, and it required thirty-five transports, with supply, hospital, and other service ships, and a convoy of men-of-war, to convey them safely to whatsoever point should be deemed best to seize for a base. The ordering and embarkation of the expedition was, of course, therefore, attended with delay and some impatience. Meanwhile the war ships released from continual watch at Santiago reconnoitered the coast to the east and west, conferring with the Cuban allies and seeking to discover the best landing point. To cover the place selected, feints were made at several points, which were bombarded by our ships in turn.

The first descent in force was upon the town of Caimanera, in Guantanamo Bay, about forty miles east of Santiago. Caimanera, or Alligator Pool, is a small town situated six miles from the bay entrance, and was the only place of any importance in the shallow harbor. It is the sea terminus of a railroad fifteen miles in length to the towns of Guantanamo, Santa Catalina, and Jamaica northward.

Tuesday, June 7, five ships bombarded the shore batteries, which the Spaniards had constructed for defense, and for eight hours threw shells toward the town in which there was a garrison of about 1,000 Spanish. Here, under the fire of the shore batteries, the *St. Louis* was sent in to cut the cable line, which, under the international agreement, could only be done within three miles of the shore. Protected by her consorts the *St. Louis* lay steady under terrific fire and succeeded in the task without injury. At the end of two days of bombardment the ships had destroyed the shore batteries and forced their way within the entrance of the bay to Fisherman's Point, on the east side.

Here it was that, on Friday, June 10, the first forces of the United States landed upon Cuban soil. They were 650 men of the First Marine Battalion Volunteers of New York, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert W. Huntington. They had been aboard the transport *Panther* since May 22, without setting foot on land. They had encountered a fearful storm off Cape Hatteras, had lain for weeks under a broiling sun, and now, with the prospect of stretching themselves on shore, were full of enthusiasm. The afternoon of the 10th they landed and marched up the steep hillside east of Fisherman's Point to the plateau at the summit, where a grateful breeze was blowing. Then, under the influence of unrestrained enthusiasm, a pole was erected and at ten minutes before two o'clock in the afternoon, Color-Sergeant Richard Silvey, of Company C, raised the Stars and Stripes over Cuban soil, while the men, drawn up with uncovered heads, saluted the flag with cheers. Then, on the hilltop a camp was laid out, tents set up, supplies fetched with enormous difficulty up the side of the hill overgrown with dense brush and the sharp cactus plant that covers the whole country. But this was a labor of enjoyment to the marines sick of being cooped up on shipboard in inaction. No Spaniards appeared to oppose the landing or to resist the establishment of the camp. The sun went down that afternoon upon Camp McCalla, so christened after the commander of the gunboat *Marblehead*, leaving the marines weary with labor but grateful



for rest assured, and proud of the honor of first landing. Next day the camp was finished and the men gave themselves up to security.

This was to be rudely destroyed, however. About four in the afternoon, while some of the men were bathing, and others lounging, with scouts out among the foothills to the north and east, a Cuban scout rushed into camp and reported that 200 Spaniards were in the tropical forest preparing to attack. Immediately shots were heard in the tangled fastnesses and our men were called to defense. A hundred and fifty who were bathing scrambled ashore, ran up the hill entirely nude, grasped their carbines, and fell into line with their comrades. Then followed a few minutes of fighting.

For the first time the Mauser rifle and smokeless powder of the Spanish regulars were matched against the Lee rifle of the American navy, with its grain powder. The result of the test was to prove the superiority of smokeless powder, at least. The rain of Spanish bullets—more like steel wire nails than conical bullets—came from ambush without betraying the hiding place of the marksman, so that our marines were fighting an unseen foe who could be flushed only by hunting for him. This exposed the hunter more than the hunted.

The little skirmish was soon over, but at nine o'clock that night when the moon had come up, burying the thickets in dense gloom and flooding the open spaces with silvery radiance, the Spanish again attacked from the thickets, shooting into the white tents and at the moving figures of pickets or those to be seen in camp. Four of our men were killed and a number wounded. The first to fall was Dr. John Blair Gibbs, of New York, a distinguished young surgeon who had given up a large practice to volunteer. He was the first man to be accepted as a New York volunteer in the navy and the first to be killed in a battle on Cuban ground. He was shot as he came out of the hospital tent into the moonlight. He was surgeon of the battalion.

All night long, without a moment's sleep, the marines sustained the defense, sending out scouting squads into the thickets and amongst the prickly cactus plants, almost impenetrable. They could discover the

enemy only by the flash of his gun. The ships in the bay threw their searchlights into the thickets to assist, but all night the unseen foe beleaguered the marines. When morning dawned there were four marines dead and a number wounded, while there were indications that the Spaniards had carried off their dead and wounded, the number of which could not be ascertained.

When day dawned the marines had been twenty-four hours without sleep. They were not yet to get any. For twenty-four hours afterwards no man in that camp had an hour of sleep or even of rest. The hilltop, which had seemed impregnable to attack, proved to be a target for the hiding foe. So at daylight down came all the clean, white tents, and all the camp luggage and supplies had to be wearily carried down the hill again. Then trenches must be dug around the crown of the hill. In these for a week the men were to crouch by day and sleep by night. They intended to hold Camp McCalla. Huddled on the hilltop they could see nothing, save here and there a flash in the night or a moving bush in the day, but they fired away as best they could. When they were not in camp, they were out in the woods scouting and skirmishing. These expeditions were trying to those untrained to the work. Most of the marines came from the cities. They were absolutely ignorant of woodcraft. None of the men had been taught to fight in this manner. Even the bravest do not like to keep looking for death and have it continually about to seize them.

With the arrival of sixty Cuban scouts and soldiers under the insurgent Colonel Alfredo Laborde, of General Garcia's command, however, on the second day, there was improvement in the situation. They understood the guerilla method of fighting. Their intuition in the thickets astonished the marine volunteers. They would go carelessly through the jungle, apparently keeping no watch and devoid of fear. Then, without there seeming to be any reason for it, they would announce that there were Spaniards in the vicinity and prepare to meet them. They were of immense service as scouts and guides, and enabled the marines in three or four days to hunt down the secreted



THE NIGHT ATTACK ON THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO

Spaniards, who were killed all through the chaparral as if they were lurking animals.

At the end of five days and nights of scouting, fighting, with almost no sleep, the Spaniards were driven back to Caimanera, and then Camp McCalla was again occupied with the tents of the brave volunteers who encountered the first horrors of the campaign to capture Santiago.

The sailors of the navy on board the war ships in the harbor, who had not expected great things of the volunteers at first, saw the heroic capture of the base with wonder and pride. They volunteered again and again to land and assist the volunteers in keeping the flag aloft. When the last Spaniard was driven back to the trenches of the town, the sailors on the *Marblehead* sent to the volunteers a testimonial of their admiration. It took the form of 340 pounds of "plug" tobacco, sent over and delivered in camp by the impulsive seamen. When it was received the marines were drawn up in line on top the hill, the megaphone was pointed at the *Marblehead*, and then ensued a passage of complimentary greetings between ships and marines, accompanied by cheers and shouts of joy.

In this heroic encounter, which cannot be called a battle, although no battle ever demanded more fortitude or involved more endurance or suffering, the United States forces obtained their first impressions of Spanish and Cuban soldiers. It was, that, while both were brave, they were of no value as disciplined fighters. The Cuban scouts were a total surprise. They could not shoot. The rifles with which they were supplied after their arrival in camp were as so many useless clubs. In the excitement of battle their instinct was to throw them away and take to their machetes. If they did fire, it was from the hip and they were as likely to kill their own men or the Americans as the Spaniards. Their enthusiasm was unbounded. When fighting was on they gave one wild cheer after another: "Viva Cuba Libre," "Viva los Americanos," "Viva Cubanos." They refused the concealment of breastworks, preferring to rise at full length after each volley and, waving their machetes, to shout wild oaths of defiance at their foes,


for whom they appeared to have the utmost hatred and contempt. Their endurance was superb. They clambered over the cactus-covered hills in their bare feet all day, easily outlasting the much larger and more powerful Americans, who are not accustomed to such movements.

Most of the Cuban soldiers were negroes, although their officers were white. Some of them were full-blooded blacks, who seemed to inherit the savage blood of their African ancestors. Had it not been for the Americans the Spaniards who were captured would have fared badly. The night the first were captured the Cubans were in tremendous excitement. They hopped about smoking, laughing, and shouting, in utter defiance of camp regulations. While arrangements were being made to have the prisoners taken on board the *Marblehead*, one of the Cubans—a little black fellow with a string of white beads about his neck—approached an American officer. Not being able to speak English, he rolled his eyes suggestively in the direction of the prisoners, tilted back his head, and drew his finger across his throat three times.

"*Si?*" he asked with a nod of his head toward the Spaniards, and again he cut at his throat with his finger.

"No," said the officer, shaking his head positively. The Cuban scowled, grunted, shrugged his shoulders, and walked away in deep disgust.

Deserters began to come in from the Spanish lines in a starving condition and much disheartened. These, with the prisoners captured and their statements and condition, surprised the Americans. Like the Cubans, the Spanish regulars were totally ignorant of the mechanism of the modern rifle. The "sights" on many of the Mausers found on the ground were so badly rusted that they could not be moved, and in such position as to indicate that the only elevation the Spanish soldier knew was "point blank." The Spaniard, like the Cuban again, fired from the hip, disregarding accuracy of aim. The fatalities among the marines were therefore accidental hits. These hits, even if accidental, caused dreadful wounds, and in the second day's fighting gave rise to the charge that the Spaniards mutilated the dead. Careful investigation by our own surgeons entirely disproved the charge.



THE CRUISER MARBLEHEAD
SHELLING SPANISH GUERRILLAS OUT OF UNDERGROWTH NEAR GUANTANAMO

The long, slender Mauser bullet, at close range, after entering the body appeared to turn around and go tearing and cutting its way through. The aperture at entry was small, but where the bullet came out great holes were torn in the killed and wounded.

II.

THE first division of the United States army of **THE LANDING OF THE TROOPS** invasion arrived off Santiago June 20. It was commanded in person by Major-General Shafter and consisted of the following troops:—

Infantry regiments: Sixth, Sixteenth, Seventy-first New York Volunteers, Tenth, Twenty-second, Second, Thirteenth, Ninth, Twenty-fourth, Eighth, Second Massachusetts Volunteers, First, Twenty-fifth, Twelfth, Seventh, Seventeenth, Third, Twentieth. Total infantry, 561 officers and 10,709 enlisted men.

Cavalry: Two dismounted squadrons of four troops each from the Third, Sixth, Ninth, First, and Tenth Cavalry, and two dismounted squadrons of four troops each from the first United States Volunteer Cavalry. Total dismounted cavalry, 159 officers, 2,875 enlisted men; mounted cavalry, one squadron of the Second, 9 officers and 280 enlisted men.

Artillery: Light batteries E and K, First Artillery; A and F, Second Artillery; 14 officers and 323 enlisted men. Batteries G and H, Fourth Artillery, siege, 4 officers and 132 enlisted men.

Engineers: Companies C and E, 9 officers, 200 enlisted men.

Signal Corps: One detachment, 2 officers, and 45 enlisted men.

Hospital detachments are included in these official figures. The staff corps numbered 15 officers. The grand total of the expedition was 773 officers and 14,564 enlisted men.

General Shafter, who was on board the transport *Segurança*, went on the *New York* to confer with Admiral Sampson, after which both proceeded to Aserraderos, eighteen miles west of the harbor, for a conference with the Cuban General, Calixto Garcia, who held that place with 4,000 of the insurgent troops, under agreement established with General Maximo Gomez, Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent forces. This had been arranged by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew S. Rowan, and was a part of the occasion of his dangerous journey through Cuba in

search of General Gomez. The three commanders held a long conversation at Aserraderos and the plan of invasion was fully agreed upon.

On Wednesday, the 22d, the preconcerted measures for landing were put into effect. The fleet under Sampson separated into small groups of ships and proceeded to attack all the batteries along the coast for many miles. Against the batteries on the west of Santiago, at Aguadores, two and one-half miles east, at Las Altares, eight miles east, and at Baiquiri (or Daiquiri), twelve miles east, the ships attacked with such weight that the batteries were silenced, and the small garrisons were driven in confusion to the hills in the rear. When this was achieved the transports were run in at Baiquiri and at Las Altares where the troops were disembarked without meeting the slightest resistance. These two places were selected in order that the Spanish outposts defending Santiago might be attacked in front by the United States forces landed at Baiquiri, while those disembarking at Altares or Siboney, would be able to fall on the right flank or the rear of the enemy.

Here, again, as at Camp McCalla, the landing was so easily made and the first advance was so little resisted that the campaign began with no intimation of the stout resistance and desperate obstacles that were to be met. The division that went ashore at Baiquiri advanced to the northwest upon a foe that vanished into the jungle and among the hills without making a stand. At Demajayabo, two miles northwest of Baiquiri, the head of the invading column rested on Wednesday night. Thursday morning the vanguard advanced to Juragua, four and a half miles further, without check. General Lawton's brigade, which formed the vanguard of the army, consisted of the Second Massachusetts Volunteers, the Eighth, Twelfth, Twenty-second, First, Fourth, Seventh, and Seventeenth Regular Infantry, and the Eighth, Fourth, and Ninth Cavalry, and a battalion of engineers. The skirmish line was commanded by Colonel Wagner. In it were fifty picked men from the brigade and about two hundred Cubans whose familiarity with the country and the tactics of the Spaniards rendered

them most desirable for this service. Colonel Aguirra was in charge of the Cubans.

Within a mile of Juragua a messenger came in from Colonel Wagner announcing that the Spanish under General Linares had abandoned the place. Brigadier-General Lawton took possession of the town without firing a shot. He found that the Spaniards had retreated so precipitately that they were unable to carry out their purpose of destroying the town by fire. An unsuccessful attempt to burn the railroad shops had been made and a few huts on the outskirts were set on fire. Otherwise property there was unharmed, and the Stars and Stripes were raised over the Government buildings.

General Lawton established temporary headquarters at Juragua and set about taking the precautions necessary to hold it against possible attack. Colonel Wagner's scouting party in advance pushed on in a westerly direction. They had not gone far when the Cubans under Colonel Aguirra stumbled upon the rear of the retreating Spaniards and shots were exchanged. Two Cubans were killed and the others wounded.

General Linares with his 1,200 Spanish forces fell back upon Sevilla, near which is a plantation called Las Guasimas, which was the field of a bloody battle between Cubans and Spaniards in the Ten Years' War, in which the Spaniards lost a thousand killed and were badly defeated.

On Wednesday, also, at Siboney, eight miles east of Santiago Bay and about six miles southeast of Sevilla, the second division of the United States forces under Major-General Wheeler had disembarked. It consisted of the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Twenty-fifth Regiments of regulars; the First and Tenth Regiments of cavalry; Roosevelt's Rough Riders; four troops of the Second Regular Cavalry, mounted; the Second Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers, a battalion of engineers, and a number of horses intended to be used by mounted infantry.

The landing was effected under cover of a fierce fire from the battleships. When the bombardment had ceased, a large number

of famished, ill-clothed Cubans, flocked down the mountain sides to welcome the Americans. Many of them wept when they saw the soldiers who had come to rescue them. The Spaniards who had been driven out of the village and the forts defending the place, applied the torch before they left and when the Americans reached the shore the houses in the village and the forest also were burning.

While the loaded small boats were being pulled ashore the bands on the transports enlivened the proceedings by playing "There'll be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night." The popular air was greeted with wild cheers from the soldiers and from the bluejackets and marines on the war ships.

Thursday the division set out to effect a junction with the main body under General Shafter. The march ahead was to prove almost intolerable, even to regulars inured to the hardships of marching. The men were equipped with all the impedimenta described by the War Department for campaigning. Each man had his rifle and cartridges, bayonet, pistol, canteen, blanket, poncho, half of a shelter tent, rations, and the other things considered necessary. All had worn the packs in Florida, and it was thought that they had become accustomed to them and would be able to bear them throughout the march.

The progress, as described by those present, under the blazing sun, fighting along half-made trails through cactus and jungle, was in itself heroism. There was no shade to protect the men, and their feet crushed the red earth into a fine dust which rose in clouds, enveloping them from head to foot. It settled in the perspiration on their faces and arms, covering them with a red paste. It worked into the folds of their packs, and was blown out into their faces and down their necks as the packs shifted on their shoulders. Dust and perspiration entered their eyes and nostrils, blinding and choking them; but the men toiled on, unmurmuring and clinging to their packs, heedful of the warnings which they had heard about deserting their shelters and rations.

But now this intolerable condition was to grow worse. As they penetrated further, not only was the burning sun overhead, but the hills shut out the breeze. The packs on the backs of the men

caught in the overhanging brush, causing them to lose their footing. At last one man threw his blanket away. His example was followed by others, and extra clothing, blankets, cans of meat and vegetables, shelter tents, and cooking outfits littered the path along which the army passed. The first guideposts on the way to Santiago were the articles cast aside by that weary, toiling line of soldiers who forced their way over the hills through the hot sun. The practice once begun, it was easy to discard things. Coats, underclothes, and haversacks followed the bulkier articles, and the ground might have been the scene of a retreat instead of a scarcely opposed advance, judging from the litter along the line of march. Many a soldier who started out bravely with all the outfit that his superiors considered necessary finished his first day's march with little besides the clothing he wore, his arms, and his canteen. What was thrown away was not wholly lost, however, for a busy band of Cubans spent their time in picking up the articles cast aside and packing them back to Baiquiri and Siboney where they disappeared in the huts in which the Cubans live.

It was not until night came that regret began to weigh heavily upon our troops. With the setting of the sun the terrific heat passed and the damp night air seemed doubly chill after the exhausting march they had made. The question of food was an important one, too. Many of the men had abandoned their rations, which were not liberal at the outset, and as there was no hope of a supply train reaching the camps before two or three days the situation threatened to become serious. The plight of the men was no worse than that of their officers, and the first regiments that pitched camp did so with a gloomy enough outlook.

Under these circumstances, as on the march, the wonderful good nature of the soldiers came to their aid and made it possible for them to overlook some of the discomforts, dismiss others, and belittle the rest. Despite their weariness and hunger, they went to work without complaint, and by combining and contriving, lending and begging, were able to give something to eat to every one and to provide shelter for most. Bacon and hardtack, in very limited quantity, made up the bill

of fare. The coffee supply was also very limited, and almost without exception the men had abandoned the tinned meats and vegetables with which they had been supplied at starting. The fare of officers and men in most of the regiments was identical. The officers had what each had packed for himself and many of them had thrown their supplies away on the march. No hardship borne by the men was not in equal measure borne by their officers, and all alike took the situation philosophically. Fortunately, there was abundance of water in mountain brooks and streams, complete water supply systems at Baiquiri and Siboney, so that the torments of thirst were not added to the exhaustion of heat and hunger on the first days of the march.

III.


THE landing of the troops had been fully covered by the fleet. The Spanish ships in Santiago Bay and the garrison of General

HURLING DYNAMITE WITH THE "VESUVIUS"

Linares in the city had been kept under constant tension by bombardments from the heavy ships of the line.

On June 23, Santiago was closed to the sea and our army was starting to invest it by land. General Pando, with a force said to be 12,000 strong of Spanish regulars, was reported to be advancing across Cuba from Havana to the relief of the city. At Manzanillo, a hundred miles west of Santiago, was a garrison of 7,000 Spaniards, but Garcia and his Cubans lay at Aserraderos and were to move northward around the bay, so that he would have to be reckoned with by any reinforcements from that direction.

During the bombardments of Santiago Bay the first experiment in warfare with pneumatic guns throwing dynamite shells was made. On June 14 the American dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius* hurled into the bay three of these dynamite shells. The Brazilian government had purchased a similar ship, the *Nichteroy* (now the United States ship *Buffalo*), for the purpose of using her against the ships controlled by the naval commanders who had joined the revolutionists. But the *Nichteroy's*



U. S. DYNAMITE GUNBOAT VESUVIUS

guns had never been fired. It has been explained that dynamite has twenty-five times the explosive power of gunpowder. For twelve years the navy had been divided as to the usefulness of the *Vesuvius* in war time, and, until some practical experiments could be made, it was argued that it would be foolish to build more ships of her type. She was one of the early ships completed for the navy and the fastest in the service for many years, but she was always regarded as a failure except by a few officers who had tested her and had the amplest confidence that she would do everything she was designed for. The good results obtained with the pneumatic gun invented by Mefford and greatly improved by Zalinski were, it is true, conceded long ago. The slow, steady action of compressed air as the propulsive force had allowed the use of enormous quantities of high explosives for the bursting charge of the shell, whereas, with ordinary gunpowder to expel the projectile, explosion in the bore had resulted even when comparatively small quantities of dynamite were fired. But many naval officers regarded these weapons as better suited to land forts with stable platforms than to naval uses. Owing to her extreme length and narrowness it was difficult for her to turn in a radius of less than 400 yards, although provided with twin screws. Naval officers have pointed out that another defect was the fact that her three tubes are stationary and can be trained only by the rudder. To train them, therefore, is sometimes a difficult matter in heavy seaway.

Captain Folger, her commander, had said on sailing to join the fleet in Cuban waters: "Whatever we can hit with a shell will be destroyed. But if a shell strikes us first it will not be necessary to erect a monument over us. There will be nothing left of us to bury."

This was the mysterious vessel that arrived at Santiago on June 14 and remained concealed all day behind the big war ships. A Cuban pilot, acquainted with the moorings of Cervera's ships in the bay, went aboard her, and at nine o'clock at night she was sent in towards the mouth of the harbor. She crept in to within six hundred

yards of the shore and took position and range with great care. In three minutes as many shells were fired, one from each of the tubes. The report of the pneumatic guns was peculiar, sounding like a sudden, short cough. The discharge imparted no perceptible force of recoil to the ship.

The first shot struck near the ridge of the hills and exploded with a tremendous roar, not unlike the thunder of a shell. There was, however, very little flame. The light emitted was rather in the nature of a glow. An immense column of earth was blown straight up into the air to a height of two hundred feet.

The effect of the second shot, which struck higher up on the cliff, was similar to that of the first.

The third shot went over the hill and probably reached the supposed position of the torpedo boats in the harbor.

The *Vesuvius* backed out at a high rate of speed, although she was moving with her engines reversed. She swept by a lighthouse tender that was lying to seaward and which was getting away from the fire of the forts, passing her as though the tender were lying at anchor.

Several times the *Vesuvius* repeated her work, though it was afterwards ascertained that no great damage had been done. But the tremendous force of the explosions and the uncertainty of the attack, combined with the lack of flame and report, filled the enemy with terror, and reduced the Spanish sailors to a condition bordering upon nervous exhaustion.

The tubes of the *Vesuvius* are of 15 inches calibre, but she did not fire the full charge they are capable of throwing. Sub-calibre charges of 5- 8- and 10-inch projectiles, containing from 200 to 500 pounds of gun cotton, were used in the attacks on Santiago. It was regarded as practically settled that the *Vesuvius* would play as important a part in completing the destruction of Morro Castle at Havana, if that should be necessary. Her range of effectiveness is from one mile to one mile and a half for smaller charges.

The pneumatic mortar was a match for the Mauser rifle, at least.

CHAPTER THE SEVENTH.

HEROES AT LAS GUASIMAS.

FIRST MILITARY BATTLE OF THE WAR—STORY OF THE "ROUGH RIDERS" VOLUNTEERS,
THE OFFICERS AND MEN—WITH BATTALIONS OF THE FIRST AND TENTH CAVALRY
THEY CARRY AN IMPREGNABLE POSITION AT LAS GUASIMAS AGAINST FOUR TIMES
THEIR FORCE—THE GALLANTRY OF VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS—FIRST
MILITARY DEATHS IN THE FIELD—HUMORS AND TRAGEDIES UNDER FIRE.

I.

FRIDAY, June 24, 1898, is a date memorable in the history of the war with Spain. Not so much for what was actually gained in victory, but for what was exhibited of American courage, tenacity, and character in the three factors that made up the fighting forces of United States troops. That day was fought the battle of Las Guasimas, near Sevilla, on the road to Santiago, the first battle of the war. The brunt of it was borne by a battalion of 450 of the regiment of Rough Riders, volunteers, 200 of the First Regular Cavalry, and 224 of the Tenth Regular Cavalry (colored), all dismounted. Not more courage galloped into the lane of death at Balaklava than marched into the treacherous valley bordered by trees concealing hidden forces far in excess of the invaders at Las Guasimas.


**ROUGH RIDERS
AND
REGULARS**

It is the nature of Americans to welcome bold experiments and to applaud success. There was no volunteer body of the war that received as much attention and invited as much interest as the regiment of cavalry known as Roosevelt's Rough Riders. That was its popular name, although Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt was but second in command. His was the resolute spirit that prompted its organization and fixed public interest upon it.

The Honorable Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the opening of the war. He had long been one of those

characteristic personalities in the public and private life of the United States that represent the vigor of democracy without regard to differences of opinion. Of the old Dutch stock of New York's oldest settlers, he was born to great wealth, and with determined character. Carefully educated in universities, he made his entrance into politics early, with vigorous ideals and practical methods. Greeted with the epithet of the "dude" politician, he received the epithet with the good nature that an athletic, courageous, and good-humored man would naturally exhibit. He was soon a representative in national conventions, was the forlorn hope candidate of his party for the mayoralty of New York, was appointed president of the Civil Service Commission, was Police Commissioner of New York, and became Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1897. Recognizing then the probabilities of war with Spain he began to encourage the system of State Naval Reserves and made many addresses in which he upheld the manful necessity of war to compel peace and secure justice. The good condition of the navy at the outbreak of war was largely due to his labors and enthusiasm.

When war was inevitable, he resigned his position as Assistant Secretary and asked for a commission to organize a regiment of cavalry of which Dr. Leonard Wood was to be commissioned Colonel. Great was the public surprise. His friends remonstrated with him and urged that he was jeopardizing his career. The authorities suggested that he would be more valuable in the Navy Department. "The Navy Department," he answered, "is in good order. I have done all I can here. There are other men who can carry it on as well as I, but I should be false to my ideals, false to the views I have openly expressed, if I were to remain here while fighting is going on, after urging other men to risk their lives for their country." He declined a Colonel's commission and asked it for his friend, Dr. Wood. There was in his answer the self-reliant courage of American manhood. Mr. Roosevelt had written admirable historical works, exciting stories of adventure in hunting "big game," while he was leading the life of a ranchman in the Far West. He was at once at the beginning and end of the American type, rich, intelligent, industrious, thoughtful, cultured, and had "sand."



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT
OF THE ROUGH RIDERS, U. S. A.

Colonel Leonard Wood, who was commissioned as Colonel of the regiment of Rough Riders, was an assistant surgeon in the army. He had been with the army on the plains, and General Miles had brought him to Washington as his attendant physician. He was then detailed as physician at the White House; but while surgery was his profession, fighting was his bent. He had the instincts and bearing of a soldier; of New England birth, a graduate of Harvard, he had a record of which any soldier might be proud, and wore a medal of honor which testified to his gallant conduct.

These two commanders, who had lived on the plains of the Far West, turned their eyes in that direction for recruits and the appeal was answered by a response from the most remarkable types of men that the varied population of the United States could produce. With admirable felicity of terse description and picturesque suggestion the regiment was afterwards described by John Fox, Jr., the well-known author, who wrote from Cuba to *Harper's Weekly*: "Never was there a more representative body of men on American soil; never was there a body of such varied elements; and yet it was so easily welded into an effective fighting machine that a foreigner would not know that they were not as near brothers in blood, character, occupation, mutual faith, and long companionship as any volunteer regiment that ever took the field. The dominant element was the big-game hunter and the cowboy, and every field officer and captain had at one time or another owned a ranch. The majority came from Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Indian Territory, though every State in the Union was represented. There were graduates of Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Cornell, University of Virginia, of Pennsylvania, of Colorado, of Iowa, and other Western and Southern colleges. There were members of the Knickerbocker Club of New York and the Somerset of Boston, and of crack horse organizations of Philadelphia, New York, and New Jersey. There were revenue officers from Georgia and Tennessee, policemen from New York City, six or eight deputy marshals from Colorado, half a dozen Texan Rangers, and one Pawnee, several Cherokees and Chickasaws, Choctaws and Creeks. There were

men of all political faiths, all creeds—Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. There was one strapping Australian and one of the Queen's mounted police, though 90 per cent. of all were native-born Americans. And athletes a plenty—Wrenn, who twice saved America the tennis championship over England, and Larned, the second-best player in the land; Goodrich, the captain of Harvard's crew in 1897, and Bull, who rowed on that crew; Dean, the best quarter-back in Harvard's history, and Greenway, the best end in the history of Yale; Channing and Church, who played football at Princeton; Hollister the runner and Waller the high-jumper of Yale; Stephens the polo player, and Ferguson and Thorpe, the members of Roosevelt's old polo team at Oyster Bay; and besides these, who were all troopers, Lieutenant Devereux, who played good football at Princeton, and Lieutenant Woodbury Kane, who did the same at Harvard, and who helped win his commission washing dishes on a cooking detail for a New Mexico outfit, and washing them, as a superior said, "d——d well."

"And more: Sergeant McElhinny, the Louisiana planter, who has an island of his own; Captain Jenkins of South Carolina, son of the Confederate general; Captain O'Neill, ex-mayor, ex-sheriff, and hunter of Indian and white desperado, Populist and Free-Silver man; Captain Llewelyn, who carries four bullets in his body; Captain Luna, who demanded at Tampa that he should be permitted to go to the front and show his loyalty because he was the only man of pure Spanish blood holding a commission in the American army; Sergeant Darry, who was Speaker of a Lower House and Gold Democrat candidate for Congress; Heffner, who, though shot mortally, asked Colonel Roosevelt to give him his gun, and, propped against a tree, kept firing until the line went forward; and Lieutenant Thomas, whose father fought in the Civil War, whose grandfather was killed in the Mexican War, who had two great-grandfathers in the War of 1812, three great-grandfathers in the war of the Revolution, while the fourth was Patrick Henry—all these were citizens of New Mexico. Lastly, there was Captain Capron, who fell—the fifth from father to son in the United States army, a captain of Indian scouts, an expert in Indian sign language, and a great hunter."

What finer or more thorough description could be given, that would set forth the swinging characteristics of that regiment of conglomerate Americans who were called "Roosevelt's Rough Riders" until they were dismounted at Tampa to go to the front on foot. Then the irresistible instinct of humor in Americans instantly dubbed them "Wood's Weary Walkers." These were the volunteers who were to be first under fire and to die on Cuban soil.

At the other extreme were the two troops of the Tenth Regular Cavalry, men whose fathers had been slaves and whose capacity to fight had long been doubted by unbelievers, but whose record of intrepidity and exhaustive service on the frontier with its twin regiment, the "Black Ninth," was well known to the War Department and signalized by many medals of honor for courage and gallantry. Nearly every man black, nearly every man disciplined by years of service, these sons of former slaves had a place in equity in the first line to fight for the freedom of Cuba.

Between these extremes were the two hundred men of the First Regular Cavalry, white troops, with ranks suddenly filled with recruits. Yet all these cavalymen were to fight on foot—dismounted cavalry.

II.

LAS GUASIMAS is so called from the tree *la quasima*, which is the characteristic growth of the locality, a low wide-spreading tree with strong boughs extending almost horizontally out from the trunk. It bears nuts rich in nutrition for the swine herded by the farmers. The spot is about six miles inland from Baiquiri and near Sevilla.

General Young's brigade of troops, the vanguard of the army, had been marched from the coast to Siboney in the afternoon of June 23, and went into camp. Its object was to effect a junction with the other division of the army and threaten the flank of the retreating Spaniards. That night Cuban scouts reported to General Young the presence of the enemy in a strong position at Las Guasimas beyond Siboney. It was

the junction of a mountain trail and a valley roadway. It was determined to attack next morning and fight the first battle of the war. Colonel Wood of the Rough Riders was ordered to take his battalion over the mountain trail, supported by the two troops of the First Regular Cavalry, while the two troops of Tenth Cavalry followed the valley road.

The march began at dawn and the Rough Riders climbed the hill. After proceeding several miles, moving with difficulty along a narrow trail that would not admit of more than four men abreast, while the scouts and skirmishers were working their way through dense underbrush, the advance entered upon the top of a ridge that pointed towards high hills ahead and on either side—holding the ridge like a horseshoe. The hills outlooking the ridge were covered with trees amid which the Spanish were concealed, from 2,000 to 3,000 strong. The 900 United States troops were in a *cul de sac* that was to have the force of an ambushade, because of the enemy's enormously greater number and stronger position. The country around was a chaos of high hills and peaks. So numerous were these that a tenacious force, fertile in resource, ought to have been able to annihilate an invading force much larger than the defenders. The Americans were marching with heavy packs and suffered greatly with the heat. The First Cavalry behind and the Tenth in the valley road at the foot of the ridge, were inured to the heat and moved cheerily along.

The advance halted for relief from the heat to permit men in ranks to fall out on the roadside and recover.

Captain Allyn K. Capron of Troop L, Rough Riders, was riding "at point," or ahead of the main body, when he became aware of the presence of Spaniards on the hill to his right. He sent word back to the main body and the men were deployed on both sides of the trail with injunctions to keep silence. The news that Spaniards were within striking distance had suddenly developed in this remarkable body of hard riders and dead-shots a spirit of strange hilarity. Some of them laughed aloud and exchanged jokes. Quiet was restored and the advance proceeded cautiously.

Suddenly from the hill on the right a Spaniard stood up from cover and fired the first shot. Thomas Isbell of Troop L, a dead-shot, saw him rise and almost as soon as the Spaniard had fired, he fell dead with Isbell's bullet through his head.

Then from the three sides that encircled the ridge the enemy began to pour a furious plunging fire upon the volunteers, who were now at a disadvantage because of the smokeless powder employed by the Spaniards. These first volleys were mostly concentrated on Troop L, in advance. Captain Capron was killed in the first few minutes. It was difficult for our soldiers to see the enemy through the underbrush, but every advance step of an American offered a plain target upon which the Spanish riflemen could concentrate their fire.

After the first shock of encounter, the Rough Riders were ordered ahead at double-quick, shooting as they ran. The Mauser bullets from an overwhelming force were dropping our men dead and wounded about, when the rage of the volunteers began to find vent in curses at their inability to get sight of the enemy and take vengeance.

"Don't swear, men!" cried out Colonel Wood, with cool good-humor, "Don't swear or you'll catch no fish!"

Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, who, with Colonel Wood, was in front encouraging the men, picked up a Krag-Jørgensen rifle that had been dropped by a wounded trooper and leaping forward ahead of his men began firing shot after shot into a blockhouse that stood at the head of the slope.

Then the men steadied down and fought with the precision of regulars. Five times during the advance the volunteers were ordered to cease firing and they obeyed instantly, a proof of discipline remarked by the regulars as most unusual.

Forty or fifty men had fallen, when the battalion cleared the underbrush and could see the blockhouse at the top of the slope with a clear open space between.

After a moment's pause for formation, the volunteers, with Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt marching in front of the line, made a dash for the blockhouse, the men raising the terrible yell of the Western Indians as

they went. A murderous fire poured from the blockhouse. Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt turned and, waving his sword, called on his command to follow him up the hill.

The Spaniards poured a steady fire and for a second the volunteer fighters hesitated under the shock of it. At that critical moment the Tenth Cavalry on the valley road to our left and the First Cavalry in the rear that had been ordered against the wings of the enemy had made their attacks and charged up the slopes with the intrepidity of disciplined veterans. The sound of their guns was echoed by cheers from the Rough Riders who dashed against the blockhouse with cyclonic force. At the sight of such impetuous daring the enemy burst from the fort and ran to the cover of the woods behind, leaving seventeen dead on the ground as they fled. Then they gave way on both wings and 3,000 Spaniards were in full flight before 950 Americans that had fought against enormous odds and disadvantages.

No pursuit was possible, and our victorious troops camped on the ground and held it.

It was charged that the Rough Riders were led into ambush by the unnecessary carelessness of the officers. This charge was immediately dispelled by the reports of General Wheeler and General Young, stating that the movement was made under orders and for the purpose of forcing a collision. It was probably true that the force of the enemy was largely underestimated by the Cuban scouts that discovered them.

But the result of the encounter was, beyond all its cost, of great value to our troops. Our army was as irresistible as our navy against great odds. The Spaniards were plainly disheartened and confused by the result of the battle. So sure were they of victory that they had brought some of their women with them to witness the defeat of the Americans. The fact was, the unfaltering advance of our men, after volleys had been poured into them from the front and flanks was a killing surprise for the Spaniards. By Spanish rules of war the Americans were whipped early in the fight, and so badly whipped that their invincible volleying and rushing were like the resurrection of men

who ought properly to remain dead. Indeed, they complained that the Americans did not fight under the rules of civilized warfare, but, like savages, charged on without fear of death, when they should have retreated.

III.

THE victory at Las Guasimas was not dearly bought—as casualties in battles go—but the list of dead and wounded produced a great impression upon the public at home. First to fall was Captain Allyn K. Capron of Troop L, Rough Riders, one of a family of soldiers. His father was Captain Allyn Capron of the First Regular Artillery. Allyn K. was one of three sons and was ambitious to enter West Point Academy, but, with a younger brother, failed of appointment. They were not turned from their purpose, however, but enlisted in the regular army, and by conscientious work and study both finally won commissions as Second-Lieutenants. Allyn K. Capron got a transfer to the Rough Riders and was made Captain of Troop L. He was a well-built, handsome man, about twenty-seven years of age. He was very courageous and very popular in his troop. His friends were not at all surprised to learn that he was in the thick of the fight, and he died a hero. After being mortally struck he turned to a Sergeant standing near. “Give me your gun a minute,” he said to the Sergeant, and, kneeling down, deliberately aimed and fired two shots in quick succession. At each a Spaniard was seen to fall. The Sergeant, meantime, had seized a dead comrade’s gun and knelt beside his Captain and fired steadily. When Captain Capron fell he gave the Sergeant a parting message to his wife and father, bade the Sergeant good-bye in a cheerful voice, and was then borne away dying.

THE FIRST
MILITARY
HEROES

The second on the list was Hamilton Fish, Jr., prospective millionaire, athlete, adventurer, ranchman, laborer, Sergeant of Rough Riders. He was one of a family that has rendered conspicuous service

to this country from the days of the Revolution. His great-grandfather, Colonel Nicholas Fish, was a gallant soldier of the Revolution, esteemed especially by Washington. His grandfather was Hamilton Fish, fifty years ago Governor of New York, and afterwards a United States Senator, and, finally, Secretary of State in the Cabinet of President Grant. Young Fish's father, the Honorable Nicholas Fish, who was just graduated from college as the Civil War was drawing to a close, has been United States Minister to Belgium and Switzerland, and was at the time of his son's death an honored resident of New York City. His uncle, the Honorable Hamilton Fish, was long an able and conspicuous member of the New York Assembly, and subsequently, as its Speaker, sustained the honorable record of his family. Young Fish was about twenty-six years old. Like most members of the family he was very tall, standing six feet three inches in his bare feet. He was of powerful build. For two or three years he was a student at Columbia University, and was a crack oarsman. He was a fine boxer and was magnetized with animal spirits and the love of danger. Wild, prankish, yet good-natured, this young man who was called "incorrigible" met his death with the simplicity of a hero. Standing behind a tree, firing, a comrade in the open fell wounded. Young Fish stepped out, drew the wounded man behind the tree, stepped out in the open to take his place and was shot the next moment. He lived twenty minutes and died without complaint.

Captain Maxim Luna of the Rough Riders was of pure Spanish blood and enlisted in New Mexico for the purpose of fighting to obtain for Cuba the freedom he had found in the United States.

Among the wounded were Major Alexander O. Brodie of the Second Battalion, Major James L. Bell of the First Cavalry, and half a dozen officers of the three commands. The wounded numbered about fifty.

The stories of heroism were characteristic. One of the men of Troop E, desperately wounded, was lying between the firing lines in an open spot. Assistant Surgeon Church hurried to his side and, with bullets falling all around him, calmly dressed the man's wound, bandaged it

and walked unconcernedly back, soon returning with two men and a litter, bringing him into the lines. While engaged in his duties, another Rough Rider who was standing behind a tree ahead, called aloud, "Doctor, you'll get shot if-you-don't-watch-out."

The Surgeon turned his face, laughed at the man behind the tree, and retorted: "Well, what business have you here without getting killed?" And each resumed his work with a smile.

In the hardest of the fighting during the advance, the New York "swells," as the aristocratic privates were called, began to sing popular songs and apply the words to the occasion, amidst laughter and applause.

Edward Marshall, a newspaper correspondent, who was in the thick of it, was shot, the ball striking his spine and causing paralysis. He was borne to the rear and, as his condition seemed desperate, he called for his chief, asked for a cigarette, and lying on the stretcher smoking, dictated the story of the battle as far as he had seen it, between moments of paroxysm. When he was asked where he had been struck, he smiled and answered, "All over, I guess, because I don't feel it anywhere."

The courage of the black troops as they charged deliberately up the slope was everywhere applauded. There was no hurry, no hesitation, but cool deliberation. When a man was struck his comrade turned and called "Hospital!" with as much presence of mind as if it were a sham battle. The black troops displayed fine courage and discipline.

There was not lacking courage among the enemy. They were badly disciplined and poor marksmen, but there were individual instances of daring that were repaid with death by the American dead-shots.

There were two hundred Spanish killed and many wounded. That they had carefully planned the fight was plain, because their wounded were carried off to Santiago in wagons, of which there was a long train.

CHAPTER THE EIGHTH.

CLOSING IN ON SANTIAGO.

THE TERRIBLE HARDSHIPS OF THE TROOPS MOVING FROM BAQUIRI TO ATTACK—SPANIARDS
TERRORIZE CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS WITH TALES OF "YANKEE" CRUELTY—PREPARING
THE LINE OF ASSAULT AND CUTTING OFF THE ENEMY'S SUPPLIES—THE FEINT
ON AGUADORES AND SANTIAGO BY THE AMERICAN FLEET AND DUF-
FIELD'S TROOPS—TWO DAYS OF MURDEROUS GUN-FIRING.

I.

THE fierce and irresistible onslaught of our cavalry on the enemy at Las Guasimas sent the Spaniards flying back upon the outposts of Santiago. They made no effort to hold Sevilla, which General Wheeler occupied next day and whence, on Sunday, he sent the advance guard with Cuban scouts two miles ahead to take position near the hill of San Juan. Rest was needed and delay was required to bring up field guns and reinforcements from Baiquiri. Then, too, the dreaded rainy season began on Saturday and the camps and roads were deluged with the downpour. The troops chafed, and the officers also, but it was necessary to have the siege guns and to draw them over the trail through the jungle.

THE ADVANCE
ON SANTIAGO

A newspaper correspondent on the ground admirably described in the New York *Sun* the condition, the prospects, and spirit of the army during this wait of six days.

"No man," he wrote, "who has not gone over this trail, no man who was not in the terrible downpour of rain which drenched the American army to the skin this afternoon, can understand the suffering of our troops and the heroism with which they bore it.

"Cavalrymen, dismounted for the first time in years, and infantrymen from cool Michigan and Massachusetts, toiled hour after hour along these so-called roads and paths, through the jungles of cacti, poison vines, and high grass that cuts like a razor, in a blistering

sunlight that makes the skylines of the distant hills shimmer and waver before the eyes, while from the stagnant pools strange, gray mists float upward, and vultures, with outstretched wings, look greedily down from above.

"The vegetation torn down and trampled under foot by our troops has fermented, and a horrible sour breath arises from the earth. Curious stenchs steal from hidden places in the jungle.

"Thousands of gigantic land crabs, spotted with yellow and red, wriggle and twist themselves along the sides of the roads, with leprous, white claws clicking viciously, a ghastly, dreadful sight to young soldiers fresh from New York, Boston, and Detroit. Ragged Cubans slip noiselessly through the undergrowth or sprawl under the shade of huge gossamer trees watching with childish pleasure the steady onpush of their American defenders.

"The heat is almost intolerable. The sun is like a great yellow furnace, torturing everything living and turning everything dead into a thousand mysterious forms of terror.

"The fierce light swims in waves before the eyes of the exhausted soldiers. This morning a young infantryman reeled and fell in the road almost under the feet of the mule ridden by your correspondent. When I helped him to his feet he smiled and said: 'It's all right. I never struck such a place as this, but I must get to the front before the fight begins. I had to lie to get into the army for I am only seventeen years old.' Five minutes after he was trudging along gallantly.

"Two hours later the first great tropical rainstorm we have encountered fell from the sky, not slantwise, but straight down. It was the first actual test of the army in a most dreadful experience of the tropics. For three hours a great, cold torrent swept down from the clouds, drenching the soldiers to the skin, soaking blankets, and carrying misery into all our vast camp, reaching out on either side of the trail, extinguishing camp fires, and sending rivers of mud and red water swirling along the narrow road, dashing over rocks where the trail inclined downward, and through this filthy flood the

army streamed along, splashing in the mud and water or huddling vainly for shelter under the trees.

"An hour before the heat was so intense that men reeled and swooned; but now came one of the mysterious transformations of the tropics. The whole army shivered, and robust men could be seen shaking from head to foot, turned gray and white. Millions of land crabs came clattering and squirming from under the poisonous undergrowth, and the soldiers crushed them under their heels. Every man who had quinine swallowed a dose. The officers, splashed with mud to their hips, hurried here and there, urging the men to strip naked when the rain was over and dry their clothes at the camp fires.

"Presently thousands of men were standing about naked while the sun drew up thick vapors from the earth and vicious tropical flies stung their white skins. The American army is a noble body of men when it is stripped. Think of the tremendous strain of heat like this and rain like this in one day on men from a northern climate, and yet there was not one word of complaint anywhere.

"The writer has seen several armies in the field, but he never saw a more splendid exhibition of cheerful endurance. One thought which seemed to run like an electric current through the army was anxiety to get to the front. The soldiers everywhere begged to have their regiments put in the first line of attack. The weather is nothing to them, the possibility of disease is nothing to them, exposure and hunger do not trouble them. They want to fight. You can see it in their faces; you can hear it in their talk."

During six days a cordon of these men was drawing around the enemy. The situation and the plan of attack may be briefly described. Six miles from the sea at the head of the bay of the same name, lies the city of Santiago, surrounded on all sides by high mountains which rise almost straight up from the water. These mountains stand in ridges practically running parallel with the coast. Between the first and second ridges is Santiago. Two and a half miles east of the entrance of the harbor is Aguadores, directly south of Santiago itself. Southeast of Santiago, on the top of a hill, is San Juan. About three

miles northeast of the city is El Caney. Santiago is a walled city, and the three small towns were its outposts. General Shafter first intended to take it by siege, then concluded to carry it by assault, and, in the end, both plans were adopted.

From Aguadores to El Caney the line of the invading army presented nearly six miles of front when arrayed for attack. It consisted of about 12,000 soldiers of the United States, together with a force of Cubans, under the command of General Calixto Garcia, estimated at from 3,000 to 4,000 men, many of whom were occupied in scouting service. Refugees and deserters from Santiago reported that there were 12,000 Spanish regulars in the city under General Linares, of which number 4,000 were sick or disabled. A condition of terror prevailed among the inhabitants, who had been told that 40,000 American troops were marching on the city. It was declared also that the United States troops were picking up Cubans as they advanced and were forcing them to carry guns and to fight in the front. The women of the city were terror-stricken at the tales that were told of the cruelties and outrages perpetrated by the hated "Yankees."

The Spaniards warned Cubans that all who left the city would be killed by the Americans. They added that the Cubans who left the city to join the American army were all shot as soon as they got in range of the "Yankee" guns; that the Americans were killing *pacifcos*, men, women, and children. The better class of Cubans knew that all these stories were false and did their best to counteract them. They were not very successful, however, as the Spaniards declared they had absolute proof.

The situation in Santiago was desperate. There was famine everywhere. The soldiers, of course, had most of the food, but it was of the poorest quality and greatly restricted as to quantity. Civilians had to shift for themselves. Practically all the food in the city consisted of black bread, which, in most cases, was unfit to eat. Many were starving because they could not get even this. Water was scarce, owing to the cutting off of two of the sources of supply by the Americans. There were many wells in the city, however.

Meanwhile the enemy was preparing to defend Santiago to the bitter end. Trenches and earthworks were constructed and in front of these were erected barbed-wire fences, many in number, to prevent our troops from making any of the tremendous charges such as had swept away the Spaniards at Las Guasimas. But the Americans had prepared for this with details of soldiers supplied with steel "clippers" to precede the main body and cut down the fences. Naval guns from the batteries of the disabled war ship *Reina Mercedes* in the harbor were landed and mounted at the various points of defense, and the guns on Admiral Cervera's ships were relied upon to throw a great weight of shell and solid shot into our troops.

From Manzanillo on the west General Pando was expected to come to Linares' assistance with a force estimated at from 5,000 to 11,000 men. It was proposed to send General Garcia with his Cubans to prevent this, but when General Shafter heard that food was scarce and disease prevalent in Santiago, he decided that it was better to have Pando's force enter and increase the distress. "Besides," he added, "we will know then where all the Spanish forces are." General Pareja at Caimanera, with a number of Spaniards, was kept busy with the United States marines and war ships in the harbor and could not reach Santiago.

On June 30 the investment was complete. The Cuban outposts nearest to the city had reached a picturesque old stone house three miles from Santiago. The portholes and turrets of the old building were a few days before manned by a hundred Spanish soldiers. Now the house was held by fifty Cubans. From this position the city of Santiago could be distinctly seen below. Red Cross flags were flying in many places, apparently to discourage gunners. All this time the advanced skirmish and picket lines were exchanging desultory shots, with little effect. The methods of the Cubans in picketing the advance excited admiration among American officers and troops. The work is of such a character that it would have been impossible for the Americans themselves to do it as well, owing to their ignorance of the country and their lack of exact knowledge of Spanish

methods. The ragged, half-starved insurgents in the harassing undergrowth and almost impassable defiles left not a single footpath or knoll unguarded. At least three sentries were at every point. No one could pass without their knowledge. They would sit on one knee, crouched over, with guns at half-cock, for hours at a time, watching patiently every wave of grass or movement of the trees that might indicate the presence of the enemy.

II.

AT EARLY morning on July 1 the American army and navy began a continuous assault on the enemy from Aguadores on the sea to El Caney on the northeast of Santiago. Never before in warfare had there been massed so many powerful and ingenious engines of destruction to be wielded on both sides by men of acknowledged courage, and on the side of the United States, at least, by men of the highest competence and training. The assault was actually three separate battles, although two of them, inland—San Juan and El Caney—involved each other and the same troops.

BOMBARDING AGUADORES AND SANTIAGO DEFENSES

The attack on Aguadores by General Duffield with the Michigan Volunteers and some Cubans, aided by the war ships, was purely a feint to prevent the Spanish forces there from going to the assistance of those at points nearer Santiago. General Duffield's four battalions were loaded in cars on the railroad and transported westward from Siboney until the fire of the enemy was met. Then they were taken off the cars and marched forward to the assault.

Aguadores is on the sea side. Through the mountain in its rear is a pass through which the railway line extends. Batteries were on the crags on the west side of the rocky pass and a masonry fort on the east side, half a mile inland. Standing off the shore were the United States cruiser *New York*, with Admiral Sampson on board, and the *Suwanee* and *Gloucester*, converted yachts. Communication

between the ships and General Duffield was maintained by signals made by means of a white flag "wig-wagged" by code.

At seven o'clock eight companies marched inland to get in the rear of Aguadores. An hour later the sound of firing was heard, indicating that the pretense of assault had been commenced by the army. According to signal, the war ships then began their part of the work. The *Suwanee* began shooting at the fort and got the range on the second shot. The *New York's* aim was remarkably accurate, the shore batteries being struck every time by her shells. Clouds of smoke, red with dust, obscured everything. This was kept up for an hour, and it seemed that every inch of the vicinity had been ploughed up by the missiles. In the meantime the *Suwanee* kept firing at the fort. Every shell went through and exploded inside.

There was a huge red and yellow flag at the corner of the fort. Commander Delahanty of the *Suwanee* fired and hit it just at the base of the staff. The men on the *New York* and *Gloucester* cheered lustily. No one was seen within the fort, but the tilted flagstaff was straightened. The Commander fired four more shots and hit the fort every time, but not the flag. The fifth time the flag and staff were tilted again. The sixth shell struck the flag squarely in the middle, tearing it to ribbons; the seventh severed the pole, at a range of 2,000 yards.

This splendid marksmanship was received with cheers and the roar of siren whistles on the war ships. The men on the *New York* and *Gloucester* were so interested that they had ceased firing; but now they resumed, and it rained shell everywhere. The fort was hit often; great holes were knocked in it, and blocks of granite were thrown into the air to fall into crumbled dust.

The answering fire, if any, was too feeble to be noticed. Now and then there was a puff of smoke at places where batteries were supposed to be. The next moment a shell from one of the ships would strike the spot. No shots from the forts were seen to land on the ships.

While the firing was in progress the *Yale*, *Newark*, and *Vulcan* arrived, crowded with soldiers. They ran close alongside the *New*

York. The soldiers cheered every shot. They wanted to land, then, but the sun was too high.

All the ships carried great American flags, the *Newark* the largest of all. She sailed in under the guns of Morro so that from her decks the Spaniards could be seen with the naked eye, but she did not draw their fire, although she steamed up and down twice. She signaled to the *New York* for permission to join in the fire against Aguadores, but the flagship refused. The *Newark* continued parading in front of Morro until eleven o'clock. Then firing ceased for half an hour and the ships took up new positions, opening again. After the second renewal of the firing the bushes on shore parted and men in single file came out. The first carried a Red Cross flag, the last had the same banner in his hand; the party had half a dozen wounded men and two dead.

There was another stop at noon; then the firing was resumed with greater energy, the shots being aimed at the masked batteries. The result was not seen from the ships, but the soldiers inland saw the great shells burst passing over their heads. The firing lasted until 2:20 o'clock, and ceased for the day. The soldiers who came out said the shells had ruined all the fortifications.

Next morning, responding to the advance made by the army on San Juan and El Caney and for the purpose of distracting the Spaniards in the city and on the ships in the bay, a magnificent bombardment began of the forts and batteries at the entrance and of the inner harbor and of the Spanish positions about Santiago itself. The tremendous assault was to deceive the enemy's navy into the belief that the American ships intended to force their way past the sunken *Merrimac* into the bay. It succeeded, as it was afterwards admitted that the nervous strain of expectation had exhausted the Spanish sailors.

At sunrise the line of the United States war ships was formed. It comprised the *Gloucester*, *New York*, *Newark*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Brooklyn*, and *Vixen* in the order named. The gunners received orders to fire slowly, but not to lose opportunities.

The firing began at a signal raised upon the *New York* at ten minutes to six o'clock. The first shot was fired from the forward turret of the flagship. It was immediately answered by the batteries to the east and west of the harbor entrance. The other ships quickly followed the *New York*, and the bombardment became general. The Spanish guns replied for ten minutes, then the gunners seemed to desert them. Sampson's fire was maintained steadily for half an hour, when the *Newark* was ordered out of the line.

The manœuvring of the battleships during the action evidently surprised the enemy. As the ships changed position, moving on to give those behind them a place, the Spaniards began to shout, in the belief that they were retiring disabled. But it was poor satisfaction, for every Spanish shot was answered by one that struck almost the spot whence the last puff of smoke came from the Spanish batteries. The *Oregon*, which led the way, firing deliberately, sailed in almost to the entrance of the harbor. The *Indiana* swung in to the east of the *Oregon*. When she opened up, every one of her guns was brought to bear upon the east battery, and the result was observed by the dust and the masses of earth and brick, with here and there a cannon, hurled high into the air. The ship was concealed by smoke, but, belching fire every second, she rained shells true to the mark until the east battery ceased to answer.

The *Oregon* took Morro Castle for her mark, and knocked great holes in it. The big flag on the castle, which had waved lazily above the smoke of every engagement, was lost sight of when the *Oregon* opened fire at just seven o'clock. As the flag was knocked over an exultant yell from the battleship was taken up on the other ships and wild cheering followed. One shell struck the face of the old castle, which was now crumbling. At the next shot a large section of the ramparts seemed to be carried away. After this there was no reply.

The *Oregon* and *Indiana* were then ordered inshore until their guns were brought to bear upon the Punta Gorda battery, behind Morro. They passed to the west directly under all the outer guns, firing quickly as they went. A great explosion was seen on Tivoli Hill, where Punta

Gordo is, and there were thirty distinct explosions, all within a small area. A shell went through the cabin of Admiral Cervera on his flagship in the bay, setting it on fire. Another exploded on the deck of a Spanish ship, killing and wounding several sailors. One of the great 13-inch shells, not intended to cause such injury, struck the façade of the Cathedral in Santiago and caused great damage to the old church.

The firing lasted until eight o'clock, when the fleet was signaled that the shells thrown toward the Spanish positions might endanger our own troops. Then firing ceased, but no such magnificent naval spectacle had been witnessed up to that time. Again the marksmanship of American gunners was demonstrated to be unsurpassed.



CHAPTER THE NINTH.

SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY.

THE TERRIBLE STRUGGLES OUTSIDE OF SANTIAGO—WHEELER AND KENT'S ADVANCE FROM EL POZO UP THE VALLEY TO SAN JUAN—"THE BLOODY CORNER" AND THE HEROISM OF OUR TROOPS—HAWKINS'S AND ROOSEVELT'S CHARGES ON THE HILL—CHAFFEE'S GREAT FIGHT AT EL CANEY AND THE DEARLY BOUGHT VICTORY—SCENES AND INCIDENTS OF THE BATTLES—A FOREIGN OPINION.

I.

**BATTLE OF
SAN JUAN** WHILE the war ships and Duffield's brigade were hammering Aguadores and the bay of Santiago, General Shafter's two divisions under General Wheeler and General Lawton were charging the outposts of San Juan and El Caney with an impetuous vigor that was to overthrow the superior strength of the enemy in his own chosen intrenchments. General Lawton's division composing the right wing of the American line was sent against El Caney, a village three miles north-east of Santiago, protected by fortifications, a block-house, and trenches. On Lawton's right General Garcia with 2,000 Cubans covered the roads leading to Santiago to cut off any reinforcements.

The center of the army was at El Pozo, about four or five miles south of El Caney, under Generals Wheeler and Kent. Its objective was the high hill of San Juan, almost a part of the suburbs of Santiago and the highest eminence in close reach of the city. It was defended by trenches, two houses converted into defenses, and its approaches were covered by mazes of barbed wire obstacles and innumerable hiding places for sharpshooters along the available road. The flanks of the roads were also defended by numerous hills, each occupied and defended by Spaniards, rendering advance one continuous series of skirmishes, amounting altogether to a day's battle.

The fighting line of our army consisted of about 13,500 men; 1,500 under Duffield on the left, about 7,000 under Wheeler and Kent in the center, and 5,000 under Lawton, engaged on the right. Of this number there were three regiments of volunteer infantry and one of volunteer cavalry. The remainder were the regulars with their recruited force. The cavalry under Wheeler was dismounted.

Before daylight Friday morning (July 1), everything was in readiness. Wheeler had planted Grimes's battery of field guns in the San Juan valley, menacing a hillside plantation called El Pozo which had been converted into a blockhouse. There were four guns in Grimes's battery, and they were but three miles from the walls of Santiago with San Juan hill between.

The first gun of the battle was fired by Captain Capron of the First Battery, who was with Lawton on the right. His son had been killed at Las Guasimas a week before.

But the battle itself was to begin in the center, at El Pozo, the first intrenched hill on the road to San Juan. It is almost impossible to describe the action at San Juan, which was a battle fought largely without orders, with orders that could not be delivered, and in opposition to orders. What plan there was, at first, was thrown to the winds through necessity. It was a battle without record, except the actual experiences as remembered by officers and men. It is asserted that it was no part of Shafter's intention to take San Juan on that day, unless El Caney could be reduced early; so that Lawton could move along the ridge to the southwest and attack San Juan in the flank or rear. It is also asserted that Shafter believed El Caney could be taken in a short engagement, and that his army would be before the walls of Santiago in one day and capture the city the next.

Whatever the intention, the obstinacy of the Spanish defense proved much greater than was expected; yet, however much the fighting qualities of the Spaniards were underestimated, the unflinching courage of the Americans was to overcome all the failure of plan, estimate, and actual resistance, and to surprise the world with unsurpassed heroism.

General Wheeler, with his two cavalry brigades, commanded by General Samuel S. Sumner and Colonel Leonard Wood, had moved to within two and a half miles of San Juan on the night before, and was resting on the hillside on the left of the valley, through which ran the shallow San Juan River, and the Santiago wagon road. Across the valley was Hawkins's brigade of Kent's division of infantry, and in the rear of these the two brigades of Colonel Wikoff and Colonel Pearson. They were out of sight of the enemy's guns on San Juan.

At half-past six in the morning Grimes's battery opened fire on El Pozo, for the purpose of uncovering the enemy's position. He provoked no reply for twenty minutes, when the Spaniard, having obtained our range by the smoke of Grimes's guns, answered. It was first detected by a muffled report, followed by the sinister singing and hissing whizz of shrapnel that came over the brow of the hill where Grimes was posted, and burst into death-dealing fragments. The shot revealed our disadvantage. Grimes was employing 3.2-inch field guns with black powder. The Spaniards were replying with 5-inch guns and smokeless powder. Nothing could be seen of the enemy's position; our troops were fighting spectres in jungle and hills. For ten minutes the Spanish artillery fired away and Grimes responded, though his gunners were picked off and the enemy's fire was being concentrated upon our men in the bushes behind. Then the troops were ordered off. At the same moment the Spanish battery ceased firing and remained entirely silent against all attempts to draw their fire.

It was a successful ruse to draw the Americans out. Hawkins's brigade moved down the hillside to the river and road, a narrow passage at that point, under orders from Kent to advance up the road toward the objective point. When they reached the ford they were met with orders to let the cavalry under Sumner and Wood have right of way. This resulted in confusion, owing to the narrow roadway and a new form of attack that now began.

From every tree top, from every bush-crowned knoll and jungle thicket in the vicinity, front, sides, and rear, sharpshooters of the

enemy, hitherto silent, began to pour in deadly and galling fire upon our troops as they emerged upon open ground. Using smokeless powder, the position of these sharpshooters was not revealed. They were covered by the fan-like sprays of foliage. All that could be known was what the ear discovered of the continuous crackle of the rifles, and what the eye observed of our men falling dead and wounded as they entered the open spot at the ford, where the water was thrashed by the rifle balls as if hail were falling.

Under this baptism of fire, forty minutes were lost in permitting the cavalry to pass, and then, without waiting longer, the infantry were marched along parallel to the cavalry, a tedious and dangerous movement, necessitating slow progress, and presenting masses to the sharpshooting fire of the enemy.

After moving ahead the advance entered an open spread of the valley, from which San Juan could be seen. The view was full of deception. It was apparently a smooth, green hill, with clumps of trees and bushes here and there, and houses among them. But each clump proved to be the summit of an intervening hill, defended by barbed wire and Spanish troops. From this point of view it was determined that San Juan could be captured by assault upon the Spanish right, to the left of the road.

At this moment a message was received from Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, who was scouting from a balloon over our army, that there was a narrow pathway along a creek branching off to the left of our advance, but some distance in the rear. This path had been ingeniously covered by the Spaniards from passing observation, but from the balloon it was clearly visible.

The value of the path to deliver the brigades in the rear by a detour against the enemy's right at San Juan, was instantly perceived and General Kent rode back to deflect his troops in that direction, while two regiments of Hawkins's brigade and the cavalry pushed ahead under the galling fire.

Upon arriving at the point indicated, a ford at which a small creek entered the San Juan, Kent and his staff met the first battalion of

the Seventy-first New York Volunteers coming forward to join their brigade under Hawkins.

The ford and cross-path here combined to make a small, open, rock-covered, swampy spot, overgrown at the edges by tall grass and bushes, closed in by tall trees and jungle growth that also lined the creek and path that entered from the left or west side. Halting the battalion, General Kent gave instructions to the officer in command to proceed west by the path.

This was the spot since called "The Bloody Bend of San Juan." As the battalion entered the open and moved to the left, entirely inexperienced in war, without any knowledge of the shock of sudden fire from ambush, they were assailed by deadly volleys from every tree top and ambuscade about the ford. Little wonder that these raw troops were for the time being thrown into confusion and recoiled from the shock. Kent ordered them to lie down in the grass and thickets. Soon after the Second and Third battalions came up, and, being informed of the dangers of the ford, were prepared against the shock. It was the highest test of the pride and courage of these volunteers that, disdaining the cover of bushes and trees, they marched erect through the deadly angle, while the trained regulars behind, practiced in the science of war, and knowing the value of avoiding danger until the final blow is to be delivered, crawled and wriggled on their bellies through the grass and bushes until they were in the shelter of the narrow path.

Immediately behind this regiment came the Third brigade commanded by Colonel Wikoff. It consisted of the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth Regulars. Its passage of the "Bloody Bend" was the beginning of a record of soldierly heroism never surpassed in American history. Moving into the open it seemed to invite a concentration of all the ambuscaded Spanish hatred. Colonel Wikoff was killed a moment after he had reached the ford. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth of the Thirteenth succeeded him and in five minutes fell wounded. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum of the Twenty-fourth, who also fell in five minutes badly shot. Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers of

the Ninth then became commander. The brigade had had four commanders in eleven minutes.

A brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Pearson was hurried up, and two of the regiments, the Second and Tenth, were sent to the left, while the Twenty-first was ordered forward to take the place, in Hawkins's brigade, of the Seventy-first New York that was now attached to Pearson's.

The three divisions of our army toiled and fought with dogged persistence for hours against continuous ambushes, only less concentrated and dismaying than those at the "Bloody Bend." The cavalry in front, marching to get opposite the enemy's left, advanced the entire distance through this deadly fire, being torn by shrapnel from San Juan whenever they came into view in the flat and broadening valley, having continually to make detours to drive the enemy from the hills that rose on the sides, and which were defended by trenches, barbed wire, and trees concealing sharpshooters no eye could detect. With the cavalry, occasionally parallel, sometimes in advance, marched Hawkins's infantry, under the same force of resistance, while the brigades of Pearson and Ewers, detouring to the left, were passing hillside ambushes.

It is not wonderful, therefore, that—now advancing, now stopping to make a diversion against a hill—commands, regiments, battalions, and companies became confused, orders went astray, and the rear guard became the advance without knowing it. But not one body of these troops turned back. That determination of American character, developed by years of struggle against the silent immensity of plains and forests, which in deadliest temper develops into patience and coolness, shone out all along the line of march through that awful ambush, with a steady glow that was but accumulating force for explosion.

No troops ever made better use of their advantages than the Spaniards did about San Juan. Ingenuity had seized upon every bush and every weapon that could be brought into play. No place of concealment was neglected, no opening left unguarded. Knowing the range to every

open spot, through which our troops must pass, concealed by smokeless powder, they were spirits of air, terrible because unseen.

After two or three hours of advance the cavalry were on the east front of San Juan, Hawkins's brigade was on the southeast, and Pearson's and Ewers's brigades were on the south and southwest. Between our lines that had been moving along the valleys there were several intervening hills almost like terraces leading to San Juan itself. The hill of San Juan that had appeared so gentle in ascent from a distance, now rose high up from the valley.

From this time, about two o'clock in the afternoon, all accounts of the battle that have been available are confused with respect to the general action and are based upon individual observations by officers of their own commands, unable to correctly perceive the forces supporting or operating at another part of the field.

A halt was called. Nothing had been heard from Lawton's division at El Caney, except the booming of Capron's guns from time to time. To take San Juan without Lawton's assistance was not in orders, and yet there was nothing left but to take the hill, go into camp under the very muzzles of its artillery and rifles, or to retreat. Retreat was ignored as impossible, and encampment under fire as absurd.

It was a moment pregnant with heroism. It was delivered of thousands of heroes, one of whom by his conspicuous rank, his intrepid coolness and magnetic control of men, stood out among them all. This was Brigadier-General Henry S. Hawkins, whose conduct in another part of the field was duplicated by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, and on yet another side by regiments and battalions, with no orders or settled leadership, whose men acted upon the intelligence that perceived opportunity and seized it by common impulse.

After conference, the brigade under Hawkins was ordered to advance up the terrace in the direction of San Juan. The movement took them out of the cover of trees and bushes in the valley and across the open and unprotected hillside upon which a growth of high grass offered the only chance of safety in crawling. The two regiments that were with him, the Sixth and Sixteenth, went doggedly up the hill, squirming

in the grass where they were deployed. The Twenty-first had not arrived. Yard by yard the cool regulars drove the enemy back from clumps of bushes and thickets until they found themselves over the last terrace, with the center of San Juan hill rising in front of them, crowned with trenches in which the enemy was lying in force.

At about the same moment, it appears beyond all question, the brigade of Colonel Ewers on the left, consisting of the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth, arrived from its jungle detour and appeared before the right of the enemy at the foot of San Juan itself. Colonel Ewers had not been able to get his regiments so connected as to communicate his succession to the command; but these regulars had advanced under battalion orders and by companies. They halted as they saw the hill and realized the charge to be made. The men of the Twenty-fourth began to sing the "Star Spangled Banner" and took off their hats in the very teeth of the enemy that was harassing them with deadly fire.

Then, on their right, General Hawkins, a magnificent soldierly figure, tall, stalwart, with a white moustache, pointed gray beard, and the eye of an eagle, rode out in front of his two regiments, the Sixth and Sixteenth, and scornfully turning his back to the Spanish line, every man in which marked him for death, cried:—

"Boys, the time has come. Every man who loves his country, forward and follow me!"

He turned his horse and with set face rode forward up the hill. Two thousand Americans leaped to their feet with a tremendous cheer in which the "Rebel yell" and the Indian yell were mingled, and dashed up the hill after their fearless leader. Through volley after volley of withering fire, during which men reeled and fell out, while their unhurt comrades sprang to fill the gap, the men, steadying down from the first rush, climbed and pulled themselves up the slope until they could see the strained and amazed eyes of Spaniards gazing at a spectacle never before witnessed in war—the dogged advance of those intrepid Americans who would not be denied by even the yawning hell that modern instruments of war could belch in their faces.

Our men fired as they went and then, with a last rush, bayonets on, they sprang for the trenches from which the astounded Spaniards turned and ran like rabbits, while our troops, breathless as they were, shot them as they fled, but could not pursue.

General Hawkins smiled grimly. He had not received a scratch in the terrific *mélée*, but down the hill lay scores of his brave soldiers, dead or wounded. In that day's fighting the heroic Sixth had lost 119 killed and wounded, and not a man was "missing." The Sixteenth lost 101, with only six missing.

On the left of Hawkins, the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth had heard the cheer of their comrades on their right and they, too, had charged up the hill on the enemy's right, going through the same deadly fire and resistance. It was a longer distance and they had none but the line officers to lead them on. When they had nearly reached the summit a Gatling gun, that had been brought up by Hawkins, was planted so as to enfilade the Spanish trenches before the Third brigade, and with a yell the Americans made a savage rush, bayonetting the Spaniards who had not been quick to run, and driving the enemy flying into the trenches outside Santiago's walls.

On the right, at about the same time, the cavalry was maintaining American heroism by equally glorious work. Under the brow of the first hill leading to San Juan, a council of war was held upon the advisability of charging the main hill. There was some suggestion that the loss of life necessary could not be justified. Colonel Roosevelt argued that the only way to capture the hill was at once, when our troops were at its foot. General Wheeler had listened without comment.

"If you will let me, I will lead the way," cried Colonel Roosevelt, turning to General Wheeler.

Without a word Wheeler gave the daring volunteer that inscrutable look which in the hour of extremest peril gives consent and confers death or honor.

Roosevelt sprang to the front of his Rough Riders, flashed his sword, and cried "Forward, charge the hill!"

The Rough Riders, some of the Twenty-first Infantry now come up, and some of the Ninth and Tenth (black) Cavalry followed him with cheers and, with a determined rush that carried them to the very top of the ridge, they fell upon the trenches from which the enemy had fled in confusion. Now it was discovered that there was yet another hill, that had been masked by the ridge of that captured, and which was a little higher. Roosevelt, excited with the enthusiasm of battle, called for another charge and dashed forward, followed by only five men. Observing this he rode back and cried: "I did not think you would refuse to follow where I would lead."

With one impulse the troopers followed him up the hill. His horse was shot, but the rider fell upon his feet and, seizing a rifle, climbed up, firing as he went. That hill, also, was captured.

And now for an hour the Americans hid under the cover of their captured places, avoiding the artillery onslaught from the trenches before them, and waiting for the cover of night.

What company or what regiment was first at the top of San Juan hill that day? What matters it? All were there at different points when needed. What spot was the top of that deadly hill? They were all American companies and regiments—any one of them was brave enough and worthy to be first!

II.

OFF to the right of the army that took San Juan out of the "very jaws of hell," General Lawton began the attack on El Caney at six o'clock in the morning, when Capron's battery fired the first gun at the fort. The report echoed and reëchoed and died away. There was no reply. Another shot followed, and then another. Still there was no reply. It seemed as if the Spaniards would not fight. That view of it, however, was a great mistake. The Spaniards had no artillery at El Caney, and our own troops had none but the four field guns under Capron, distant a mile and a half from the village. El Caney, situated on the top of a hill, had at its southeast corner a steep, bare, conical hill, upon the top of which

**THE CAPTURE
OF EL CANEY**

stood a round stone fort with a tiled roof sloping up to a sharp point. To the east, south, and southwest the town was defended by barbed wire entanglements, and the stone houses in the town—even the old church—had been loopholed and converted into defensive stands for resistance.

Capron's battery continued firing until it had delivered twenty-seven shots, to which no answer was made. But as the twenty-eighth shot was being fired there was a whistling near our battery, followed by the explosion of a shell from the *Reina Mercedes'* battery. Another and another followed, but the Spaniards on their harbor water battery did poor shooting. Their shells did not touch our battery, but fell on a house where some soldiers were hiding, some distance away. The three shells wounded thirteen Cubans and eighteen Americans.

The number of our troops sent against El Caney was about 5,000, though only about 3,500 were engaged. The plan of attack was made by Brigadier-General Adna R. Chaffee, who had reconnoitered the country and acquainted himself with all the paths and roads. General Chaffee's brigade of the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry was placed on the east of the town, Colonel Miles's brigade of the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry was on the south, and General Ludlow's brigade, comprising the Second Massachusetts Volunteers and the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry, was at the left on the southwest side.

The Spaniards were quite as willing as, and better prepared to sustain a fight than, the Americans. After the long bombardment by Capron's battery Chaffee's brigade was sent forward to lead the attack under cover of the artillery. The Seventh and Twelfth were moved ahead and the Seventeenth was held in reserve. An advance was also ordered on the south and southwest, but all had to be made cautiously. The powder smoke from the battery and the guns of the volunteers gave the Spaniards our range, and enabled them to do deadly execution. Besides, the ground was covered with barbed wire resistances and every thicket concealed sharpshooters.

At a distance of 600 yards from El Caney, hiding behind bushes and lying in the grass, our troops maintained a rifle duel with the enemy for three hours. The volunteers were ordered to the rear, so as not to expose our line by the smoke from their guns.

A blockhouse on the slope, that harbored a small detachment of the enemy's sharpshooters, was turned over to a detachment of our Cuban allies. They exhausted their ammunition, but did not disturb the Spaniards. Yard by yard the Americans crept up the hill, but hour after hour passed and the progress was painfully slow.

At 10:30 we were just holding our advance in good safety, although losing more than the enemy, when an order arrived from Shafter to cease the assault and move to the assistance of Wheeler and Kent at San Juan. It was a serious interruption. As a military observer present pointed out, to comply with the order would have entailed a demoralizing defeat in the face of the enemy. General Lawton did not obey the order, but pressed the attack. The Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry joined in the attack. The fire of Capron's battery became terribly effective, and was directed to reduce the fort. At one o'clock the flag was shot away. The incident evoked cheers from the whole army of attack, and heartened them up.

Captain Lee of the British army, who was present for observations under the orders of his Government, described the spirit and peril of our troops at that moment. "Wishing to see how Chaffee's men were faring," he wrote, "I crawled through a hedge into the field beyond, and, accidentally, into such a hot corner, that I readily complied with General Chaffee's abrupt injunction: 'Get down on your stomach, sir.' Indeed, I was distinctly grateful for his advice, but could not fail to notice that he was regardless of it himself. Wherever the foe was thickest he strolled about unconcernedly, a half-smoked cigar between his teeth, and an expression of exceeding grimness on his countenance.

"The situation was a trying one for the nerves of the oldest soldier, and some of the younger hands fell back from the firing line and crept into the road. In a moment the General pounced upon

them, inquiring their destination in low, unhoneeyed accents, and then taking them persuasively by the elbows, led them back to the extreme front and, having deposited them on the firing line, stood over them while he distributed a few last words of pungent advice. Throughout the day he set the most inspiring example to his men, and that he escaped unhurt was a miracle. One bullet clipped a breast button off his coat, another passed under his shoulder strap, but neither touched him, and there must be some truth in the old adage that fortune favors the brave.

"Close in front of me, a slight and boyish Lieutenant compelled my attention by his persistent and reckless gallantry. Whenever a man was hit he would dart to his assistance, regardless of the fire that this exposure inevitably drew. Suddenly he sprang to his feet, gazing intently into the village, but what he saw we never knew, for he was instantly shot through the heart and fell over backward, clutching at the air. I followed the men who carried him to the road and asked them his name. 'Second-Lieutenant Wansboro, sir, of the Seventh Infantry, and you will never see his better. He fought like a little tiger.'

"A few convulsive gasps and the poor boy was dead, and as we laid him in a shady spot by the side of the road the Sergeant reverently drew a handkerchief over his face and said: 'Good-bye, Lieutenant, you were a brave little officer, and you died like a true soldier.'"

A few minutes before three o'clock Capron's battery had played so effectively upon the stone fort as to materially reduce the resistance, and then General Chaffee at the head of the Twenty-fifth Infantry charged the hill and took the fort in the face of deadly volleying. The inner walls of the fort were splashed with blood. The gate was so wedged with dead and débris that it could not be entered. The rifle trenches were full of Spanish dead, most of them shot through the forehead, their brains oozing out.

But yet the town remained to be taken. Our troops were sheltered in Spanish trenches and by the brow of the hill. Capron's battery now turned upon the town itself, but the effect could not be observed.

When our troops had moved up under the shelter of the foothill, they were divided and sent right and left to enter the streets.

The fighting before they reached El Caney was as nothing compared with the resistance met in the town. They were fired on from all sides by the enemy, who were concealed everywhere. The trenches in view were filled with men, whose hats were visible. The Americans shot the hats to pieces, but killed none of the Spaniards, who had resorted to the old trick of placing their hats on sticks for our men to shoot at. The breastworks in the northeast corner of the town did the most damage. This battery of Gatlings was not discovered for a long time. It showered an almost resistless fire upon our men. The Americans lay down to avoid it. The Spaniards had the range, however, and killed and wounded many of our men as they lay. The officers suffered particularly.

But the masked battery was soon located and then began a charge through the streets that sent the Spaniards flying, while our soldiers picked them off as they ran. Every street leading out was filled with the rout, and 125 Spaniards were captured. The enemy had lost half their number in killed and wounded, 125 were prisoners, and 375 escaped.

Up went the flag over the fort and church and four miles to the southwest came cheers from the heights of San Juan, where victory was already perched.

The Spanish retreat from El Caney left that outpost safely in our possession, being further from the city than San Juan. At night General Lawton attempted to march with some troops to reinforce Wheeler's division at San Juan, but met with opposition from concealed Spanish forces and was compelled to make a detour so long that he reached the point only next day at noon.

III.

**HOLDING ON TO
THE DEARLY
BOUGHT
VICTORY**

WHEN the sun went down on that terrible first day of July, the stars and stripes waved over San Juan and El Caney, and over our troops, weakened by many killed and wounded, worn by twelve hours of constant marching and fighting under the broiling sun, with little to eat, and yet with the prospect of still more desperate work ahead. There was to be no rest. No wonder there was a moment of depression, when for an hour the hearts of some of these heroes sank within them. On San Juan there were not more than 5,000, while in front of them the enemy, 8,000 strong, lay in their trenches, supported by heavy artillery ready to assault or defend. We had 5,000 at El Caney.

In his report to General Shafter, written that night at 8 o'clock, General Wheeler described the position with the simplicity of a soldier, and the dauntless heart of a hero. This sick man had been at his post all day. After describing the capture of the hill and the cessation of the fighting towards sunset, he wrote:—

"I examined the line in front of Wood's brigade, and gave the men shovels and picks and insisted on their going right to work. I also sent word to General Kent to come and get intrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins in person and told him the same thing. They all promise to do their best, but say the earth is very difficult, as a great part of it is rocky.

"The positions our men carried were very strong, and the intrenchments were very strong.

"A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and take up a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I have positively discountenanced this, as it would cost us much prestige.

"The lines are very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear with wounds and so many are exhausted, but I hope these men can be got up to-night, and with our line intrenched and Lawton on our right we ought to hold to-morrow, but I fear it will be a severe day. If we can get through to-morrow, all right; we can make our breastworks very strong the next night. You can hardly realize the exhausted condition of the troops. The Third and Sixth Cavalry and other troops were up marching and halting on the road all last night, and have fought for twelve hours to-day, and those that are not on the line will be digging trenches to-night.



AMERICAN TRENCHES SURROUNDING SANTIAGO

"I have been on the extreme front line. The men were lying down and reported the Spaniards not more than three hundred yards in their front."

There was in the condition much to appal any but the strongest heart. Throughout the night the picket firing was continuous. Men who could be spared were carrying the wounded back to Siboney and burying the dead on the battlefield. The wounded were carried in army wagons, that jolted over the stones during the passage of five long miles.

What a passage of torture that was—not of physical pain alone; but the Spaniards, with the instinct of cruelty, threw off the restraints of civilized warfare. During the day's fighting their sharpshooters deliberately fired upon our wounded as they were carried from the battlefield, and guerillas, armed with Mausers, infested the road to Siboney, firing upon the wounded, nurses, helpers, newspaper correspondents, and all non-combatants. The perpetration of such acts enraged our troops to a point that threatened reprisals, but none was permitted.

The Spaniards expected vengeance, conscious of their own brutality. A body of 165 Spanish prisoners was sent to the rear in charge of a detachment of our troops. Half the prisoners were servants and camp followers taken at El Caney. The remainder were a company of regulars of the *Battalion Constitucional*, with two lieutenants and one sergeant. They saluted the American officers they met, in a most cringing fashion, and one officer hailed a Cuban who was with our troops, saying:—

"Please ask these gentlemen who are in charge of us to kill us here by the roadside and not force us to undergo the torture of a long walk before we are shot."

"Fools," answered the Cuban in Spanish and with evident disgust, "they will not harm you; they will only keep you prisoners."

But the Spaniard shook his head. He believed little in warfare in which the lives of captives were spared, and he could not believe that the Cuban was not taunting him.

At Siboney doctors and nurses were ready. The nurses did wonderful work. In the cases of a large percentage of the wounded operations were necessary; the tables were filled, and hundreds were waiting their turn. The work went on steadily all night by the light of small lanterns and candles. It was a strange scene in the huge tents. When their wounds had been dressed, the men were carried out and laid upon the grass in blankets.

At the front fighting was resumed early Saturday morning. The Spaniards made a desperate effort to recapture San Juan hill. They assaulted again and again, and each time were driven back with awful loss. Our Hotchkiss guns did great execution. Finally, the enemy was driven back upon the third intrenchment, before Santiago itself. Then the Spanish sharpshooting began and all day long the exhausted soldiers on both sides carried on the sullen duel, with artillery, with volley firing, with spasmodic advances and feints, while all through the field and along the roads the guerillas harassed and shot down our stragglers. The Spanish fire along the line was so hot that no one could stand up at times. For two miles in our rear the road was blocked with wounded. But when night came the Americans held every inch of ground they had taken, and the Spanish prisoners brought in were dejected and confessed the desperation of the enemy within the city's entrenchments.

Our losses in the two days' fighting included twelve officers and about two hundred and fifty men killed, with thirteen hundred wounded. The wounds proved to be unusually easy to handle and deaths from them were few. The Spanish loss was very much greater, both in killed and wounded. Half the force in the city was disabled in the two days' fighting.

Among our dead were a number of gallant and distinguished officers. Colonel Charles A. Wikoff of the Twenty-second Infantry, killed, enlisted as a private in Company H, First Pennsylvania Infantry, in the War of the Rebellion. He was made a First-Lieutenant, and promoted to Captain in 1864. He was made a Major in the Fourteenth in 1886, and promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel of the Nineteenth in

1891. His commission as Colonel of the Twenty-second dated from 1897. For gallant and meritorious services at the battle of Shiloh he was brevetted Captain, April 7, 1862, and for bravery at Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge was made a Brevet Major. Colonel Wikoff was born and reared at Easton, Pennsylvania. He was highly esteemed as an excellent officer and amiable and agreeable man. Colonel Wikoff lost an eye in the Civil War, and could have been retired for that disability, but he always expressed the wish that he might serve until his sixty-fourth year and be regularly retired. Since the Civil War he had been on constant duty in the West.

Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Patterson of the Twenty-second Infantry, killed, wore a medal of honor presented to him by Congress "for most distinguished gallantry in action at the battle of the Wilderness in Virginia, on May 5, 1864, under the heavy fire of the advancing enemy, in picking up and carrying several hundred yards, to a place of safety, a wounded officer of his regiment, who was helpless and would otherwise have been burned in the forest; while serving as First-Lieutenant, Eleventh United States Infantry." He was a New Yorker by birth, a soldier of fine character, and popular in the service.

Colonel John M. Hamilton of the Ninth (black) Cavalry enlisted in the Civil War as a private in 1861. He was born in Canada, and after serving for two years with gallantry he was transferred to the regular army and came out of the struggle a Captain. He was advanced to the command of the Ninth during the Indian wars on the frontier.

On the Spanish side there was among the killed General Vara del Rey, a distinguished officer in charge of the defense at El Caney. General Linares, Commander-in-Chief at Santiago, was badly wounded in the charge on San Juan and was compelled to hand over the command to General José Toral. Commander Romero, of the celebrated *Guarda Civile* of Spain, was also desperately wounded.

IV.

**SUMMARY OF
A GREAT
VICTORY**

SAN JUAN and El Caney comprised together one of those great contests that history will discuss and controversy will struggle with for a long time. Everything will be disputed except the valor and determination of American soldiers and the desperation of Spanish resistance. Well-informed men who participated express the opinion that when the military statistician completes his work and military experts analyze the totals showing the number of men engaged and those killed and wounded, it will be found that the battle of San Juan was one of the bloodiest on record. It is estimated that the average of disabilities was above ten per cent. General Kent's division, it is said, suffered to the extent of thirteen per cent.—an average higher than many of the famous battles in history.

Although the battle of July 1 was properly one engagement, nevertheless there were two distinct and separate, though interdependent, fights going on at the same time—that which gave us the stone fort and the town of El Caney, taken by the men of Lawton's division, and that which advanced our center (Wheeler's division) three miles and gave us San Juan hill and blockhouse, and commanding positions for our batteries. The two engagements were interdependent, for, if the center had been repulsed and driven back the Spaniards could, and probably would, have swept down and flanked our right. Had Lawton's division been driven back, the Spaniards would have come between Wheeler and our base of supplies—Siboney—and starved Wheeler out. The artillery opened the engagement in each fight (treating El Caney and San Juan as separate engagements), but it was the infantry and dismounted cavalry, assisted to some extent by the Gatling section, that secured definite results.

From the best obtainable information it may be set down to the glory of the United States soldier that part of the charge on San Juan was made, not after orders, but without orders from any officer commanding a division or brigade. It was the spontaneous forward movement

of one brigade that could not be stopped or checked until the troops halted, breathless, but victorious, on top of San Juan hill, and that carried commanding officers along with it, willing, leading, and brave, but without the intention.

Of the incidents of the first day's fighting, that illustrate the temper of our troops and the uncomplaining patience and fortitude of the wounded in the absence of surgeons and hospital helpers, those described by Captain Arthur Lee of the British army, a competent and disinterested observer, are best in point. His observations were set out in his official report to his Government, and are not, therefore, to be considered as tinged with any sentiment, except that which is necessary to put his own military authorities in possession of the truth concerning the character, courage, discipline, and disposition of the troops of another nation.

He noted that at El Caney our total artillery force was but four guns, and these were quite unequal to the task of demoralizing the enemy. Consequently the infantry had to do all the fighting, and the brunt of it fell upon the men of one brigade. He reported that little attention was paid to the Spanish firing until our black powder smoke established the range, and then bloody execution commenced.

"The expenditure of ammunition on our side," he writes, "was enormous and improvident, for there was little target visible, but the Spanish sharpshooters concealed in the trees, cottages, and blockhouses were replying with deadly effect. At one point eight marksmen of Captain Evans's company crept forward to occupy a small advanced knoll, and five were hit in less than as many minutes. At another point seven men of the Seventeenth regiment broke through a hedge into the field beyond, and instantly a volley killed three and wounded the remaining four. The Second Massachusetts was compelled to withdraw from the fight, because their Springfield single-loaders drew so much fire in their direction.

"Two men of the First Infantry crept forward under fire, and, within 200 yards of the enemy's trenches, cut all the barbed-wire impediments. Colonel Haskell, leading the Seventeenth Infantry, was hit

three times in a very few seconds; his quartermaster was killed by his side.

"The Seventh was exposed to a terrible fire. Hour after hour the men stood it unflinchingly, the fierce sun scorching their backs, suffering heavy losses from an enemy practically invisible, and to whom they could not reply effectively."

Captain Lee at noon came to a sunken road and noticed it was full of men lying down. He asked an officer if they were reserves. The answer was:—

"No, sir; by —, they are casualties."

He found over a hundred killed and wounded laid out on as many yards of road, and so close together that one could only pass by stepping over them. There was a strange silence among these men, not a whimper or a groan, but each lay quietly nursing his wound with closed eyes and set teeth, only flinching when the erratic sleet of bullets clipped the leaves off the hedge close above their heads.

"Many looked up curiously at my strange uniform as I passed," he added, "and asked quickly and quietly: 'Are you a doctor, sir?' I could but shake my head, and they would instantly relapse into their strained, intent attitudes, while I felt sick at heart at the thought of my incompetence. Some of the slightly wounded were tending those who were badly hit, and nothing could have surpassed the unskilled tenderness of those men. I was astonished, too, at their thoughtful consideration.

"'Keep well down, sir,' several said as I stopped to speak to them, 'them Mausers is flying pretty low and there's plenty of us here already.'

"The heat in the little road was intense; there was no shade, not a breath of air, and the wounded lay sweltering in the sun until the head reeled with the rank smell of sweat and saturated flannel. Right among the wounded lay, curled up, a Cuban, apparently asleep. Upon approaching him, however, it was only too apparent that he had been dead for several days, and on the tree overhead two sleek and gorged vultures looked down furtively at his ever-increasing companions.

"The worst feature of it all was the scarcity of doctors. Hour after hour these wounded men had lain in the scorching sun, unattended, and often bleeding to death. Their comrades had, in many cases, applied the first aid dressings in rough and unskilled fashion, but, so far as one could see, there had been no medical assistance. The nearest dressing station was three-quarters of a mile to the rear, and, while the medical staff there was, undoubtedly, more than busy, it was chiefly with such cases as were slightly enough wounded to walk down for aid.

"One man I noticed lying very quiet in a great pool of blood. A comrade with a shattered leg was fanning him with a hat, and keeping the flies off his face. I sat down beside them, and, seeing the man was shot right through the stomach, knew there was nothing I could do beyond giving him a little water. I asked him how he felt, and he replied with difficulty:—

"‘Oh, I am doing pretty well, sir.’ His companion then said: ‘Well, sir, if you can, you might send a doctor to see this man. He was one of the first hit, about eight this morning, and no one has seen him yet.’ The wounded man here broke in: ‘That’s all right, Mick, I guess the doctors have more than they can do looking after them as are badly hurt, and they will be along soon.’ I looked at my watch and it was nearly one o’clock.”

Saturday afternoon both sides, worn out with fatigue, rested. Then came a lull as if before a storm—the night of Saturday, July 2, glorious to our military arm, presaging ominously the event that was to follow on Sunday on the sea, and fill the world with astonishment at American prowess.

CHAPTER THE TENTH.

DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON.

THE DASH OF THE SPANISH SHIPS OUT OF THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO—THE GREATEST NAVAL
DUEL IN THE WORLD'S HISTORY—ALL THE ENEMY'S SHIPS AND DESTROYERS BUT ONE
ANNIHILATED BY OUR WAR SHIPS IN FIFTY-FIVE MINUTES—THE LONG CHASE
AFTER THE "CRISTOBAL COLON" AND HER CAPTURE AFTER A RACE
OF FIFTY MILES—THE GLORY OF THE "BROOKLYN,"
"OREGON," "TEXAS," AND "GLOUCESTER."

I.

SUNDAY morning, the third of July, dawned clear and beautiful over the ocean and the bay of Santiago. The United States ships of war that lay in a great semicircle before the entrance were bathed in the brilliant sunshine that glittered on the water just rippled by a breeze. Along shore the last misty haze of dawn hung under the cliffs, blue and dim. On the crags of Old Morro and Socapa Point the guns were still pointing outward from the battered forts, and above the walls streamed the flag of Spain.

For a month and a day our ships of war had lain off the same spot, keeping unwearied watch upon the gash in the cliffs that marked the harbor entrance. By day they lay off from four to six miles, with a lookout at every ship's head; at night they steamed in, lying from two-and-a-half to four miles off, with a blazing searchlight from one of the ships, by two-hour turns, fixed upon the center of the gash. As our troops closed about Santiago, the ships drew nearer in daylight, and on this Sunday morning they steamed with bare steerway, or drifted, in a half-circle eight miles long, from two to four miles from the shore.

Inside the bay, in front of the wharves of Santiago, were the ships of Spain commanded by Admiral Cervera, the torpedo section commanded by Vice-Admiral Villamil, two officers of great repute and

noble lineage. The Admiral had determined to remain in the harbor and assist in the defense of the city by driving back the American troops with his heavy guns when our men should move on the lines. But the cord had tightened about Santiago, and the Admiral's plan had proved impracticable. He could not elevate his guns sufficiently, and the intrepid Americans had followed the Spanish so closely, beating them back step by step, that his fire would have endangered his own allies quite as much as the American forces. It was gloomy in the city. With the invaders at its very doors, the Spanish soldiers, exhausted by fighting, hunger, disease, and sleeplessness, were dejected; the citizens terrorized with vague apprehension. The sailors on Cervera's ships were in want of food and worn with nervous anxiety.


The Admiral had, moreover, received positive orders from the Spanish Government and Captain-General Blanco at Havana, to leave the harbor, put to sea and, if possible, sail to the rescue of Havana. With his swift cruisers it was believed Cervera could at an opportune moment dash out of the harbor at full speed and escape danger from pursuit, except by our *New York* and *Brooklyn*, equally swift vessels. Under these orders, against which the Admiral had protested as being impossible to execute with hope of success, he had, nevertheless, made his preparations to act. The coal bunkers were filled, live cattle for provision were taken aboard, the ships were stripped, guns loaded, and all was in readiness.

Saturday night, in fact, had been selected for the desperate enterprise; but on that night the United States ships had refrained from keeping their searchlights on the harbor entrance, and it had been decided that the Spanish ships could not steam past the sunken *Merimac* in the dark. For that reason Cervera waited till Sunday morning. The news of his purpose was abroad in the city, and thousands of persons were expected on the wharves to witness the dash to battle. But the events of the previous day had rendered such a spectacle uninteresting to the beleaguered and terrorized populace in Santiago. None came to see the pride of Spain's navy go to the field of the swiftest and most awful destruction ever known in naval warfare.

On the ships, therefore, the men waited in dejection for orders. The Captains issued brandy freely to dispel the nervous depression, and encouraged their men with promises or urged them with threats to do their duty. There was to be no surrender, but a fight to death. At eight o'clock a lookout on the mountain top brought the information that Admiral Sampson's flagship, the *New York*, and the battleship *Massachusetts* had left the blockading line and steamed eastward out of sight. This was good news to the Admiral. The *Brooklyn*, he thought, was the only American left capable of overhauling any of his own cruisers. Quickly the plan of sortie was arranged. Admiral Cervera, on his flagship, the *Maria Teresa*, was to lead the way, turn to the west, where the *Brooklyn* lay at one end of the blockading line, and attack Commodore Schley's cruiser. Under cover of this the *Vizcaya* was to follow and ram the *Brooklyn* if possible. If this was successful, there was the open sea in which to run away from the heavy battleships.

The commanders were given orders, more brandy was served, and the men were worked up to the point of desperation, at which it seems the Spanish sailors were expected to fight best—the old eighteenth-century plan of “Dutch courage through a blind drunk,” as long ago described by an English sailor.

Meanwhile, out on the sea, in the dancing sunlight, the Americans were at easy Sunday duties. No man on those ships dreamed that Cervera would emerge in the broad light of early morning, when the men he must engage were fresh from a profound night's rest and in perfect condition to meet attack. The *Brooklyn* lay at the west of the line, three miles off shore, while the little converted yacht *Vixen* was close in under the cliffs, two miles west of the Socapa battery. Next in order, eastward from the *Brooklyn*, lay the *Texas*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *Indiana*, and the steel yacht *Gloucester*, formerly the pleasure yacht *Corsair*. The *Gloucester* was off the bay of Aguadores, so that it was at the western end of the line only, between the *Brooklyn* and the shore, that there was an open space through which the enemy could turn, unless it intended to attack the line.



THE SPANISH WAR VESSEL "MARIA TERESA"

The *Massachusetts* had sailed east to Guantanamo bay to coal, and, seven miles off in the same direction, Admiral Sampson, on the *New York*, was steaming to Siboney to meet General Shafter by agreement for a conference.

At half-past nine o'clock Commodore Schley, seated in his chair under the awning of the *Brooklyn*, had just dismissed the men after "quarterly muster," when the articles of war are read aloud to the crew, according to regulations, four times a year. On the other ships quarters inspection was in progress. The men were in their "Sunday clothes." It was a peaceful and lazy scene, despite the air of prompt discipline during the performance of duty.

Overhead the bright sun. There was nothing ominous of the next minute that was pregnant with the most frightful destruction and terrible carnage that modern war has yet known.

II.

THERE came one moment when every ship in the line was alive with premonition. Lookouts had observed smoke rising back in the harbor, but that was not unusual. Suddenly, every look-out saw the same thing, and at the same instant every sailor on the fleet felt a mysterious thrill. Even those on the *New York*, seven miles away, afterwards told of the mysterious instinct that, like a telepathic whisper, made all suddenly look back at the harbor entrance.

**THE DASH
TO
DESTRUCTION**

At the rear of the gash in the cliffs appeared the fighting masts of a war ship, her funnels pouring out dense clouds of smoke, indicating that she was coming out with speed.

"The ships are coming out!" was shouted on every Yankee war vessel.

It was as if electricity had vitalized every man and every machine on our ships of war. The same signal flew to every masthead, followed by another from Commodore Schley, on the *Brooklyn*, "Close in and engage the enemy!"

But signals were not necessary. The clear orders that had been known for weeks, the perfect discipline on board every vessel, caused every Captain to fight his ship without signals. Then it was, not taken by surprise, but steadied by amazed excitement, that the three thousand men aboard our war ships, drilled in perfect sobriety, trained upon excellent food and with regular method, felt the nerves and muscles in their healthy bodies tingle with the eagerness of long-expected combat. They had enjoyed splendid gunning practice during the bombardments, and now it was "to do or die."

It was thirty-five minutes past nine when the nose of the Spanish flagship, *Maria Teresa*, showed outside the entrance and, swinging to the west, headed toward the *Brooklyn*, firing as she came. On all our ships some of the furnaces and boilers were being cleaned out, and the driving power was low; but signal bells and tubes were hurrying orders everywhere, while messengers went scurrying about ship, gunners stripped for action, and awnings were stowed away. The *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, and *Texas* were at nearest range, with the *Gloucester* off to the right.

In a minute guns were trained from every turret, barbette, and steel bastion, and into the cloud of white steam and black coal smoke that enveloped the *Maria Teresa*, the four battleships hurled their shells and solid shot. The first shell that struck the Spaniard shattered her main water-supply pipe and the second went into the Admiral's cabin, exploded and set the stern afire, while another from the *Indiana*, as the flying Spaniard turned to westward, exploded as it tore through a gun-room and killed sixty men. Still the Spaniard held on his way and headed out somewhat toward the *Brooklyn*.

And now, eight hundred yards behind her, the second Spaniard, the *Vizcaya*, steamed out of the entrance, belching smoke and flame under forced draught, and turned to follow the *Maria Teresa*.

Commodore Schley, on the *Brooklyn*, had but two boilers in service, though the others were being fired up, and he was not able to make more than eight knots. With the instinct of a fighter he guessed the intention to ram his ship, and with the splendid skill of a manœuverer

he executed a movement so bold as to confound the Spaniards. He had not yet fired a shot, but was running westward and northward to cut off the flight. Now, however, he wheeled in the face of the enemy, to starboard, and with all the speed he could command, steamed bow on to meet the *Vizcaya* prow to prow. The Spanish flagship, however, was undone. Already her men were unable to stand to their guns, swept by the killing metal of our battleships, and thick with the smoke of fire burning everywhere. In vain did her officers threaten their gunners, and even shoot them down to prevent desertion of the guns. The *Texas* and *Oregon* were running in and devastating her, and the *Iowa* and *Indiana* were assisting.

Captain Victor Concas, of the *Teresa*, was standing on his bridge with the second officer, Captain Maocochron, to whom he turned:—

“Shall we beach the ship for humanity’s sake or fight longer, disabled as we are?” he asked.

“We should beach her,” replied Maocochron.

As he spoke, a shell struck Captain Concas, who fell dying. His last orders were to beach the *Teresa* and haul down the colors. This was done and the Spaniard ran ashore, on fire from stem to stern. The men were compelled to leap into the water and swim ashore. Admiral Cervera, an old man, was aided by his son, a Lieutenant, and gained the beach wearing only his underclothing. All occurred in twenty minutes.


Meanwhile the *Vizcaya* had come out twelve minutes after the *Teresa*, and, seeing the plight of the flagship ahead, abandoned the idea of ramming the *Brooklyn*. She therefore sheered off towards the coast, seeing which the *Brooklyn* changed her course, and with the *Oregon* and *Texas* poured a terrible fire into the new enemy that had just run the gauntlet of the *Indiana* and *Iowa*.

At this moment the *Cristobal Colon*, the fleetest ship of the Spanish navy, its pride and glory, had steamed out, and the scene in front of the harbor became magnificent and terrible. The clouds of smoke that enveloped the ships from the rapid discharge of the great guns began to expand and cover the water. The *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and

Texas were cramming their furnaces with coal saturated with oil, which produced such rapid and pure combustion that the flames from the furnaces roared out of the smoke stacks, while the continuous flashes from the guns belching out fire and smoke gave observers in the rear an impression that American and Spanish ships alike were on fire. And all around on the water the falling and exploding shells made fountains of spray leap up.

Through the veil of smoke that impended, the *Cristobal Colon* had rushed from the harbor fast upon the heels of the *Vizcaya* and plunged through the rain of shot and shell almost unscathed. Immediately behind her came the *Almirante Oquendo*, last of the cruisers. Into her the *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Oregon*, and *Brooklyn* hurled the full weight of their guns. The first shell that landed exploded in her after-torpedo compartment, setting the ship on fire. The decks were swept as if by a hurricane of destruction, the Spanish gunners were killed at their guns, and the guns overturned upon them. But she fought on desperately, hoping to give the *Vizcaya* and *Colon* some advantage in flight.

Just as she passed the *Indiana* and *Iowa*, the *Oregon* moved in upon her with guns vomiting destruction, while the *Texas* and *Brooklyn*, heading for the quarry making west, turned their after-guns upon her. On the *Oquendo* brandy had been served out to the crew for desperate resistance, but no courage could withstand the tempest of fire that swept her. Suddenly there was an explosion forward and she turned to the beach, just a mile beyond the spot where the *Maria Teresa* was already wrecked and burning. Her colors came down and her commander, Captain Juan Lazaga, it was reported by some of the crew, committed suicide in the conning tower of his vessel, as she headed to the rocks. Afterwards, when the wreck was examined, there were found at the entrance to the tower a jeweled sword, a revolver, and a heap of ashes, among which were human bones. The cartridges of the revolver had been discharged, four by heat, one by the hammer. The captain of the *Oquendo* was not found among the prisoners.



THE "MARIA TERESA"
AS SHE APPEARED AFTER THE BATTLE NEAR SANTIAGO

Forty minutes had now elapsed since the first ship emerged. To the west the *Vizcaya* and *Colon* were speeding, pursued by the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, and *Oregon*.

A few minutes before, out of the harbor entrance came rushing, like a railroad train, the torpedo destroyer *Pluton*, with Vice-Admiral Villamil in command, and, immediately behind, her sister craft, the *Furor*. They were spitting shots furiously from the small guns they carried.

These were the type of war craft designed to make thirty knots an hour. Armed with torpedo tubes and small batteries, much mysterious power had been attributed to them by the navies of the world in the absence of practical tests. Was it part of Cervera's plan to have these boats come out last, and, while our great ships were occupied with his cruisers, the torpedo machines should fall upon the rear and destroy them? If it was, never did plan fail so wretchedly.

At the east of Morro the steel yacht *Gloucester* had been lying. Her commander, Lieutenant Richard Wainwright, expectant of the appearance of the destroyers in the rear, had moved up slowly under cover of the shore, gaining steam power by the delay, but firing the small batteries of his ship at the big cruisers as they came out.

As soon as the low, black, racing hulls of the destroyers were seen in the harbor channel, the big shells from the battleships began to fall about them, enveloping them in the smoke of explosion and the spray of columns of water that shot up like fountains from the spots where shot and shell fell about them. The awful impact of that storm of metal seems to have produced upon the little craft a shock like that which a charging army feels when it receives the point-blank, deadly volley of a cool adversary in waiting. They wavered for a minute, seemed to slow up, and hesitated whether to turn to the east or west. That moment was fatal. One more concentrated hail of missiles fell upon them from the battleships that immediately left and steamed westward. Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, signaled "Gunboats in," indicating that the *Gloucester* would not be endangered by our own

ships' fire. The destroyers, with blind fatality, had also turned west and were following the path of death.

Then the thrill which always accompanies the sight of heroic bravery leaped in the hearts of the American crews. They saw the *Gloucester* with the speed of the wind dash in northwestwardly towards the shore, directly across the course of the destroyers, firing her port guns at the *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya*, her starboard broadside at the destroyers. The *Texas* sent one last shot at the *Pluton*, which struck her boiler. There was a rending, tearing sound, and a volcano of steam and black smoke rose from the Vice-Admiral's boat. Another shot from the *Gloucester* destroyed the *Pluton's* steering gear and she hung helpless, close up to the beach, toward which she began drifting on the tide. Then the *Gloucester* turned her bow and steamed directly to meet her, and, the *Furor* coming up, she ran between the two, delivering both broadsides. The *New York* had come up speedily to the chase of the *Colon*, and she sent two shots at the *Furor*. The *Gloucester* held on her course with dauntless courage, straight into the fire of the destroyers and under the guns of the shore forts. Then the flag came down on the *Pluton* as she went ashore, and the *Furor*, with fire and smoke pouring from her deck, wavered, turned shoreward, struck her colors, and went down, battered, riddled, and sinking, as was her companion.

III.

HUGGING the coast ahead, masked by smoke and flame, urged on by desperation and hope, the *Cristobal Colon* and *Vizcaya* raced to the west, with the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *Texas* off shore in hot pursuit, firing as they raced, with the *Iowa* and *Indiana*, foul of hulls, laboring behind at slower speed. On the *Oregon* and *Texas* full speed had been hard to attain. Steadying to the task, straining every human power on board to increase the steam pressure, the two ships hung upon the quarry to capture or destroy. It was a terrific race of steam against steam, of machinery and men against machinery and men, of hunter against hunted, of hope against despair.

A DEATH CHASE
ON THE
OCEAN



REUTERS

THE "ALMIRANTE OQUENDO"
AS SHE APPEARED AFTER THE BATTLE NEAR SANTIAGO



The great vessels groaned and the draughts roared as if the ships were alive and laboring with human desire. On board these battle-ships it was like that other race, when—

“The *Prairie Belle* burnt a hole in the night

* * * * *

With her furnace crammed rosin and pine.”

Except the *Brooklyn*, it was heavy battleships against swift cruisers. Down in the furnace rooms on the battleships, stripped to the skin, dripping oily sweat from their shining bodies, the stokers—those obscure heroes, without the inspiration of scene or objective to encourage them—were true Americans. On the *Brooklyn*, when the chase began after the *Cristobal Colon*, Commodore Schley realized the position of the engine room and furnace men. He called his sailors, formed a line down the stairs and sent cool beer, kept for the officers, down the line to cheer the faithful workers. In addition, an ensign stood at the hatchway and described the chase, the shots, and the results, to the first man in the line. The message was thus carried down to the depths of the hold by human telegraph. Every point of our success was cheered by the gallant stokers, who worked on with renewed energy to send the great ship with greater speed than even her builders had expected.

That was the American way.


On board one of the Spanish vessels, it was told with horror that firemen and engineers who were unable to endure the heat, smoke, and escaping steam, and who attempted to come up, were pushed back by the officers, and the hatches fastened. That, finally, in an insane fury, coal oil was poured over the hatches and ignited when the ship was about to drift ashore—and no man came alive out of that hell under the water line.

That was the Spanish way.

The *Colon* had outstripped the *Vizcaya*, and now the pursuers concentrated their fire upon the latter, with an occasional shell at the *Colon*. It was long-range shooting and they were difficult targets, but

the United States gunners were good at all ranges and targets. Six minutes after the onslaught began on the *Vizcaya*, that vessel was on fire astern, her gun-decks swept, her sailors dead and dying strewn the floors, her hull was riddled, and she turned and lurched headlong to the shore. Her flag was still flying at the gaff, and it fluttered there until it was almost burned away by the flames that were leaping up from her hull and upper works. A boat was lowered from her and men leaped overboard on every side. A detachment of Cuban insurgents on the shore were firing upon the unfortunates in the water and in the boats. Captain Evans of the *Iowa* fired a small gun over the Cubans to warn them off, and, in obedience to orders, stopped to pick up the survivors, 38 officers and 240 men. The *Vizcaya* went ashore at Aserraderos, fifteen miles west of Santiago.

During this time the *Cristobal Colon* had increased her lead and was flying under forced draught along the coast. Flame and smoke came from her funnels, and, under cover of the shore, her hull was with difficulty observed. After her sped the *Brooklyn* in advance, well out from shore, the *Oregon* next, a little closer in, the *Vixen*, still closer in, and the *Texas* astern. It was the quarter of an ellipse hemming in the flying Spaniard. Behind, at a great distance, came the *New York*, flying like the wind. As she passed the spot where the *Vizcaya* had been destroyed, she passed two naked men in the water. They were Spanish sailors who had leaped overboard to escape from the burning ship. The first was a magnificent fellow, physically, and an expert swimmer. He was heading, apparently, for Santiago. As the *New York* approached him he stood up in the water, waving both arms above his head, shouted some unintelligible words, and smiled terribly. A life-preserver was hurled toward him, for which he struck out in long, powerful strokes. The second man was passed a few minutes later heading for the beach. He was nearly exhausted, and wasted much of his remaining strength in shouting for help and cursing at the apparent delay in getting it. He was evidently frightened. Life-preservers were also thrown to him, but it could not be seen whether or not he reached them.



U. S. BATTLESHIP TEXAS

Minute after minute the chase sped on, the speed of the Americans increasing, that of the Spaniard not improving, until the *Colon* began to slip back to the inner focus of the terrible ellipse that was rushing to embrace her in destruction.

Minute after minute went by. The Americans had ceased to fire and were intent upon capture or to demonstrate the superiority of our ships in chase. Mile after mile the great engines of war raced on. On the *Oregon* the speed was seventeen knots an hour and she was keeping up with the *Brooklyn* and overhauling the Spaniards, while the *Texas* was also exceeding her speed record.

Twenty, thirty, forty miles, were run and now the doom of the last of Spain's famous squadron appeared. Far ahead the dim blue outlines of Cape Cruz were seen. The cape jutted out from the coast and the *Colon*, following the shore line, must skirt it. The *Brooklyn*, sheering off the coast, steered straight for the Cape Cruz point, making the diameter of a quarter circle, while the *Colon* would be forced to make the circumference. The *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* drew abreast the enemy; the *Texas* followed the quarry.

The men on our ships had been cheering, and were gathered on decks, watching the chase with intense excitement and with that outflow of humor, so cynical, yet practical, in the teeth of danger. Captain Clark signaled from the *Oregon* to Commodore Schley on the *Brooklyn*: —

"A strange ship, looking like an Italian, in the distance."

This was an allusion to the fact that the *Colon* had been purchased from Italy.

Commodore Schley, sitting on the edge of the forward eight-inch turret, in a careless attitude, his glasses on the *Colon*, smiled as the message was brought, and answered: —

"Tell the *Oregon* she can try one of those thirteen-inch railroad trains on her."

There was a terrible roar as the shell went by the *Brooklyn*, a moment of suspense and watching, and then a hearty cheer as the great projectile struck the water close astern the *Colon*, four miles away.

Another was tried, which reached the mark, and there were more cheers. It had struck the bow and weakened the ship.

Plainly outraced, the *Colon* slowed up. She fired one shot to the rear at the *Texas*, hauled down her colors, which were left in a limp huddle at the foot of the line, turned her nose to shore and ran aground at Rio Tarquino, forty-eight miles west of Santiago at 1:15 P. M.

This was the spot where the crew of the *Virginus* had landed and had been massacred by the Spanish, thirty years ago.

The other five ships had been destroyed in fifty-five minutes, but the chase of the *Colon* lasted three hours and sixteen minutes, during which, under complete preparation and forced draught most of the time, she had made less than sixteen knots an hour, while our ships under disadvantages in respect to preparation, removing which as they steamed, had outsailed and destroyed the pride of Spain—a cruiser rated as the swiftest in the world's navy.

Captain Cook of the *Brooklyn* went on board the *Colon* in a boat to receive her surrender. The *New York* then came up and Commodore Schley went on board to report to Admiral Sampson. While doing so the *Resolute* came up and reported a strange war ship off Santiago. Schley was ordered back with the *Brooklyn* to meet her. It proved to be the Austrian cruiser, *Maria Teresa*, seeking permission to take Austrian refugees from Santiago.



CHAPTER THE ELEVENTH.

DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON (*Continued*).

DREADFUL SCENES ATTENDING THE RESCUE OF SURVIVORS AND THE CAPTURE OF PRISONERS---
INCIDENTS OF THE SURRENDER OF ADMIRAL CERVERA AND CAPTAIN EULATE—SPAN-
ISH SHIPS REDUCED TO WORTHLESS HULKS BY THE FURY OF OUR ATTACK—
TREACHEROUS DESTRUCTION OF THE "COLON"—ANECDOTES OF THE ENGAGE-
MENT—CONTRAST OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH MEN AND METHODS
— THE EFFECT OF THE VICTORY AND THE CREDIT OF IT.

I.

CAPTAIN COOK, of the *Brooklyn*, chief-of-staff of Commodore Schley, who had boarded the *Colon* to receive her surrender, bore from his commanding officer considerate instructions to permit all the officers of the enemy's ship to retain their personal effects. This was chivalrous treatment of the vanquished. It proved to be entirely undeserved. The rules of warfare provide that when an enemy has hauled down his colors and run up the white flag of surrender, the property of the government he carries and the arms of the crew are by that act transferred to the conquerors. The *Colon* was run ashore at high speed upon a rather steep beach, from which she slipped back into the sea by the working of the waves. Then it was discovered that the sea-valves of the vessel had been treacherously opened, so as to render it impossible for her to float. It must have been done after she had surrendered, or she could not have made the swift run that carried her far up on the beach.

WRECKED SHIPS
AND VAN-
QUISHED MEN

The *Colon* was not much injured by our firing; her hull was not penetrated below the water line, and it would have been possible to repair her at small cost and convert her into a valuable addition to the United States navy. It was doubtless to prevent this that her commander resorted to the trick, dishonorable in civilized warfare, of rendering her useless. The sea-valves were not only opened but

their caps were heaved overboard, the dead-lights of the portholes were smashed, and even the breech-plugs of the guns were thrown into the sea.

The 530 survivors were taken on board the United States ship *Resolute*, and the captured ship was examined. Except for the vandalism of her crew she could have been saved. But she swung off, and drifted westward, turning her bow off shore. The *New York* went in, and placing her prow against the nose of the *Colon*, pushed the latter into shoal water, where she turned over on her side and sank, swallowing the sand and refuse of the coast, an almost hopeless wreck.

The *Colon* had but two serious wounds from our fire, her sides having been masked by the *Oquendo* and the *Vizcaya* during the hottest part of the engagement.

Meanwhile, the death-strewn coast of Cuba, from Santiago to Aserraderos, a distance of fifteen miles, the scene of gigantic work of destruction, had become a theatre of heroic rescue. It was as if the angel of Mercy had followed upon swift wing the angel of Death.

No sooner had the riddled ships run ashore than the American pursuers changed from merciless adversaries to unwearying life savers. When Captain Cook ordered a boat out to board the *Colon*, his men, half-naked and begrimed with powder, ran shouting and dancing to their work. He cautioned them, however, to show no signs of triumph or exultation to the vanquished, and the crew rowed to the *Colon* in silence. As they approached the ship the Spaniards called out "*Bravo Americanos!*" and then our men returned "*Bravo Españoles!*" The cabin and gun-room tables of the Spaniard were littered with wine and brandy bottles, and the men were half drunk and dazed.

Back at Aserraderos the *Iowa* had stopped when the *Vizcaya* was beached. Five boats were sent out to rescue the Spaniards. It was a frightful scene. Fire was raging furiously between decks, and portions of the steel hull were red with heat. Men were hanging to chains or other grappling points, many were scrambling ashore through the surf. The fire was threatening magazines and projectiles, but the American seamen plunged into the wreck, seeking the wounded that

had been abandoned to a horrible fate by their own terror-stricken comrades. Loaded guns were now and then being discharged by the heat, but all this was braved. The *Ericsson*, torpedo boat, assisted at this rescue. Ashore Cubans were in waiting to assail the wretched Spaniards as they crawled upon the beach, but the arrival of the Americans put a stop to the barbarity.

Captain Antonio Eulate commanded the *Vizcaya*. More than any other Spanish officer he typified the racial pride and weakness of his nation. He had been especially selected to bring his vessel to New York harbor in a show of defiant courtesy when the *Maine* had been sent to Havana. While he was yet on the ocean the *Maine* was destroyed at Havana and Captain Eulate did not discover the fact until he reached New York. Then he entered the harbor with his flag at half-mast, without music, and declined all invitations to be entertained, giving as his reason his sympathy for the sailors lost on the *Maine*. He displayed no fear, and his conduct in all ceremonious acts was above reproach.

He remained ten days in New York, during which time the excitement over the *Maine* tragedy was high, and then he sailed away to Havana. After he had gone, one of the *boulevard* papers of Paris printed a ludicrous story which was attributed to an officer of the *Vizcaya*, who was said to have written the account home. It was intended to illustrate the cowardice of the Americans and their trembling fear of the Spanish. The story was, that when the *Vizcaya* raised anchor to steam out of New York harbor, the piers were crowded with thousands of "Yankee pigs" who began hooting and jeering at the vessel. Captain Eulate, who was on the bridge, heard the contemptuous sounds and became white with passion. Ordering the ship to stop, he had his launch lowered and manned, and then called for his second officer, to whom he said, showing a revolver:—

"If you hear a pistol shot from me on shore, you will at once open fire and bombard the city!"

Then he went in his launch to the pier, while the "Yankees" continued to jeer or to show confusion. He mounted the stairs, walked

along the front of the pier, revolver in hand, while the "trembling pigs of Yankees" cowered before him and crushed each other as they huddled back. Captain Eulate, controlling his voice, which was almost breaking with passionate and scornful rage, cried out:—

"If any man dares to jeer the ship and flag of Spain, I will kill him!"

Dead silence ensued and lasted for twenty minutes, during which time the Spaniard, with frowning brows, paced the pier, ready to execute his threat. At last, seeing that the "rabble of Yankee pigs" was completely cowed, he descended into his launch and, without a glance backward, boarded his ship and steamed out, while the thousands upon thousands of frightened "Yankees" stood in respectful silence.

It is not possible that Captain Eulate, or any of his officers, was authority for this ludicrous romance. It was doubtless made of the fancy of some Paris scribbler, for the amusement of the Latin prejudice against Americans. But it had been translated and republished in the newspapers of the United States, so that an individual and special interest was felt in the brave Spaniard who had borne himself so well under trying circumstances at New York.

When he was discovered on the beach by the *Iowa's* crew, he was covered with blood from a number of wounds and, it afterward appeared, was suffering some mental strain or aberration. Yet he retained his pride of office and race as he was taken off to the *Iowa*. As he was carried up the battleship's side, unable himself to mount, Captain Evans ordered the ship's guard to parade as a token of respect. The Spanish commander was deeply affected as he was carried aft, where Captain Evans waited.

Here Captain Eulate stood up, drew his sword from its scabbard, held it up and, with tears in his eyes, kissed the blade. Then he stepped forward and offered the hilt to Captain Evans. But the American Captain with a gesture pushed it back, and advancing seized Captain Eulate's hand.

"Keep your sword, sir," he said; "you have fought like a brave and gallant officer."

The Spaniard fairly broke down in gratitude at this signal courtesy. He would have fallen but for assistance, and was borne to his state-room in tears, crying, "My poor *Vizcaya*—lost, lost!"

He was the only officer who refused parole when brought to American soil. To accept parole from the enemy is against the regulations of the Spanish army and navy, justifiable only before court-martial. It was also said that he was the only officer among the captured who possessed no independent income and was solely dependent upon his pay.

It was darkly hinted, also, that his mental condition of moroseness, nervous excitability, and depression, was due to remorse—that he had, with his own hands, pistolled forty of the *Vizcaya's* gunners who attempted to desert their posts during the terrible fight. This was not established; it was most probably false in entirety, one of those grim manufactures of a moment opportune to the hands of a picturesque seeker after sensation. But Captain Don Antonio Eulate was the most strikingly picturesque figure of that day. He tempted the romancers of both continents.

From the *Vizcaya* 24 officers and 248 men were rescued, out of a crew of about 550. Others were picked up later, on the beach, where they were hiding from the Cubans. But more than 150 were killed by our fire, drowned, or burned on the ship. Captain Eulate said one shell had exploded in a wardroom, killing 90. Of the survivors, 32 were wounded, a few of whom died afterward.

Eight and a half miles further in the direction of Santiago, the *Almirante Oquendo* lay wrecked on Juan Gonzales Point, and a few hundred yards further, the *Maria Teresa*; these two, the last and first of the Spanish cruisers to emerge, and first to be destroyed.

The *Indiana* and *Gloucester* were here engaged at rescue. The surroundings were appalling. Both ships were glowing like furnaces, their upper works an array of twisted and distorted beams and shattered walls. Admiral Cervera had leaped overboard, clad in his underclothing only, and his son had assisted him until a life raft was reached. The Admiral entreated Lieutenant Huse of the *Gloucester*

not to go aboard his burning ship, lest explosions should kill those attempting to rescue the wounded on board. But the Americans did not hesitate. They scrambled upon the decks and bore the wounded out of the intense heat and stifling smoke, and transferred them to our boats, where American surgeons attended to their injuries with all the skill they would have exerted for our own crews.

Admiral Cervera was conveyed on board the *Gloucester*, where Captain Wainwright received him with the distinction due to his rank. The Spanish Admiral, Don Pascual de Cervera y Topete Conde de Jerez, Marquis de Santa Ana, was the nephew of Admiral Topete, one of Spain's naval heroes, and boasts of royal blood. He was about sixty-five years old. His first campaign was the Spanish expedition to Morocco in 1859, where he won promotion. He was once naval attaché of his government at Washington, and speaks English fluently. He was sent to Cochin China in 1862, and in 1868 to Peru, as captain of a war ship. Two years later he was called to Cuba, to take charge of the blockade, but later went to Spain and became Minister of Marine. When he retired he was placed in command of the *Pelayo*, Spain's only first-class battleship. He was made Admiral in 1887. When Spain prepared her fleet for Cuban waters Cervera was placed in command. A man of distinction by birth, manners, education, and experience, he does not appear to have possessed abilities equal to his opportunities. On the *Gloucester* he was given a stateroom and provided with apparel.

"I have been defeated," he said to Captain Wainwright, "and my career is ended. I thought you would be having 'church' on your ships, and as I had been ordered to run out and escape to Havana it was the best opportunity to be expected. My ships are lost, and all I have is lost. Permit me to give you my autograph—all I can—in recognition of your courtesy and humanity."

Two and a half miles nearer Santiago, the Destroyers, *Pluton* and *Furor*, had sunk near the beach. Each carried 72 men. Only 39 of the 144 men were found alive. Among the dead of the *Pluton* was Vice-Admiral Fernando Villamil, an expert in torpedo-boat construction,



ALFONSO XIII., KING OF SPAIN

who was a naval officer of eminence, well known in Europe and America. He was a man of tenacity of purpose, a fine drillmaster and executive aboard ship, and of very agreeable appearance, bearing, and manner. He enjoyed the personal friendship of the Queen-Regent. Some four years before his death, while a Commodore, he was ordered to San Sebastian, the summer home of the Spanish royal family, to act as guard for the youthful King and the Queen-Regent, at that seaside town. His appointment aroused the envy of other Spanish naval officers who desired the opportunity of being near the royal family. At that time Villamil commanded the torpedo boat *Destructor*, a boat of his own designing, but the laughing stock of the Spanish navy, on account of its small size and low freeboard. The Queen-Regent, however, was greatly interested in this new fighting craft and paid frequent visits to it, causing much heartburning among the other officers. In the middle of summer she and the King decided to sail to Bilbao, and chose the *Destructor* for the voyage. This caused a great outcry, and the Minister of Marine begged the Queen-Regent to send the King on another boat, so that in the event of an accident at least one of them would be saved.

"Commodore Villamil," asked the Queen-Regent, "is there the slightest danger?"

"None, your Majesty," was the reply.

"Then we will both sail with you," replied the Queen-Regent, much to the discomfiture of the Minister of Marine. The trip was made in safety, and Villamil was shortly afterward raised to the rank of Admiral.

The Spanish loss was about 300 killed, 150 wounded, and about 1,600 prisoners. The four cruisers had complements of about 550 each, but these were doubtless reduced by disease and accident; and the Destroyers 144 together. There were at least 2,250 men on the vessels, and it is believed that the Cubans killed and secreted the bodies of a number, not reported, and that 150 managed to find their way back to Santiago through the jungle, unless they were picked off by Cubans on the way.

II.

THE glory of our ships was deservedly great. To the *Oregon* was credited the first alarm of the enemy's intention. She signaled "Think the enemy are preparing to leave the harbor," and fired a small gun to attract the fleet's attention to the signal. On the authority of one who investigated the action, who observed it from the *New York*, who seems to have been a naval officer, and whose report is here adopted for its lucid account of the part taken by each ship, the *Oregon* was the first of our battleships cleared for action, and she engaged every Spanish ship in order. Her 13-inch guns did most execution among the enemy's ships, and the handling of the ship herself was a proof of her excellence in every particular. Her station was south of the Morro, well to the eastward of the *Vixen*, *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, and *Iowa*. In the long chase after the *Cristobal Colon* she passed all these, one after another, except the *Brooklyn*, and did it with less apparent effort at speed than was shown by any other ship. The *Cristobal Colon's* funnels, especially, belched out immense columns of dark smoke. The power of her forced draught carried even flames at times from the stacks. None of the American vessels made so much smoke, and from none were the columns so continuous. The *Oregon's* smoke was not heavy at any time, and there were minutes at a time when only the faintest haze floated from her funnels. The great ship piled up a big foam-crested billow across her bows, and rushed on as though dragged by a hidden force of incalculable power.

The *Gloucester*, formerly the pleasure yacht *Corsair*, achieved a name for herself that will long be remembered. She had the slight advantage of a harmless appearance, and may not have been attacked very fiercely. Her own advances were straight, quick, and fearlessly undertaken. She was not hit during the action, and this statement alone is convincing proof of the incomparably poor marksmanship of the Spaniards. The little vessel was a target for every gun mounted on shore and for the broadsides of the *Colon*, *Oquendo*, *Furor*, and *Pluton*, all at easy range. The shells flew around her, landing on all sides.

After the two destroyers had shown the white flag, the *Gloucester* lowered her boats and gathered in as many prisoners as came her way. Some she rescued as they swam, a few she took directly off the burning *Pluton* with that vessel's surrendered colors, and some she took from the beach.

The *Brooklyn* was lying at the western and outer end of the American line when the ships came out. Her first sight of the escaping enemy was when the Spanish flagship *Teresa* rounded the head of land at the western side of the harbor and pointed for her, firing as she came. There was a distance of at least three miles between the ships, but from the direction taken by the *Teresa* the *Brooklyn* expected to be rammed at any moment and turned her own strong bow to meet the enemy. When the whole Spanish line had cleared the harbor entrance and headed to the west, the *Brooklyn* turned off too, and started to head off the escaping ships. She fired her starboard broadside as she gathered headway, and kept up an intermittent fire until her guns grew hot and several of them were put out of commission. Her turret guns, considering the range, were her most useful arms. Only two of the *Brooklyn's* boilers were in commission at the appearance of the enemy and it was some time before fire could be placed under the others. Like the *New York*, however, she hurried on, increasing her speed by coupling on fresh boilers as fast as steam was up in them. Before one o'clock she had six and her auxiliaries in circuit. The *Brooklyn* was slightly in advance of the *Oregon* during the greater part of the long chase of the *Colon*, but when the *Colon* finally ran ashore the *Brooklyn* turned in astern of the battleship.

The *Vixen*, formerly the yacht *Josephine*, was on the extreme western station. The course of the Spanish ships was outside her. For several reasons the little vessel moved quickly out. She was in range of the American ships for one thing, and her presence might interfere with their fire at the enemy. So the *Vixen* raced out to the southward as fast as she could, firing valiantly at the cruisers as she went. She followed the chase to the westward and was sent back from Rio Tarquino with dispatches.

The *Texas*, which had met with many accidents of navigation in times of peace, and had thus earned the wardroom sobriquet of "The Old Hoodoo," proved herself worthy to rank in the first class, doing work scarcely less effective than the *Oregon*. She was in the thick of combat from beginning to end, and her guns engaged every one of the enemy's ships. The shot that tore open the boilers of the *Pluton* is credited to Ensign Guise of the *Texas*. The Spanish commanders had special orders to sink the *Brooklyn* and *Texas* if they could. As the *Texas* drew up on the *Oquendo* Captain Phillip, her commander, left the bridge and went to the conning tower to direct the fighting. Scarcely had he done so when a shot passed where he had been standing. She was several times struck, one shell exploding in her smokestack, but no shots caused serious injury. The guns of the *Texas* were swung in so many directions in the fury of fighting, that the concussion caused by cross-deck firing deafened most of her men for days. One was hurled down a hatchway by the tremendous impact of the rushing air, and suffered a broken arm.

The *Indiana*, being slow and unwieldy, did little more than fire as a stationary fort as the ships came out of the entrance. After the sinking of the destroyers, by which time the outcome of the action was already pretty evident, she was ordered back to the harbor entrance to keep watch there. On the way she lowered boats and joined in the rescue work.

The *Iowa* was in all the fighting equally with the *Texas*, until the sinking of the *Vizcaya*, when she was ordered back to take part in the rescue of the Spaniards.

The *New York* and her Admiral took no part in the fighting, but the ship was racing to the assistance of the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*, after the *Colon*. She made the 55 miles under the handicap of small boiler power, but arrived only half an hour after the *Colon* was beached.

For the Spaniards there was no glory. All their ships had met the same fate but the *Colon*, and she escaped it only through treachery. She was surrendered in order that her own men might destroy her.



THE FLAGSHIP NEW YORK UNDER FULL SPEED

Her officers shrank from combat only to take refuge in the vandalism of cowardice. For these acts they were liable to punishment by death; but no notice was taken of it.

A correspondent of *Harper's Weekly*, describing the Spanish wrecks a day after their destruction, wrote thus of the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*, which might also describe the *Vizcaya*:—

“They lie in a little cove a few hundred yards apart, both bows on to a hard sand beach, at the foot of high hills that come down to the sea less steeply than usual, and are separated from the water by a stretch of flat, low, grass-grown land adorned with tall cocoanut palms. The two beaches, neither more than 300 yards in length, are separated by a bluff of precipitous rock. High and gloomy hills to the north shut in the view, while the heavy ground-swell rolls in its heavy voice against the shore. This cove, five and one-half miles from the entrance to Santiago, was most opportune for the two hard-pressed ships, as the usual coast line is steep, rocky, and it would be impossible for ships or men to have survived for a minute the thundering breakers.

“Smoke still poured from the two ships, and blew away in a thin veil against the dark hills; the surf beat along their sides and swept in and out through the sternports and through shot-holes and torpedo-tubes. It was quite a climb up the tall sides of the *Maria Teresa*, and once in the gangway the scene that met our eyes was one of utter ruin. Bad as the ships looked from the outside, the paint all burned off, or hanging in folds where the water had cooled its farther progress, guns slewed every which way, and wire rope and tackle hanging over the side in wild disorder, the scene on deck was so much worse as to leave one speechless with dismay.

“The spar-deck was nothing but an array of twisted sagging iron beams, set with copper bolts that had held the deck-planking, and now stuck up in ragged rows or bent over as the fire had left them. Around some of the broadside 5-inch guns bits of deck still remained and smoldered, sending up wreaths of pale blue smoke. Around the guns and scattered about between the smokestacks and ventilators were charred bodies that gave out an unpleasant odor. The forward military mast had fallen, mixed up with guns, davits, and iron plates, on the starboard side. The bridge was a mass of twisted iron and brass. Smokestacks and ventilators sagged, and some of the latter had fallen down entirely. There was a great hole where the magazines had been, forward and aft; they had exploded from the bottom up, in the line of least resistance, ripping the deck and beams away entirely, so you could look down to the bottom of the ship, where the water swashed around. The iron deck aft was bent and twisted and buckled under the weight of the big turret and 11-inch gun. The main deck, made of iron plates, still remained, and was covered with ashes and débris fallen from above. The forward part of the

ship was full of dead, and was too hot to admit of much investigation. Sailors from the *Texas* swarmed over the vessel while we were there, and brought up from below rifles, outlasses, and souvenirs of all sorts. One man had a hat full of silver money that had melted and stuck together. The hammock nettings were full of burned tin boxes that had held canned food; wine bottles and such litter were scattered about, and from forward and aft were brought many books of a doubtful character."

There was no honor for the Spanish ships. They were all magnificent vessels of their type. The armament, protection, and motive power of the *Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya* ranked them as almost second-class battleships rather than cruisers. The *Colon's* 11-inch guns had never been mounted, and they were missed. Her crew, however, was the best one of the four, and had had charge of the guns of the western battery at Santiago, that had done the most effective work against the blockading fleet. The *Furor* and *Pluton* were of the latest type of the torpedo-boat destroyer class, and had been much feared, though not by the Americans. The engagement at Santiago in many respects was without precedent.



CHAPTER THE TWELFTH.

DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON (*Concluded*).

SPANISH STORY OF THE BATTLE AS TOLD BY SURVIVING OFFICERS—IT DOES NOT DIFFER
IN SUBSTANCE FROM THE AMERICAN ACCOUNT—INCIDENTS AND ANECDOTES OF
THE ENGAGEMENT—HOW THE BATTLE LOOKED TO OBSERVERS—
TO WHOM DOES THE CREDIT OF VICTORY BELONG?

I.

THE Spanish side of the story of the great battle is a part of its history no less necessary than our own. Admiral Cervera was permitted by our Government to make up and forward his official report to Spain, but it was a confidential communication, and its character was not indicated. A copy is in the archives of the United States Government. The Admiral declined to speak publicly of the battle, and the officers also declined to make any authorized statement; but during their pas-
sage to Annapolis on board the *St. Louis*, as prisoners, they spoke freely to our officers of the experiences of their ships. A report of these statements was carefully made up and published in the *New York Sun*, from which this summary is taken.

THE SPANISH
STORY OF
THE BATTLE

Lieutenant Gomez Imas of Cervera's staff on the *Maria Teresa* said: "After clearing the harbor we headed to the westward along the shore. We fired the first shot of the battle, aiming at the *Brooklyn*, then about three miles away. The *Texas*, *Oregon*, and *Brooklyn* returned our fire, but their first shots all fell short. As the distance between the ships decreased the shells commenced to strike us and did great damage. First, a shell exploded in the Admiral's cabin, setting fire to the wood-work there. A signal was sent to the engine room to start the pumps, but the fire mains had been ruptured by an exploding shell, so that no water could be got on the fire. Another shell struck the main steam


pipe, disabling the port engine, and the escaping steam killed every man in that compartment. One exploding shell killed or wounded eighty of our men. Our fire was directed principally against the *Brooklyn*. The fire in the after part of the ship had driven the crews away from the after guns, and the rapid-fire guns of the American ships were playing havoc with our men and riddling the upper works of the ship. Having one engine disabled and the whole after part of the ship on fire, the vessel was headed toward the shore in search of a suitable place for beaching. The Captain said to the Admiral:—

“‘My ship is in flames, my engines are disabled, my men have been driven from the guns and are being killed; ought I not for humanity’s sake to surrender?’

“The Admiral answered, ‘It will be useless to fight longer.’

“The flag was hauled down and the ship run on the beach. The Captain was struck and severely wounded just as the flag was being lowered. The fire was now raging aft so that there was great danger of the magazine being blown up at any minute. The Admiral and those of the officers and crew still alive took to the water, the risk of drowning being preferable to the certainty of being burned or blown up. Many reached the shore, but some were drowned. Admiral Cervera stripped to his underclothing and plunged into the water. Two of the sailors secured ropes to a grating, and taking the other end of the ropes in their mouths swam to the shore towing the grating, the Admiral bearing part of his weight on it. The Admiral’s son, one of his staff, swam along behind his father and assisted him as best he could. Had it not been for this assistance Admiral Cervera would undoubtedly have been drowned, as he is a very poor swimmer. While the men were in the water the Cubans on shore commenced firing at them until the *Iowa* put a stop to that atrocity by firing a shell among them and scattering them.”

Captain Eulate of the *Vizcaya* said: “When the *Maria Teresa* headed for shore I passed her, and I had the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* all firing at me. The firing from these ships was terrific;



U. S. BATTLESHIP IOWA

shells were bursting all around us. My ship was set on fire by a shell exploding in my cabin. My engines and pumps were disabled, and I could not fight the fire. My men were being killed and wounded in large numbers. A shell finally exploded in one of my forward magazines and I was forced to head for the shore. When I went into action I had flying at the masthead a large embroidered silk flag, which had been made and presented to the ship by ladies of the province of Vizcaya. When I saw that my ship would be lost, I had this flag hauled down and burned, and hoisted another ensign in its place. My flag was shot away twice during the engagement, the last time just as the ship grounded. The boats of the *Iowa* picked up those of my officers and men still left alive, carrying them to that ship. When I went on board the *Iowa*, I took off my sword and tendered it to Captain Evans, but he refused it, saying that I had fought four ships and that I should keep my sword. That was the proudest moment of my life."

The Captain of the *Oquendo* committed suicide, and the second and third officers were killed during the engagement. The following description was obtained from the paymaster of the *Oquendo*:—

"When we came out of the harbor we were fired on by the *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Oregon*. Our fire was mostly directed against the *Texas*, for we had seen the splendid shooting done by her in the attacks on the batteries. From the first the firing was terrific, and great damage was done. The after part of the ship was set on fire by bursting shell and could not be put out. Finally, fearing that the magazines would explode and everyone be lost, the ship was beached and the flag lowered. The mortality on the ship was great, over half of the crew having been killed and wounded."

Captain Moreu of the *Cristobal Colon*, said to have been by far the ablest officer in the fleet, gave an account of his ship. He did not open fire at first, but passed inside of the other vessels. When the *Vizcaya* headed for the shore, he passed her and then opened fire on the *Oregon*, *Brooklyn*, and *Texas*, which ships had taken up the chase. He ran to the westward, close to the shore. The heavy guns

intended for this ship had never been mounted, and when asked where they were, the Captain shrugged his shoulders and said: "Perhaps in the pocket of the Minister of Marine." Finally, when nearly fifty miles from Santiago, he was headed off and hauled down his flag at 1:20 P. M. There was no serious battle damage done to this ship, and but one man killed and sixteen wounded.

Lieutenant Diego Carlier, in command of the destroyer *Furor*, and Lieutenant Pedro Vasquez, in command of the *Pluton*, told each the same story. They were literally riddled by the rapid-fire guns of the *Oregon*, *Iowa*, and *Texas*. Their boilers were struck and exploded, one after the other, in rapid succession. A large shell struck the *Pluton* almost amidships and exploded, nearly tearing her in two. She sank almost immediately. The steering gear on the *Furor* was shot away, and she ran into shoal water and sank. These vessels each carried seventy-two men. But twenty-two were saved from the *Pluton* and but seventeen from the *Furor*. The officers all expressed themselves amazed at the rapidity and accuracy of fire of the American ships. They all expressed the hope that Spain would see the uselessness of continuing the war.

Another officer said: "For twenty days I have had no rest. Every night we expected some kind of an attack. One day, when you bombarded El Morro, a shell came over the heights and wrecked my room. Ever since the war began I have known that this day must come. Particularly since May 29, when you blockaded us in Santiago harbor, we have been under a nerve strain such as the knowledge of certain defeat, deferred from day to day, must always induce. Imagine to what a tension our nerves have been wrought up. We knew perfectly well that in coming out of the harbor we were coming to destruction, but it was a sacrifice that we had to make for our honor and our country. There was no way out of it, and, since it had to come, I cannot but feel relieved that it is over, and I am grateful to God that we have fallen into such kind hands."

An American officer who was present when the Spaniards were taken aboard one of our rescuing ships, bore testimony to the bravery

displayed. "About thirty of the prisoners," he said, "were wounded, all of whom bore their suffering with most admirable spirit. One poor fellow had his right foot knocked off above the ankle and another severe wound in the calf of his leg; but our surgeon was busy trying to stop the flow of blood from a man who was bleeding to death, so the heroic sailor said: —

"‘Oh, I’m all right; all I want is a cigarette.’ Then, having smoked one, instead of fainting, he actually went to sleep! No man could witness, as I did, the patience and fortitude displayed by these poor, suffering prisoners, without experiencing increased respect for them. Understanding the condition of affairs at Santiago, notwithstanding that our forces were sure to administer a crushing defeat in case the enemy came out, I must bear witness to the courage of Admiral Cervera, his officers and his men. It was a cruel fate. They knew that they were offering themselves up in making a desperate effort, and they chose to do it because there was only one alternative—that of giving up without a struggle. They played their last card and lost. I must mention how the Spanish prisoners behaved when we fired our national salute at noon. As the first gun was fired and our officers all stood up and uncovered, the Spanish officers did likewise and their men followed the example, all standing in respectful silence until the last gun was fired."

II.

IN THIS great naval battle off Santiago, Spaniard and "American mercenary" had measured themselves again, as they had on the other side of the world when Dewey erased the squadron of Montejo. The movement was reversed, but the result was not changed. Dewey had sailed into unknown and masked dangers and had annihilated the Spaniard under the guns of his shore forts, without the loss of a man. At Santiago Cervera steamed out against a force he knew perfectly well, with four cruisers

INCIDENTS
AND
ANECDOTES

as strong as battleships in armament, and much higher in contemplated speed. Spanish incompetency with machinery and Spanish incompetency at the guns had in both instances gone down before the unrivaled skill and accuracy of American engineers and gunners. Dewey surprised Montojo in his own fastness, and beat him by celerity and intrepidity of action. Cervera surprised Schley, but yet was beaten by the celerity and intrepidity that could recover against all odds. Montojo had been at a ball. Schley's squadron was expected to be "at church." It was the living against the dying race.

Nothing could illustrate more strikingly their racial differences than the condition and conduct of the men. The American seamen were all sober; the Spaniards were all stimulated to the point of desperation by liquors—the fashion of the eighteenth century. When rescued, the Spaniards at first trembled at the expectation of death; the Americans risked death again to save their wounded enemies. So astonished were the Spaniards at their treatment that Admiral Cervera cabled to General Blanco: "The crews are very grateful for the noble generosity with which they were treated." The prisoners were taken to healthful quarters in the United States, supplied with good quarters, clothing, and food, the officers conveyed to Annapolis and released on parole; yet they expected court-martial, disgrace, perhaps death, because they accepted this ordinary kindness. The Spaniards abandoned their own wounded to the fires on their vessels; and were amazed when the Americans entered these burning hells to rescue men they had just been engaged in destroying.

When the *padr * of the *Vizcaya* was taken aboard the *Ericsson* he sat down upon a chest. The wounded of his own charge were brought in and he was asked to remove from the chest in order that a wounded Spaniard might be placed upon it for treatment. He coldly refused to yield, and it is to the honor of Ensign Edie of the rescuing crew that he promptly seized the heartless chaplain and contemptuously threw him upon the floor.

These are not natural exhibitions of human cruelty; they are the outcome of caste, that institution of social slavery that exists in Spain.

Some of the Spaniards exhibited the highest courage, fortitude, and nobility of conduct under their misfortunes. The junior surgeon of the *Vizcaya* declined to have his wounds dressed until his men had been attended to. One young officer, with his left arm broken and helpless, mounted the side of his prison ship without assistance, and with his right arm saluted the deck as he reached it. Captain Eulate, Admiral Cervera, Captain Maocochron, and others, bore themselves with the naturalness, simplicity, and courage of brave men. When Captain Eulate's sword was refused, and he burst into tears, the crew of the *Iowa* burst into cheers for him as a brave man.

When the *Texas* had riddled the *Oquendo* and the Spanish colors came down, to be followed by a great explosion that marked her ruin, the crew of the American started to cheer.

"Don't cheer, boys," cried Captain Philip; "the poor devils are dying." And the cheers were silenced on the very lips of the conquerors.

When the *Colon* surrendered, the same crew gave three cheers and a "tiger" for their veteran commander. Instantly Captain Philip called all hands to the quarter-deck, and, with bared head, thanked God for the almost bloodless victory.

"I want to make public acknowledgment here," he said, "that I believe in God the Father Almighty. I want all you officers and men to lift your hats and from your hearts offer silent thanks to the Almighty."

All hats were off. There was a moment or two of absolute silence, and then again the overwrought feelings of the ship's company relieved themselves in three hearty cheers for their commander.

The engagement was almost the counterpart under reversed plan of that at Manila. But one man was killed on the American ships at Santiago. He was George H. Ellis, yeoman, of the *Brooklyn*. Ellis was standing with Commodore Schley, when the *Vizcaya* came out of the harbor.

"Ellis," said the Commodore to the yeoman, "find the range of that ship."

Ellis stepped toward his place to comply, when a shell took his head off so quickly that the body remained swaying for a moment, until companions rushed forward and caught it.

"Too bad!" cried the Commodore, who replaced the glasses to his eyes and resumed his watch of the enemy.

The *Brooklyn* was struck twenty-six times by the enemy's shots, but sustained little injury. It was proof that the Spaniards concentrated their fire upon her. The *Iowa* was struck five times, two shells piercing her, one starting a fire that was quickly extinguished. The *Texas* was struck three times.

The *Oquendo* received greatest punishment from our gunners. When examined, part of her hull was under water, but in that portion above it, it was found that she had been struck sixty-six times. The *Teresa* was struck thirty-three times, the *Vizcaya* twenty-four, and the *Colon* eight. All had distinct wounds in their hulls. The shots were from the 4-, 5-, 6-, 8-, and 12-inch guns. One big shell, a 12-incher from the *Texas*, tore a hole through the *Oquendo*. There were other shell holes made by the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *Iowa*. The *Vizcaya's* forward torpedoes, which had their war heads on, exploded, tearing a great hole in her bow. She was the worst wreck of all. The *Oquendo's* back was broken on the beach. The *Teresa's* fire mains were destroyed at the beginning of the action. She was set on fire by a 6-inch shell immediately and could not put it out.

III.

TO WHOM
BELONGS
THE CREDIT?

THE Fourth of July, 1898, in the United States was not less glorious to our national pride and the strength of our arms than the first Fourth had been to the struggling hopes of the Republic. On the afternoon of the 3rd Admiral Sampson sent the following cable dispatch to Washington:—

SIBONEY, July 3, via HAYTI, July 4.

The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth of July present, the destruction of the whole of Cervera's fleet—not one escaped. It attempted to escape

at 9:30 this morning. At two the last ship, the *Cristobal Colon*, had run ashore sixty miles west of Santiago and had let down her colors. The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya* were forced ashore, burned and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The *Furor* and *Pluton* were destroyed within four miles of the port.

Our loss, one killed and two wounded. Enemy's loss, probably several hundred from gun fire, explosions and drowning. About 1,300 prisoners, including Admiral Cervera. The man killed was George H. Ellis, chief yeoman of the *Brooklyn*.

[Signed] SAMPSON.

This message reached the President at noon on Monday the 4th following quickly the information briefly printed in the newspapers. It filled the country with joy and exultation. From the depression caused by the heavy losses at San Juan and El Caney, national spirit leaped to patriotic heights.

Immediately on the receipt of Admiral Sampson's message the President sent the following:—

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4. }

Admiral Sampson, Playa del Este:—

You have the gratitude and congratulations of the whole American people. Convey to your noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have been added to the American navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the nation.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

Secretary Long sent the following:—

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4.

To Admiral Sampson, Playa del Este:—

The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your fleet, remembering affectionately your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave! You have maintained the glory of the American navy.

JOHN D. LONG.

As has been pointed out, the battle of Santiago was almost a reversal of the movement at Manila, but the result had not been reversed, and was the same in both combats. The men behind the guns, behind the ship, behind the engines, had triumphed over Spanish incompetency, in each instance, with scarcely a scar to show for it. At Manila we had eight men slightly wounded; at Santiago one man killed and one slightly wounded.

In the two engagements the enemy had lost four of the finest first-class cruisers of the world's navies, eight unprotected light cruisers, six gunboats, and two of the most valued destroyers of her great torpedo fleet—twenty ships in all, valued at about \$25,000,000. The *Colon* had been purchased from Italy at a cost of \$3,500,000 and the three original Spanish cruisers cost each as much to construct. The Spanish loss in men in both engagements was about 1,100 killed, 2,400 captured, several hundred wounded and missing.

The United States had not lost a ship or a ship's boat, and the injuries sustained to armor and machinery were trivial. The superiority of our men could have received no more signal demonstration.

Whose was the victory at Santiago?


That was the question to spring up even before the cheers of national exultation had ceased. It was as though the people of the United States were unable to realize the vast extent and the glorious completeness of the battle in detail. The report of Admiral Sampson did not mention the name of an officer or ship of our navy, but gave the glory to "the fleet under my command." The magnificent performances of the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship, and the temporary absence of the Admiral, during which time the command devolved upon Schley, gave to public opinion, heated by excitement and passion, seeking for heroes and resentful of any appearance of favoritism, the impression that Sampson had ignored the claims of "the fighting Commodore."

The sudden elevation of Sampson had caused comment, and his position was, professionally, embarrassing and delicate.

Whose was the victory at Santiago?

It was, as Sampson said, that of the fleet under his command. It was, as Schley said in his report, when with the directness of an officer of courage, loyalty, and thorough discipline he wrote to the Admiral, "I congratulate you upon the great victory to the squadron under your command, . . . a victory that seems big enough for all of us."

Who would care to alter this verdict of two heroes?



U. S. ARMORED CRUISER BROOKLYN

It was a victory "big enough for all"—from the Admiral, on his great cruiser, to the humblest powder-monkey on the *Gloucester*; from the gallant Commodore to the lowliest stoker. There can be no effective action without plan, just as there can be no good plan established without action. It is not the true nature of Americans, except under excitement, to underrate the value of that patient, silent, loyal, brave, and far-seeing Admiral, who made no mistakes in preparation or disposition, who demonstrated, in the difficult and burdensome task to which he was called, the glory of the genius of Republican institutions; the genius of thoroughness of education in his profession, of untiring industry and energy, of deliberate preparation for the purpose in hand, of unflinching responsibility for what result soever might ensue, and the calm courage and willingness to set his life upon the outcome.

Nor could they fail to view without admiration the valiant acts of the Commodore, ready in his place, quick and dauntless to meet the enemy, with his life in his hand, and who was the conspicuous figure to lead in the actual fighting—the figure of deathless courage that all the world hails as a hero. His work could not have been better done.

The victory at Santiago belongs to Americans, to Sampson, Schley, Clark, Philip, Cook, Evans, Taylor, Wainwright, and the patriotic men on all the ships. What if Sampson was away at the beginning, upon an errand of highest duty—was he not there at the finish? If Schley had been struck down by the first shot, can Americans believe we should have lost? Were there not Clark, Philip, Evans, Cook, and Taylor? Did any one of the men or the ships act in such manner as to indicate that the stout fabric of the American navy was woven about a single thread, to unravel and fall in pieces if that thread were cut?

To credit the victory to any but "the fleet under Admiral Sampson" is to discredit all.*

*Lieutenant Akijama, naval *attaché* of the Japanese Empire at Washington, who accompanied our fleet for observation, was questioned by the *New York Sun* on his return

In recognition of the victory the President soon after promoted Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson to be Rear-Admiral, and Commodore Schley received the same advancement. In both cases the reason recorded was "for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle." Captain Philip, of the *Texas*, was made a Commodore, and all the other commanders were advanced in the order of their rank for their participation in this engagement, and that at Guantanamo.

from Santiago, July 21. He had witnessed the battle, and was asked if he had formed any opinion upon it.

"Many," he replied. "First, the arrangement of the American fleet by Admiral Sampson. It was complete. It was without fault."

"You think, then, that Admiral Sampson deserves the credit for the battle?"

"Sincerely, I do. The officers of other Governments all agree with me that the greatest credit is for the Admiral. He made the plans. He gave the orders. He said where each ship should wait for the Spanish. The Spanish came. The result was the most complete victory that ever was known. He was not there. He was unfortunate. But the fight showed, by its complete victory, that his plans were right. If the flagship had been in the fight, she would have fought as well as the other ships. The seamanship, the crews of the American ships, the directness of their aim, it is all alike. It could not be better.

"Admiral Sampson was fortunate to have brave, quick officers to obey the commands he had given to them. They were quiet, waiting. The Spanish came and made a surprise. The Admiral was away. It was a good test. The American fleet went quickly to meet them. It was as if they knew long before that the Spaniards were coming. Commodore Schley fights well. He led the fleet with great dash. They fired so fast, so fiercely, so accurately, that the people who looked thought 'the American ships are on fire.' The firing, I say, was so great that the Spaniards were [Here the Lieutenant made a downward motion of his hands with the palms outward, more expressive than words could have been.] stopped from helping themselves. The Spaniards would be brave in fight, very likely, but there was no chance; your fleet was too good. If any one had said before such a victory was possible, he would have been laughed at.

"The smoke around your fleet was very great. Shooting straight seemed to be impossible. But the shooting was very straight. All the foreign officers said to one another often on the *Seneca*: 'It is wonderful; it could not be better.'"

Asked to compare the naval battle of Santiago with the battle of the Yalu, Lieutenant Akijama said:—

"They would be hard to compare, because the character of the fights differed. At the Yalu there was much manœuvring. All through the fight the position of the ships changed. At Santiago it was shoot, advancing on the Spanish. When the Spanish found themselves overpowered and desired to escape, it was follow and destroy. It was simple, but it was well done. If it had not been well done it would not have been simple, but most confused; the American victory would not have been with only one man killed."

New York Sun, July 22, 1898.

CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH.

PROGRESS OF OUR ARMY AND NAVY.

GENERAL SHAFTER SURROUNDS SANTIAGO AND DEMANDS ITS SURRENDER—SINGULAR PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS—EXCHANGE OF HOBSON AND HIS MEN, AN EXCITING INCIDENT—THE "ST. PAUL" SINKS THE TORPEDO BOAT "TERROR" AT SAN JUAN—THE "TEXAS" SINKS THE "REINA MERCEDES" IN SANTIAGO HARBOR—"ALFONSO XII." SUNK AT MARIEL—THE LUDICROUS VOYAGE OF ADMIRAL CAMARA'S FLEET THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL AND BACK AGAIN.

I.

WHILE our navy was destroying the Spanish sea forces that Sunday morning, our soldiers, haggard and exhausted with battle and hunger, yet undismayed, lay before the walls of Santiago, tenaciously holding every foot of ground that had been won by their blood and valor. Saturday four batteries were moved up into position to bombard the city and a portion of the entrenchments, to aid General Ludlow with a force to move to the north and shut in the city on that side. The same day Colonel Escariel arrived in Santiago with about 1,000 Spanish reinforcements.

**TIGHTENING THE
CORD ABOUT
SANTIAGO**

The condition of the roads to the rear prevented supplies from being brought up, and our troops were living upon scant rations. General Shafter and General Wheeler were ill with fever, General S. B. M. Young was seriously ill and had to be sent back to the hospital ship, although he protested in the delirium of fever his desire to go to the front. On Saturday night a council of war was held and misgivings were expressed, only to be swept away by the tenacity of General Wheeler, who declared that not an inch should be conceded. General Shafter cabled to Washington for reinforcements to support the exhausted army and was promised aid as quickly as troops could be dispatched. The council decided to put on a bold front to the enemy

On Sunday morning, while Cervera's fleet was leaving the harbor to meet destruction, a flag of truce from Shafter entered Santiago bearing this letter to the commanding General:—

To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:—

SIR:— I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General U. S. A.

It was given into the hands of General José Toral, who had succeeded to command through the wounding of General Linares and the death of General Vara del Rey, second in command. Toral was aware of Cervera's movement and hoped that its success would weaken our naval forces by the necessity of pursuit of the Spanish vessels. Without delay he sent back a response full of cool defiance. It read:—

"I advise the foreign women and children that they must leave the city before ten o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message."

The reply was brought to Shafter at 6:30 in the evening, and with the truce-messenger came a deputation of foreign consuls who appealed for more time in which to get the non-combatants out of the city. They asked leave to send these to El Caney and represented that there were from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand persons anxious to leave, many of them old, feeble, sick, and helpless. They were also without food, which Shafter could not promise to supply while his own troops were hungry and supplies were coming forward with dangerous slowness. He granted to the refugees permission to go to El Caney, but firmly refused to allow any at Siboney, where it was determined to keep our hospitals free from the danger of infection. By the consuls he forwarded the following to General Toral:

The Commanding General Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:—

SIR:— In consideration of the request of the consuls and officers in your city for delay in carrying out my intention to fire on the city, and in the interest of the

poor women and children, who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and enforced departure from the city, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action solely in their interest until noon of the fifth, provided during the interval your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my own. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.

General Toral consented to this truce and the evacuation of Santiago by the miserable refugees of war began next morning. Among them were the Civil Governor, the Mayor, and the highest officer of justice. They had been forbidden to depart by Toral, but escaped in the rout, a most significant indication to our authorities of the desperate straits in the city. When questioned they reported the effects of the siege as dreadful, and Spanish losses as very great. The poorer classes were at the point of starvation. Food was very scarce. Only rice and black bread were to be obtained. The food was all held by the army, and was given out in smallest quantities by officers. The people were almost ready to surrender before the fight, and after that they were anxious to capitulate. These civil officers had favored surrender, for which they had been denounced by General Toral, but they continued to urge him. The Archbishop of Santiago, the highest ecclesiastical authority in the island, was in favor of surrender, and he, too, had pleaded with General Toral, who continued, however, to maintain his stubborn attitude. They did not believe Toral could hold out much longer. Pressure upon him was great from citizens and soldiers. The foreign consuls had confirmed these reports and opinions.

Not fewer than 18,000 men, women, and children marched out of Santiago that Monday morning, over the roads deep in mire that led to El Caney. The village, that had only a thousand inhabitants, was much damaged by the battle on the preceding Friday, so that the massing of 18,000 helpless persons there meant pitiful hardships and much suffering. The sick were carried on litters, many of the weak women succumbed to the heat and fell almost dead by the roadside. Many women were widows, wives, or mothers, of Spanish

soldiers. Thousands were well dressed, some of the women of the highest class handsomely attired in silk gowns. These volunteered as nurses, and when the families of the killed or wounded discovered how well the wounded Spanish were being cared for, they became devoted adherents of the American cause.

At noon, on Tuesday, the truce would expire. That morning, however, a flag of truce came out from Toral. The bearer of it, instead of being blindfolded, as usual, to prevent observation of the strength and disposition of our forces, was escorted open-eyed past our batteries, trenches, and lines, so that he might be impressed with the hopelessness of resistance. Toral had heard that Cervera's ships were destroyed, but could not believe it. His communication to Shafter was lengthy. He asked that the truce be further extended, as he wished time to communicate with the Madrid Government concerning the surrender of the city. He also asked that cable operators be sent to operate the line between Santiago and Kingston. He pledged his honor as a soldier that the operators should not be asked to transmit any matter that did not solely bear on the surrender, and that he would return them safe to El Caney when a final reply should be received from Madrid. This request for operators was necessary for the reason that the operators of the Santiago cable were British subjects and had all left the city under the protection of the British Consul when the non-combatants left. The commissioner said General Toral desired to consult the authorities in Madrid because he had been unable to communicate with Captain-General Blanco at Havana.

It was finally arranged that the truce should be extended until Saturday, and the cable operators were sent into the city.

Toral's commissioner also bore to his commander the following letter from Shafter:—

SIR:—1. In view of the events of the 3d inst., I have the honor to lay before your Excellency certain propositions, to which, I trust, you will give the consideration which, in my opinion, they deserve.

2. I inclose a bulletin of the engagement on Sunday morning, which resulted in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet, the loss of 600 officers and

men, and the capture of the remainder. The Admiral and General Paredes and other officers escaped alive and are now prisoners on the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*. The latter ship, in which are the Admiral, General Paredes, and the surviving Captains of all the vessels, except the Captain of the *Almirante Oquendo*, who was slain, has sailed for the United States. If desired, this may be confirmed by your Excellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson and he can arrange to visit the *Harvard*, which will not sail until to-morrow.

3. Our fleet is now perfectly free to act. I have the honor to state that unless a surrender is arranged by noon of the 9th inst. the bombardment of the city will be begun and continued by the heavy guns of our ships. The city is within easy range of these guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9,500 yards and the 13-inch much further. The ships can so lie that with a range of 8,000 yards they can reach the center of the city.

4. I make this suggestion in a purely humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to cause the slaughter of more men of either your Excellency's forces or my own, the final result, under circumstances so disadvantageous to your Excellency, being a foregone conclusion.

5. As your Excellency may wish to make reference of so momentous a question to your home Government, it is for this purpose that I have placed the time for the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow of a reply being received.

6. I beg an early answer.

Then began an extraordinary series of negotiations, never before heard of in the business of warfare. Both sides were not averse to gaining time. Toral dared not surrender without authority from Blanco or his Government at Madrid. Shafter, whose forces were suffering from disease following hunger, exposure, and exhaustion, was willing to wait for 6,000 fresh troops that were speeding to his assistance with General Nelson A. Miles, the Commander-in-Chief, at their head. These arrived at Baiquiri on the day the truce expired.

Meantime, Toral, after consulting with his superiors at Madrid and Havana, suggested terms offering to evacuate Santiago if General Shafter would permit him to depart unmolested with all his troops, arms, and flags. He added that any attempt to conquer the city must cost the Americans enormously in the matter of lives, for he had been reënforced, and now had plenty of ammunition. Resistance, he said, would be long as well as strong, because, by sending

out the poor of Santiago to be fed by the Americans, he had enabled himself to provision his garrison for an indefinite time.

The truce was again extended one day. Six batteries of Randolph's light artillery arrived and occupied positions overlooking the Spanish lines and the city. The disposition of troops composing our line was about as follows: On the right, Lawton's division (Ludlow's, Chaffee's, and Miles's brigades) and Wheeler's cavalry division (First, Ninth, Tenth, and Rough Riders); center, Bates's brigade; left, Kent's brigade. It was reported that the Spaniards were digging trenches in the streets of Santiago, and otherwise preparing for a house-to-house fight.

Sunday the 10th General Shafter notified Toral that by the President's directions the Spanish proposition to surrender was rejected, and that the United States would accept no terms but unconditional surrender. General Toral replied in effect that he would discuss no other terms than those suggested by himself.

The attack on the city by the artillery did not begin until after five o'clock in the afternoon, when the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, and *Indiana*, lying off Aguadores, threw shells over the cliffs in an effort to reach the city, six miles distant and hidden from view. Signals from shore announced that the shells fell short of the Spanish position. From Shafter's lines, the Spanish defenses outside the city were fired upon by our field guns, mortars, Gatling guns, and the dynamite gun of the Rough Riders. The enemy's reply proved to be less vigorous than was anticipated. On our side Captain Charles W. Rowell and one private were killed and four wounded.

On July 11 Shafter's available forces, counting all reënforcements, and deducting the dead, sick, and wounded, was about 22,500 fighting men. This is based on an estimate of 15,337 men in General Shafter's original expedition, and a little more than 10,000 in various expeditions which had since gone, making in all 25,500 men. Bombardment was resumed that day until a flag of truce was raised in the city and negotiations were resumed.

II.

THE undeniably brave, if desperate, resistance of the Spanish troops had earned the respect and admiration of the United States forces. Whatever the incompetency of the Spanish navy, none was displayed by the military forces. Spain's troops have always been celebrated for courage and cruelty. They cost Napoleon more trouble than any other adversaries. During the truces before Santiago there was some fraternization between officers on both sides and our men recognized the courtesy and courage of their enemies.

RELEASE OF
HOBSON AND
HIS MEN

This good opinion was increased when, on July 6, Toral agreed to exchange Lieutenant Hobson, the hero of the *Merrimac* incident, and his seven sailors, for an equal number of Spanish prisoners.

The incident was picturesque and exhilarating to the soldiers, wearied by long service in the trenches.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, the agreement having been concluded, the Spanish prisoners to be exchanged started from the American lines in charge of Lieutenant John D. Miley of Shafter's staff. Lieutenant Miley was followed by three Spanish Lieutenants, from whom one was to be selected to be exchanged for Lieutenant Hobson. They were blindfolded and carried in a covered wagon. The officers were followed by the soldiers for whom our sailors were to be exchanged. The road led up a hill on the crest of which our firing line was lying in the trenches. Passing through the line, the procession moved four hundred yards down the hill toward Santiago and turned into a field. Here the bandages were removed from the prisoners' eyes, and all the party sat down under a tree to await the arrival of Hobson and his men, who could already be seen moving out of the city with a white flag floating above them, accompanied by a guard.

When the two groups met beneath the tree the eyes of both armies were upon them. The Spanish officer in charge of the Americans talked for an hour with Lieutenant Miley before final terms of

exchange were agreed upon. Lieutenant Miley told the Spanish officer that he might select any one of the three Spanish Lieutenants in exchange for Hobson. Finally Lieutenant Arias was selected for the reason that he was wounded.

Then the two groups saluted and each turned back to its own lines. As the Americans came up the hill road, Lieutenant Hobson was riding in advance with Lieutenant Miley, on horseback. The soldiers recognized him by his uniform, and instantly broke into deafening cheers. The party moved rapidly forward, and when they were well within the American lines the sailors cheered, while the soldiers waved their hats and shouted themselves hoarse. One of the regimental bands played "The Star-Spangled Banner," whereupon all cheered again and again.

Hobson looked somewhat pale, due, perhaps, to his confinement in prison, but he smiled and bowed in response to the welcome given to him.

The ovation to the sailors equaled that given to Hobson. The men rode in the wagon that had conveyed the Spanish prisoners. The vehicle was constantly surrounded by cheering soldiers, who seized and heartily shook the outstretched hands of the released heroes, while the band, in honor of the seamen, played "When Johnnie Comes Marching Home."

Lieutenant Hobson's account of his imprisonment of a month gave to our soldiers and sailors, and to the people of the United States, a high impression of the courage and sincerity of Admiral Cervera. The Spanish Admiral had made their comfort and care his personal responsibility as far as the demands of his position permitted. "If he had been my personal friend," said Lieutenant Hobson, "he could not have been more solicitous for my welfare." The prisoners were in the Morro fort for a few days, after which they were removed to Santiago. They had been sick with fever, but received careful medical attention, and Cervera had brought to bear all his official influence to secure the exchange of these brave men, and their restoration to the fleet they had so greatly honored by their heroic deed.

Hobson's testimony to Cervera's fine conduct was sufficient to win from the United States a display of popular admiration and much kindness to the unfortunate Admiral when he was brought to Annapolis a prisoner of war.

On the second night before Hobson's exchange the Spaniards made a futile attempt to imitate his exploit. At midnight they tried to tow the dismantled cruiser, *Reina Mercedes*, into the entrance and sink her across the channel not closed by the *Merrimac*. It was moonlight, and the watch on the battleship *Texas* observed the glint of reflected light from the steel sides of the *Mercedes*. Signal was made to the other ships of our fleet and then the *Texas* opened fire with perfect deliberation, between the cliffs. The aim was so true that the shots drove the *Mercedes* out of her course to the north side of the channel, where a 13-inch shell struck her in the hull, exploded, and sank her in shoal water, leaving her masts and upper works out of water, and the ship far out of the channel.

July 6 the Spanish cruiser *Alfonso XII.* left Havana harbor and proceeded eight miles to the westward before she was discovered by the American blockading squadron. The latter then gave chase. The cruiser attempted to enter Mariel, but stranded at the entrance of the port. We fired at her until she was set on fire. Detachments of Spanish infantry and artillery hastened to the shore and saved her crew and part of her cargo. Two of her crew were wounded. The cruiser was a total loss.

III.

WHILE the army was waiting before Santiago, the prestige of our navy was to be advanced even more. Captain Sigsbee, who had been commander of the *Maine*, was placed in command of the auxiliary cruiser *St. Paul*, and on June 22 arrived off San Juan, Porto Rico, to assist in the blockade of that port. The afternoon of the same day, while lying six miles off shore, lookouts discovered a ship coming out of the harbor. It proved

**CAPTAIN SIGSBEE
SINKS THE
DESTROYER
"TERROR"**

to be the Spanish unprotected cruiser *Isabella II.*, and she opened fire on the *St. Paul* without effect. Captain Sigsbee waited for a nearer approach, but the Spaniard stopped as if trying to draw our ship under the guns of the forts.

At this moment the lookout reported that the destroyer *Terror*, the finest of the Spanish torpedo boats, was coming out of the harbor, keeping out of sight behind the *Isabella*. The trick was now apparent. The cruiser was to act as a decoy to lure the *St. Paul* within striking distance of the destroyer. The *Isabella* maintained quick firing, perhaps to cover the *Terror* with smoke. The latter turned off along the coast, as if manœuvring to come out. Captain Sigsbee followed, endeavoring to get between the two Spaniards with the purpose of keeping the *Terror* in the trough of the sea if she headed for an attack.

When the *Terror* realized that she was being outmanœuvred, her commander sent the destroyer around in a circle to get up speed, and then headed straight for the *St. Paul*. It was a perilous moment now, for everything depended on gunnery. Unless a shot stopped the *Terror*, there was nothing to prevent her coming near enough to launch a torpedo and destroy the *St. Paul*. The American gunners let the enemy get within 6,000 yards, and then welcomed her with the whole starboard battery—three 5-inch guns, two 6-pounders, two Hotchkiss rifles, and two 3-pounders. All guns carried the range, and several shots struck the *Terror*, damaging her slightly. She stopped suddenly in her onward rush—she was coming at full speed—and wheeling around fired at the *St. Paul* without effect.

Both Spaniards now seemed anxious to retreat, and the *St. Paul* pursued, shooting away the rear smokestack of the *Terror* and landing several shots on the cruiser that now ran away, another gunboat coming from the harbor to assist her. The *Terror* was also retreating, firing as she ran, when the *St. Paul* sent in a shell from a 5-inch gun that struck the enemy on the port side astern. It tore through the engine room, killing the engineer's assistant and mortally wounding a sailor, completely wrecked the engine and

steering gear, and, going out through the hull, left her in a sinking condition.

The *Terror* began drifting and signaling for help. A ship ran out to her assistance as she was now well under the guns of the fort. It was too late to tow her in. She was pushed towards the beach and sank fifty yards from shore. The *Isabella* and her consort then retreated into the harbor.

Merchant ships coming out of San Juan reported the ludicrous side of the engagement. The Spaniards mistook the *St. Paul* for her sister ship, the *St. Louis*, which was not so heavily armed, and concluded to sink her at a safe distance. The Spanish naval officers publicly announced their intention to engage the American in a duel for her destruction. The populace cheered the officers wherever they appeared, until finally the captain of the *Terror* made an address in the public square. He was going out to sink the American or be sunk by her, he declared, and then cordially invited the people of the city to mount the hills surrounding the harbor and watch the battle. They accepted the invitation. From the *St. Paul* hundreds could be seen watching the battle from the heights above the city. The other Spaniards were not much injured.

IV.

ABOUT the same time a new Spanish squadron, the third and last of the navy possessed by the enemy, sailed from Cadiz, ostensibly to succor the beleaguered capital of the Philippines, but really for the desperate hope of attempting to draw our ships away from Santiago to follow and thus give Cervera rather more chance to escape. It was under the command of Admiral Camara, and consisted of the battleship *Pelayo* (second class), the armored cruiser *Emperador Carlos V.*, the *Rapida* and *Patriota* (auxiliary cruisers like our *St. Louis*), the *Giralda*, a steel pleasure yacht converted into a destroyer corresponding to our *Gloucester*, and three torpedo boats, the *Audaz*, *Osado*, and *Proserpina*, with half

ADMIRAL CAMARA'S FLEET AND ITS COMIC-OPERA VOYAGE

a dozen troop ships having about 7,000 soldiers on board, accompanied by colliers and supply ships.

Never in modern warfare was the dispatching of a force against the enemy, for the purpose of falling upon him with a swiftness amounting to surprise, attended by ostentatious ceremonies so fully displaying the weaknesses of race. The politicians who were governing Spain knew perfectly well that the war was hopeless, that neither their army nor their navy could cope with ours, but the internal dissensions of factions, the perils that threatened the Alfonsine dynasty, the uncontrollable selfishness and vanity of party leaders, made it impossible at that time to publicly acknowledge the truth. Cervera's squadron had not been destroyed, Santiago had not been attacked by land, and therefore, it was vitally necessary for political reasons to maintain at home a warlike front.

The departure of Don Quixote de la Mancha to assail windmills was not more solemnly ludicrous than the sailing of Camara's fleet, but the latter was enveloped in magnificent ceremonial. The ships were splendid offensive machines on paper; practically they were distrusted by their own officers. Their seaworthiness was suspected, their engines were out of order. They had been renovated at Ferrol, near the French border, by French engineers, and it was understood that French and Austrian gunners and machinists were secretly enlisted to secure the proper management of the engines and to work the guns.

The ceremonies were solemn and aroused intense enthusiasm in Spain. The ladies of Cadiz embroidered a flag, which the Bishop blessed aboard the *Emperador Carlos V.*, for which vessel the flag was made. The prelate arrived and departed accompanied by a procession of choristers, and vestmented youths bearing censers. The ceremony was marked with all religious pomp. The choristers led the crew of the war ship in singing hymns of hope and prayer.

The Minister of Marine delivered a lyrical, patriotic oration. He announced that the reserve squadron would no longer be reserved, but would seek danger for the country's sake. It was a privilege to

be placed in a situation that must ennoble the humblest sailor, transforming him into a hero. The officers and men of the ships visited the cathedral, and amid much emotion, all kneeling, made the customary vow never to surrender to the enemies of Spain, but to die in her service.

Before leaving Cadiz Señor Aunon, Minister of Marine, telegraphed to the Queen-Regent that "the reserve squadron and the expeditionary troops, who are quitting Spanish waters, send a warm and enthusiastic salutation to your Majesty, avowing their determination to fight to the death for the honor of the nation." A great pretense of secrecy was maintained concerning the fleet's destination. The Spanish were not permitted to know whether it would attack Boston, go to Cervera's relief, or to Manila. But the United States knew perfectly well that it was to sail eastward through the Suez Canal.

The progress of Camara's fleet was comparable only to a comic-opera promenade. Moving slowly, with many impressive feints, accompanied by vague rumors and contradictions, it passed Gibraltar and entered the Mediterranean. Then it put in at Cartagena, where it was met with the announcement that the United States were assembling a squadron of war ships under Commodore John Crittenden Watson, to attack the seaports of Spain and ravage them. Camara's project, as a reality, was thus instantly exploded. Dewey's fleet, reënforced by the *Charleston* and the monitor *Monterey*, was strong enough to destroy him; yet even if he went to Manila, the Spanish coasts would be left undefended.

But Camara dared not return to Cadiz. At a farewell public banquet he had declared—for the purpose of impressing the populace—that he would never return until his flag had been dyed in American blood; and Spanish colors were waved, the band played national airs, while Spanish emotion and French champagne mingled themselves in a glorious "fizz" of patriotism and excitement.

For political purposes, therefore, our threat was counteracted with the announcement that a fourth squadron was assembling at Cadiz, and Señor Sagasta admitted that Camara had sailed for Manila.

And so he had, and he arrived at Port Said, the northern entrance of the Suez canal, on June 26. Then ensued a series of amusing difficulties. The Egyptian Government refused to permit him to coal in the harbor, and then granted to him the permission, only to withdraw it. Then he was permitted to coal from his own colliers, and again that privilege was withdrawn. Spain accused England of conniving at and fomenting these causes of delay and sent a note to the Powers. Meantime, the United States had purchased all the private coal supplies at Port Said.

When at last Admiral Camara took on coal of his own and made ready to enter the canal, he offered a draft on his Government for the \$260,000 necessary to pay canal tolls. The draft was politely declined, and gold was demanded. After vexatious delay, the draft was guaranteed by French financial creditors of Spain, and the fleet passed through. It lay off Ismaila until July 9. Cervera's squadron, meanwhile, had been destroyed, and Toral was about to surrender Santiago. Then the Spanish Government ordered the fleet to return to Cadiz, paid another \$260,000 of toll, and Camara, turning the prows of his terrible armada to the north, once more braved the dangerous waters of the canal, and navigated his fleet through the frowning tempestuositities of the Mediterranean safely home without sustaining the loss of anything more than time and money.

American preparations to send Commodore Watson's squadron against the Spanish coast were meanwhile continued, and knowledge of it filled all Spanish seaports with terror. The towns were deserted, and all Spain fled inland except from great fortified ports such as Cadiz, Barcelona, and Cartagena. It was our purpose to carry the war to Spain's very doors.

CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH.

THE DEATH GRIP AT SANTIAGO.

AN OMINOUS PAUSE ON BOTH SIDES—THE SPANISH REËNFORCEMENTS OF PESTILENCE AND FAMINE—THE SINISTER MEANING AND HISTORY OF "THE HONOR OF SPAIN"—TWENTY THOUSAND STARVING REFUGEES TO SUPPORT, AND YELLOW FEVER TO COMBAT—SPANISH TROOPS LOOT THEIR OWN CITY WITH ATROCITY—SHAFTER SENDS A SHARP DEMAND TO TORAL—PERSONAL CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE GENERALS—"ITS A D—D POOR SORT OF HONOR THAT MAKES SOLDIERS DIE FOR NOTHING"—TORAL AGREES TO SURRENDER THE CITY—WILD REJOICING IN THE AMERICAN ARMY.

I.

THE gaunt and haggard soldiers of the United States still kept sleepless guard over every rood of the walls and trenches that contained Santiago. Day after day passed with no change, except that the patient men added to their earthworks, or moved into a better position, or changed a battery. Day after day small bodies of reënforcements arrived from Siboney or Baiquiri, covered with the mire from the red roads, worn with the labor of wading through the sticky trail, climbing up hillsides, and along the rock-covered beds of mountain torrents. As they trudged wearily on they could see the mute signals of heroism, testifying how the advance army had fought its way.

**SPAIN'S ARMY OF
PESTILENCE
AND FAMINE**

Through jungles, on hillsides, in rank grass, and strung from rock to rock in gorges and streams, the terrible coils and strands of barbed wire, with which the Spaniards had abatished the approach, were discovered. It had been believed, at first, that these obstacles were merely wire fences along post lines, from four to eight feet high, but it was discovered when the advance was made on Santiago that there were not only fences to be encountered, but all the forms of the barbed torture that ingenious Spanish cruelty could invent. The wire was stretched from tree to tree at irregular heights. Sometimes a strand would be fastened to a stump, and from there to a

height of eight or ten feet to a tree, then down again to the next tree to a height of three or four feet from the ground. In this way hedges, with six or eight strands of barbed wire, were strung along for miles, the construction being so irregular that the soldiers could not learn where to look for the individual strands.

The whole formed a formidable barrier superior to the abatis made from the limbs or trunks of trees. Wood can be torn away by artillery fire, and, once down, the troops can pass over. Or it can be set on fire and destroyed. But the barbed-wire barriers had to be cut with shears, or beaten down carefully with clubs. While the men were halting, the wires did not prevent the enemy's bullets from mowing down our soldiers. In some instances the strands were woven so closely together that the clippers could not be inserted between them; yet the terrible Mauser bullets came through with deadly ease.

July 12 General Miles and about 8,000 reinforcements had arrived at the front and General Ludlow, with a force of Americans and Cubans, had occupied the town of Caimanes, west of Santiago, across the bay.

But the army of Spain meanwhile had also developed reinforcements, and these had invested our lines as effectually as our troops had invested Santiago.

This new Spanish force, though it flew no colors of Spain, though it marched with no pomp or display, was yet more to be dreaded than the Spanish army in Santiago—it was more terrible than a thousand armies with banners. It was massed and ordered and placed by maleficent veteran purposes that had served as allies and servants of Spain for five hundred years of abandonment of power to cruelty and treachery. These veteran allies had marched in the bloody train of Alva in Germany, with the Duke of Parma in the Netherlands, with Cortez in Mexico, with Pizarro in Peru, with Philip V., and Charles III., when Spaniard fought Spaniard with ferocity, treachery, and evil cunning that equaled themselves on both sides and demonstrated that good faith and mercy were congenitally absent from Spanish character. The cruelties practiced upon prisoners and harmless non-combatants are forbidden of record in open history.

They are still practiced where Spanish domination is safe from the inquisitive eye of other races. Hideous ingenuity in cruelty drove the native Indians of Cuba, by thousands, to find suicide preferable to life in the power of Spaniards. To this year Spanish soldiers in the Philippines have nailed captive revolutionists to walls in an attitude of crucifixion, and lashed them to death. Within two years General Weyler, a worthy successor of Alva and of Philip, undertook to crush revolution by starvation. He had placed 225,000 murders to his account, when the United States forced his recall to Spain, where the public received him as a hero.

Wherever the army of Spain has passed, it has left behind scars upon the fair name of mankind as cruel as those of the branding iron upon the flesh of its victim. When the Spanish soldiery has relaxed itself it has been in the pleasures of torturing the conquered, in the unspeakable agonies of inquisition, in the exercise of intrigue in a bottomless sea of treachery, or in public corruption that has made practical government impossible among them.

In any monarchical government, buttressed by a rich and powerful *caste* of nobles, the soldiers of its standing army determine the character of the people. The soldier, representing everywhere the living type of courage, is the hero of the masses. What must be the hereditary practices of Spanish soldiers is reflected ominously to-day in the populace of Spain, whose vast crowds on holidays abandon themselves to blood-scent, and, as the fume of revolting cruelty rises from the sand of the bull-ring, it envelops every tier—royalty, nobility, commonalty—in a vaporous madness, such as the barbarous Greeks and degenerate Romans entered upon during their “mysteries,” but which in Spain evokes a frenzied lust for murder that delights in the sight of physical suffering.

No wonder such a nature seeks concealment beneath the garb of a chivalrous etiquette, and masks its intentions behind the accommodating ambiguities of noble language. But, behind the costume and the alluring phrase, have always existed the pitiless heart, filled with the love of cruelty, with the intricacies of fraud and treachery, with the

pride of a limitless selfishness that would sacrifice the world for its own vanity. For five hundred years "the honor of Spain" has been a phrase with which Spaniards have juggled to conceal the selfishness of caste pride. The "honor of Spain" has been maintained by the sacrifice of every virtue and noble ideal that mankind has cherished as a factor entering into honor.

It was the army of Famine and Pestilence that Toral had marched out of the gates of Santiago, led by the spectral veterans of old. In the garb of helplessness and innocence it passed through the American lines to El Caney. Twenty thousand refugees were there, or scattered along the roads, or roaming the jungles in an effort to reach Siboney. It was the beginning of the season of the *fiore amarilla*, the yellow fever, that pestilence of filth and feter, which Spanish institutions have allowed to persist—a silent witness of their indifference to death as the alternative of cleanliness and industry. For a hundred years Santiago de Cuba, Havana, and San Juan de Puerto Rico have been centers of this deadly disease, which has ravaged all the warm and tropical countries having free communication with them.

It was even showing its jaundiced face in the city of Santiago when General Shafter, pursuing the tactics of civilized warfare, answering the demands of humanity, had given Toral notice of assault in order that the non-combatants might retire. "Good!" was the reply of the Spaniard, "we shall have 20,000 fewer mouths to feed." And the non-combatants did retire—retired to the ranks of the besiegers. "Good!" Toral might have said, if he did not actually say it, "we send you famine and the *fiore amarilla* along with our poor and helpless. Feed them and nurse them, or starve and die with them!" For Toral knew that the hunger and disease and filth and despair of 20,000 women and children in Santiago was a greater and more terrible army threatening his troops than the 22,000 Americans standing intrepid and unconquerable sentries at every door by which escape might be possible.

The Anglo-Saxon—to whose nature cruelty is to be justified only as the last extremity of necessity, to whom maleficent treachery is a brand of the unpardonable infamy—must turn with loathing from the

thought that Toral sent the poison of disease to the adversaries his soldiers had not been able to beat back from impregnable defenses. But he knew the disease, the season, the dangers, and the effects. He sent his helpless dependants to the magnanimous invaders—in return for magnanimity he offered the horrors of pestilence and famine.

And now, he could well afford to temporize, to squirm and delay behind the old sinister pretense of "the honor of Spain." With an army 20,000 strong in disease and starvation in our rear, and an army of 11,000 in the trenches of his fortress, every day's delay for Toral meant hope. Every day's delay, while the cold rains fell in torrents, or the burning sun scorched and tortured the unacclimated, hungry, and exhausted Americans, gave opportunity for infection and spread of the fever.

Our army was supporting the Spanish army of pestilence. Our own troops were living upon half rations of "hard-tack" and water, while such supplies as could be brought up were divided with the starving thousands at El Caney. Men, women, and children, 20,000 of them, with two hundred houses in the village. They huddled in the streets, squares, roads, and fields, which they converted into a vast lazaretto of despair.

"*Mucha hambre!*" wailed the women and children, "I am so hungry," and the food for the army went to the helpless. But no soldier of the United States complained or would have stopped the relief. The Red Cross Society sent nurses, medicines, and supplies to the refugees. Flour was distributed—the refugees did not know how to make use of it. The army cooks set up bakeries and made bread for the starving, while the soldiers in the trenches ate "hardtack" and took courage of determination against the Spaniard hiding in the city. Our surgeons and physicians and nurses attended the sick of the refugees and the wounded of the enemy, while the wounded troops of the United States tramped back on foot, or were jolted in ammunition wagons, over the torturing roads to Siboney.

Even to Siboney a thousand helpless refugees had managed to penetrate, bringing with them fever and deadly hunger. July 11 yellow

fever had appeared at the hospital base there, and General Miles ordered every house in the town to be burned, in the hope of staying the infection. The torch was applied. A great, drowning torrent of rain extinguished the incipient flames and drenched the houses to a degree that made it necessary to lose another day. But Siboney was burned on the 12th.

Out in the trenches before Santiago the soldiers of the United States were chafing. There was no complaint at the hardships that humanity imposed upon them, although the seasoned regular troops were weakened for lack of good food, tents, and by the tension of hiding in trenches. Even those who had fought over the hot and arid plains of the West were appalled by the deadly humidity of this Cuban climate, a steaming suffocation all day, that gave place to a clammy chill all night.

They chafed at delay and inactivity. They wanted to fight, and cursed every hour that did not bring the order to storm the enemy's works.

General Shafter reflected upon the cost of carrying the town by assault. Our ships could not enter the harbor until the mines there had been removed or destroyed. The long-range bombardment was a slow, difficult, and almost impossible task. There were only his soldiers, then, to take the city. To order these brave men, who had weakened themselves by fighting their way through every peril and difficulty of the jungle, and by hunger and toil in the trenches, to assault the artillery, barbed-wire abatis, and the treachery of street-fighting in Santiago, was a serious step to take. Even though they pleaded for the order, the cost of it was his responsibility, and he determined not to give the order except as a last necessity. And General Miles agreed with him.



MARKET IN SANTIAGO

II.

WHAT our soldiers could see of Santiago from their lines on the hill of San Juan was its beauty in the panoply of war. They could look down upon its ancient red and yellow houses, gleaming in the sunlight against the vivid background of green on the mountains behind. The red and yellow flags of Spain were flying from walls, roofs, and pinnacles. The white flag of the Red Cross Society, with its blood-red Maltese cross in the center of the field, flew over the hospital from which the wounded Spaniards could see our troops by looking out the windows.

THE SPANIARDS
LOOT THEIR
OWN CITY

In the military headquarters on the *Plaza de Armas* General Toral devised the many ingenious ways of saying "To-morrow," by which he had evaded Shafter's demands, and he patiently waited for the work of his allies, pestilence, and famine.

The Spaniard was doing his work characteristically in the old city. Dreadful stories were brought out by refugees and deserters. Before surrendering the city they were sacking it. The Spanish soldier does not discriminate when he begins to loot. All valuable property of civilians, friends and enemies alike, is his by right of taking or destroying. The dwellings and storehouses of all who had fled were broken into and despoiled.

One peculiarly atrocious crime was reported, against the Señora Rosa Chacon de Odis, a wealthy resident who had refused to leave because her fortune, which consisted of gold, silver, and securities of various kinds, and her valuable jewels, were kept in her house. She thought the property would be safer under the protection of Spanish soldiers than within the American lines. It was known among the Spanish soldiers that she had much property in her house, and one night some of them went to her residence and assassinated her. Then they looted the house of everything valuable.

Churches and handsome residences were invaded and everything of convertible value carried off, fine pictures were cut out of the frames or defaced and slashed with swords, windows broken, furniture hacked

and destroyed. Banks were despoiled of money and nameless barbarities of violence perpetrated upon the few defenseless women remaining. For those two weeks Santiago de Cuba was in the merciless clutches of the fourteenth century. Only those things were left untouched that were necessary to the comfort of the Spanish soldiery who were upholding "the honor of Spain," or to destroy which would necessitate the abandonment of indolence and a resort to labor.

In the San Carlos Club on the *Plaza de Armas*, the resort of aristocratic society, the officers off duty congregated at night to regale themselves. Resplendent in gold braid and decorations, they listened to a mechanical musical instrument that had been imported from the United States for the entertainment of the club membership. Among the airs rendered was one that none of the Spaniards recognized, but which became a favorite. It was "The Star Spangled Banner," and its rendition always called out applause and a demand for repetition.

And so, between the excitements of riot and luxury, Toral communicated the mysterious evasions contained in the Spanish word *mañana* ("to-morrow") in reply to Shafter's demands. The fever was very slow in beginning its work.

But General Toral received on July 13 an abrupt notification that if Santiago was not surrendered unconditionally without further delay the ships would begin a continuous bombardment at noon next day and destroy the city for which his obstinacy must bear the responsibility. He read between the lines of that message that if he sought to escape the shells of the ships the soldiers he had so long irritated and menaced with treachery might meet him with terrible retribution.

III.

COUNCIL OF WAR FORCES THE CAPITULATION

THERE was a council of war before Santiago on July 13. It was between General Miles, General Shafter, General Garcia, and Lieutenant Hobson of the navy, representing Admiral Sampson. General Garcia counseled a heavy and continuous bombardment if the next answer from General Toral should

be a request for further delay or a refusal to surrender. He declared that the Spaniards could not hold out long, and that the best action to take was to reduce them at once by bombardment. He added that if General Toral's proposed terms of surrender, which specified that his troops be permitted to retire with their arms, were complied with, the Spanish forces would immediately join General Luque at Holguin, where there were 10,000 men and 2,000,000 rations, or would fall back on Puerto Principe, where the Cubans had many head of cattle.

It was declared at the council that Captain-General Blanco was personally opposed to the surrender on any terms, and wanted the forces there to hold out to the bitter end.

The possibility of the fleet forcing the entrance of the harbor, steaming up to the inner bay and bombarding the city, was brought up at the council. Many army men had insisted that it was Admiral Sampson's duty to go to the city with his battleships, and accusations had been made that the navy was not willing to accept its share of the dangers. These rumors had caused ill-feeling, but they were untrue. Admiral Sampson had told the military authorities that it would be madness in him to try to pass the harbor entrance as long as the forts commanding it had not been reduced. Lieutenant Hobson explained to the council the reasons rendering it impossible for the fleet to get into the harbor. The approach from the sea was several miles long, and was mined for the entire distance.

It was agreed at the council that the city could be taken by the army in three hours, with the loss of 1,000 men, and by the navy with the loss of one ship. It was also agreed that such losses were not necessary.

When the council adjourned the notice to Toral that caused him to act was at once dispatched. An answer was not expected until next day; but Toral replied at once and suggested a personal conference with Shafter. Up to that date the negotiations had been carried on through aides.

The conference was held under the shade of a great cottonwood tree, midway between the lines of the two armies. General Miles

was present, in his character as commanding general of the armies, and as an adviser. General Shafter was attended by Colonel Maus and Captain McKittrick. General Toral came attended by Colonel Velasquez and Mr. Mason, British Vice-Consul at Santiago. Señor Mendoza acted as Shafter's interpreter. The two groups were characteristic of the two nations. General Miles wore a plain blue field uniform, while Shafter and his aides were attired in the dirty brown linen blouse coats adopted for the men in Cuba. Toral and Velasquez were magnificent with gold lace, braid, and medals.

General Toral began by pointing out that his government would not permit him to do more than surrender possession of the city, marching his troops with their arms to join the main Spanish army. General Shafter replied that the United States Government had declined to accept anything but unconditional surrender, and he must insist upon it.

To this General Toral politely responded that each General must obey the orders of his Government, as loyal soldiers. He, himself, personally regretted that his government left him no discretion.

General Shafter reminded him that no soldier was expected to destroy his army when nothing could be gained. He pointed out the investment, the presence of the ships, the unlimited reinforcements that could be brought, the starvation of the refugees, and the danger of disease that threatened all alike. That, moreover, it had been determined to immediately assault Santiago by land and sea, at all cost, and General Toral must realize that it could be taken.

Personal anecdotes are not always reliable, but when they are redolent of peculiar character they gain credence. Such an anecdote came from the front, growing out of this conference. General Shafter, known to the army as "Bull" Shafter, for his obstinate fighting and brusque qualities, was also celebrated for a vocabulary rich in powerful, if profane, emphasis. A self-made man, a self-made soldier, and full of vigor, he had learned to attend strictly to business and to waste no time upon the accomplishments of ceremonial etiquette.



MAJOR-GENERAL WM. R. SHAFTER.

When General Shafter began his reminder of the hopelessness of the Spanish position and the fact that the place could be taken by assault, Toral answered with lofty chivalry:—

“Even if that can be done, yet it is to be remembered that every soldier in my army is ready to die to maintain the honor of my country.”

“Tell him,” General Shafter is reported to have said, in an emphatic outburst, when the interpreter had translated Toral’s remark: “tell him, I say, that while it is honorable in his soldiers to be willing to die, it is a d——d poor sort of honor in their country which requires them to die for no purpose. We call it murder. It is no honor for my soldiers to kill his for nothing. I do not want to kill his men because they are brave, and I don’t want my men killed for nothing. He must take the responsibility before the world for every life lost. Humanity and the common sense of war demands his surrender in order that these soldiers and helpless refugees may be saved!”

Señor Mendoza, himself a Spaniard, accustomed to graceful amenities, was perhaps struck with this impetuous and blunt presentation. It is not known whether he interpreted the Anglo-Saxon directness of the speech to the fiery but courteous Toral. Whatever he rendered in its place, however, proved sufficient.

Toral hesitated, the conference became general, and the Spaniard confessed the hopelessness of his defense. He appealed to Shafter and Miles, however, to spare his army humiliating treatment. Upon this it was agreed that the troops should deliver up their arms and ammunition to their own officers in the city, that the Spanish officers might retain their side arms, and that the soldiers would be marched with military honors into encampment outside the city and transported to Spain as quickly as possible by the United States Government. This was done to avoid epidemic and the expense of supporting and guarding such a large body of prisoners.

After agreement the conferees separated to appoint commissioners to meet and draw up the agreement in terms.

The truce was continued until these commissioners could meet and conclude the work.

When the American conferees returned to our troops and announced the agreement of capitulation, the army broke into wild cheers of delight. They began in the center and spread right and left in waves of enthusiasm. The news flew to the rear over the miry roads and telegraph wires and the "Old Doxology" was sung along miles of bristling entrenchments. "Santiago has fallen!" was the pass-word from mouth to mouth between laughing, cheering, singing, and excited veterans, who hugged each other at the prospect of relief. But no sound of applause came from the ominous trenches in front of them or from the picturesque city that lay glowing in the bright sunlight in the valley below.



CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH.

SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO.

TORAL MAKES A DESPAIRING EFFORT TO FIGHT OFF SURRENDER BY DELAY—THE TERMS ENFORCED WITH COURTEOUS FIRMNESS—OCCUPATION OF THE CITY ON SUNDAY JULY 17, WITH IMPRESSIVE CEREMONIAL AND AMIDST WILD ENTHUSIASM BY OUR TROOPS AND THE POPULATION—FRATERNIZATION OF SPANISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS—DREADFUL CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN SANTIAGO—SICKNESS, INFECTION, HUNGER, ANARCHY—WORK OF THE AUTHORITIES AND THE RED CROSS—SKETCHES OF GENERALS SHAFTER AND WHEELER, LEADERS OF OUR ARMY.

I.

ON THE morning of July 15, the commissioners from each army appointed to draw up and sign the terms of surrender met under a spreading *ceba* tree between the lines.

For the Americans came General Joseph Wheeler, General H. W. Lawton, and Lieutenant Miley of Shafter's staff. For the Spaniards came Colonel Fontaine, chief of Toral's staff, General Escariel, and Mr. Robert Mason, British Vice-Consul. They met shortly before noon and our commissioners were courteously invited to enter the city and complete the business comfortably. The invitation was as courteously declined.

TERMS OF THE CAPITULATION

At the very outset of proceedings a misunderstanding arose, through the presentation of a letter from Toral, which General Shafter had referred to our commissioners, with instructions to reject its proposition as to the disposition of arms. The copy here given is a literal translation and is a curiosity:—

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 15.

To Excellency, Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces:—

EXCELLENT SIR:—I am now authorized by my Government to capitulate. I have the honor to so advise you, requesting you designate hour and place where my representatives should appear to confer with those of your Excellency to effect the articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been agreed upon to this date. In due time I wish to manifest to your Excellency my desire to know the resolution of the

United States Government respecting the return of arms, so as to note on the capitulation; also the great courtesy and gentlemanly deportment of your Great Grace's Representatives, and return for their generous and noble impulse, for the Spanish soldiers will allow them to return to the Peninsular with the arms that the American army do them the honor to acknowledge as dutifully descended.

JOSÉ TORAL,

Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Army Corps.

The misunderstanding, it was thought, was due to a failure of exact interpretation on the previous day. At that time the interpreter, translating the language of General Toral, had given Generals Shafter and Miles distinctly to understand that Captain-General Blanco had consented that the commissioners should have plenary powers to negotiate the terms of surrender, such terms as agreed upon to be binding upon both parties. Something had been said about a notification to the Madrid Government, but General Shafter insisted that the capitulation had actually been agreed upon, and that no further consent of the Madrid Government was required.

The Spanish commissioners combatted vigorously the assumption that Toral had already capitulated. The consent of Madrid, they insisted, was still necessary; but at the same time they declared decisively that it would be forthcoming, as Captain-General Blanco had authorized it and the home government would also approve. General Toral, who was personally present and who directed the negotiations on his own behalf, said he had never been overruled by the Captain-General. Still, he added, until Madrid had sanctioned it Santiago had not capitulated.

All this was extremely unsatisfactory to our commissioners, who clung tenaciously to the understanding General Shafter had received. Leaving the question still open, the commissioners proceeded to consider the preliminaries. Lieutenant Miley had drawn up thirteen articles of a general nature and these were submitted to General Toral personally, who made a strong appeal that the word "capitulation" be used instead of the term "surrender," and that his army be allowed to march out, the officers with their side arms and the men with their small arms. He said the arms could afterward be sent to Spain, either in the same ships with the troops or on some other ships. General Toral further remarked

that he expected that our commissioners, as representatives of a brave and a chivalrous people, would not seek to humiliate his army or make it appear that he was vanquished. As brave men, his soldiers desired to go home with honor. They had simply yielded to superior force, and they would prefer dying to going home without their honor.

The Americans expressed sympathy at this appeal but declared it was beyond their power to change the terms as understood and approved by the President. They could only agree to recommend such changes in detail to the President, at Washington, who alone had the power to approve.

At two o'clock General Toral retired to Santiago to confer with General Linares and returned shortly with suggestions of further change in details. He proposed an adjournment until next morning to continue the negotiations. General Wheeler, who had taken the lead in the discussion for the United States, emphatically declined to wait, and insisted that terms must be settled before the day closed. Thereupon a recess was taken until four o'clock, when a few alterations of verbiage were agreed to, for the purpose of softening expression without changing the meaning.

After each commissioner had been asked in turn if the agreement was complete and satisfactorily understood, General Wheeler suddenly requested them all to sign. It was a test of Spanish nature. The enemy's commissioners had agreed to the articles, but they were plainly surprised at the request to complete it by their signatures. There was no excuse, however, and, with much reluctance, they signed the two copies, and the boards separated to meet the next morning at 9:30 o'clock. In the meantime each side was to report the terms to its own government.

Saturday morning Toral received approval of the terms from his superior officer. The Washington Government, however, would not approve the recommendation of its commissioners to consent to return the arms of the Spanish troops. Shafter had been particularly instructed not to so agree, and the commissioners had been directed by Shafter to the same purport. But the commissioners, after avowing

their inability to concede the demand, had consented to recommend it as a matter of form, to hasten the conclusion. The President was determined to retain the Spanish rifles and ammunition and declined the recommendation.

The articles of surrender that were signed may be thus summarized:—

The first declares that all hostilities shall cease pending the agreement of final capitulation.

Second—That the capitulation includes all the Spanish forces and the surrender of all war material within the prescribed limits.

Third—The transportation of the troops to Spain at the earliest possible moment, each force to be embarked at the nearest port.

Fourth—That the Spanish officers shall retain their side arms and the enlisted men their personal property.

Fifth—That after the final capitulation the Spanish forces shall assist in the removal of all obstructions to navigation in Santiago harbor.

Sixth—That after the final capitulation the commanding officers shall furnish a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war and a roster of all the soldiers in the district.

Seventh—That the Spanish General shall be permitted to take the military archives and records with him.

Eighth—That all guerillas and Spanish irregulars shall be permitted to remain in Cuba if they so elect, giving a parole that they will not again take up arms against the United States unless properly exchanged.

Ninth—That the Spanish forces shall be permitted to march out with all the honors of war, depositing their arms to be disposed of by the United States in the future, the American commissioners to recommend to their Government that the arms of the soldiers be returned to those "who so bravely defended them."

The territory surrendered was in extent somewhat more than a third of the province of Santiago, including the military jurisdiction of the Fourth Corps of the Spanish army. It did not embrace the important towns of Manzanillo and Holguin, where there were many Spanish troops, nor the 6,000 men of General Pando's corps, that had left Manzanillo to succor Santiago, but failed to reach their destination. The western boundary of the territory surrendered begins at Aserradero, a town near the coast, west of Santiago, thence to the town of Palma, a little east of north of Aserradero, and about

twenty-two miles distant, thence northeast to Sagua de Tanamo, on the north coast, a town at the head of the *surgidero*, or anchorage of that name, and almost directly north of Guantanamo. It includes an area of 8,000 square miles.

The number of soldiers surrendered as prisoners of war was estimated to be about 20,000, but when the muster rolls were made up there were 22,789 in and about Santiago, and between 1,000 and



MAP OF CUBA.

That portion of Cuba surrendered with Santiago is colored black.

2,000 additional troops were reported to be scattered through the zone of surrender—a total of about 25,000 men, mostly in well-fortified places, protected by all the resources of the country, wholly surrendered to an attacking army of 22,250 men, only 16,000 of whom were effective when the surrender occurred. Within three days the Spaniards had turned over 7,000 Mauser rifles and 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

II.

SUNDAY morning, July 17, the eleventh Sunday after Manila, the second Sunday after Cervera's annihilation, and the second Sunday after the first demand for the surrender of the city, the **RAISING THE FLAG OVER SANTIAGO** United States troops marched into Santiago to take possession. All Saturday swarms of refugees had tramped wearily over the roads returning to the city, many to find their homes despoiled, all to find hunger awaiting them.

It was shortly before nine o'clock Sunday morning, when, pursuant to the program arranged, General Shafter, accompanied by Generals Wheeler, Lawton, Kent, Ludlow, and Ames, with eighty other officers, marched out of the American lines down the hill to the tree under which the negotiations for surrender had been conducted. The moment they halted under the tree every cannon on the hillsides, within the city, at Siboney, and at Aguadores, boomed the national salute of twenty-one guns that filled the echoing valleys with the magnificent thunder of victory and called 60,000 people to attention.

From one end to the other of the eight miles of American intrenchments, our troops, standing on the sand bags, waved their hats aloft and raised cheer upon cheer of rejoicing.

A troop of colored cavalry and the Twenty-fifth Colored Infantry immediately started forward to join General Shafter and his officers.

A few moments later General Toral, in resplendent uniform, at the head of two hundred of his officers in full-dress uniform, left the gate of the city and marched to the tree, preceded by trumpeters. There was a salute of bugles on both sides, after which General Shafter and General Toral saluted each other formally and the officers on both sides exchanged courtesies and introductions.


When these ceremonies were concluded, the two commanding Generals met in front of the lines. General Toral spoke in Spanish, his voice trembling with feeling as he concluded:—

"General," said he, "I am forced by my fate to surrender to the possession of the American army and to you the city and the strong-



(THE ILLUSTRATION BY JAMES, D)

GENERAL TORAL'S SURRENDER OF SANTO



FRAI STARTED ON HIS

OF THE PHOTOGRAPH BY NEW YORK PICTURE SERVICE

holds of Santiago. I am now ready to do so formally and honorably as agreed."

As he finished the Spanish officers brought their swords to "present arms."

"I receive the city," replied General Shafter, briefly but courteously, "in the name of the Government of the United States of America!"

The two Generals saluted, after which General Toral turned and, addressing an order to his officers, they wheeled about and, with swords still presented, marched toward the city followed by the American officers and the troop of cavalry. As the procession entered the city, tremendous cheers broke out again from along the American lines.

Inside the walls Spanish troops met the official body and escorted it to the *Plaza de Armas*, in front of the Governor's palace, opposite which stands the Cathedral. The square was filled with people. The soldiers drew up in line and General Toral was courteously authorized to salute his flag. This was done amid silence by firing twenty-one guns, after which the Spanish flag was hauled down from the staff over the portico, upon the front of which stood in black letters, formed of gas-pipe for illumination at night, the words:—

"VIVA DON ALFONSO XIII."

General Shafter then formally presented to General Toral the sword and spurs of General Vara del Rey, who had been killed at El Caney. His body had been identified and given respectful burial by the United States troops. General Shafter had ordered his sword and spurs preserved to be returned to General del Rey's family. He placed them in General Toral's hands for that purpose. This considerate act made a deep impression upon the emotional Spaniards.

The Spanish troops were marched to the arsenal and surrendered their arms, after which, accompanied by the Americans, they were marched out, 7,600 strong, a weary, haggard, disheartened body, to a camp provided for them near the city.

The Americans returned to Santiago at once, accompanied by the Ninth Infantry Regulars, who were drawn up in the *Plaza*.


The American officers were then invited to the palace, where they were introduced to all the civil officials, the Governor, the Mayor, the Intendant of Police, and others. The Archbishop of Santiago, Fray José de Sturrs de Isainz y Crespo, the highest ecclesiastical dignitary of Cuba, accompanied by his chief prelates, came in a body and paid their respects to the conquerors. Luncheon was served and a short rest taken.

A few minutes before twelve o'clock, the Americans and their entertainers left the palace and walked into the *Plaza*. Lieutenant Miley had ascended to the roof of the palace with a great new silken flag of the United States. Just as the clock was striking twelve, Lieutenant Miley, Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., and Captain McKittrick bent the flag to the halyards, ran it to the top of the staff and broke its glorious folds wide open upon a strong southwestern breeze.

Every building facing the *Plaza* was crowded with persons and the little park itself was filled to suffocation with eager and curious humanity. As the flag unrolled its stars and stripes upon the breeze all heads were uncovered, and the soldiers presented arms. As the last stroke of the hour tolled out, the Ninth Regimental Band played "The Star Spangled Banner," which was followed by cheers from the soldiers. They were joined by more than half of the people, who cried "Viva los Americanos." The crowd was composed of miserable and half-starved creatures whose appearance told plainly the sufferings they had undergone since the siege began. They all seemed grateful that the Americans were in possession of the city, evidently believing the days of hunger and misery were over.

The Spanish officers and members of the San Carlos Club, who had been applauding "The Star Spangled Banner," and demanding its repetition by the orchestra at the clubhouse, were much astonished to hear our band playing it as the National Hymn of the United States. They looked at each other guiltily, then smiled, and finally told the story with laughter.

As the American flag floated over the city, Captain Capron's battery, at the right center of the American line, fired a national salute.



STREET SCENE -- SANTIAGO

And as the guns thundered, all the 20,000 men, from the Third Regiment on the left of the line, to the Eighth Regiment far off on El Cobre road on the right, shouted, cheered, and threw their hats into the air. Following the salvos of cheering, one got an idea of how completely Santiago and the Spanish army were hemmed in. Our soldiers stood on the crest of the trenches, which they had won at the cost of so many lives, as far as the eye could reach.

To these ceremonies succeeded fraternization over the trenches between men of the opposing lines. Our soldiers had been forbidden to cross trenches or to enter the city, for fear of infection, but the Spaniards went forward from their near camp to the edge of the American trenches, shook hands with their captors, expressing admiration and respect for those with whom they had so desperately fought.* It was a curious spectacle. Each Spaniard had a bottle of rum or wine in his haversack, and these were offered to the Americans to drink "good health." In return our soldiers gave their recent antagonists "hardtack," which was received with gladness.

*An incident that stands alone in the history of wars, occurred upon the sailing of the Spanish prisoners for their homes in Spain. A Spanish private soldier, Pedro Lopez de Castillo, authorized by a plebiscite taken of his 11,000 fellow-prisoners, sent through his officers the following address to the American army from the vanquished side:—

Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army in Cuba:—

SIR: The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place on the 16th of July last, recognizing your high and just position, pray that through you all the courageous and noble soldiers under your command may receive our good wishes and farewell, which we send them on embarking for our beloved Spain. For this favor, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 Spanish soldiers, who are your most humble servants.

[Signed.] PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,

Private of Infantry.

The letter addressed to the soldiers of the American army was as follows:—

SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY:—We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men, in whose breasts there live gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, and with all our strength, endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been vanquished by you (so our Generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitulation), but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent the power of our

That afternoon 90,000 pounds of rations were served to the Spanish prisoners from our commissariat. These soldiers cared nothing for the loss of Cuba, and were overjoyed at the thought of returning home. They had received no pay for nearly a year, had been poorly fed, and were discouraged.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Marble of the navy, in command of steam launches, had entered the harbor in the morning, by permission of Admiral Sampson. The Spanish gunboat *Alvarado*, was surrendered to him, and he took possession of other vessels in the harbor that had been used for troop ships. Spanish officers accompanied him to explode or remove the submarine mines in the bay, a task accomplished in time to permit the Red Cross relief boat, *State of Texas*, to enter at 5 p. m.


From the Spanish officers was heard again almost incredible statements of the dense ignorance in which the home government had kept its most trusted officers of the events of the war. Admiral Cervera and his captains had not learned of the annihilation of Montojo's

respective States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage, as before stated, a quality which we had not met during the three years we have carried on this war against a people without morals, without conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but hidden, shot their noble victims from ambush, and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort, and, lastly, to us, whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honored us with distinguished courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony. With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all, there remains but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and watered it with your blood, as your conscience called for, under the demand of civilization and humanity, but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers, these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civilized communities.

From 11,000 Spanish soldiers.

[Signed.] PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,
Soldier of Infantry.

Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.



III.

THE city was in a horrible condition of uncleanness and disorder. Santiago is three centuries old; it lies upon a hillside, sloping to the bay. Its topography invites perfect sewerage and sanitation at slight cost. But the Spanish have never paid attention to sanitation. The narrow streets, with broken curbings and unmasked gutterage, are cleaned only by the copious rains. At night all sorts of garbage and refuse are thrown into them from dwellings, to decay or to be carried off by rains—it matters not which. Even dead animals lie for days, poisoning the air with stench. The soil of the yards and gardens is saturated with the refuse of centuries, breeding fevers. It had been determined in advance not to allow the American army to enter, except in sufficient force to support the civil authorities pending final arrangements. The main army was ordered back to the hilltops and mountains at a distance, and only necessary communication with the city was permitted.

UPON taking possession General Shafter committed the civil government to the hands of the autonomist officials already in office, who were to perform their duties under the supervision of the United States military governor designated by him. The first military governor appointed was General Chambers McKibbin, who was succeeded in a few days by Brigadier-General Leonard Wood of the Rough Riders, who had been promoted from Colonel after Las Guasimas, his place as Colonel having been filled by the promotion of Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt. General Wood's selection was due to his fine practical knowledge of medical and sanitary subjects, very important for the time, and also for his executive ability.

THERE were 1,800 patients in the public hospitals and every house contained its sick. On top of this, hunger and destitution. There were 40,000 persons for the Red Cross Society to supply with food. The surrender destroyed at once the value of Cuban and Spanish money. Gold was demanded until the value of American silver and



CHRISTINA STREET, SANTIAGO

paper money was demonstrated. For two weeks citizens of the highest standing and means had been forced to live upon rice, tough meat, and occasionally poor vegetables. Horses killed in battle were turned over to the butchers for the soldiers.

It was a dreadful condition to face both inside and outside the city. The camps of the prisoners were sure to become a threatening source of disease and infection. The most strenuous efforts of the military executive and the noble labors of the Red Cross Society were necessary to mitigate the sufferings, which could not be fully relieved. The helpless populace, the prisoners, our own army in the mountains, the thousands of sick and wounded at Santiago, El Caney, Siboney, and Baiquiri, must be handled under circumstances difficult enough to dismay the stoutest heart and will.

This was not all. Business destroyed by the siege must be reestablished, commerce must be reopened with all its tedious regulations under the new attitude of the province toward our government. Order must be maintained, jealousies soothed, appeals heard, and over all must be held an iron hand to establish the unquestioned authority of the United States in all questions of public and private rights.

The President at once transmitted by cable to General Shafter a proclamation to be published, declaring the intentions of the United States towards the territory under temporary control of the United States. It guaranteed to the people security of their persons and property in all their private rights and relations, without regard to party, faction, birth or religion. The municipal laws already in force were to be continued until suspended or superseded by others. The courts were to continue their functions under the judges occupying their seats if they accepted the supremacy of the United States. Such judges would administer justice under the law of land as between man and man, under the supervision of the United States Military Governor, who was empowered to establish new courts of common justice if the sitting judges failed to recognize the new authority. All public property, railways, telegraphs, schools, churches, homes of art and science, monuments and archives were to be guarded and

protected; none must be destroyed except as an urgent military necessity. Private property was to be carefully protected in every case and, if its seizure should prove necessary for military purposes, must be paid for in cash at a fair valuation. The revenues payable formerly to Spain were to be collected for the United States. All ports in the surrendered territory were to be opened free to the commerce of neutral nations upon the payment of duties in force at the time of importation.*

*The President's proclamation is a historical paper of great interest. It is the first State paper ever issued from this government containing authorization and instruction for the government of captured foreign territory, and also a proclamation to the people of the territory of the intentions of the government regarding them and their interests. The full text of the document is as follows:—

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1898. }

General Shafter, Santiago, Cuba:—

The following is sent to you for your information and guidance. It will be published in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the widest circulation in the territory under your control:—

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1898. }

To the Secretary of War:—

SIR: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States, render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation.

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will, therefore, be the duty of the commander of the army of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, coöperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerents, and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before

The conditions prevailing in and around Santiago were crushing in their immediate demands. The prevalence of rains, the precipitate advance of the army from the coast, the length of the lines, and their thinness, had disorganized and demoralized the supply trains, and in

the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.

The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as between man and man, under the supervision of the American Commander-in-Chief.

The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be preserved. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it is necessary to do so.

While the rule of conduct of the American Commander-in-Chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind, if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience, and a high sense of justice.

One of the most important and most practical problems with which it will be necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable property of such government may be seized by the military occupant and converted to his own use. The real property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity.

All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be appropriated to his use, but, unless in case of military necessity, they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all schoolhouses, are, so far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments or archives, or of works of science or art is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity.

Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, and can be confiscated only as hereafter indicated. Means of transportation, such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but unless destroyed under military necessity are not to be retained.

While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions upon the enemy in their seaports, towns or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expenses of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation.

As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to

the immensity of casualties, sickness, and suffering the medical and surgical corps, though it labored with unsparing devotion, was wholly inadequate to the task confronting it.

The army was cheered up by immediate acknowledgment of its great triumph. After the flag had been raised in Santiago at noon, General Shafter received and had read to the troops present the following telegram from President McKinley:—

“The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under General Toral.

“Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation.

“The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them.”

The message was transmitted by the Secretary of War, who sent with it a telegram of congratulation.

To the President General Shafter replied:—

“I thank you and my army thanks you for your congratulatory telegram of to-day. I am proud to say every one in it performed his duty gallantly. Your message will be read to every regiment in the army at noon to-morrow.”

Major-General William R. Shafter of the Fifth Army Corps, who was in command of the forces at Santiago, was born in 1835 on a farm

substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army.

Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for when possible in cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given.

All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be open to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By order of the Secretary of War.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General.


near Galesburg, Michigan. He was, therefore, sixty-three years old when, at the head of the army of invincibles, he invaded Cuba. He weighed three hundred pounds when he set out and lost fifty pounds during the campaign of thirty days. General Shafter's history is characteristic of American life and opportunity. He was reared as a plain farmer's boy, doing hard work in the field and getting such schooling as he could obtain between crops and through the hard winters. His youth was one of plain living, hard work, modest ambition. When he was grown he became teacher of the county school, and there Lincoln's first call for volunteers found him in 1860, being then twenty-five years old.

He quitted his occupations and ambitions, went into town, raised a company of volunteers for the Seventh Michigan Regiment, and was commissioned First-Lieutenant. His record in the Civil War was a fine one. He was brevetted Brigadier-General, for "most distinguished gallantry in action at Malvern Hill, Virginia, August 6, 1862, while serving as First-Lieutenant, Company I, Seventh Michigan Infantry, in command of prisoners, voluntarily taking an active part in that battle and remaining on the field, although wounded, until the close of the engagement." At Fair Oaks, before, he had been brevetted Colonel for gallant conduct. In 1864, he organized the Sixteenth Regiment of colored troops and in the battle of Nashville led them with marked success. At Fair Oaks, General Shafter was badly wounded, but he could not be persuaded to leave the field until the battle was over. He then went back to the hospital tent for treatment. Shortly after the battle he was promoted to be Major of the Nineteenth Michigan Regiment, and in a few months he was made Lieutenant-Colonel. In 1866, he was mustered out of the volunteer service, and then began a struggle to determine what he should do. He had become a thorough, well-disciplined soldier, and dreaded farm life. After long consideration he entered the regular army. He was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the Forty-first United States Infantry. After the consolidation of regiments in 1879, he was promoted to be Colonel of the First United States Infantry. He obtained his star as Brigadier-General in 1897.

With the development of plans for the invasion of Cuba the President and Secretary of War began to seek for suitable leaders. Prominent among them was General Shafter. President McKinley made him a Major-General, and he was assigned to command the troops in the Santiago campaign.

General Shafter's thirty years of service on the frontier distinguished him as a splendid soldier, an aggressive and daring fighter of Indians, and a popular officer and gentleman. He was a firm but practical disciplinarian, caring little for the niceties of form but demanding faithful performance of the spirit of discipline. He was full of geniality and humor and subject to quick changes of temper. But he was just to his men, who stood in awe of him and who loved to follow him in danger, where he was at his best. Personally a man of conspicuous bravery, he was very active and liked hard work. His great bulk was never in his way until the terrible climate about Santiago struck him down. But illness did not make him cease his purpose with the army. There is no successful general who can escape criticism, but it must be admitted that the obstacles to be overcome at Santiago were so enormous that, while they will increase the criticism, they will increase in a corresponding degree his distinguished success in the campaign. It was characteristic of the man, blunt, unaffected, violent in language, brusque in manner at times, that he wrote this in a letter home from the front at Santiago: "It is to the gallant soldiers who uncomplainingly bore every privation that the country is indebted for its victory."

Major-General Joseph Wheeler, of the Cavalry Corps, coöperating with General Shafter, second in command, was a distinguished leader of cavalry in the Confederate army during the Civil War. He was born in Alabama in 1836 and was, therefore, a year younger than Shafter. He weighed nearly two hundred pounds less. He was admitted to West Point Academy in 1854, when eighteen years old, and graduated to enter the regular army as Second-Lieutenant in a regiment of mounted riflemen at Fort Fillmore, on the Rio Grande.



GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER

He resigned his commission April 22, 1861, to enter the service of the Confederacy. He was attached to General L. P. Walker's staff with the rank of Colonel; but after a short service on the staff, he went back to Alabama and raised a regiment. When it was proposed to make him a Brigadier-General in the Confederate army, objection was offered on account of his youth, but the objection was overcome, and the wisdom of the appointment was justified by his results.

He became a daring and skillful commander of cavalry, dividing with General Forrest the honors of that arm of the service on his side.

Since his disabilities were removed after the close of the Civil War, General Wheeler has been continuously in Congress from the Eighth Alabama district. He left his seat to accept a commission as Major-General of Cavalry in the war with Spain. In his absence the Governor of Alabama, acting upon the rule prohibiting any member of Congress from holding employment under the government, declared his seat vacant, and ordered an election to be held to fill the vacancy. General Wheeler's constituents met in convention and promptly nominated him to fill the vacancy by unanimous action.

He has been an interesting, active, and respected Congressman. He is but five feet two inches tall and weighs one hundred and ten pounds. His nervous vitality and physical restlessness made him a marked personage. One of the characteristic stories of this peculiarity is told of the Honorable Thomas B. Reed, then Speaker of the House, who cherished high respect for General Wheeler's unswerving integrity of character and firmness of purpose. After the death of an old member of the House, a group was discussing those left alive. General Wheeler was present, an old member, and one of the group observing him, remarked, "Well, we have General Wheeler left." "Yes," remarked the Speaker quickly, "the Almighty has never been able to find the General long enough in one place to lay His finger upon him." Nobody enjoyed the epigrammatic comment more than the subject of it. He was one of the strongest men of the Ways and Means Committee. When asked by Mr. Dingley if he would like to

go to Manila as Military Governor, he replied that he wanted to go to Cuba, where he could more readily help to bring things to a close. He had been a student of the operations of the Cuban insurgents. At sixty-two General Wheeler displayed at Santiago the same indomitable spirit that distinguished him thirty-three years ago. He left his sick bed and went on horseback to the front of the line all day at San Juan, and, though burning with fever after twelve hours of fierce battle and exposure, interposed before discouraged officers who were suggesting retirement from the positions already won and that could only be held by unflinching bravery, and indignantly refused to hear of retreating one foot. He warned General Shafter against the proposal and by his splendid and fearless courage of heart and determination turned the disheartened ones the other way about, by infusing his own tenacity of purpose into them.

At San Juan, during the hottest fighting, it is told that General Wheeler forgot his whereabouts on the calendar of time for a moment and, as the enemy showed signs of weakening, cried out impulsively to his troops:—

“Give those Yankees h—ll now, boys!”

His aides and those standing near burst into laughter and told him what he had said.

“Oh, well,” he explained with a smile of deprecation, “I just forgot a moment—but you all know I meant the Spanish. I’m a Yankee myself, now, wearing the uniform and following the old flag of the country where Yankee and Dixie are the same words to the whole land.”

No soldier earned more distinction than General Wheeler.

CHAPTER THE SIXTEENTH.

GARCIA'S DISAFFECTION AND MANZANILLO.

DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE CUBAN ALLIES WHEN SANTIAGO WAS NOT GIVEN INTO THEIR CONTROL — THE STORY OF THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERALS GARCIA AND SHAFTER, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES INTO THE INTERIOR — CHARACTER OF THE SERVICES RENDERED BY THE CUBANS IN THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN — OUR WAR SHIPS UNDER TODD SINK AND DESTROY FIVE SPANISH GUNBOATS AND THREE TRANSPORTS, KILLING A HUNDRED OF THE ENEMY — NOT A MAN OR SHIP OF THE AMERICANS HURT.

I.

POLITICAL misunderstandings with the armed Cuban forces began with the surrender of Santiago, and added for the moment to the difficulties of the situation. It was particularly noticed on the day of occupation that no Cuban flags were raised in the city. A party of Cubans mounted the hill of the Morro at the harbor entrance on Sunday morning and displayed a Cuban flag on the staff over the walls, but Admiral Sampson ordered it down at once by signal to his shore forces. The only Cubans accompanying General Shafter into the city to take possession were General Joaquin Castillo and an aide on his staff. They went as personal guests of the American General, and did not take official part in the ceremonies.

General Calixto Garcia, commanding the Cuban allies in the department of Eastern Cuba, had been engaged in all the operations around Santiago from the landing of the United States troops to the surrender. He had arrived at Aserraderos on June 14 in response to a communication from General Miles to place himself under the orders of the American commander for full coöperation, having about 4,000 troops under his authority. They were poorly clothed, and when some of them reached the American fleet and camps, were so nearly starved that a number died in a few hours, after voracious

THE INCIDENT
OF GARCIA'S
DISAFFECTION

eating. As rapidly as possible they were supplied with clothing, equipments, food, and then assigned to positions in the United States line under command of their own officers. They were principally used for scouting and advance skirmishers, because they were familiar with the country and the Spanish methods of fighting.

General Garcia took part in important conferences and movements before and during the investment of the city. His troops fraternized with the Americans in good spirit at first, but complaints arose. There can be no doubt that the ragged and unfortunate insurgents were wholly undisciplined according to our ideas. They had been fighting for three years after guerilla tactics, and had no training in the business of proceeding by regular formation and with cool determination to assault. The overwhelming numbers of the United States troops and the display of power and preparation in ships, munitions, and supplies, doubtless served also to make these half-starved bush-rangers feel some discouragement between foes and allies each so much greater in strength. They could not speak English, which gave room for much misunderstanding. They were not gluttonous for the hard and exhausting labor of building roads and fortifications. They had never needed either, flying light in their campaigns through jungles, having no supply trains to provide for, each man carrying his all on his horse or in his haversack.

That the Cubans rendered valuable services during the Santiago campaign, there is little doubt. General Wheeler said that while they were wholly undisciplined according to our standard, they had in no instance, to his knowledge, refused to obey any order or respond to any request made upon them. On the contrary, they seemed anxious to do everything in their power, and where there were miscarriages, they were probably due to lack of understanding of our language and inability to comprehend just what was wanted. At El Pozo, one of the points in the Santiago battle, where three hundred of the Cubans fought, forty-seven of their number were killed and wounded, or more than fifteen per cent., as high a percentage of casualties as any other organization could show.

When Santiago was evacuated by the 20,000 non-combatants, and capture or surrender was inevitable, the Cuban patriots were expectant of the immediate triumph of their cause under the guarantee of the United States that this Government intended only to extinguish Spanish sovereignty on the island and establish the independence of the people of Cuba. A plebiscite was taken quietly among the non-combatants and Cuban troops, which resulted in the selection of General Demetrius Castillo for Military Governor of Santiago when the city should be taken. Accordingly, the name of General Castillo was recommended to General Garcia by the leaders, and in a conference the recommendation was laid before General Shafter. The Cuban leaders maintained that at the first conference between Garcia, Sampson, and Shafter at Aserradero, Shafter had promised to turn Santiago over to Garcia's occupation as soon as it was surrendered.*

If such a promise was actually made it was singularly unwise and, under the light of conditions that prevailed at the time of the surrender, General Shafter could not, under the President's instructions, or in good common reason, place the city under control of insurgent authorities. At that time it was an imperative necessity that the 40,000 occupants of the city should feel the strong arm of United States authority for the prevention of panic and disorder. The recommendation of General Demetrius Castillo for Governor was therefore rejected by General Shafter, who explained that the capitulation was to the United States forces and that it was his intention to continue the autonomist officials in place until further orders from the President.

Upon this General Garcia declined to enter Santiago on the day of surrender or while it was administered by officials that had received their commissions from the Spanish Government.

When, therefore, orders were issued that no Cuban or American troops should enter Santiago for occupation, except those needed to maintain order, and that no Cuban flag should be raised in the city, General Garcia and his staff held aloof from all participation and

*Statement of General Joaquin Castillo, Associated Press report, August 24, 1898.

withdrew to a distance for consultation. A few days afterward Garcia sent to Shafter a letter containing a statement of his intention to withdraw from the campaign and his reasons therefor. He said:—

“I have done my best, sir, to fulfill the wishes of my Government, and I have been until now one of your most faithful subordinates, honoring myself in carrying out your orders and instructions as far as my powers have allowed me to do it.

“The city of Santiago surrendered to the American army, and news of that important event was given to me by persons entirely foreign to your staff. I have not been honored with a single word from yourself informing me about the negotiations for peace or the terms of the capitulation by the Spaniards. The important ceremony of the surrender of the Spanish army and the taking possession of the city by yourself took place later on, and I only knew of both events by public reports.

“I was neither honored, sir, with a kind word from you inviting myself or any officer of my staff to represent the Cuban army on that memorable occasion.

“Finally, I know that you have left in power at Santiago the same Spanish authorities that for three years I have fought as enemies of the independence of Cuba. I beg to say that these authorities have never been elected at Santiago by the residents of the city, but were appointed by royal decrees of the Queen of Spain.

“I would agree, sir, that the army under your command should have taken possession of the city, the garrison, and the forts. I would give my warm cooperation to any measure you may have deemed best under American military law to hold the city for your army and to preserve public order until the time comes to fulfill the solemn pledge of the people of the United States to establish in Cuba a free and independent government. But when the question arises of appointing authorities in Santiago de Cuba, under the peculiar circumstances of our thirty years' strife against the Spanish rule, I cannot see but with the deepest regret that such authorities are not elected by the Cuban people, but are the same ones selected by the Queen of Spain, and, hence, are ministers to defend against the Cubans the Spanish sovereignty.

“A rumor, too absurd to be believed, General, ascribes the reason of your measures and of the orders forbidding my army to enter Santiago to fear of massacres and revenge against the Spaniards. Allow me, sir, to protest against even the shadow of such an idea. We are not savages ignoring the rules of civilized warfare. We are a poor, ragged army, as ragged and as poor as was the army of your forefathers in their noble war for independence, but, as did the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, we respect too deeply our cause to disgrace it with barbarism and cowardice.

“In view of all these reasons I sincerely regret to be unable to fulfill any longer the orders of my Government, and therefore I have tendered to-day to the Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban army, Major-General Maximo Gomez, my resignation as commander of this section of our army.

“Awaiting his resolution, I withdraw my forces to the interior.”

The letter was transmitted to Washington, by General Shafter and it was accompanied, according to reports from the War Department, with comments disparaging to the Cuban troops. He held Garcia's troops responsible for the safe arrival in Santiago before the surrender of General Nario's regiment of Spanish regulars. He sent the following reply to General Garcia:—

"I must say that I was very much surprised at the receipt of your letter this morning, and regret exceedingly that you should regard yourself as in any way slighted or aggrieved.

"You will remember the fact that I invited you to accompany me into the town of Santiago to witness the surrender, which you declined.

"This war, as you know, is between the United States and Spain, and it is out of the question for me to take any action in regard to your forces in connection with the surrender, which was made solely to the American army.

"The policy of my Government in continuing in power temporarily the persons occupying the offices is one which I am, of course, unable to discuss. To show you the views held by my Government, I inclose a copy of the instructions received by me yesterday from the President, which appear to cover everything that can possibly arise in the government of this territory while it is held by the United States.

"Full credit has been given to you and your valiant men in my report to my Government, and I wish to acknowledge to you the great and valuable assistance you rendered during the campaign.

"I regret very much to know of your determination to withdraw yourself from this vicinity."

As has been said before, Shafter's action in refusing to permit authority to the Cubans to any extent was entirely proper and necessary, but it is evident after reading the two letters that he had lacked in tact and in proper consideration of the delicate position of those despairing and long-hoping patriots, whose impulsive nature would have responded to kindly candor.

This is not pointed out to criticize General Shafter's conduct of the war. It is always easy to point out mistakes after the fact, but in haste, difficulties, and confusion, action must be taken without delay and in the temper of the moment. General Shafter was in bad physical condition, he was harassed with manifold duties, and was, moreover, a man of brusque and quick temper.

The errors of detail in all great emergencies are many and are of no importance if they do not affect the result of the central purpose. In this instance the disaffection of the Cuban leader caused the Washington administration some uneasiness.

There had been many disparaging criticisms of the Cubans made by some of our officers. It had been suggested that no more supplies or arms be furnished to them. Washington authorities, however, were favorably impressed by General Garcia's protest, and the Cabinet decided not to cease its efforts to retain the coöperation of the allies.

Immediately after sending his protest, Garcia sent a courier to General Maximo Gomez of the Cuban forces with his resignation, and withdrew with his troops toward Jiguani, fifty miles northwest of Santiago.

The influence and extent of the feeling aroused by this incident could not be estimated at the time it occurred, but it was unfortunate.*

II.

**A FINE NAVAL
VICTORY AT
MANZANILLO** THE fall of Santiago was followed in two days by another naval victory at Manzanillo, not less complete than those at Manila and Santiago, but involving fewer and smaller ships and lacking, therefore, that factor of peril upon a vast scale which invests battle with magnificence and dramatic display. The United States war ships on blockade duty before Manzanillo on the east side of the Gulf of Guacanayabo, about one hundred

* In one paragraph of his report on the Santiago campaign Inspector-General Breckinridge speaks of the Cuban allies in these words: "In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were used largely as outposts on our front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discussion among the officers of this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they have rendered. They seem to have very little organization or discipline, and they do not, of course, fight in the battle line with our troops. Yet in every skirmish or fight where they were present they seemed to have a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance in our first landing and in scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe, however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to our expectation and understanding, unless they are under the constant supervision and direction of one of our own officers, as our movements and views are so different and a misunderstanding or failure so easy."

miles west of Santiago, were the *Wilmington*, *Helena*, *Scorpion*, *Hist*, *Hornet*, *Wampatuck*, and *Osceola*. All were auxiliary vessels except the *Wilmington*, under command of Captain Todd (who had been at Cienfuegos when the *Winslow* was badly damaged and Ensign Bagley was killed), and the *Helena*, her twin gunboat. Captain Todd was the ranking officer in command of the Manzanillo flotilla, and by direction of Admiral Sampson he approached the harbor at seven o'clock on Tuesday morning, July 18, for the purpose of destroying the Spanish gunboats and transports contained in the harbor.

At 7:30 o'clock the *Wilmington* and *Helena* entered the northern channel toward the city, the *Scorpion* and *Osceola* the mid channel, and the *Hist*, *Hornet*, and *Wampatuck* the south channel, the movements of the vessels being so timed as to bring them within effective range of the shipping at about the same moment.

At 7:50 fire was reopened on the shipping, and, after a deliberate fire lasting about two and a half hours, three Spanish transports, *La Gloria*, *José Garcia*, and *La Puricama Concepcion*, were burned and destroyed. The pontoon, which was the harbor guard and store ship, probably for ammunition, was burned and blown up. Three gunboats were destroyed. One other was driven ashore and sunk, and a fifth was driven ashore and was believed to be disabled.

The firing was maintained at a range beyond that of the shore artillery. It was continued until, after a gradual closing in, the shore batteries opened fire at a comparatively short range, when one of our ships was recalled, the object of the expedition having been accomplished. No casualties occurred on board any of our vessels. Great care was taken in directing the fire that as little damage as possible should be done to the city itself. The Spanish loss was reported to be nearly a hundred killed. The gunboats destroyed or driven ashore helpless, were the *Dalgado*, *Guantanamo*, *Ostralia*, *Continola*, and *Guardian*.

If the Manzanillo engagement had occurred at the outset of war, it would have taken a great place in history. It is only smaller in size than the other great engagements and the result was exactly

the same—the enemy's ships annihilated, not one of our vessels injured, and not an American sailor injured.

The achievements of the navy up to July 19 were extraordinary. The two squadrons under Dewey and Sampson had destroyed, of Spanish war vessels, four armored cruisers, three torpedo boats, seventeen unprotected cruisers and gunboats, and four transports, and had captured nearly thirty merchant prizes of considerable value. Our only loss was the damaged *Winslow*, six men killed, and seven men wounded. The Spaniards had lost about twelve hundred killed, six hundred wounded, and two thousand prisoners.

Commander Todd's triumph at Manzanillo was in keeping with the glory of this unparalleled naval record.



CHAPTER THE SEVENTEENTH.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FALL OF SANTIAGO.

EXTRAORDINARY TEST OF THE FIGHTING QUALITIES OF AMERICANS BEFORE THE SURRENDER—
THE ENDURANCE, COURAGE, AND INDIVIDUAL SKILL OF OUR TROOPS AMAZED ALL FOREIGN
MILITARY OBSERVERS—OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY SOME OF THE EXPERTS—THE
STORMING OF SAN JUAN CONSIDERED AN IMPOSSIBILITY IN ADVANCE—
WHAT THE NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS DEMONSTRATED TO THE
WORLD—EFFECT OF THE COMBINED OPERATIONS—
GREATER IN SIGNIFICANCE THAN ANY
BATTLE OF THE CENTURY.

I.

THE land fighting before Santiago was dwarfed by the spectacular glory of the naval engagement that followed swiftly upon its heels. The ocean is the perfect battlefield, offering no natural advantage to either combatant. On land, the limitless opportunities for defense, concealment, and surprise require most patient investigation both of the original plan of a battle and its variations in execution, in order that the action may be comprehended and explained. All that is known at first are the general results and the confused mass of individual experiences and incidents that indicate the fighting temper of the forces engaged. The fighting before Santiago on July 1 and 2 was without precedent, and was involved in more confusion than any other modern battle of respectable scale. The destruction of Cervera's squadron was achieved amid all the surroundings of a magnificent theatrical display. Its opening, swift progress, and final tragedy, possessed a dramatic completeness of effect that could not have been surpassed if the details had been designed and rehearsed in advance.

TEST OF OUR
ARMY BEFORE
SANTIAGO

Yet, splendid as the achievement was, the heroism displayed by the soldiers in the obscurity of the inland jungles was of a quality that equaled the courage and skill by which our ships were brought out

victorious. And, at the moment when the observers of the land battles were preparing to analyze the incidents and construct the great story, the naval engagement intervened and relegated the army's achievements to second place. It was not until two weeks had elapsed and Santiago had surrendered, that the world understood the significance of the American fighting at San Juan and El Caney.

The discovery was momentous. Upon a larger field 16,000 men, against the same odds and with the same determination of unprecedented courage, devoid of any quality of desperation, had repeated the achievement of the 950 at Las Guasimas. As Sampson's fleet demonstrated that Dewey's victory was the fruit of national character and system, and not chance, the forces at San Juan and El Caney enforced with equal thoroughness the lesson of Las Guasimas.

It established the quality of manhood developed by free government, which the monarchical systems had persistently denied. The very blunders of forecast called out triumphantly the individual resource of each soldier, apart from the combination in bodies. It is doubtful if the desperate courage of the Spaniards had been underestimated; but certainly the deadly Cuban climate, with its alternation of burning heat and nightly chill, its drowning tropical rains, the rankness of vegetation, the tangled jungles, and the absence of foundations for road building—certainly, these were all underestimated or not prepared for. Yet, if it had been determined to overcome these obstacles before attacking, the purpose of the government to push the war to a quick conclusion could not have been achieved. Cuba could not have been scientifically invaded and the war ended short of twelve months.

It was thoroughly characteristic of the American idea of "business" that when Shafter perceived the heat and the impending of the rainy season he determined without hesitation to "beat the rains to Santiago," and do the necessary fighting while the health and spirits of the men were good. It cannot be said that the losses in battle were greater because of the impetuous advance. The losses by disease later demonstrated the wisdom of haste.

The three battles on the journey were characteristic of what Europe has sarcastically called "American enterprise." Disregarding tradition and precedent, the army of the United States, provided with no field artillery of sufficient power, plunged into a jungle and marched against a fortified city—leaving all supplies behind, and throwing away, on the march, every pound of clothing and equipment that was not necessary for actual fighting.

The extreme advance guard of 950 cavalrymen, marching and fighting for the first time dismounted, half of them volunteers of two months' training, charged an enemy two or three times greater in numbers, intrenched, provided with artillery, protected by barbed-wire entanglements, in a familiar jungle, and drove him back after an hour's fighting. It was called an "ambush," and at home amateur critics of war attributed to desperation the valor of our troops. It was to be discovered later that from Las Guasimas to Santiago the same ambuscade confronted all our troops.

Halting only to fight, rest, and permit the main body to come up, cut off from provisions and hospital relief, with quarter rations for empty stomachs, the half nude and weary, but determined, army reached the outposts of Santiago and assaulted them with a spirit that would not be denied. The outposts that were to be taken in two days were stormed and captured against overwhelming odds of defense in one day, after ten hours of ceaseless fighting. The night was spent in making intrenchments and resisting attempts at recapture, and the next day in the blazing sunlight, without tents, without food, without relief, they fought the enemy back to his last ditch and held the city.

Of the 15,000 troops engaged, three regiments were volunteers practically useless, not for lack of fighting qualities—the stubborn march disproved that—but because their rifle ammunition carried black powder and the smoke menaced our troops by revealing our position at every discharge. Of the remainder one regiment was of volunteers with smokeless powder ammunition and the remainder regulars, one-third of whose ranks had been recruited within sixty-five days. One-third of that army was practically composed of volunteer recruits.

The military observers present, representing foreign nations, were unanimously of the opinion before the attack on Friday the 1st, that the storming of San Juan and El Caney, without the aid of heavy artillery, was a military feat impossible of accomplishment. The intrenchments of the enemy, his position, his advance defenses, his artillery and numbers, rendered him impregnable against enormous odds. Yet all this was swept away by infantry alone, by troops thrown into regimental confusion in the jungle, some without brigade or regimental commanders, yet all welded into substantial cohesive formation by the instinct of self-reliance, springing from intelligent knowledge of the value of combination and organization.

Captain Lee and Captain Paget of the British army declared that the United States troops had performed the impossible in warfare. Count von Goetzen, the German *attaché*, whose opinion will scarcely be suspected of too much leaning to the side of the United States, said the fighting of the Americans was wonderfully well done, and that the storming of the outposts was a wonderful feat of war. The fighting was creditable, he declared, to both sides, but he did not dream how formidable San Juan was until after it had been taken. The American marksmanship was surprising. The vigorous way in which our troops sprang to the deadly work was a tremendous lesson to other nations. The volunteers, he heard from other expert observers who had watched them, were fully up to the regulars, and the dash and spirit exhibited were marvelous. Major Grandprey, of the French service, who has been quoted elsewhere, declared that some of the best-grounded theories adopted in Europe were overturned by the achievements of the American soldiers. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, a leading newspaper authority of Germany, in a well-considered article from a military contributor, declared that the United States troops before Santiago had surpassed all precedent, and that the susceptibility of the American citizen to quick training had demonstrated that our volunteer militia was a much more reliable force than the compulsory reserves of Europe, an utterance astonishing in the light of past beliefs.

It may be said that our military operations against Santiago were marred by blunders or misfortunes, without raising the question of cause or responsibility for them. But through all, the intelligence, tenacity, and strong character of the American citizen found an unerring way to victory against the odds of the enemy in front and the failure or impossibility of support behind.

The courage of our soldiers was matched by the skill of our seamen. The naval battle of Santiago was most extraordinary in its contrasts of methods and men. For eighty-six years American seamen had engaged no foreign adversaries. Our ships were regarded as too light in armor, or too heavy in armament, and too delicate in interior mechanism. It had been predicted by foreign experts that our battleships would be capsized by the recoil from the delivery of full broadsides from the great and small guns. These theoretical doubts were dissipated. The battleships, in bombarding, were "listed," or careened to one side by running the heavy guns out of the ports and turrets, in order to gain elevation sufficient for the guns on the other side to throw shells over the hills. Not a gun exploded, not a piece of delicate machinery failed, not one gloomy prediction was realized.

Our methods of fighting, like our methods of diplomacy, were startling to the enemy. Europe has clung to the conventions. In diplomacy, Europeans proceed by the tortuous paths of tradition and the etiquette of precedent. They pronounced the American directness of procedure by going to the heart of the subject in a businesslike manner as "brutal" and "irritating." At San Juan the Spanish complained that our troops charged, when, under all the conventions of warfare by accepted tactics they should have run away!

In the naval battle our commanders wasted no time in vain technical parade and manœuvre. They fell upon the adversary with all the weight of metal that could be discharged, pounding the amazed and breathless Spaniards to destruction before they could recover from the shock. The European gunner is trained to shoot on the upward roll of his side of the ship, with the result that most of the Spanish shots were hurled harmlessly over our ships. United States

gunners are trained to fire on the downward roll, so that the missile may go straight to the enemy's hull, or reach it on *ricochet*. The hulls of the Spanish cruisers testified to the deadly efficacy of the method.

II.

**EFFECT OF
SANTIAGO ON
THE WORLD**

THE three battles of this century, preceding Santiago, that were enormously greater in political significance than important as mere military operations, were Waterloo, Gettysburg, and Sedan. The effect of Waterloo was the destruction of the personal power and threatened political supremacy in Europe of Napoleon. The effect of Gettysburg was to presage the downfall of the institution of slavery in the United States, and the denial, by force of arms, of the political theory of the right of a State to peacefully withdraw from the Federal Union. The effect of Sedan was the ushering into immediate power of the German Empire, that Bismarck had patiently constructed from the petty German States, the solidarity of which was committed with its crown to the keeping of William I., of the new imperial dynasty. In no military sense are these battles comparable, but in significance they are. They were of momentous effect upon the nations and continents whose interests were directly concerned. But, to the round world, they were, after all, more or less, incidents of locality. Waterloo was, perhaps, greatest of all; but the world of 1814 was much smaller than the world of 1898.

In respect of the importance of the forces engaged on land and the display of recognized scientific military operations, the land battles before Santiago were mere skirmishes beside Waterloo, Gettysburg, and Sedan. But in respect of the revelation resulting from measuring the fighting and enduring qualities of the American soldier by the standard obtaining in the standing army of Spain, the result was of the highest significance. Among the people of the United States it confirmed and established the confidence they had long cherished in the efficiency of their race. It was more important to

us than Gettysburg, in that, while it erased every jarring memory of Gettysburg itself, it sanctified and heightened the one glorious heritage—of the valor of all Americans who met in that heroic struggle; and that the reunited devotion to one country and one flag was sealed in sacrifice of blood and life by North and South together fighting side by side. It revealed to us, as by inspiration, the strength and character of our population, and the resourceful intelligence springing from liberty restricted only by the rights of man. That this revelation was understood by all foreign observers was confessed. They were sent to observe both sides; not merely the tools of war, but the nature and power of the men who wielded them. It is for the purpose of studying forces as possible adversaries that such observations are made.

When the combined operations of the army and navy at Santiago are considered, it is not improbable that the Spanish defeat will prove, by future results, to have been more significant than any other battle of the century.

The overwhelming and quick defeat of Spain was confidently prepared for and expected by the United States. The progress of the war did not appreciably interrupt the regular course of our everyday life or business.

It was also conceded by all other nations that Spain must be defeated if the prosecution of the war were not averted by the intervention of European Powers. But some grave authorities abroad did not dream that it was possible for Spain in a hundred days to be stripped of all her colonies, her splendid fleet annihilated, her ocean commerce paralyzed, her finances demoralized, her population maddened to the point of revolution, an important body of her army captured within its own fortified places by a smaller army, and the prisoners transported back to Spain, at the expense of the conquerors, as an act of compassionate charity, founded upon good "Yankee" economy.

And all this without the enemy being able to strike a single blow in return, or to disarrange in any particular the ordinary course of life in this country.

The significance of Santiago lay in this: that those who had considered Dewey's action at Manila to be a miracle of good fortune, saw it repeated at Santiago, at Manzanillo, at San Juan de Porto Rico, and at Nipe. Those who thought the 950 at Las Guasimas were reckless dare-devils, who won out of sheer audacity, saw the same quality of indomitable courage repeated by increased forces, with equal success, at San Juan and El Caney.

When Santiago surrendered, the republic of the United States, so long scorned by Europe as a nation of money-getters and sordid adventurers, with no traditions of dignity or glory; so long treated with contempt by Europe in its accredited representatives as being a government of ignorant and corrupt politicians and mercenaries—that republic, after Santiago, stood before the world suddenly revealed in its real strength, taking undisputed place in the first rank of nations, unsurpassed in its practical ability to provide for offense or defense, and with a capacity for future influence in the whole world, and for the increase of its strength restricted only within the national purpose, whatever that might be.

The surrender of Santiago was the deathblow to Spain, and a sudden warning to Europe.

Even after the destruction of the *Maine* the Spanish Government did not expect war with the United States. That act of cruel perfidy was so well shrouded in mystery, as Spain viewed it, that it might be made the subject of endless diplomacy; or, if put to it, the "mercenaries" of America could be pacified with a money indemnity. No allowance was made for the existence of a profound public sentiment in the United States aroused by the murder of our seamen. Once before Spanish authorities had shot to death the crew of the *Virginus*, filibusterers from this country going to aid Cuban revolutionists, and nothing had come of the outrage. The idea that the United States possessed any actual sympathy for Cubans perishing under Spanish cruelty, neither Canovas nor Sagasta could comprehend as anything more than rhetorical declamation covering a pretense to forward some scheme of sharp practice that our government was preparing to

present. They frankly admitted that Spain could not be victorious in a war with the United States, but they did not expect war—diplomacy, and money indemnity, at the proper time, would dispose of American protestations of honorable purpose and humane motives.

Curiously enough, England, the European nation best able to know and understand the spirit and power of the United States, underrated the situation at first. Her naval and military authorities did not hesitate to prophesy that the Americans were sure to be victorious in the end, because, although the national spirit rose slowly, it rose surely under adversity, and was then irresistible. They were ready, however, to expect the first successes for Spain, whose standing army and excellent navy, equipped according to European standards, would be superior to the overloaded and lumbering ships of our fleet and the handful of soldiers composing our standing army, which would have to be laboriously recruited from raw volunteers, these, naturally, of the lowest classes of our population.

Even after Manila, the London *Times*, that recognized channel of sound conservative opinion in England, took a gloomy view of our outlook. "In time, of course," it said, "the United States will be able to bring out their immense, almost inexhaustible resources of military and naval strength, but for the moment nothing decisive can be looked for so long as Admiral Cervera's fleet is in being, and while the American army is in process of manufacture." All that had then been gained, it believed, was the knowledge that European intervention was no longer practicable.

"Intervention by the Powers" was, in fact, the trump card that Spanish statesmen believed they held for use when all other resources should prove futile. It was not possible to admit that a republic of "pig-stickers," "railroad builders" and "tradesmen" would dare resist the dignified wishes of the "Concert of Europe," whose mission was the maintenance of the balance of power, the custodianship of the secrets of diplomacy by circumlocution, and the division of the estates of deceased governments among heirs to be selected for the decedent.

It was to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the Franco-Russian League that Spain looked for assistance. Great Britain was, as usual, independent of alliances, a solitary among nations, more powerful and much more feared than the United States, but yet a solitary, as we have always been.

When Congress had taken steps that left no doubt of immediate war, Spain recognized that her own diplomacy was ended. She turned immediately to Austria, whose Emperor was the uncle of the Queen-Regent and granduncle of Alfonso XIII., to the Pope and to France. The mighty mystery of the "intervention of the Powers" was thus solemnly invoked. The venerable Leo XIII., representing in his pontifical character and personal virtues the loftiest mission of religion, made overtures to the President that were acknowledged with interest and respect and replied to with open frankness of explanation. Then the aged pontiff suddenly learned that even in this effort to preserve that curious national pretense called her "honor," Spain had not hesitated to ascribe his action to the wrong initiative and to represent his motives in such a manner as to cover his high office with indignity and to reflect insult upon the United States. Overcome with grief and feeling deep humiliation, Leo XIII. withdrew, not the less respected by our Government and the world that recognized his greatness of mind and nobility of purpose.

During this time, also, the Powers of the continent had agreed to make united "representations" to the government of the United States through their ambassadors and ministers in a body. The note was intended to have the appearance of disinterested anxiety for peace and the effect of a menace from combined Europe, if we persisted in the determination to make war on Spain, and to destroy her sovereignty in Cuba. Italy did not join in the action.

The continent having agreed upon the plan, application was made to Great Britain to join in the remonstrance. The continent relied upon the ancient feeling of jealous dislike between England and the United States, and the recent embroilment over the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary, as causes sufficient to move the Queen's ministers.

Much to Europe's surprise, Great Britain declared a purpose to take no step unfriendly to Spain or the United States, which countries were presumed to be capable of managing their own affairs. But Mr. Balfour, in the Premier's absence, went further and consented to an action, the significance of which the Powers did not then probably fully perceive. He desired peace, but he could not interfere. He would, however, unite with the Powers in presenting to the President of the United States an address expressing the hope that war might be averted, and offering friendly offices. But the nature of the address must first be communicated to the President and his consent obtained for its public presentation.

The text of the original note as determined upon by the Powers is not known, but when the British ambassador at Washington entered the White House, at the head of the delegation of foreign representatives, it was notice to the world that the President had dictated the terms of the joint address and that the British ambassador presented it as the friendly and courteous suggestion of the greatest European Power, and that his presence estopped the representation from being construed as a menace, upon peril of its repudiation by the British Government, and the danger of provocation that might attach.



CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH.

DEFEAT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

EFFECT OF ENGLAND'S ATTITUDE ON CONTINENTAL EUROPE—NEW CUBAN POLICY AND ITS COMPLETE REVERSAL IN OUR FAVOR—THE CONCERT OF EUROPE ACCEPTED IT AS PROOF OF AN ALLIANCE—CHARACTER OF THE GOVERNMENTAL DIPLOMACIES AND THE METHODS OF THEIR PROCEDURE—ACTION AND ATTITUDE OF ALL THE NATIONS WHEN WAR BEGAN—EFFECT OF DEWEY'S VICTORY AT MANILA.

I.

THE action of Great Britain, which converted the intended menace into assurances of apologetic anxiety, and thus enabled the President to express, under terms of courteous acknowledgment, the unalterable determination of the United States not to permit interference by the European concert in any of our differences with Spain, was as annoying to the concert as it was gratifying to the American people. Our old fraternal enemy had atoned to the great republic for the wrongs inflicted upon the colonies before 1776. At the opportune moment Great Britain had chosen between aliens in language and political ideals and a people possessing substantially those she possessed. And she chose her own.

REPULSE OF
PROPOSED
EUROPEAN
INTERVENTION

Whatever reasons may be ascribed to England, of selfish interest or shrewd foresight, her decision cannot be impeached as lacking in that unerring common sense and high intelligence of practical purpose which characterizes what are known as the Anglo-Saxon people. There is nothing permanent in the effusions of impulsive sentiment alone. The United States not less than England has founded her greatness upon practical and material interests. The independence of the American colonies, achieved against gross oppression by the mother country, has been of vast benefit, not alone to the enfranchised colonies, but to the people of England. In contrast with the Continental and South American republics,—mere personal or organized

autocracies wearing republican costume,—the British people have studied the United States, and have themselves erected a great republic attired in the robes only of monarchy and imperialism.

The first result of England's action was to inflame Europe against her and intensify the feeling against the United States, though it could not be expressed in overt acts. It must be admitted that Europe had abundant reason for disappointment. For a hundred years it had been England's expressed policy to maintain the sovereignty of Spain in Cuba against any strong maritime rival, particularly the United States. Mr. Canning said during his primacy that "the possession by the United States of both shores of the channel, through which our Jamaica trade must pass, would, in time of war with the United States, or, indeed, of a war in which the United States might be neutral, but in which we continued to claim the right of search and the Americans to resist it, amount to a suspension of that trade and to a consequent total ruin of a great portion of our West Indian interests."

The utterance was made in support of his proposal to send a squadron to Havana to check any advances the United States might be tempted to make in 1822. As late as 1852, England, foreseeing the probable construction of a canal through the Central American isthmus, served notice upon the United States of its expectations. In that note was this paragraph:—

"Now, if the maritime Powers are, on the one hand, out of respect to the rights of Spain, and from a sense of international duty, bound to dismiss all intention of obtaining possession of Cuba, so, on the other hand, are they obliged, out of consideration for the interests of their own subjects or citizens, and the protection of the commerce of other nations, who are all entitled to the use of the great highways of commerce on equal terms, to proclaim and assure, as far as in them lies, the present and future neutrality of the island of Cuba."

So tenacious had been England's purpose to guard the interests of her vast maritime commerce in the West Indies, and even its future opportunities, that she succeeded in obtaining from the United States an agreement in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty that a canal through the isthmus, if built, should be open to ships of all nations upon equal

terms, in times of war as well as peace, and that the United States would not establish any fortifications or exert any control in violation of that pledge.

In view of these facts of history, the continental nations naturally sought reasons for the sudden volte-face upon a question of the greatest magnitude to the supremacy of British maritime interests. France, it was asserted, had taken the initiative in forming the concert and in seeking England's agreement to it. If this is true, there was very good reason, because France and England had been closely united in Cuban understandings. Just after the Mexican War these two Governments had proposed to us a tripartite agreement of self-denial between each other and joint denial against other nations, against taking possession of Cuba and to discountenance attempts toward that purpose on the part of Cubans themselves, though it was not to prejudice the right of Cubans to assert and obtain independence. The treaty was rejected by the Fillmore administration and England retired with a direct notice of her determination to exercise her free right to enforce her views, if occasion arose, by combination with other interested nations.

The expressed intention of the United States not to annex Cuba or to do more than establish the freedom of the people, and their right to self-government in 1898, did not afford any explanation of England's attitude. It was not possible for continental diplomats to believe that the declaration of such magnanimous purpose was more than a hypocritical cloak for the acquisition of rich territory. Even if that were possible it did not explain England's purpose. During the Ten Years' War in Cuba when the *Virginius* affair was agitating the United States, President Grant had proposed the independence of Cuba to Europe through diplomatic overtures. France remembered that England had then urged the Powers to refuse, and the proposition fell lifeless.

It was not to be believed that England relied upon the self-denying purpose of the United States in 1898 more than in 1874—besides international philanthropy was the dream of utopian people only.

The only reason practicable under continental ideas was that Great Britain and the United States had established an agreement to resist European intervention or coercion in Cuban affairs, in order that they might take and hold the invaluable island for themselves. They were confirmed in this by the publication in an English newspaper of recognized authority of the statement that the Queen's ministers had determined to remain neutral; that if any combination were formed to interfere with the United States, Great Britain would not only hold aloof from it, but would, in fact, assist the United States. The publication was not upon official authority, but it was not denied.

The view continental governments took of these movements, indicating a perfect accord between the two nations, was of profound significance. An alliance of English-speaking nations was gigantic in its potentialities. It offered elements of cohesive strength in a common language, correlated ideals and purposes, and in material wealth and power, that were incalculably threatening. The continental nations, speaking diverse languages, accustomed to diverse ideals and purposes, honeycombed with petty jealousies, the masses of people weakened in faith by growing temptation to emigrate to the United States or the British Colonies, whence came from relatives and friends established there glowing accounts of peace, prosperity, and freedom—all these constituted elements of disintegration, in spite of the perfection of their enormous war establishments.

Besides, if there actually existed an Anglo-American agreement, resistance to it meant the precipitation of that dreaded evil of the century's governmental development—universal war.

The failure of the concerted representation, and the specters evoked by the situation, left Europe without immediate plan of action; but the pressure to force intervention grew stronger during inaction.

II.

WHEN, therefore, we declared war with Spain, England was our acknowledged friend; Russia was practically the unchanged friend of all previous political existence; France, the first of our friends and allies, torn by distracting interests and political jealousies, was leading the opposition to our purpose; Germany, bound to us by the natural strong ties created by millions of faithful and excellent citizens come to us from all parts of the sturdy Fatherland of genius, courage, and energetic industry, was unfriendly in its ruling classes, but yet to be relied upon in the body of its people; Austria, of course, was devoted to Spain with feeble power; Italy expressed popular approval of our intentions; the Spanish-American republics were officially loyal in the fullest degree to their continental protector, but the blood and language of Spain decided the sympathies of their populations against us.

The narrative of the adventures of these governmental interests during the war is not less interesting than the story of actual war itself. For, after all, one nation, among all the nations, is as one person, made up of the types of its population composed into a generalization of their traditions, intelligence, character, wealth, and local customs. The capacity of a nation for courage, purpose, and ambition is expressed as it is in one man. Pride or simplicity, impulsiveness or deliberation, jealousy or trustfulness, strength or weakness, candor or duplicity, appear in nations, and are as distinctly recognizable as in men.

The establishment of a free democracy in the United States was upon the foundation of the equal political rights of all men, and the social equality of all men to the extent of their equipment. To the leadership of a vast, nervous, energetic, and ambitious population, we have called men of natural genius and capacity, without regard to precedent or origin. It is not form so much as substance that free democracy demands. The great Liberator and profound statesman among

our leaders began life as a rail-splitter; the great General, twice president, began as a farm boy and tanner. We have honored a canal-boat boy, a tailor, farmers, lawyers—there is no presidential caste excluding any male child born in the United States. Those of our leaders who have shown greatest genius have usually been those who had the humblest beginnings in life. In the war with Spain every leader that was to develop sprang from the common average of industrious and sturdy citizenship.

The American national character as expressed by its Government is an aggregation of directness of purpose, disregard of details that are not vital, and a sort of energy in action that may be best described, perhaps, in the American phrase of "getting down to business," with the intention of going directly to the point without evasion.

In monarchical government the theory of the power of royalty "by the grace of God" demanded through many centuries, and does yet demand in a modified form, that the idea shall always be materially presented through the glamour of splendid ceremonial, privileged castes, the exclusion of subjects from the affairs of the sovereign, who is the state; consequently, the envelopment of state functions, diplomatic exchanges, and political procedure in a cloud of ceremonious formalities, precedents, mysterious phrases, and time-consuming leisureliness, has made European diplomatic service a profession open to those who have mastered the cult and closed usually to those who have only the capacity.

It is because representatives of our government at these centers of etiquette have ignored nice distinctions (that could only delay progress) in order to conclude a simple matter, that they have been regarded with terror, Americans generally described as "pigs," and our whole governmental procedure in diplomacy as "brutal." Prince Bismarck, the greatest man of the century in intellectual power and clearness of foresight, was celebrated as one European diplomat who brutally told the truth, while others, who knew thoroughly well the esoteric verbiage in which to encase a fact and involve it in tortuous uncertainties, dreaded to meet him in conference or negotiation.

He mastered them with ease, and they described him as intolerably brutal in stating his demands. But Bismarck, himself, when, at the Berlin Peace Congress, he met Disraeli,—who was master of the etiquette of diplomacy, as well as of the power of direct and energetic pressure, stripped of all reservation and pretense,—said, “I do not care much for their Lord Salisbury, who is merely a wooden lath, painted to look like iron; but look out for that terrible Jew—he means business.”

Of all European governments—excepting, of course, that of the Sultan—the diplomacy of Spain has been the most artful and unscrupulous in method. Having small significance among nations, because of her poverty and degeneration, her diplomacy has been exercised by dynasties and cabinets upon the political factions of the Spanish people, upon the revolutionists of the outraged colonies, and guarded as a weapon to be used by leaders temporarily in power, but not to be betrayed to the common people. The chief diplomatic weapon she has used in times of revolution was magnanimous promise, canceled by cruelest treachery. The Ten Years’ Revolution was brought to an end by the promise of Marshal Campos that Maceo and all his officers and soldiers should be permitted to leave Cuba, and that the insurgent slaves should be emancipated to full citizenship without punishment. The terms were accepted, Maceo left the island; but his officers were sent prisoners to Ceuta, and the slaves were not emancipated until most of them had died under punishment from masters against whom they had revolted. In the Philippines revolutionists have been soothed by decrees of chivalrous amnesty. When they reported to surrender arms, they were massacred in cold blood.

Hundreds of instances might be cited of Spain’s Machiavellian procedure. The revolutions in Cuba that devastated the island, destroyed prosperity and trade, and involved the United States in continuous cost and hurt by the necessity of suppressing filibustering expeditions, were due to Spain’s utter incompetency to govern. Yet for years, by the exercise of the most adroit diplomatic duplicity, by explanations and promises limitless in ingenious cunning, she was

able to prevent action until the atrocities of Captain-General Weyler revolted our common instinct of humanity. In the presence of the horror she had aroused, her politicians shifted places and the relentless cruelties of Canovas were succeeded by the generous promises of Sagasta. Autonomy had been promised often before with the knowledge that it could be suspended. Hesitating upon that memory the doubt of the United States was answered by the sacrifice of the *Maine*.

Such was governmental Spain among international associates—the persuasive and enticing strumpet of diplomatic morals, whose idea of national virtue was that the more sincere it was the more it would cost to purchase. What more could be expected of a country whose social code is crowded with maxims such as these:—

“Renounce the devil and thou shalt wear a shabby cloak. The good man’s son inherits poverty. Alas, for the son whose father went to heaven! Blessed is the son whose father went to the devil. The official who cannot lie may as well be out of the world. He who does not lie does not come of good blood. Gold is omnipotent, and the ducat is his lord-lieutenant.”

The usages of diplomacy in Europe rendered the continental nations much more susceptible to influence by the Spanish procedure than Great Britain or the United States. France, especially, with vast financial stakes in Spanish securities, and Austria, moved by ties of family, could give great assistance in an attempt to entice Europe into a threatening attitude against us.

III.

PUBLIC manœuvring and feinting in diplomacy are carried on along lines of phrases calculated to hasten or delay expected action by others or to invite expression of opinion. Thus, a dispatch beginning, “It is reported here in political circles,” etc., means that the press of the other interested country will reveal how popular opinion receives the action rumored as probable. Then, there is the phrase, “An attaché of a foreign embassy,

WHAT WAS DONE
WHEN WAR
BEGAN

of high standing, declared to-day," etc. The phrases progress in definiteness thus: "It is rumored that the Government is preparing a decree"; "Unofficial announcement is made"; Semi-official statements appeared to-day"; "Official announcements were issued by the Government to-day." Usually the latter is final, but, if a loophole is vitally necessary, it is possible to follow the official decree with this: "The minister of war has advised the authorities that the official decree published yesterday is subject, of course, to all the modifications consistent with the decree of the year before last, defining the status of the governmental bugbear," etc. It must be remembered that these are mere primary phrases in the diplomatic Ollendorff. When one government is in position to secure the dissemination of these feints by origination in the news center of another country, the finesse increases in complication. While the antagonist is occupied in deliberating upon the intention or significance of the feint, much may be done.

On the day that Sampson's fleet sailed from Havana, "it was reported" from London that Great Britain was preparing a neutrality proclamation for immediate issuance, and that the cruiser *Albany*, which we had purchased and were outfitting at Newcastle to bring home, and the torpedo boat *Somers*, at Falmouth, would not be able to leave those ports within the regulation time, and therefore must remain until after the war. It would also force Dewey's squadron from Hong-Kong.

Spain had war vessels in French docks and ports; in Italian ports; her finest squadron in the Portuguese harbor of St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Islands; in Argentina. If England chose to rush into neutrality before official declaration of war, there was no reason why France and Portugal need hurry to disoblige a neighboring government.

The United States, thus reminded, hurried the last details of preparation. Cargoes of ammunition, of sulphur, of various war supplies, were cleared from all ports where they originated. From Washington went a semi-official statement, that if England took such hasty action this government would demand of Portugal immediate action

to compel Cervera's fleet to leave St. Vincent. Cervera's fleet was in distress for coal and supplies.

Four days later Washington furnished a paragraph that "the War and Navy Department officials are looking forward with interest," to the official publication of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality; that Dewey's fleet at Hong Kong and a Spanish torpedo boat at Queens-town had been ordered to leave those British ports in advance of official publication, that, however, the United States would probably not make demands on Portugal until Great Britain's action was formally announced. From London "a Berlin correspondent learned" that Great Britain and Germany would not interfere, but that France and Austria, and probably Italy, would do so after the first collision, "even if it prove quite indecisive."

The next day in the British Commons Mr. Balfour announced that the proclamation of neutrality would soon be ready, and the press dispatches gave information that "the report that American war ships had been notified to depart within forty-eight hours is incorrect." That day Congress declared that a state of war existed, and the next day the President cabled his proclamation of that declaration to all the nations. England at once issued neutrality commands, put Dewey's fleet upon notice to sail, and the *Albany* and *Somers*, unprepared, were locked up pending the end of the war.

The President's proclamation granted to all Spanish merchant ships in our harbors, when the war began, a period of thirty days for safe clearance. The act perplexed Spain. "What," asked the official press "is the meaning of this moderation after so many provocations? Does America want to gain time?" Spanish military and financial circles were anxious. They translated our fairness as foreboding an intention to prolong preparations until autumn, and thus wear Spain out in expense and anxiety. They could not believe we were eager to fight the "invincible forces of Spain." This question was answered the same day by the bombardment of Matanzas and the death on the field of glory of Captain-General Blanco's historic mule of Matanzas. All eyes were thus fixed upon Cuba.

The publication by Washington that Dewey's fleet had withdrawn to Mirs Bay and would sail thence to Manila, was answered by dispatches from Madrid that the American squadron that was going to Manila was composed of vessels of no importance and that Manila was enthusiastically eager to receive them, and all preparations were complete to destroy them. Two days later Madrid announced "it is rumored here" that Germany had officially warned the United States that she would not permit bombardment of any of the principal towns in the Philippines for the reason that German interests would suffer greatly from such an act.

Throughout the first ten days the British Government had made no sign, but popular feeling in England and Canada had expressed itself in open and universal enthusiasm for the United States. Messages of sympathy and hope had been cabled to the President from societies and public meetings, and the newspapers were filled with cheer. To a London correspondent, admitted to an interview, the President had said, for publication in London, in answer to the question whether he had any message for the English people: "Tell them that the people of our whole nation respond to their expressions. And," he added, "tell them we will not forget."

To this Madrid replied through Paris in an interview with the Conservative leader, Silvela, in which he declared Spain's intention to convene the Powers of Europe for intervention as necessary to continental interests. "England," he said, "has sided with the United States, but it will not be long until she perceives the immensity of her mistake."

The very next day the explosion of Dewey's shells annihilating the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, glorious as the sound was to this nation, frightful as it was to Spanish hopes, was yet merely the hissing of a fuse that was to explode the greatest international political bomb-shell of the century.



REAR-ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY, U. S. N.

CHAPTER THE NINETEENTH.

THE PHILIPPINES QUESTION.

DEWEY'S VICTORY AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE EASTERN QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS—
LORD SALISBURY'S SPEECH ON LIVING AND DEAD NATIONS—EXPLANATION OF THE EAST-
ERN QUESTION DEVELOPED SINCE THE CHINESE-JAPANESE WAR—MR. CHAMBER-
LAIN'S STARTLING SPEECH SUGGESTING AN ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE
ON THE LINES OF COMMON PURPOSES—THE SENSATION CAUSED
IN THE WORLD BY HIS UNEXPECTED FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, AGAINST ALL CABINET PRECEDENTS.

I.

WITHIN forty-eight hours after Dewey had hoisted the Star Spangled Banner over the arsenal at Cavité international governmental diplomacy was astounded at the interjection of the Philippines question into the complications and threatening aspects of the Eastern Question. The first news of our victory called into existence in the United States a new spirit that from various quarters demanded the capture of the entire Philippine Archipelago and the holding of the islands as American colonies. This was echoed by similar suggestions from England and was opposed by strong elements in this country as well as by intimations from continental capitals that such action was impossible in view of the political policy of the United States, even if the attempt should not be prevented by Europe. Before the final reports of the utter destruction of Montojo's squadron were received, the situation at Manila could only be guessed at, but the question was debated fiercely.

WHAT THE CAP-
TURE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
MEANT

The first news made public by Spain that the American ships had been repulsed, followed by reluctant admissions of partial Spanish defeat and intimations of injuries to the Americans, left upon European minds a doubt whether Dewey's victory had been as sweeping as claimed at Washington. The cutting of the cable deepened the

perplexity until official dispatches could arrive. The United States nourished no doubts of the superiority of our men and ships, and England expressed no hesitation to believe the full extent of our success. But England expressed fears that Dewey could not hold his advantage for lack of supplies and assistance, to obtain which would involve delay, during which continental jealousy of America would be accentuated. France threatened us immediately with vague hints of interference, and all Europe was cheered by the fact that our Pacific squadron lacked a secure base of operations.

After the battle at Cavité the British consul at Manila offered to take the Chinese population under British protection. Spain refused the offer with an outburst of resentment toward Great Britain, accusing her of attempting to inject Chinese politics into the situation. From Russia came reproachful intimations that an Anglo-American alliance would be distasteful, reminding us of old friendship, and the fact that she had long looked forward to an eventual Russo-American alliance. Germany maintained silence during the opening discussion.

It was on May 5 that, Lord Salisbury having returned, petulant exchanges of feeling became serious apprehensions. On that day he delivered an address to the Primrose League in London, in which he referred to the all-engrossing subject in the manner of the old-fashioned English statesman, avoiding direct mention but giving to his allusions mysterious suggestion of weight.

He began his address gravely by declaring that he could not pass by the terrible conflict now being waged between two highly civilized nations. He could only hope that the recollection of the blessings of peace would before long restore the tranquillity of the world. "I cannot dwell upon the subject," he said, "without danger of departing from that attitude of strict neutrality which it is my duty, as well as that of many others, to maintain." After discussing pointedly the dangerous relations between Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and France, as developed in the Eastern Question, he closed with a foreboding criticism that was to enrage Europe. The nations of the

earth, he declared, might be roughly divided as the living and the dying. On one side were the great countries of enormous power, with railroads giving them the means of concentrating at one point the whole military force of their population, and assembling armies of a magnitude never dreamed of in generations gone by, with weapons growing in their efficiency for destruction.

By the side of these splendid organizations, which presented rival claims that the future might only be able by bloody arbitrament to adjust, there were a number of communities which he could only describe as dying. They were mainly the communities that were not Christian, but he regretted to say that this was not exclusively a fact. In these States disorganization and decay were advancing almost as fast as the power of the others was increasing. There were other countries which were not well provided with leading men or ministers in whom they could trust, that were apparently drawing nearer and nearer to that fate, and yet clinging with strange tenacity to the life they had.

Misgovernment, he said, was constantly on the increase there, and their administration was a mass of corruption, so that there was no firm ground on which any hope of reform or restoration could be based, and in other degrees they were presenting a terrible picture to the more enlightened portion of the world. How long that state of things was likely to go on, he would not attempt to prophesy. All he could indicate was that the process was proceeding and that the weak States were becoming weaker and the strong States becoming stronger.

He did not think it was necessary to go into any detail, but only to point out what the inevitable result of that process must be. It was that the living nations would gradually encroach upon the territory of the dying States and the seeds of conflict would speedily appear. Undoubtedly, England would not be allowed to be at a disadvantage in any rearrangement that might take place. On the other hand, England would not be jealous if desolation and sterility were removed by the aggrandizement of a rival Power.

The studied care with which Lord Salisbury refrained from designating the governments decaying in public corruption, was the old-school manner of lending profound significance to the countries obviously in point. China, threatened with dismemberment; France in the throes of fear through the intimations of unspeakable corruption in her legislative and military oligarchy, exposed by glimpses of the Dreyfus case; Spain, honeycombed with dishonest administrators and helpless to govern at home or abroad—these were some of the interesting names with which to fill the blanks.

As if to add emphasis to Salisbury's warning, the Chinese Minister to the Court of St. James on the evening of the same day spoke at a public dinner with cordial welcome to Great Britain. He said the only way China could survive in competition with the world was by combining with Great Britain, to whom she offered a free field for her commerce. China, hitherto, had been the most exclusive country in the world, acting on the principle of excluding outsiders. This was now the principle of only her common people. The educated classes were prepared to welcome British trade and desired that the friendship of the two countries be consolidated on the widest basis, socially, politically, commercially, and economically. He referred to the opening of the Chinese waterways and the impending construction of railroads, and said he hoped that every obstacle to the expansion of British trade in China would soon be removed.

Four days after the glorious first day of May, therefore, Great Britain's first minister and the Chinese voice had thrust upon Europe the Philippines question wrapped in the Eastern Question.

Further significance was given by the preparations already hurrying in the United States to send Major-General Merritt with troops to the aid of Admiral Dewey.

II.

THE Eastern Question, that is, the aspect of it that interposed itself between the United States and any practical interference by Europe with our seizure of the Philippines, may be briefly summarized. It was the outgrowth of the Chinese-Japanese War. The Chinese Empire had been opened to the commerce of the world many years ago by the persistence of British commercial interests. What are called "open ports" were established by England through which all commercial exchanges must pass. No foreigner was permitted to enter the Empire through any closed port. The Anglo-Chinese treaty pledged England against attempting to acquire any territorial rights beyond the coaling station and commercial base of Hong-Kong, and it pledged China not to alienate to any other Power any portion of the rich and productive basin of the Yang-tse-Kiang River, which contains half of the 400,000,000 inhabitants of the Empire.

THE EASTERN
QUESTION IN
A NUTSHELL.

The terms of the treaty were kept in good faith and other nations made treaties with China by which they were permitted to extend their commerce through the open ports on equal terms with "the most favored nation." Great Britain's maritime preponderance and the close relations established with the Chinese administrators gave her great advantages of good will, and when the war with Japan began the value of her trade with China was about \$200,000,000 annually, with the United States next in importance.

Russia, which had been steadily increasing her Asiatic territory, seeking an open harbor on the Pacific below the winter ice line, had gradually penetrated down the coast until Korea was reached. More advance was contemplated, but the strength of Great Britain was feared.

That Great Britain did not exert her good offices to avert the war between China and Japan was surprising to European governments. She was friendly with both, might have composed the grievances, or, as a last resort, was strong enough to have compelled arbitration.

Her failure to act awoke European suspicion of her wisdom and determination. When, therefore, in 1893, the treaty of peace between China and Japan had been concluded at Shimoniseki, to the dissatisfaction of the defeated nation, by yielding Korea to Japan, and England looked on without making a sign, Russia invited Germany and France to intervene with her. The result was that the Shimoniseki treaty was revised by them, Japan was permitted to hold Korea as a guarantee only until China should pay over the money indemnity for the cost of war as agreed. Great Britain made no protest and Japan was compelled to renounce the advantages gained by war and to give up all hope of enlarging her industries and relieving her population by having a foothold on the mainland.

The weakness displayed by Great Britain in that incident set in play the resources of impenetrable Muscovite diplomacy. She did not make the first move—she never does—but there is always produced a capable instrument to precede and open the way. Two or three years had elapsed when two German missionaries were murdered by a Chinese mob. The German Emperor sent some war ships to Kiao-Chou Bay on the west coast of the Yellow Sea, between Korea and Shantung Province, and seized the port and bay as an indemnity. He followed that by demanding a cession of the bay and a small territorial district on the terms upon which Great Britain held Hong-Kong.

This was German initiation, but the Muscovite justification was established. The Czar promptly seized Port Arthur and Talienwan, commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, within reach of Peking itself. France followed, taking the island of Hainan off the south coast, protecting the French colonies of Tongking on the mainland.

These successive blows to the prestige of Great Britain were sufficient to destroy Chinese confidence in her strength. Russia at once took energetic measures to complete a Manchurian branch of the Trans-Siberian railway to Port Arthur, and began to acquire actual ownership of land by purchasing the ground in Port Arthur. Alarmed

by these proceedings Great Britain obtained from the Chinese Emperor the port of Wei-Hai-Wei, commanding the approach through Korea Bay to Port Arthur.

The situation was full of serious menace to English industries and British commerce. The Northern Chinese provinces, now within the influence and under the fear of Russia, could be crossed with railways, while the German sphere of influence south of Wei-Hai-Wei could be opened through similar concessions. The promise of China that the valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang and the treasures of the Middle Kingdom should never be alienated to any other Power was of no importance, if the territory could be drained of and supplied with vast commerce through flanking encroachments.

When the Spanish-American war opened, therefore, Great Britain was placed between the alternatives of making war against the Russo-Franco-Germanic Power, or of surrendering her old power and being undermined of her great commercial trade in the East. She could not fully rely upon Japan as an ally, although the two nations were well able to defeat the three in opposition on the sea. English manufacturers and shipowners were in despair at the prospect, and British politics were taking on threatening aspects.

This was why Dewey's victory at Manila, and the instant demand on the part of a strong body in the United States to hold the Philippines, were so enthusiastically received by all England. Since this country had at stake the next greatest value in commerce with China, the acquirement by us of vast colonial interests in the Philippines would increase our commerce and effectually check the encroachments of Russia, Germany, and France. Great Britain and the United States could be depended upon to maintain open doors to every port in China.

III.

THE resentful protest excited in continental Europe by the scarcely veiled allusions in Lord Salisbury's speech was as nothing compared with the uproar created by the unexpected and remarkable utterances of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in the English cabinet, on May 13. Mr. Chamberlain's speech was delivered at Birmingham and was received with great outbursts of enthusiasm by the vast assemblage that listened to it.

ANGLO-AMERICAN
ALLIANCE IS
PROPOSED

Mr. Chamberlain's speech was as remarkable for its method in departing from all recognized conventions of restraint by cabinet ministers as it was for the boldness of the views he expressed, views that amazed Europe—not because they were held, but because the etiquette of cabinets was thus rudely destroyed. Lord Salisbury had uttered disagreeable reflections, but he had uttered them in correct form, so that no “gentlemanly” government could find fault with the manner. Mr. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was telling the truth so directly and plainly as to be offensive to all the governments in opposition.

Mr. Chamberlain began by declaring that the time had come for English leaders to leave off the old ideas of fifty years ago and speak plainly to the great public, instead of keeping mysteriously silent. Then, after explaining and commenting upon Great Britain's long-continued policy of isolation, he continued:—

“A new situation has arisen, and it is right that the people of this country should have it under their consideration. All the powerful States of Europe have made alliances, and as long as we keep outside these alliances, as long as we are envied by all, and suspected by all, and as long as we have interests which at one time or another conflict with the interests of all, we are liable to be confronted at any moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even the most extreme, the most hot-headed politician would be able to contemplate it without a certain sense of uneasiness. That is the situation which I want you to have in view, which you must always have in view, when you are considering the results of the foreign policy of any Government in this country. We stand alone, and we may be confronted with such a combination as that I have indicated to you. What is the first duty of a Government under these circumstances? I say, without hesitation, that it is to draw all parts of the empire closer

together, to infuse into them a spirit of united and of imperial patriotism. We have not neglected that primary duty. We have pursued it steadfastly and with results that are patent to all the world. Never before in the history of the British Empire have the ties which connected us with our great colonies and dependencies been stronger; never before has the sense of common interests in trade and in defense and in war—never before has the sense of these interests been more strongly felt or more cordially expressed.

“What is our next duty? It is to establish and to maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. They are a powerful and a generous nation. They speak our language, they are bred of our race. Their laws, their literature, their standpoint upon every question are the same as ours; their feeling, their interest in the cause of humanity and the peaceful development of the world are identical with ours. I do not know what the future has in store for us. I do not know what arrangements may be possible with us, but this I know and feel—that the closer, the more cordial, the fuller, and the more definite these arrangements are with the consent of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for the world. And I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance. Now, it is one of the most satisfactory results of Lord Salisbury’s policy that at the present time these two great nations understand each other better than they have ever done since more than a century ago. They were separated by the blunder of the British Government.

“It is not in this connection that our foreign policy has failed; it is in regard to the East, and especially to the Far East.”

After discussing the comparative situation of Great Britain in China and the perils that threatened British interests there, Mr. Chamberlain closed with this declaration:—

“No, there was only one alternative to the policy of the Government—the policy of war. Let us consider the alternative. We might have declared war on Russia. We might for a year or two have held Port Arthur against Russia, but we have no military force there to back us and no frontier in China. I am one of those who think that for any country there are worse things than war; there is loss of honor; there is loss of those interests which are so vital to the security of the existence of the nation. But, in any case, I hope I am sensible enough never to give my voice for war unless I can see at the commencement of the war a fair probability that at the end of the war the objects of the war will have been obtained. Now, what does history show us? It shows us that unless we are allied to some great military power, as we were in the Crimean War, when we had France and Turkey as our allies, we cannot seriously injure Russia, although it may also be true that she cannot seriously injure us. If that is the case, it is a case which deserves the serious consideration of the people of this country. It is impossible

to overrate the gravity of the issue. It is not a question of a single port in China — that is a very small matter. It is not a question of a single province; it is a question of the whole fate of the Chinese Empire, and our interests in China are so great, our proportion of the trade is so enormous, and the potentialities of that trade are so gigantic that I feel that no more vital question has ever been presented for the decision of a Government and the decision of a nation, and for my part I have tried to-night to state clearly and without exaggeration the conditions of the problem that we have before us. I think you will see that it is complicated enough to preclude all hasty judgment. One thing appears to me to be certain. If the policy of isolation, which has hitherto been the policy of this country, is to be maintained in the future, then the fate of the Chinese Empire may be, probably will be, hereafter decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our interests. If, on the other hand, we are determined to enforce the policy of the open door, to preserve an equal opportunity for trade with all our rivals, then we must not allow Jingoes to drive us into a quarrel with all the world at the same time, and we must not reject the idea of an alliance with those Powers whose interests most nearly approximate to our own. I have thought it right to warn you of the dangers ahead. But I have a great confidence in the future of this country, and I do not doubt that an issue will be found out of all the difficulties which will be worthy of our tradition and our race."

The day before this startling declaration was made by Mr. Chamberlain, the official papers in Germany had printed an official communication from the Emperor's Government, called out by rumors in the French, English, and Austrian press that German sailors and naval officers were openly fraternizing with the Spanish and that Germany would oppose American seizure of the Philippines. The communication declared that, after the Emperor's declaration in the speech from the throne, upon closing the session of the Reichstag, nobody could doubt that Germany's neutrality would be loyal, complete, and strict. Let this be said also of the French, English, and Austrian newspapers, it continued, which were endeavoring to represent the German Government and public opinion as taking a part against policy. Unless there should be imperative reasons for force, Germany would do nothing to disturb the friendship existing for a hundred years with a country where millions of Germans have found a second fatherland.

Mr. Chamberlain's advocacy of Anglo-American alliance in terms of eloquence amounting to sentimental enthusiasm, had come as if in

quick response to the German Emperor's calm diplomatic reserve. Spain resented it bitterly, and Señor Sagasta observed that if he had given utterance to sentiments so full of feeling Europe would have regarded him as a reckless statesman. The Spanish press said, "it was believed" Spain would appeal to Europe to oppose an Anglo-American alliance, and that the day such a document was signed would be the date of the conflagration of universal war.

The organ of the Social Democracy in Germany published this comment, which was significant of popular German opinion, because no prosecution followed it:—

"Into the putrid swamp of European politics has been cast a stone, and the turbid, slimy waters spout up. The great Republic on yonder side of the ocean, without castles, nobles, or a standing army, has suddenly sprung out of her position of neutrality to Europe, and one European State which has slaughtered myriads of men wrestling for freedom is undone. Old Europe, in consequence, is shaken to her foundations. It is a new power—no militarism, no huge fleet, yet a mighty, an overwhelmingly mighty, elemental power.


"In Asia the same phenomenon has appeared. The new power has become the balance of the scales. Even if an alliance with England comes to nothing, the new American position in the Far East crosses every combination hitherto effected."

The German Government made no sign, but expressed surprise that a cabinet minister should speak with such unreserve. The French journals considered it as foreboding designs against the French fleet and then against Russia, seeking thus to alarm her Muscovite ally into action.

The semi-official press of Moscow assumed for Russia a strong pro-Spanish attitude. It denounced the Americans as pirates, whom only Great Britain's attitude saved from having to face the coalition of Europe. It was jubilant over a report that two Spanish vessels had beaten five American war ships. It heartily hoped that Spain would be the victor in the war.

Other papers were much more guarded in their expressions, though they generally displayed a pro-Spanish tendency.

Even the English press was astonished at the unexpected candor of Mr. Chamberlain's revelations, and hastened to explain that his



declarations would be construed by other governments so as to find in them what they desired to find. Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords said the importance of Mr. Chamberlain's remarks depended upon their interpretation, and in the Commons Mr. Balfour said the Government would not discuss them.

In the United States the speech was received with popular enthusiasm. The possibility of such a governmental alliance was scarcely considered, but the evident intention of Mr. Chamberlain's speech, to call out an expression of race feeling, was successful. In numerous public meetings in the United States and Canada, the American and British colors were displayed, entwined together, evoking tremendous enthusiasm. The Queen's birthday was celebrated by American and British orators, speaking at the same boards, each extolling the common race virtues as displayed by the other's Government and national history.



CHAPTER THE TWENTIETH.

"IMPERIALISM"—"EXPANSION"—ANNEXATION.

THE UNEASINESS IN THE UNITED STATES CAUSED BY THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS "IMPERIALISM" AND "EXPANSION"—THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION AND A COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN DREAD OF OUR APPEARANCE IN ASIATIC WATERS—THE IMMEDIATE EXTENT OF NEW MEASURES PROPOSED—THE NICARAGUA CANAL, HAWAII, NAVAL AND ARMY ENLARGEMENT—THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII, AND THE HISTORY OF THE MEASURE IN CONGRESS—THE CAPTURE OF GUAM IN THE LADRONE ISLANDS—A COMEDY OF WAR.

I.

THE Philippines question, as discussed in the United States from the moment the extent of Dewey's victory was comprehended, was called "Imperialism," or "The Policy of Expansion." But the uneasiness it caused in the United States was not comparable to the consternation into which it plunged all European politics. It was well understood when war began that our Government would not stop at securing the independence of Cuba. It was the full purpose to seize Porto Rico and all the islands of Spain in the West Indies. This was a necessity. The presence of Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies was not a cause of political fear, but the destructive wars, the cruelties practiced, and the apparent incompetence of Spanish administrators, rendered her presence, in Cuba at least, unendurable for humanitarian and economic reasons. Her presence in Porto Rico, if Cuba were taken from her, would not be so annoying and not at all to be feared in itself. But if, after the war, she should sell Porto Rico to England or to some other powerful nation, our southern seaboard would be menaced, and we should have a very vulnerable front in maintaining our South American and Central American interests. The sound alternative was to expel Spain altogether from the continent, and seize her possessions for security and as our indemnity for the cost of war.

IMPERIALISM
AND
EXPANSION

This situation as it applied to our interests was reversed in the Philippines. If we should hold them permanently, it meant to three of the greatest European Powers the intrusion of a new and dangerous rival in a position of great strategical importance, at the very doors of their Eastern interests. It meant to them politically what it would mean to the United States if Germany or Russia acquired Porto Rico, and could inject the jealousies and perils of European affairs into our home waters. But it also meant to them, in an economic sense, far more than the alternative would mean to the United States.

The long-inherited feuds of European monarchies at home, and their acquired feuds in colonial experiments, have necessitated standing armies and naval establishments upon such a great scale that taxation has become among them not only oppressive in amount but irritating in the trivial and numberless methods of its application. If the United States intended to permanently occupy the Philippines and annex them as national territory, the defensive power of England, Russia, Germany, France, and Japan, would of necessity have to be largely augmented by each of the nations, not upon terms of cordial alliance with us. If all were on equal terms, then the power of all would have to be increased.

To the United States, comparing her population, vast wealth, and unlimited natural resources (already in process of rapid development under her free industrial system) with those of the other countries, the increased burden would be inconsiderable. It would crush the others, except Great Britain. The national debt of the United States is very small when compared with the nations she might meet in Eastern rivalry. However small the debt or however light the tax rate, no increase of either is ever desirable by those who have dealings with the tax collector. But at the point where Americans would merely grumble and pay, the continental taxpayers would be driven to revolution or ruin. This was the secret of European consternation and the secret of Great Britain's prompt offices in our behalf. Next to the United States she possesses the greatest reserve power of wealth; but her taxation is great. In proportion to national wealth, the taxation

and debt of the United States is trivial as compared with European States. The common language and common business purposes of the two English-speaking nations would render their alliance, in the sense of sympathy, a natural and perfect solution of the situation for Great Britain. The only other possible allies she could then count upon in the last extremity were Germany and Japan—neither made to the purpose by nature.

It must be acknowledged, also, in fairness, that when Great Britain offered her friendship to induce the United States to take territory in the East and be a supporter in keeping open to commerce the ports of China, she was well aware that this country would have a hostage to hold. Canada, with its great railway system, giving England communication with Hong-Kong and Australia, of great importance in conceivable times of difficulty, lies beside the United States, full collateral to secure the performance of honest obligations. In that respect alone, if for no other reason, Great Britain was the best of possible allies for the purposes urged upon the United States, as this Government was responsively her best ally.

The preparations of the President to send reënforcements of war ships, and an army corps under General Merritt, to the assistance of Admiral Dewey, were approved with enthusiasm. The popular movement in favor of seizing the Philippines, which immediately followed the fall of Cavité, was the natural impulse of a people full of exultation and pride over the completeness, without precedent in naval wars, of the victory that Dewey had achieved with a skill and intrepidity that conferred splendor upon American arms. It was the spontaneous outburst of simplest patriotism to ask that the flag, so valiantly planted, might float there forever in memory of the heroes who raised it. But popular outbursts are not always the safest gales for ships of state to sail before.

Political leaders and students of national policy grew uneasy. There was no party alignment upon the question. Each spoke for himself, or for the expressed views of his constituency, as he could ascertain and interpret them.

It was admitted that if the United States annexed the Philippines for colonial territory the act would involve very serious responsibilities and a radical departure from the traditions and customs of national policy. But it was contended that traditions and customs of national policy were good only when they promoted good ends; that when they interposed between the country and the manifest high destiny of its influence to confer freedom and civilization upon the oppressed, they ought to be given up for better policies and ideas.

The warning contained in Washington's "Farewell Address" against entangling foreign alliances, was met with the completion of the sentence advising that such alliances should be contracted only as needed to serve our purposes.

The difficulties of governing and properly controlling "conquered peoples," elicited the rejoinder that there had been very little trouble in governing Louisiana and Texas, both conquered from aliens. But, was the interruption, the Filipinos were mostly in primal savagery, to which retort was made that they could not be expected to emerge from that condition under the sinister rule of Spain, and the United States had a similarly savage population when the country was first settled, and results had justified the methods of civilization.

It was urged as prudent national economy to reserve merely coaling stations in the islands and return the sovereignty to Spain. To this Imperialists interposed the declaration that as we were encouraging the native revolutionists for our own advantage, justice and humanity would be revolted at the consequences of turning these natives back to face the pitiless vengeance of Spain.

It was suggested that the islands might be turned over to one of the Powers of Europe. Against this it was pointed out that to do so would provoke war among European Powers; that as the United States was, by the fortune of war, in practical possession of the islands, all considerations of national duty to republican governmental ideas forbade her to throw the responsibility upon others; she must inculcate the principles of liberty and education in the Philippines.

The opponents of "Imperialism" argued that the possession of the Philippines would require a vast addition to our naval strength to defend the islands; the maintenance of a large standing army to preserve order during the years necessary to convert the population to American ideas of law and order; that the United States would become embroiled in the quarrels of other nations; that there was enough territory at home to fully occupy the government and the energies of the population.

The advocates of "expansion" answered that the enlarged revenues from the islands (although taxation would be greatly reduced from the Spanish exactions) would pay for the increase in cost of the army and navy; that the encouragement of industrial activity under decreased taxation would soon make the islands valuable; that the United States ought to take her place as an international power without fear of embroilment; that she had successfully defended herself from colonial infancy to magnificent national maturity; that she had become responsible for the islands through an accident, not through intention, and the American people were entirely capable of developing and governing them without lessening the progress of the United States; that the islands were necessary to protect our commerce in the East, threatened by Russia, Germany, and France; that the decline of England's trade with China in the past two years ominously foretold the fate of American trade if it were not defended with determination, backed by a display of power ready for use; that the first cost of colonial establishment was not to be considered as a loss, for the reason that the loss of trade certain to follow a failure to occupy the Philippines would be enormously greater than the cost of occupation, and, moreover, would be a permanent loss.

Anti-expansionists quoted the Monroe Doctrine and its long and determined enforcement by the United States as being in itself an implied pledge that our country would not seek to plant a republican form of government on other continents. Imperialists answered that the expressed pledge was not to interfere with the "internal affairs" of foreign countries, and pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine was

only the declaration of our purposes and had never been approved by Europe, and could be upheld by the United States by force only, as was intimated in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, and that Great Britain agreed to arbitration without assenting to the doctrine.

II.

WHILE the arguments thus briefly outlined were the simple principles of the differences of political opinion, the unknown lengths to which a policy of expansion by colonial acquisition would commit the United States were, after all, the real cause of uneasiness. The immediate horizon of the necessities of such a policy was plainly visible. If the Philippines were to be held, the annexation of Hawaii was logically necessary for strategic and economic reasons. Manila was 7,500 miles from San Francisco. Honolulu was 2,000 miles out on the path to Manila. Our ships would need the Hawaiian Islands for all purposes. It would be equally necessary to have stopping places between Honolulu and Manila, a distance of 5,500 miles. More than this, fortified coaling stations on the Asiatic mainland would be a requirement.

From another point of view arose the necessity of completing the Nicaraguan Canal or of securing coaling stations along the route from the Atlantic seaboard by way of the Suez Canal to the Philippines. The ownership of the Spanish West Indies, if independent Cuba should ultimately be annexed on her own request, would give perfect security to the canal and increase the volume of traffic.

Commodore A. S. Crowninshield, U. S. N., chief of the Bureau of Navigation, an officer of experience, keen observation, and capacity, outlined the possibilities and advantages of the Nicaraguan project in a congressional publication,* early in May.

"We Americans," he said, "pride ourselves upon the rapid development of our country, upon its great trade and commerce, which have

* Senate Document No. 263, issued May 16, 1898.

arisen from its wonderful resources through the activity and business qualities of our people. But there is a country whose development has been much more rapid than ours, a country which remained for untold centuries isolated from the rest of the world, but which, within the past few years—mainly through our aid and example, it is true—has burst the web of ignorance and inactivity which bound it, and emerges to-day before the eyes of the world as a civilized nation, making quick progress in all that proves a people strong. Suddenly, therefore, we are brought to face the fact that a new power has arisen in the Pacific, that Japan is already claiming imaginary rights within the Hawaiian Islands—lands civilized and peopled by those of our own blood, whose intelligent citizens speak our mother tongue—and we realize on the instant that here is a power with which we must reckon in the settlement of serious questions.

“Hawaii is 3,400 miles from Japan, but there are now 20,000 of the Mikado’s subjects settled in Hawaii, and the interest of Japan in the status of these people is so great that it has caused her to protest vigorously against the suggestion of the annexation of these islands to the United States. In thus recognizing the necessity of possessing a powerful fleet of war vessels as a factor in defense or aggression, her statesmen, themselves apt students of history, have read to us a lesson which we might well commit to memory and to practice.

“Beyond Japan, a few hundred miles to the west, lies the Chinese Empire, with its four hundred millions of people. While Japan has advanced, China has remained dormant. But will this continue? Given new rulers, a new form of government, and the adoption of Western ideas, China will throw off its yoke of conservatism, and then our Pacific States will be confronted with a second Asiatic power many times greater than Japan. With these possibilities to be considered, it behooves this country to make itself strong where it is now weak. In other words, it should be our first effort to develop our Pacific coast States. Let us glance for a moment at the effect of an isthmian canal upon this development.

"As a political factor in increasing the influence and power of this country in the Pacific, the canal will be far-reaching. To-day, if the United States were forced into a war with Japan over possession of the Hawaiian Islands, which to her are stepping-stones to our continent, we should be placed at a great disadvantage; for it is a fact that at this moment Japan's naval force is greater than our own Pacific and Asiatic squadrons combined. To reënforce our Pacific fleet we should be obliged to send ships from our Atlantic squadron, forcing them to make a voyage of 12,000 miles, thus consuming many weeks, whereas, with the canal in existence, our powerful North Atlantic squadron could be put into the Pacific within a week. Thus would the canal enable us to more than double our naval strength in the Pacific.

"From every point of view, whether political or commercial, it is plain that the Nicaragua Canal is a necessity to the United States. It will build up our Pacific coast States as they must be built up if we are to properly face the Orient. It will add immeasurably to our naval power, and it will increase our influence not only far out into the Pacific Ocean, over the islands and waters of that vast region, but also over the Caribbean Sea and adjacent waters.

"It is undoubtedly a fact not only that the American people believe that any canal that shall connect the Atlantic and Pacific shall be controlled by the United States, but that our government has given, upon more than one occasion, expression to this sentiment.

"We should be wise in our generation, and, by legislation and such other steps as may be necessary, inaugurate, without further delay, the work of completing the Nicaragua Canal. Let us pierce the isthmus at the one spot which nature has already pointed out, and thus fulfill what has been for centuries the hope of commerce and the dream of navigators."

The Nicaragua Canal had not been merely the dream of navigators. It had been one of the dreams of international avarice and the subject of governmental activity and fear. In the failure of the United States to encourage it, France had undertaken the Panama Canal project. For

years the Nicaraguan project had been a cause of bitter dispute in Congress. It was antagonized by corporations of great wealth whose interests were involved by the competitive strength of a short water way of carriage. Its cost was estimated at from \$115,000,000 by its advocates, to \$200,000,000, by its opponents.

The annexation of Hawaii had also been resisted by industrial interests and the traditional influences of governmental policy strong in parties. The writings of Captain Mahan, U. S. N. (retired), on the influence of sea power upon the history of nations, had made a profound impression upon Europe, but were estimated at their key value by the men of our navy only. They had pointed out the modern changes and necessities of naval armament and support. Great Britain, especially, had applied his theories and occupied many small Pacific islands for future emergencies of her sea power.

The discussion of these projects in the United States during times of peace had been accompanied by much rancor and exaggeration and had the effect of giving to them an ominous importance in respect to cost and the evils to be feared. The influence of this effect still remained, but to popular sentiment the changed position of the country dwarfed reasons that had once been gigantic in argument. There was no question that the great preponderance of popular sentiment, excited by splendid achievements and buoyed up by pride, was favorable to expansion as it appeared at the time.

III.

IMMEDIATELY after the announcement that ships and troops were to be hurried to Manila to enable Dewey to occupy the city, the sentiment in favor of expansion was cheered by two significant intimations from the President. One was that the first expedition to Dewey's relief at Manila would pause on the way and seize the chief island of the Ladrones group, belonging to Spain. The other was, that Congress, upon the expressed

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desire of the President, would take determined action to annex the Hawaiian Islands.

Since the native monarchy had been overturned by the revolution which resulted in the establishment of a republic under President Dole, the annexation of Hawaii had caused bitter contention in Congress. President Harrison sent to the Senate just before he retired from office a treaty of annexation, and one of the first acts of President Cleveland was to withdraw the proposed treaty and advise the reinstatement of the monarchy, on the ground that the revolution was aided and abetted by forces from the United States war ship in the harbor at the time and that without that aid the revolution would not have been successful. He contended that reparation should be made to the native government. His efforts failed, and upon his retirement President McKinley sent to the Senate the treaty of annexation for confirmation. A two-thirds' vote of the Senate was required to approve the treaty. There was no possibility of obtaining the necessary majority and the treaty remained in committee without action.

The lower house was known to be largely in favor of annexation, but the minority was very strong in influential leadership and the measure threatened to produce party dissensions and disturb alignment. The House could not, of course, take action on the treaty, but it could promote and effect annexation by a joint resolution accepting the application of the Republic of Hawaii to become territory of the United States. The resolution required a majority vote only in the House and Senate and would thus evade the necessity for a two-thirds Senate vote to approve the treaty.

Preparations for dispatching the first reinforcements to Manila revealed the inconvenience of possessing no coaling station in the Pacific and the sore need of colliers to accompany and supply our men-of-war and the troop ships in convoy. This was the opportunity of the annexationists and on May 17 the government of Hawaii decided to render assistance unconditionally to the United States against Spain and offered the use of her harbors as a base of supplies. The

acceptance of the offer would commit the little mid-Pacific republic to a breach of neutrality and bind the United States to defend her against all consequences arising.

The offer was accepted by the President as an executive act rendered necessary by war. On May 17 a joint resolution introduced in the House by Mr. Newlands, of Nevada, was reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Among the reasons advanced by the committee for its adoption were these:—

“We must face the future in dealing with this proposed annexation. It is impossible for the republic of Hawaii to maintain a permanent existence, preserving in force the influences which are now in the ascendant there and which are cordial and friendly to the United States. Of its mixed population of 109,000 a powerful element is Japanese—24,407,—of whom 19,212 are males, almost all of them grown men, for they are not divided, as ordinary populations are, in the usual proportions of men, women, and children.

“They are a far stronger element of physical force than the native race, which has diminished until there are now only thirty odd thousand, of whom, by the usual proportions of population, there are not over 8,000 grown men. The native Hawaiian race cannot in any contingency control the island. It must fall to some foreign people.

“The Japanese are intensely Japanese, retaining their allegiance to their empire and responding to suggestions from the Japanese officers. Very many of them served in the recent war with China. The Japanese Government not long ago demanded of the Hawaiian Government, under their construction of a treaty made in 1871, that the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands should have equal privileges with all other persons, which would include voting and holding office. This claim was made when a flood of Japanese subjects, under the supervision of the government of that country, of from 1,000 to 2,000 per month, were being poured into the Hawaiian Islands, threatening a speedy change of the government into Japanese hands, and ultimately to a Japanese possession. The demand was resisted by the little Republic, and a treaty of annexation with the United States arrived at for a time.”

After reciting the history of Japan's protest against the treaty, the advantages of its reciprocal clauses to our commerce, and the fact that the rights of the United States to the privileges of Pearl Harbor would cease with the termination of the treaty, the committee's report continued:—

“With the Japanese element in the ascendant and the government under Japanese control, the treaty would be promptly terminated, and with it our special

rights. This would be the first step taken by that active and powerful government toward the complete incorporation of the islands into the Japanese Empire and their possession as a strategic point in the northern Pacific, from which her strong and increasing fleet would operate. The Japanese Government is now friendly, but that would be the manifest dictate of enlightened self-interest to a wise Japanese statesman.

"Annexation, and that alone, will securely maintain American control in Hawaii. Resolutions of Congress declaring our policy, or even a protectorate, will not secure it. The question of protectorate has been successively considered by Presidents Pierce, Harrison, and McKinley, in 1854, 1893, and 1897, and each time rejected because a protectorate imposes responsibility without control. Annexation imposes responsibility, but will give full power of ownership and absolute control.

"In the struggling interests that have recently come into play in the Pacific. the separate existence of the Hawaiian Government is liable at any time to raise complications with foreign governments, as in the case mentioned above of the recent interposition of Japan. An independent feeble government is a constant temptation to powerful nations, in the stress of contending interests, to intermeddle and disturb the peace. Once incorporated into the territory of the United States, all this is done away with.

* * * * *

"It has been objected that the constitution does not confer upon Congress the power to admit territory, but only States. The same objection was raised to the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, because there was nothing in the constitution expressly authorizing such admission and treaty, and Jefferson himself, who made the purchase, shared the doubt. But we have made eleven such acquisitions of territory, and the courts have sustained such action in all cases. Texas was annexed by joint resolution of Congress, similar to the one proposed now. The island of Navassa, in the Caribbean Sea, and many others, have been made territory of the United States under the act of August 18, 1856, authorizing American citizens to take possession of unoccupied guano islands. They are United States territory, subject to our laws. So Midway Island in the Pacific, 1,000 miles beyond Hawaii, was occupied, and Congress appropriated \$50,000, which was expended trying to create a naval station there. The manifest principle is that the power to acquire territory is an incident of national sovereignty.

"The acquisition of these islands does not contravene our national policy or traditions. It carries out the Monroe Doctrine, which excludes European powers from interfering on the American continent and outlying islands, but does not limit the United States, and this doctrine has long been applied to these very islands by our government. As Secretary Blaine said in 1881, the situation of the Hawaiian Islands, giving them strategic control of the North Pacific, brings their possession within the range of questions of purely American policy.

"The annexation of these islands does not launch us upon a new policy or depart from our time-honored traditions of caring first and foremost for the safety and prosperity of the United States."

The opposition to annexation was deep-seated, and involved so much delay, that in the Senate ten days later Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and Senator Morgan of Alabama, resorted to the extremity of offering amendments to the war revenue bill, thus making resources for war depend upon annexation. Mr. Lodge's amendment was the Newlands joint resolution. This proceeding quickly forced the lower house to an agreement to permit early and free discussion and action upon Hawaii.

Debate did not begin in the House until June 11. Ten days before, the first military expedition to the Philippines had arrived at Honolulu, outward bound. The soldiers were welcomed with lavish kindness. Two Hawaiian native princes boarded the *Charleston* and presented to the ship two American flags on behalf of the ex-Queen Dowager, widow of King Kalakaua. The United States troops paraded through the city and were reviewed by President Dole. A great public dinner was prepared at which the 3,500 soldiers were entertained. Natives and aliens all joined in the demonstration.

During the day the Spanish consul sent a protest to the government against the violation of neutrality. Foreign Minister Cooper replied as follows:—

"In reply to your note of the 1st inst., I have the honor to say that, owing to the intimate relations now existing between this country and the United States, this country has not contemplated a proclamation of neutrality, having reference to the present conflict between the United States and Spain, but, on the contrary, has extended to the United States privileges and assistance, for which reason your protest can derive no further consideration than to acknowledge its receipt."

The Gordian knot of opposition was disposed of by the force of events. The joint resolution quickly passed the House by an overwhelming majority, and, in spite of determined delay in the Senate, was adopted by that body on July 6 by a vote of 42 to 21, exactly the two-thirds needed for treaty confirmation.

The joint resolution as adopted is as follows:—

Joint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

WHEREAS, The government of the republic of Hawaii, having in due form signified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and also to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, government, or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining; therefore,

Resolved, etc., That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be and they are hereby annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and are subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United States of America.

The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition, provided that all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands, all the civil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill vacancies so occasioned.

The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded, between the United States and such foreign nations.

The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution, nor contrary to the constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.

Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands, the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.

The public debt of the republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of the passage of this joint resolution, including the amounts due to depositors of the Hawaiian Postal Savings Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States, but the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed \$4,000,000. So long, however, as the existing government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued as hereinbefore provided, said government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt.

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.

The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem necessary or proper.

SEC. 2.—That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

SEC. 3.—That the sum of \$100,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, and to be immediately available, to be expended at the discretion of the President of the United States of America for the purpose of carrying this joint resolution into effect.

Possession of Hawaii was not taken until August 12, by which time the Hawaiian legislature had ratified the action of the United States. The flag was raised over the executive building with brief ceremonies in the presence of a great concourse. United States Minister Sewall and President Dole had exchanged the ratification documents, and Admiral Miller with a force of marines took formal occupation.

IV.

MEANWHILE, the first Philippines expedition, convoyed by the cruiser *Charleston*, commanded by Captain Glass, had taken possession of Guam, the principal island of the Ladrone group, about 1,200 miles east from the Philippines. The original name of this group of numerous, but mostly uninhabited islands, was "*Islas de las Velas Latinas*," or, Islands of the Lateen Sails, chosen by Magellan, their discoverer; but his sailors preferred to call them

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"Islands of Thieves," and the nickname has survived the memory of the more poetical designation.

The *Charleston*, with three transports under convoy, arrived off Umata Harbor on the morning of June 20. Protecting the entrance to the harbor frowned the ancient stone forts of St. Iago and Santa Cruz. The latter is on an island in the middle of the harbor. The weather was misty and rainy, but it was soon made out that St. Iago was not manned, but that Santa Cruz presented a dark air that seemed to mean business, probably because of the thickness of its walls and the depth of embrasures and ports in which the guns might be masked.

After a reconnoissance that failed to discover the presence of the enemy, Captain Glass fired a 5-inch shell at the fort. It fell short, but a dozen more chipped holes in the walls and scarred the tower. No response was made, and no human being was to be seen.

After waiting some time a rowboat was seen coming around the island. It contained the Spanish naval captain of the Port of San Luis d'Apra, the town at the head of the little harbor; the surgeon of the Spanish garrison, and a merchant who had once lived in the United States, and could speak English.

These Spanish officials and the merchant came aboard the *Charleston* and apologized with great courtesy for being unable to return the salute. They explained that there were no cannon and no powder at San Luis and they were unaccustomed to receiving salutes.

To say the least, the situation was one not fitted to the grim-visaged surroundings of war. When Captain Glass informed them that he had been bombarding their fortress and not saluting the flag—that their country and his were at war, the Spaniards were astounded. The last mail had been received early in April and contained no intimation of war. The mail was received every two months and the June steamer was two weeks overdue. When they heard of Montojo's destruction, their wonder increased. Their ignorance was complete, as was Cervera's, Augusti's, and Toral's concerning Spanish defeats. Only victories are published by Spain.

The officers were set at liberty to communicate with Governor Marina, at Agaña, the capital of the island, four miles from the port, and arrange for surrender. Next day the Governor, his officers, fifty-four Spanish soldiers, and fifty-four native soldiers, were disarmed and the Spaniards taken aboard ship, prisoners, to be carried to Cavité. The natives were released. The downfall of the Spaniards was very popular. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over the fort.

The merchant, Francisco Portusac, was a naturalized American citizen. He said it was useless to leave a garrison; that the Chamorros or natives were honest, mild, and orderly. He had the largest pecuniary interest at stake and he could trust them. Upon learning this, the *Charleston* and her consorts sailed away to Manila. The island of Guam has from 8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, and in the remainder of the group there is a population estimated at 16,000.

Thus, the annexation of Hawaii and the seizure of Guam were links in the chain across the ocean. Guam is 1,200 miles from Manila, 4,300 miles from Honolulu.



CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FIRST.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE.

REMARKABLE REVERSAL OF THE OLD ATTITUDE OF AVERSION BETWEEN AMERICANS AND BRITONS—
CONTINUATION OF THE RESPONSE TO MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S SPEECH—UTTERANCES AT THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN DINNER IN LONDON—PARTY LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES IN
PARLIAMENT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO FRIENDSHIP AND UNION WITH
UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN A MEMORABLE DEBATE—RE-
MARKABLE FOURTH OF JULY CELEBRATION IN LONDON.

I.

NO ASPECT of the war was more surprising than this sudden reversal of the official and popular attitude of British and American relations. For a hundred and twenty-two years feelings of cordial and open aversion had been expressed and maintained between the two peoples. The vigorous dislike of the people of the United States for England had compelled official expression of it by representative leaders. That feeling was actively reciprocated by the English Government and the English people. The growth of American sentiment in favor of the Irish agitation for Home Rule and the ample financial support contributed to the Irish organizations, had intensified that feeling of aversion which cannot be called hatred, but may, perhaps, be described as a condition of jealous pride, that found expression in an attitude of scornful aloofness and in continual "nagging." To "twist the tail of the British lion" was political capital to an American politician.

At the bottom of the feeling, however, was an instinct of profound respect that each held for the national strength, intelligence, and practical, homely wisdom of the other. The United States constitution is founded upon the essential common-law principles of England, with no caste exceptions. Our national democracy is, in its nature, much like the charter of the corporation of the city of London.

Although we have received a very great proportion of immigrants from Germany, Scandinavia, France, and Ireland, these have assimilated the Anglo-Saxon ideas of individual freedom and have not changed in appreciable degree the original political character of the population. It might almost be said that, in proportion as the immigrant has understood, accepted, and exercised the Anglo-Saxon aspiration for liberty under the common laws of order, he has become prominent and successful. This curious influence of American citizenship upon the foreigner may be observed everywhere in localities where natives of the same foreign country are not gathered in sufficient numbers to form a separate quarter, where they are often tempted to continue alien customs and ideas. The Germans and Irish have adapted themselves marvelously to a free democracy. Their ties of sentimental affection for and family relations with the Fatherland are strong and unwavering, but their loyalty to their new home has been demonstrated to be as firm as if they were native Americans.

So it is that the United States and the British peoples are one at bottom, despite the infusion here of other races and the differences that climate has produced. All possess the patriotism that finds expression in an arrogant national pride. But it is the pride of conscious intelligence of strength. The English-speaking people study their rivals carefully, in order to discover and possess themselves of the strength of their rivals, and to ascertain their weakness also. And they study their own strength and weakness, and their pride is, therefore, the confident expression of knowledge. The "dying nations," on the contrary, have the fatal habit of ignoring the rival as one incapable of furnishing valuable suggestion, and their pride is born of ignorance and blind self-confidence.

When the details of Dewey's victory came from Manila, Great Britain recognized the significant difference between American and Spanish men and methods. She had long taunted us with ruinous corruption in politics, pretending to deduce the result that we had become degenerate through wealth and self-pride. Twice had England fought us. Twice had England found us to be good fighting men and

most dangerous marksmen. She saw again exhibited at Manila the same qualities, developed and augmented, exercised with modern implements of war. She required no further test to be convinced that the only change was improvement.

A few days later Mr. Chamberlain spoke. He spoke for an hour and a half in order to make a declaration for the United States in ten lines. This declaration with apparent carelessness was placed near the middle of his address. The remainder was devoted to home politics and European neighbors. Let us see, was the inquiry contained in Mr. Chamberlain's brief reference to the United States, whether these Americans, who can fight so well, are strong enough in common sense and political wisdom to turn their backs on past animosities. Both nations are big enough to look into each other's affairs and its own at the same time.

The popular response to Mr. Chamberlain's declaration was prompt and astonishingly unanimous, in England and her distant colonies, in Canada, and in the United States. Australian sailors applied to be received into our navy, public meetings in Canada indorsed alliance, and within ten days the popular attitude of brotherly aversion had been reversed.

In London on June 3 a public "Anglo-American" dinner was given, attended by six hundred persons, prominent in public attention, but not connected with the government. A large majority were Englishmen, the remainder American residents and visitors. It was arranged for the definite purpose of "promoting closer relationship between the two countries."

Lord Coleridge presided and in proposing the first toast, "Our Kinsmen beyond the Sea," he said that he had seen the motives of America in the Spanish War question. There were always people who disbelieve in the possibility of national probity and honor; but he was foolish and ignorant enough not to share in this disbelief, but even if he did, none the less he would desire victory to wait upon the American banner. He would wish it in the interest of America and of Spain, and, higher than all, in the interest of common humanity. He did not

applaud without reserve all the contests in which America had engaged. Twice only had she fought with all her soul and strength; first with England, and she fought for freedom. That contest was forced upon her by the folly of a king and the imbecile subserviency of his ministers, and America was right. This sentiment was received with great applause. Her second great contest was also for freedom, and the spirit which prompted her to those great struggles is with her yet. Why, then, should the countries not draw together? They were the only two nations on the earth which knew how to combine public order and private freedom. He did not ask a public alliance, offensive or defensive. What Englishmen sought was personal and international friendship.

The Bishop of Ripon made an eloquent address, in the course of which he said: "Some nations use the word liberty, but hardly know the thing. But England and America have lived too long in freedom to misunderstand its meaning. There are some causes worth paying any price for, and freedom is one of them."

On the day preceding, at Washington, a conference had been held between commissioners from Canada and our State Department, for the purpose of reopening negotiations for the composition of many old differences concerning the Fisheries question and customs annoyances between the two countries. It had resulted in the signing of an amicable protocol for full settlement by commission. This announcement was received with cheers, and the dinner resulted in the organization of an Anglo-American Society for the promotion of international friendship.

In the British Parliament a remarkable debate occurred, precipitated by Sir Charles Dilke of the Liberal party. In attacking the Salisbury government he insisted that the only success Lord Salisbury could be said to have attained during his ministry was that he had secured better relations with the United States. That success, however, could not be ascribed, he maintained, to the ministerial policy. Especially rash and feeble had it been in the case of the United States, seeing that only three years ago Lord Salisbury had rejected the principle of arbitration laid down by the United States in the case of Venezuela,

and afterward had accepted it. That better relations now obtained between Great Britain and the United States, the speaker attributed exclusively to the conduct of Sir Julian Pauncefote, Ambassador at Washington, and to the action of the opposition, the leader of which had discouraged debate on the Venezuelan question at a most critical period.

Another eminent Liberal, Mr. Asquith, who was Home Secretary in the last Gladstone cabinet, and in the Rosebery cabinet, declared that he entirely agreed with what Mr. Chamberlain had said in Birmingham when he declared that the closer union of Great Britain and America, not only in sympathy of thought, but in political coöperation, is no longer merely the ideal of those who see visions and dream dreams. Mr. Asquith believed that such coöperation was destined to be one of the great civilizing forces of the twentieth century.

Sir William Vernon Harcourt, the leader of the opposition, heartily concurred in the strong language in which Mr. Chamberlain had expressed the desire for closer and more permanent relations with the United States. Ever since he had had anything to do with public life, his great and foremost object had been the cultivation of good relations with the United States. He had seen attempts to represent that there was a difference between the two parties in the parliament upon that subject. There was no such difference. There was no member of the Liberal party, any more than there was of the Unionist party, who did not place friendship or alliance, in the sense of cordial friendship,—of an *entente cordiale*,—with the United States, in the very forefront of English foreign politics.

Mr. Curzon,* the political Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, said that he was glad to hear Sir Charles Dilke express the feeling of satisfaction shared, as he believed, by both sides of the House, “at the friendly relations now existing between the American Government and people and ourselves.”

The only members who opposed the idea of an alliance or even a cordial understanding between the two countries were the Irish nationalists.

* Now Lord Curzon, Governor-General of India.

Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, in a speech practically closing the debate, referred to an assertion by Mr. Morley that no positive alliance was desirable. Mr. Chamberlain said: "Nothing in the nature of a cut-and-dried alliance is proposed. The Americans do not want our alliance at this moment; they do not ask for our assistance, and we do not want theirs. But will any one say that the occasion may not arise when Anglo-Saxon liberty and Anglo-Saxon interests will be menaced by a great combination of other Powers? I think that such a thing is possible, and in that case, whether it be America or England that is menaced, I hope that blood will be found to be thicker than water."

Mr. Chamberlain's concluding sentence was received with loud cheers from both of the British parties, but with expressions of dissent from the Irish Nationalists. It ran as follows: "Meanwhile, I say, without forcing this opinion upon either party, or desiring that either nation should enter into an alliance with which the majority of both nations would not thoroughly sympathize,—I repeat what I said at Birmingham,—the closer, more definite, and more clear the alliance between the United States and ourselves, the better it will be for both nations and for the civilized world."

It was apparent to statesmen and leaders in both nations that no alliance was possible in the sense of formal compact of offense and defense as understood in Europe. The temper of both nations and the nature of the Government of the United States were opposed to any political alliance beyond that growing out of immediate sympathy, interest, and common purposes. The popular response to the so-called proposition of "alliance" was the manifestation of the ready purpose of Great Britain to help us if any European combination threatened interference. Successful interference would injure England's interests quite as much as those of the United States. The common sense and common interests of the two governments were thus brought into much closer relations by the general expression of opinion.

Throughout the period of the war there was no change in the attitude of the two countries. When our war revenue bill was discovered

to press heavily upon the maritime tonnage of British commerce, a reminder of that fact, by the Salisbury government was met by a prompt revision of the clause by Congress, entirely to the satisfaction of England.

The Fourth of July was celebrated this year in England, Canada, and the United States, with equal enthusiasm. The flags of both nations were displayed at public meetings. The American Society in London gave a public dinner at which many Englishmen of eminence and great influence were present. Admiral Sampson's telegram, announcing the victory over Cervera, arrived just before the guests were seated, and its reading was greeted with indescribable excitement and enthusiasm.

The addresses were all tinged with cordial congratulations to both nations. The Marquis of Ripon impressively pointed out that the United States was now at the parting of the ways. The responsibility of President McKinley, he said, was greater than that of any President save Lincoln. He must face a greater problem than that of war, a problem which would determine the history of America. Continuing, he said: "The interests not only of your country but of this are involved, and the decision to a large extent will shape the destinies of the world." He and all the other English speakers affirmed that Great Britain awaited without jealousy or envy the decision of the United States to become a great international Power, carrying the blessings of liberty, knowledge, and peace to other quarters of the earth.

The Earl of Dufferin recalled the ties binding Great Britain and the United States. There were, he said, dominant responsible forces which must in the long run unite the two countries in honorable and generous friendship. He rejoiced at the fresh symptoms necessary to amity. Whether these feelings, in the face of the unstable condition of the world, would eventually take a concrete form might be regarded as a matter for pleasant speculation.

United States Ambassador Hay's reply in response to the friendly utterances was received with great cheering and enthusiasm. His very first sentence evoked a deafening burst of cheers. "To-day," he said, "a new splendor fills the span of the earth from Santiago to

Manila." The passing year, he continued, would be memorable for nothing of greater significance than the lucid recognition by both the American and British peoples that the way of pleasantness between them was the way of wisdom, and that anything like variance would be folly and madness. This recognition was no mere passing emotion born of a troubled hour, but had been growing for many quiet years. It only needed rough weather to show it to the world. Now that a cordial and clear understanding had come, there was no reason why it should not last forever. It injured none and threatened none. All its ends were peaceful and beneficent. Recalling the day, he contended that it ever had been a day of good augury to mankind. He predicted that the nation would show the same efficiency and promptness in war and the same clemency and generosity in its hour of triumph as in days of old. The nation that ended a vast rebellion without a single execution or bill of attainder might safely be trusted to be considerate and magnanimous in victory; and when the bitterness of the present troubles had passed, both sides would be found to have profited from the issue.

Mr. James Bryce, a Scotch member of Parliament, distinguished for his critical writings on the constitution of the United States, said: "In 1776 there was on one side a monarch and a small ruling caste, on the other side a people. Now, our Government can no longer misrepresent the nation, and across the ocean people speak to a people. The Atlantic is ten times narrower now than it was then, and the passage of men to and fro has increased a thousandfold; and through the personal knowledge of Americans by Englishmen and of Englishmen by Americans there has been laid the best foundation for good will and mutual understanding between the nations. We have both come, and that most notably within the last few months, to perceive that all over the world the interests of America and of England are substantially the same, and in recognition of this fact we see a solid basis for a permanent coöperation."

The public celebration of the day in London called out demonstrations of popular fervor unprecedented in the celebration of the day

outside of the United States. London streets were filled with American and British colors intertwined.

The usual reception at the American embassy was attended by 15,000 persons. Lord Salisbury called personally, an unprecedented Fourth of July compliment, and the function was also attended by almost the entire diplomatic corps.



CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SECOND.

ATTITUDE OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

THE CURIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES—THE DESPERATE CAUSES OF HER UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS US AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR—MISTAKES AND FOLLIES OF THE PARISIAN PRESS AND PARISIAN POPULACE—ABSURD COMPARISONS OF SPAIN AND AMERICA—REPRISALS PROPOSED IN THE UNITED STATES THAT CAUSED A SWIFT CHANGE OF ATTITUDE—RUSSIA AND HER CONNECTION WITH THE ANTI-AMERICAN CONCERT—A NEGATIVE ACT ATONED FOR BY LONG, UNBROKEN FRIENDSHIP, AND FRESH MANIFESTATIONS OF GOOD FEELING.

I.

IT is not exaggeration, perhaps, to say that the United States as a nation has entertained for France a feeling of warmer friendship than for any other country on the globe.

There was a strong element of almost sentimental affection in our regard for France as an abstraction, and equally for the French people. La Fayette was not nearly so clothed with national devotion at home as he was in the United States. The feeling for the French people can scarcely be described. Absolutely alien in temper, taste, ideals, and race, yet that they were our friends in the first death-struggle for independence was enough. The fact had given us courage. It awoke in the heart of America that fervid gratitude which a competitor in any struggle feels springing up at the sight of one face in a strange multitude that cheers him with a look of encouragement and sympathy.

OUR CURIOUS RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND THE FRENCH

But, truth to tell, no man ever received more monument in proportion to actual deserving than did La Fayette from America. His abilities as a soldier and statesman were not above mediocrity. He was a good man and a brave man, and, as an aristocrat, sympathizing with humanity, his position was striking. To the American colonies his sympathy was inspiring. What if he did not show himself a

Hannibal in battle, or a great statesman in the closet, was he not the loyal and loved friend of Washington? He was to Americans, and is yet to many, the Washington of France. No good American would take back one word of all the affection and reverence that this nation has uttered about him.

In La Fayette we saw the French people—that look of sympathy at the critical moment. After independence, the affectionate feeling for France grew, despite quarrels and petty disagreements.

For, we reasoned, was not the ever-increasing intensity of her inherited hatred of “perfidious Albion” most satisfying to our national susceptibilities? Americans have been able to enjoy English jibes and sneers at the French; but, laughing, we none the less loved. Was not a friend privileged to have all the faults and foibles convenient to and necessary for happiness?

But there was much more than the La Fayette heroic myth at the bottom of American friendship for France. He was merely the symbol of an idea. The genius of French philosophical letters at the period of our independence was of much more value to us than her arms. The desperate excesses that attended her reaction against the long tyranny of the Capets, not less than her declared views of human rights, were of service. The one warned this new republic against license; her theories of natural rights applied by the fathers of America, with cooler blood and calmer vision, inspired the infant republic of the United States with wisdom and forethought.

Our friendship for France constantly grew. American people were amused but not offended at the French idea of us: that we were a race of monster millionaires, great giants of fellows, more amiable and tractable than Englishmen, but, also, even more vulgar and ignorant. They had no doubt that La Fayette had enabled us to conquer the English. Without La Fayette all would have been lost. Yet at home La Fayette was known to be esteemed as not among the first of France’s sons of genius. But, as he had enabled the amiable and novelty-mad Americans to beat “perfidious Albion,” they were proud of and amused with their protégé.

The French have never quite understood the American feeling of gratitude that ignored passing differences. Even though she sought to interfere in our Civil War, the act was overlooked.

The United States did, however, deliver one serious and overwhelming blow at French pride. It was made necessary by the invasion of Mexico, concerted by Napoleon III. and Austria during the Civil War. It was at the zenith of the third empire's glory, when Paris was glowing with the splendors of imperial extravagance and display promoted by Eugenie. The Emperor attempted to inflame the patriotism and pride of his people after the manner of his illustrious uncle, by kindling military glory abroad.

Acting with Austria he determined to erect a Franco-Austrian empire in Mexico, with Maximilian on the throne. Our State Department protested, but European Powers had never quite considered United States diplomacy as having serious weight, and Napoleon III. ignored the protest.

When the Civil War was ended and the United States free to turn its attention to neighboring relations, the expulsion of France and Austria from Mexico was determined upon. An ultimatum was drawn up, setting forth fully and conclusively the reasons for the demand that French troops be at once withdrawn from the American continent. It was the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, clearly and firmly repeated. The Atlantic Cable was then newly laid and tolls were costly, but the document in entirety was transmitted over the cable, by Secretary Seward, to the French Foreign Minister in Paris, at a cost of \$15,000. The imperative nature of the demand was emphasized by the cost of its transmission—enormous and unprecedented at the period—and Napoleon III. awoke with a shock to the realization that "L'Oncle Sam," good, aimable, but yet awkwardly strong, "meant business."

He was embarrassed, since it was no part of his expectation or intention to fight the United States. Prussia, growing under Bismarck, was a threatening and immediate danger. He must yield. The army of France was immediately withdrawn from Mexico and the fate of

Maximilian and Carlotta added to the humiliation of France an element of terrible tragedy.

Howsoever seriously statesmen viewed that action of France, it is undeniable that the mass of our people—perhaps because the incident was entirely diplomatic and not active—did not change in their feelings toward France. The French were French, excitable, erratic, impulsive; but the French had been our friends and what quarrels we might have with her must be, of course, friendly quarrels.

But to France and the French people the blow struck at their military and national pride was too severe to be forgotten. French leaders, who succeeded to the control of the nominal republic that was to-day exerting imperial authority, to-morrow relapsing into the effusive simplicities of free democracy, inherited the imperial resentment.

But it would be grossly unfair to France—and no American willingly would do injustice to France—to declare that while our war with Spain impended and after it had opened, her action was dictated by nothing more than vain resentment. Her situation was very distressful, her needs distracting. With pitiless accuracy, Lord Salisbury's description of dying nations and the symptoms of their decay applied to France. The bursting of the vast bubble of Napoleonic pretense and extravagance in 1870 had staggered the faith of the French people in all leaders. Under Thiers and MacMahon there seemed to be recovery, but it was to be rudely interrupted by an explosion of corruption in the parliament; in the shady but fashionable financial enterprises, in which needy nobles found great profits from lending their names; and in the representative press. The shameful revelations of the Panama Canal inquiry, smothered down in order that other nations might not learn the full disgrace, destroyed again the faith of the industrious millions in the integrity of representative leaders.

The French citizen is always vulnerable in his patriotic pride. When, therefore, scapegoats of the Panama affair had been solemnly offered up upon the altar of "national honor," the victims of the swindle were persuaded to wait. The canal, they were told, would be completed as soon as confidence could be restored. They were urged

to hold to their stock certificates, the value of which their children would realize, even if the present holders should not. The habit of thrift in France, which in the provinces has attained almost the eminence of a national parsimony, was soothed. The stock was put by for the inevitable *dot* in marriage settlements.

But the Dreyfus incident, which in 1894 had made the army glorious, was to return in 1897, threatening to expose in the general military staff corruption so revolting and cruel as to make the world stand aghast. At the moment when the United States was electrified by the destruction of the *Maine*, all civilization outside of France looked with amazement at the spectacle of the French Government, the French army staff, the French ministry of justice, and the French press, engaged in a duel with the author, Zola, and Colonel Picquart, head of the secret service of the army, resorting to the most desperate quibbles of law to destroy these two champions of honest justice, who were ready to prove the innocence of Dreyfus. But, if this should be permitted, the military corruption of France would be naked before the nation and the whole world.

Once more patriotic pride was appealed to. The army, at least, must be trusted. Was it possible that Frenchmen would permit sensational writers and egotists, acting perhaps with foul motives, to traduce the army? Could not a court-martial, conducted by the general staff upon the "honor of a soldier," be definitive until its findings should be revised and ratified by foreign opinion and mere writers for the newspapers? And patriotic pride stood firm once more. Zola was overthrown in form; but he had succeeded in convincing the world that Dreyfus, the most pathetic figure in the history of political exile, was probably innocent, and that the general staff was guilty.

Under the blistering criticism and denunciation of the press of civilized countries, France was shrinking before war began. The press of Great Britain and the United States was keenest and most searching in its indictment of the injustice, cowardice, and impotence, of the French Government, as displayed in sacrificing Dreyfus through fear of learning too much truth, and doing too much justice.

A much stronger nation than France would have been distracted by the dangers confronting her. Her people held 4,000,000,000 francs (\$800,000,000) of Spanish bonds, many of them secured by pledges of the revenues of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. Her financial institutions and capitalists were heavily interested in Spanish railway and industrial stocks, and much capital was employed in commercial operations between the two countries. In addition to this the enormous capital involved in the Panama Canal scheme, which had been contributed by popular subscriptions, and which holders of the certificates clung to upon promises of future redemption, would be lost forever, if Great Britain and the United States could reach an understanding.

Involved in a fog of despair over the integrity of their entire official system, with the loss of immense capital threatened, what could be expected of a people but bitter resentment and hostility to the foreign country whose actions might cause such losses? The thrifty population was certainly excusable in wishing that Spain might triumph; while a ministry that had been unable to deal with the Dreyfus outrage could not be expected calmly to examine the future.

II.

UNDER the circumstances, it was inevitable that the French popular press and her people generally would sympathize with Spain.

MISTAKES AND FOLLIES OF FRANCE

It was inevitable, also, that the Government would do so, but with circumspect concealment. For weeks before and after the first act of war, the popular press was filled with editorials denouncing the United States, misrepresenting our motives; it printed all sorts of false news derogatory to the dignity and integrity of Americans, and contained interviews, real and imaginary, calculated to arouse against us the rage and anger of their readers. The cause of Spain, on the other hand, was defended for its righteousness, and sympathy for her was manufactured to a vast extent and fanned to ardent heat.

The immediate popularity of this abuse and scorn proved that such utterances reflected popular sentiment accurately. Many persons of prominence and influence, some officials, or occupying semi-official posts, expressed through the newspapers bitter resentment against the United States. A Rear-Admiral declared that, in his opinion, the officers composing the *Maine* Board of Inquiry "were not, under the circumstances, to be believed on oath." The value of his opinion, as it defined his prejudice only, without accurate knowledge of the subject, may be estimated from an additional declaration he made that, "there is not an officer in the United States navy capable of commanding a vessel, and the navy included few vessels worthy of command!"

It is to be remembered that these opinions were expressed prior to Manila and Santiago. But they were entertained not alone by the Rear-Admiral. Many other naval officers in Paris declared in interviews that our naval officers were incompetent, inexperienced, ignorant! That discipline was lax, that instruction was ignored, and that the crews were mostly mercenaries kicked out of all other navies for drunkenness, or were deserters. One officer's opinion was that Spain's navy was three times as powerful as ours in ships, but when the efficiencies of command, crew, and discipline were considered, the Spaniards were ten times stronger.

A Spanish Admiral, who at Madrid consented to be interviewed for the purpose of suggesting a plan for their naval campaign, said: "With immediate vigor. I should advise the sending of a fleet against Washington first; then, after reducing the city, the fleet should proceed to Chicago and bring it to terms." This was equaled by sentences in a French naval Captain's published article, accompanied by diagrams suggesting also a plan of campaign. "As Cuba," he wrote, "is not far from Havana, it would be easy for the United States to transfer its fleet in the secondary movement from the one to the other." He placed the Philippines in the Indian Ocean, the Canary Islands in the Chinese Sea, and the Carolines in the spot occupied on the Atlantic chart by the Canaries.

These were not burlesque or humorous articles, but were intended as serious contributions to the discussion.

In *La Patrie*, a very popular Paris paper, appeared an interview evidently concocted by some scribbler, and pretended to give the views of a Canadian army officer. Nothing could better expose the ignorance of the reporter or of the editor who could write or accept such absurdities. Some of the views are reproduced for amusement:—

* * * * *

“The United States are in no condition to sustain a war with Spain. A war, even if they were victors, would bring such disaster to American commerce that it would be equivalent to their ruin.

“With the exception of two or three armored ships the United States navy is absolutely valueless. The officers who command it may be decent enough engineers in theory, but they are entirely ignorant of the method of fighting guns. As to the sailors, they have never been drilled to fight; they are worthless as artillerymen.

“The United States army does not exist. There are, to be sure, some 22,000 men under arms, but they are not soldiers. Doubtless, one could get recruits, but in order to raise an army of 100,000 of them an enormous amount of money would be required, and it would take several months. Still they would be only mercenaries, who would draw bounties at the recruiting station and then desert. During the war of secession every recruit got a bounty of \$3,000; and I have known personally of one man who drew this bounty three times within a week, and then immediately fled to Quebec, where he went into business on the money.

“The American soldier, the typical American soldier, is not what one would call a soldier in Europe, where one expects a man to be amenable to discipline, intelligent and docile in the hands of his chiefs. Individually, he is a good marksman and capable of withstanding fatigue, but he is of no use as a component of a body of troops, where he would have to learn tactics. However, the American officers are not tacticians, and are absolutely ignorant of the art of war. Remember, too, that I am now speaking of the standing army of 22,000 men. You may judge from this what the recruits would be.

* * * * *

“There is Jingoism in the United States, but no patriotism whatever, as that word is understood by other peoples. Americans will work, and sometimes fight, but only for money. That is the one consideration, no matter what circumstance arises. Perhaps if the United States were to undertake a war of pillage in Cuba

they would be able to raise armed bands, who would fight in exchange for the proceeds of the robberies they could perpetrate. Otherwise not.

"All the ports of the United States, from New Orleans to New York, from Florida to Newfoundland, are entirely open and unprotected. Not one has a single gun or a soldier for defense. A small fleet of Spanish gunboats could bombard all the principal cities, one after the other, and soon bring the Yankees to terms. It would be the work of a few days only.

"In conclusion, the resources of America might prolong the conflict and make the outcome doubtful. But there are many unforeseen things to take into account. We must remember that it would be a war between a valiant, courageous people on the one side, and a horde of mercenary cowards on the other."

The volume of execration poured out upon everything American at last produced a condition of excitement that exposed Americans, visiting Paris for pleasure or business, to insults and annoyance.

The few serious and dignified journals did not, of course, descend to the level of the popular press, but they dared not take the initiative to restrain the popular feeling. They did not excite malignant ignorance, but they displayed more discretion than information. It was hopeless to stem the tide when the Government was secretly leading in an attempt to checkmate the United States.

The vanity of French leaders renders them prone to be induced to take initiative when others hesitate. It has been declared upon good authority that France acted as the organizer of the attempt to form a concert for intervention. The belief that her interest with England in opposing the Nicaragua Canal and the significance of her willingness to throw over her old friend in America, in order to draw Great Britain into an alliance that would "teach America a lesson," could not be resisted. The fact that Germany had declined to act unless Great Britain joined, was ominous to all the Powers except France. The consequence of her failure inflamed her afresh against Great Britain and the United States.

All France believed in the incompetence of our army and navy, because all France was wishing for incompetence. When Dewey had won his unprecedented victory, France believed it was an accident, because France wished it to be an accident. She transferred her faith

to Cervera, to the Offenbachian Camara, and her sneers and jibes to Sampson, Schley, and Shafter.

At this time, however, France began to feel a new agony. The preparations for the Paris World's Fair of 1900 were greatly advanced. Our State Department had prepared plans and an appropriation bill for \$1,000,000, through which the representation of the United States at her fair would be an impressive feature. Opposition to the appropriation appeared in Congress, and the bill languished. In many cities and towns of the United States clubs had been formed for the purpose of saving funds in advance for the expense of visiting the fair. These clubs began to disband.

In a number of cities organizations were projected and some were formed by women, for the purpose of systematically refusing to purchase any articles imported from or made in France, and for notifying merchants that if they carried French articles of stock it would be considered cause sufficient for a withdrawal of patronage. Agitation in such direction was, of course, mere ebullition of resentment, and no more to be justified than the action of the French. It was quickly abandoned, discouraged and ridiculed by newspapers generally. But it was reported, and it had its effect upon French conduct.

The large reduction in the number of American tourists in Paris and other European centers began to cause consternation. Americans are credited with spending upon pleasure \$150,000,000 a year in Europe. France and particularly Paris receive the greatest proportion of these 750,000,000 francs annually. It seemed to the Paris tradesman as if the economic cataclysm were at hand.

Then France came to her senses. Commissioners, representing boards of trade, bringing with them letters of commendation from the Government, came to Washington and gravely issued explanations prepared for the purpose of convincing the United States that the French people had been grossly maligned by a mercenary and frivolous press, representing no actual sentiment. The French people loved the American people and were natural enemies of Spain. The appeal was full of pathos, and faultless in diction.

While this was making its effect, the "incompetent" Captains of our fleet and their "undisciplined and uninstructed crews of mercenaries" repeated before Santiago the miracle that Dewey had performed at Manila—and against Spanish ships, commanders, and crews that, according to French estimates, ought to have equaled sixty of our ships.

And our soldiers, who, by French account, were "absolutely ignorant of the art of war," had fought at Las Guasimas, San Juan, and El Caney against enormous preponderance of the enemy in position and force. When the Spanish surrendered 27,000 troops and a fortified city to about 16,000 available Americans, France was not yet convinced, perhaps, but her courtesy of speech was much improved, and the tone of her newspapers greatly changed.

There was much in the acute distresses of France to excuse her attitude, the knowledge of which caused the United States Government to exert every effort to mitigate the strain of the situation, and to refrain from any act calculated to increase the probability of widening the breach.

III.

THAT Russia consented to act in the anti-American concert proposed by France, is true, unless the concert itself is wholly a myth. It was the first unfriendly act of that Government towards the United States, and its unfriendliness was plainly negative. Since Catherine II. had quickly recognized our independence of England, Russia had been not only friendly to America, but had given active and prompt proofs of it. Under all circumstances she remained steadfast, recognizing that in the remote republic, with its well-defined insular policy, there existed no patent rivalry with her own purposes.

THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA

She had acted as the determined friend of the United States during the Civil War when France and Great Britain concerted interference in our home affairs. Even then France was the active proposer of interference. When Andrew G. Curtin was United States minister to

Russia, he was shown by Prince Gortschakoff the original autograph letter of Napoleon III. to Alexander II., proposing the action. Alexander, in an autographic reply, declared that "the people of the United States have a Government of their own choice, which they are defending with their best blood and treasure, and I will never do anything to weaken them."* He followed this up by sending a Russian fleet to American waters ready to resist with force any attempt by Great Britain and France to interfere.

In 1898 Russia was involved in serious national distresses. Her gigantic strides towards the Pacific, involving vast works of internal construction and an expansion of military and naval forces, had strained her resources at a time when she was preparing to adopt a gold basis for her currency system. Her rapid progress east had intensified the distrust and hatred of Great Britain, and the possibility of a resort to war had been imminent several years before. In that crisis she looked about for a friend. Germany was not available because of the blood ties between William II. and Victoria. An Anglo-German alliance was more probable than a Russo-German agreement. France, friendly to Russia, committed to enmity against England and Germany, presented an opportunity. She was distressed by isolation. The Franco-Russian alliance was formed, offensive and defensive. When Germany had been induced to seize Kiao-Chau, and Russia had followed it up by taking Port Arthur, France supported the movement by sitting down at Hainan.

Now, when France proposed the anti-American concert the obligations of an ally committed Russia to acquiesce. It was the fortune of international politics and European diplomacy, and it must be confessed that Russia's part in the negotiations was mere acquiescence. As soon as the concert failed and the formal diplomatic representation of peaceful wishes had been made at Washington, the Russian Government resumed and maintained its old position of friendly neutrality.

*Jeremiah Curtin, communication published July 22, 1898.

The enthusiastic response of the people of England and the United States to the suggestion of an Anglo-American alliance, was a shock to Russian feeling. A staff correspondent of the St. Petersburg *Novoe Vremya*, the leading Russian newspaper, who was sent to study the feeling of this country towards Russia and England, said in a published interview: "It cannot be denied that a most painful impression has been produced on Russian public opinion by the language of a part of the American press advocating an Anglo-American alliance against Russia in the Far East. Should the American nation follow such advice there is no doubt that it would be deeply resented by Russia, which is determined not to yield one inch of her legitimate position on the shores of the Pacific.

"Fortunately, the admirable good sense and the clear-headedness of the Americans do not admit a possibility of adopting such a policy. In the Far East, England and the United States, as the two greatest industrial nations, are natural competitors, struggling for a predominance in the Chinese markets. The part of Russia in Manchuria and Korea, as well as in China, is that of a protector of less civilized peoples, which, by their origin and history, are nearer to us than to Western nations. It is generally recognized that Russia has occupied Port Arthur merely in order to counteract the pernicious consequences of Germany's violent seizure of Kiao-Chau. Russian policy in the Far East ought to be particularly applauded by the Americans, for it creates a boundless field for American enterprise. Undoubtedly, the development of Russian influence in Manchuria will open a considerable area to American trade and industry. The only necessary condition of fully profiting by these most favorable prospects is the cessation of playing at a policy which might alienate an old and trusty friend without being able to transform a natural and traditional opponent into a disinterested ally."

It is admitted everywhere that in the exercise of her impenetrable diplomacy Russia has been more successful than she has ever been with arms, and that her diplomacy has been more profitable than the armed successes of some other nations. The declaration of her

journalistic envoy was obviously authoritative. Open political opinions are not proclaimed by Russians except at their peril. This appeal to the old American hostility against Great Britain had been expressed in the St. Petersburg *Viedomosti* more than a month before, with ingenious and strong arguments to support it, and with bitter warnings to Great Britain.* The general tone of the Russian press was most cordially expressive of friendliness to the United States.

In June the first Russian Ambassador to the United States was presented to the President at Washington. Previous representatives had borne the title of Minister. The Ambassador was Count Cassini, one of the ablest and most accomplished diplomats of the Russian Government. He had long been her representative in China, but had served at important European capitals. His transfer from Peking to Washington was considered at the time to be significant. In his address to the President he referred to the unbroken friendship between the two countries. The neutrality of Russia, after the first negative act, was full and satisfactory. Indeed, the friendliness of her people remained unchanged.

*"But there is still another point showing the usefulness and expediency of the Russian-American friendship. Let us be candid. Sincere as the assertions of a few Russophiles on the banks of the Thames and Anglophiles on the banks of the Neva may be, our relations with England must inevitably come to a bloody outcome. The war will not break out to-morrow, not after a month, undoubtedly not even after one year, but it is bound to come. The historical march of events tends toward it. The eternal antagonism of Russian and English interests shows it. Show us the nook in which Russia could tender England the hand of friendship without hiding in the other hand, behind its back, the murderous dagger! There is no such nook in existence. Russia advances toward the Pamirs, England does the same; Russia endeavors to extend its influence in neighboring Afghanistan, England sets to work the springs of its immense political mechanism in order to paralyze such influence. Russia occupies Port Arthur; England installs itself at Wei-Hai-Wei. Of Europe, the history of which is full of innumerable Anglo-Russian conflicts, it is needless to speak. In a word, there is no place in the whole world in which, as in a common sea, the course and the tendencies of both empires are merged, and thus, sooner or later, war is inevitable. Once such a war starts, what immense help the United States ports would be to Russia! The sympathetic neutrality of the United States would be for Russia more than a welcome find, and the possibility of even indirect assistance by the American fleet, which is even now pretty strong, and will become more so during the impending war with Spain. We have not yet forgotten the great help given us by the United States in 1878, at the time of the Berlin Congress, when in view of the very probable military conflict, cruisers were manned by Russian sailors in the very ports of the United States."—St. Petersburg *Viedomosti*, April, 1898.

CHAPTER THE TWENTY-THIRD.

DEWEY AND THE GERMANS.

VERY UNFRIENDLY AND HOSTILE OPPOSITION TO AMERICA BY THE EMPEROR AND THE AGRARIAN PARTY—THE COMMERCIAL ANTAGONISMS THAT PRODUCED IT—ADMIRAL DEWEY RECEIVES AN APOLOGY FROM PRINCE HENRY, THE EMPEROR'S BROTHER—THE IRRITATING INTERFERENCE OF THE GERMAN WAR SHIPS AT MANILA—DEWEY DEMANDS THAT ADMIRAL VON DIEDERICH'S SHALL ANSWER WHETHER HE WANTS PEACE OR WAR—THE GERMANS "CALLED DOWN" AT LAST—DIPLOMATIC EXPLANATIONS AND ASSURANCES—CHANGE OF TONE OF THE GERMAN PRESS.

I.

THE attitude of the German Empire and the German people towards the United States was expressed in four languages. The diplomatic records will show that it was one of "friendly neutrality to both nations." **GERMAN AGRARIAN HOSTILITY EXPRESSED**

The semi-official German press spoke the language of open hostility and enmity. The masses of German people, who have millions of kinsmen in the United States, attracted here by the limitations of life at home, were cordially friendly, and their popular press bore witness to the fact. The court and the Agrarian party, the latter composed of the hereditary landowners, the stiffest-necked aristocracy of continental Europe, were bitterly hostile to us, and through many channels gave vent to their feelings.

There has been a deadly commercial war between the United States and Germany for some years. The tariff theories of the two countries clashed, and Germany was greatly incensed by the adoption of the McKinley tariff in this country. England succeeded to the trade lost to Germany. American farm products, manufactures, provisions, and other articles, could be set down in Germany so cheaply that the landowners complained that America would destroy land values in Germany. The Agrarian party was formed to conduct a tariff policy that would close the German markets to the United States.

The land barons, ever the buttresses of the throne, contrived that court influence should be hostile to the Washington government, while the official record would remain correct throughout.

The United States did not expect or desire sympathy from the German Emperor, but we were fully prepared to stop any effort at intervention. The first intimation of hostility was a curt remark reported to have been made by the Emperor at a mess dinner with a party of officers. "It will not be too bad," he was quoted as having said in substance, "if America shall very soon require Europe to teach her the proper place for her." After some delay the utterance was officially denied with the additional declaration that the Emperor's feeling for the United States was not hostile.

When Dewey sailed from Hong Kong to attack Manila, it was announced by the Spanish Government, unofficially, that Germany had determined to prevent the bombardment of the city because of the large German interests. The annoyances of the German war ships at Manila after the great battle, brought to light a personal incident highly interesting at a time when excitement was high, and also indicative of the German court and semi-official attitude.

A private citizen of good repute and prominence, residing in Chicago, was at Hong Kong in March, when preparations were making for possible war. He had completed a tour of the Orient and was then homeward bound. All the sentiment he had heard expressed was favorable and friendly to the United States, except that coming from German officials and naval officers. These, he said, spoke sarcastically of the United States.

Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the German Emperor, had arrived at Hong Kong shortly before on his mission to represent the German government as Admiral of the navy in affairs growing out of the Kiao-Chau seizure. Immediately after his arrival, so the story ran, Prince Henry gave a banquet to the representative officers of all the fleets in port. Among those present was Commodore Dewey. After dining Prince Henry proposed the usual national toasts. These are regulated as to order of precedence by etiquette well understood

in the navies. When the Prince reached the place of the United States in the list he passed it for another nation. But when he proceeded to the second omission, it meant wilful intention, ignorance, or gross carelessness. Commodore Dewey left the banquet without ceremony. Finally, just before the entertainment closed, the Prince toasted the United States.

Next morning Prince Henry sent an aide to Commodore Dewey with the explanation that the omission had been wholly inadvertent, and was not meant as a discourtesy to the United States or her representative commander. Dewey thanked the aide for the courteous manner in which he conveyed the message from his Admiral, but in reply requested him to inform Prince Henry that the incident was one that called for a written or a personal apology from the Prince. German sarcasm was thus put to the test. Very soon Prince Henry called in person and apologized, saying that the omission was caused by neglect in writing the American toast in its proper order, and that he had intended to put no slight upon the United States. The Prince later gave a great entertainment, to which Dewey received invitation, but which he did not attend.

Incidents of the character described in the anecdote are considered in official etiquette as having occurred *in camera*, and the traveler who made it public acknowledged that he understood it was an incident *in camera* when the facts were related to him by an officer of the American fleet. He made it public in order that, at the critical moment, when the Germans were annoying Admiral Dewey after the battle, and before assistance could reach him, the American people might feel reassured of the quiet and unobtrusive, but very firm and decided, character of the fleet commander representing our forces at Manila. The story was not denied.

II.

THE hand of a strong man was undoubtedly needed at Manila after the capture of Cavité. Admiral Dewey was in a position of very great responsibility, requiring the utmost patience, courage, and abilities of the highest order. He had to establish and maintain an effective blockade against a city of 300,000 people, walled, fortified, and well-garrisoned by Spanish troops. He was expected to lend encouragement to and exert restraint upon the insurgent forces just sufficient to keep them up to the attitude of harassing the garrison without storming the city. He was almost cut off from knowledge of Spanish movements elsewhere, and must keep vigilant guard against possible Spanish reënforcements for Manila. It was hopeless to expect troops or ships for his own support short of six weeks' time.

The situation called for tension of nerve and constant watchfulness. And this was aggravated by petty proceedings on the part of German naval commanders calculated to irritate him beyond the point of patience.

There were war ships of Great Britain, Russia, France, Japan, and Austria, in Manila Bay, observing the blockade; but these nations were content to send but one vessel, or, at most, two were sometimes present. But there were five of the Germans constantly in attendance, and occasionally seven, comprising the whole of the German fleet in Asiatic waters. The *Deutschland*, commanded by Prince Henry, and her sister ship, the *Kaiser*, the flagship of Admiral von Diederichs, were heavily armored cruisers of 7,700 tons each, carrying eight 10-inch guns, with secondary batteries of 8- and 6-inchers. The other ships were the *Kaiserin Augusta*, *Irene*, *Princess Wilhelm*, *Giffon*, and *Cormoran*. In numbers, in armor, and in guns, the Germans were stronger than the Americans whose six vessels were unprotected cruisers and small gunboats.

Upon establishing his blockade, Admiral Dewey drew up a code of regulations which he considered necessary for shutting up Manila

without causing more inconvenience than the conditions required to the foreign vessels. The imaginary line of the blockade cordon was drawn from Cavité across the bay to Malibon harbor, leaving abundant room for foreign ships to enter the bay and observe the blockade.

Among the regulations was one common to all blockade codes. It was that there should be no movement of any foreign vessels or boats about the bay after sunset, without the knowledge and expressed permission of the blockade commander.

The Germans, as soon as their ships arrived, began to ignore and violate the rule. They sent launches out at night as it suited their inclination or whim. Admiral Dewey instructed his patrol launches to turn back the intruders. Admiral von Diederichs protested vigorously. Dewey sent back word with firmness that his regulations must be observed.

But the Germans had no intention of making their presence agreeable. The launches were started off later at night to convey German officers to the clubs in Manila. Dewey turned the searchlights of his ships on that part of the bay and swept it, with the result that the launches were detected and ordered back. Persisting, the Germans began to send one or two decoy launches in one direction, while others moved out under cover of darkness in another. Then Dewey turned his searchlights on the German war vessels and covered them, to prevent any boat leaving at night without his knowledge.

In naval etiquette it is particularly offensive to the pride of a commander to have his ships made the target of a searchlight from another. Admiral von Diederichs sent word to Admiral Dewey that he objected to having the ships of his fleet subjected to indignity. Admiral Dewey returned a courteous message regretting that the conduct of von Diederichs' ships made it necessary to keep their movements at night under observation. He added, with some sarcasm, that perhaps the Germans had not fully understood whether the blockade was maintained by their own or American ships.

This caused a change of tactics. One or two of the German vessels were kept at Mariveles harbor, opposite Corregidor Island, at the

entrance of the bay. The Germans now began to have their ships change position frequently, sending one from the blockade line to Mariveles while another would steam down the bay to replace it. Without knowledge of what Spain could send against him, it was one of the responsibilities of Dewey's situation to guard closely against surprise. The movements of the Germans, therefore, were well calculated to increase the nervous tension of the American commanders.

As soon as it became apparent that the manœuvres were intended to cause irritation, Dewey directed that a launch or large vessel be sent to meet every incoming ship of the Germans, to speak it and demand to know its nationality, its last port and its destination. Every ship was thus required to heave to and reply to all questions before proceeding further. This is an international rule of warfare.

Von Diederichs protested with much vehemence and asked if Dewey proposed to enforce the right of search. The American Admiral replied that under the rules he had the right to demand the name, nationality, and purpose of every ship that came into the bay while the blockade was in force.

Von Diederichs replied that the Americans knew quite well the character of each of his ships and that the formal enforcement of the right to question was intended to annoy him.

Dewey replied with firmness that the flying of the German flag was not proof that a ship was a German ship, since it was recognized in international law that a warship had the right to fly any colors she desired in war for the purpose of surprising the enemy. To the German flag lieutenant who brought the protest, Admiral Dewey said:—

“Tell Admiral von Diederichs that there are some acts that mean war, and his fleet is dangerously near those acts. If he wants war, assure him that he may have it here, now, or at the time that best suits him.”

Von Diederichs regretted that his actions had been misunderstood, and disavowed any intention to violate proper usages or to interfere with Dewey's blockade regulations.

He added that he must refer Dewey's letter, which he construed as maintaining the right of search to the commanders-in-chief then in the harbor. Accordingly, he called on Captain Chichester of the British war ship *Immortalité*, senior commander, and asked what were his intentions with respect to obeying the rigorous regulations laid down by Dewey.

Captain Chichester, suspecting an entanglement, concluded to rebuff the German by pretended concealment.

"Admiral Dewey and I," he answered, "have a perfect understanding on that point." Then waiting for a few moments for his caller to enjoy fully the disturbance his reply created, he added: "I will show you, however, as I did Admiral Dewey, the instructions in which I have been ordered to do precisely what Admiral Dewey has been contending you are required to do."

Von Diederichs' last contention was thus destroyed, but he had no intention of ceasing his annoyances. He did not report to Dewey the result of his conference.

When our troop ships arrived at Corregidor channel, the Germans in Mariveles harbor saluted them. The *Kaiserin Augusta* instantly got under way, steamed up the bay, passing closely alongside each transport in turn, and then saluted before the *Olympia* again, running up American colors as she did so. It was ostentatious impertinence, since a single salute would have been sufficient. The irritation was increased by formal applications to permit launches to go ashore after night. Reports came to Admiral Dewey that the Germans were lending material assistance to the Spaniards. They were reported to have landed flour and other supplies, and even to have landed guns. Their officers, it was said, had visited the Spanish front, and inspected Spanish fortifications. The Admiral heard from indisputable authority that the German consul had been told in the club at Manila that the Germans were landing supplies, and that Spaniards of reputation and position were ready to confirm the fact, and the German consul was unable to deny it. Upon this, permission to go ashore at night was refused, to the humiliation of the Germans.

The situation, already very strained, was much inflamed on July 8. The native insurgents had captured a Spanish ship, on which they embarked a number of their troops, and dispatched them to attack the Spanish garrison on Isla de Grande in Subig Bay. The ship returned July 7, and the commander of the troops reported to Aguinaldo that upon arriving at Isla de Grande he found the German war ship *Irene* close off the island; that the German had not only refused to permit the insurgents' attack, but had compelled the transport to haul down the insurgent colors and run up a white flag. Aguinaldo reported the incident to Dewey.

The moment seemed at hand when the strained cord must break, or one end of it be released. Admiral Dewey instructed the *Raleigh* and *Concord* to proceed at once to Isla de Grande, demand its immediate surrender, or to take it by force, at all hazard, if necessary. The garrison consisted of 600 Spanish soldiers.

The *Raleigh* and *Concord* sailed at night, and arrived in Subig Bay next morning. With decks cleared for action, the two ships steered for Isla de Grande at 8:15 A. M. As they steamed into the channel on one side of the island, the *Irene* steamed out on the other side at full speed. The garrison surrendered without resistance, and 623 prisoners, 600 rifles, and a large supply of ammunition, fell into our hands.

As the *Irene* was returning to Manila, the United States ship *McCullough* was waiting to speak her. She sent a blank shot across the *Irene's* bow, and discharged the formal duty of inquiring her name, nationality, and purpose.

The rage of von Diederichs flamed up. He sent a strong protest to Admiral Dewey against the hauling up of his ships as if they were the ships of an enemy.

The response of Dewey was sharp and not to be misunderstood.

"I desire to ask," he said, "whether it is peace or war between your country and mine. If there is war I wish to be informed. If there is peace, the conduct of your fleet must be changed. It is not the part of friendly neutrality to obstruct and distress the duty of a

friendly nation. But the proper way to make war is to clear ship and go at it."

There could be no mistaking the purport of such a message. In laconic phrase, the German was "called down" and must meet the issue. His response was an explanation and an apology. He denied that the *Irene* had interfered against the insurgents, but admitted that she had refused to answer signals until the insurgent ship had substituted a white flag for the native colors, because to do otherwise would have had the effect of recognizing the insurgents' flag, which would have constituted an act unfriendly to Spain.

The German Admiral was now facing the dead-line of conduct. If he advanced he must take the consequences; if he retired his pride would be mortified. He resorted to correspondence. Meanwhile, the news of Cervera's destruction reached Manila a few days later, the *Charleston* arrived, the *Monterey* was approaching, and the *Monadnock* was contained in the prospect. Von Diederichs relapsed into sulky obedience to regulations, and bided his time.

III.

IN THE United States and Germany, reports of the irritating conduct of von Diederichs were complicated with frequent declarations through anti-American or anti-German channels abroad that Germany was determined to resist acquisition by the United States of the Philippine Archipelago. The Emperor, it was said, had instructed von Diederichs to land a force of marines at Manila under the pretense of protecting German subjects and German interests. The deduction to be made was obvious. It would mean that Germany, having gained a foothold in Manila, would be in position to involve in confusion the claims of the United States to possession through war. The landing of marines, therefore, without permission from Admiral Dewey under perfectly defined terms, would be equivalent to an act of war, upon which Dewey would undoubtedly act.

DIPLOMACY, DIS-
AVOWALS, AND
DEPRECATION

Suggestions were thrown out that Germany and France had made arrangements with Spain by which she conceded to them coaling stations in the Philippines at points beyond the American blockade. But subterfuges of that sort did not deceive the government at Washington.

Reports that Germany's war ships were lending aid and comfort to the Spaniards at Manila, called for interrogatories and replies. The German Ambassador at Washington called on the President and assured him that a firm attitude of friendly neutrality was observed, notwithstanding the flying reports, for which the German Emperor was in no wise responsible. The Foreign Minister at Berlin assured the American Ambassador that such rumors were mere absurdities; that the presence of so many war ships at Manila was necessary to the interests of German subjects, of whom there were more in the city than of any other nation except Spain; that the Subig Bay incident was a mere act of humanity to prevent non-combatants on the island from massacre by insurgents. This did not agree entirely with von Diederichs' explanation, which was that the *Irene* did not interfere at all. It was affirmed that the German Government had no knowledge that von Diederichs' launches had violated regulations of the port blockade or that any of the petty acts of interference as reported had occurred. If such complaints were true, the government would prevent a recurrence of them.

The tone of the German press changed decisively after the events at Santiago. The semi-official Berlin *Post*, in answer to an article in a Paris paper urging that it was time the Powers took extreme measures to prevent the proposed dispatch of Commodore Watson's squadron to Europe, and to end the war, uttered the warning that, before summoning Europe to resist the United States, and predicting a quadruple alliance in the Mediterranean, it would be well to ask Great Britain's consent to yoke the European Powers to one car. The Agrarian papers denounced the change of tone in the radical press, and insisted that the Spaniards were thorough artillerymen, but had lacked material at Santiago. They considered the surrender of Santiago

unimportant, and spoke of the danger of yellow fever in a tone of dread that seemed to express great hopes of the ultimate safe burial of the whole American army.

There was no mistaking the strong and open friendliness of the great journals of the German people. The *Frankfurter-Zeitung*, in an elaborate review of the operations on land and sea at Santiago, declared that they had brought many disillusiones to the despisers of militia armies. The German newspaper strategists, especially, who jeered at "the militia generals going into the field in elegant dress," had become more cautious in their criticism since the fights before Santiago. When it was considered under what unfavorable circumstances the American soldiers had been obliged to fight, the reviewer declared that they had exhibited an endurance and bravery that could not be surpassed by any troops, no matter how well trained. Dismounted cavalymen had been employed to storm a strong position; a preparation for the infantry attack by artillery fire had been impossible, as there had been no artillery; the men suffered from lack of food, because the commissariat had to struggle with great difficulties of transportation; the preliminary preparations for the care of the wounded had proved very defective. All this was known to the soldiers, who, nevertheless, advanced with undiminished courage. The positions the Americans gained on both days of battle they not only retained, but later won still more ground.

Continuing, the reviewer spoke thus of the American demonstration:

"The Spanish troops, whose military qualities are valued very highly by the opponents of the militia, were stationed in excellent strong positions, had with them sufficient artillery, made use of smokeless powder, were superior in number to the Americans, and were commanded by officers experienced in war. Why did not these European-trained troops sally out of Santiago and simply drive the Americans into the sea? Why does not Marshal Blanco, who is said to have at his command a well-armed army of at least 100,000 men, accustomed to the climate and to fighting, make his superiority felt?

"The value of troops does not depend merely on the military drill, such as is usual in Europe. There is militia and militia. A popular army like the Swiss, with its full equipment ever ready for war, represents a stronger power at the beginning of

a war than the American State militia, which is not intended for foreign service, and out of which, when war breaks out, an army must first be formed. In spite of all these disadvantages and difficulties, the Americans have set an army on foot in a few weeks which was obliged to take the field under unfavorable circumstances, and, nevertheless, has shown itself therein not merely equal, but superior to its well-trained adversary.

“Almost as instructive as the combats on land have been the sea-fights. . . . As in the battle of the Yalu, between the Chinese and Japanese, superiority in marksmanship decided the fight off Santiago. The Spanish vessels were in part superior in speed to the American; the valor of the Spanish sailors is much praised by the Americans; experienced officers commanded the ships, but, nevertheless, they were defeated without doing much damage worth mentioning to the enemy. It is well known that for years the Americans have kept up industriously target practice, and that they expected good results from this themselves. Good guns without good gunners are useless in a fight. The Spaniards shot poorly and the Americans shot well. The result was that the Spanish vessels caught fire and were therefore compelled to run ashore. How far better armor influenced the outcome of the fight cannot be determined with certainty. One thing, however, is settled. Her speed could not save even the *Cristobal Colon* from the sure aim of the Americans. Besides this, the American material, missiles as well as armor plate, seems to have shown itself to be much better than the Spanish. American experts, indeed, believe that in this respect they are superior even to the English.”

There can be no question of the patriotism and loyalty of the German people, but love of the Fatherland does not blind their intelligence. The German-born citizens of the United States, and their descendants, are strong upholders of American pride. In all their duties as citizens, defenders, soldiers, the German-Americans have proved their devotion whenever the call has been made upon them.

It must be remembered, also, that Germany occupied a peculiar position. She had no alliance with England in the East, while Russia and France (the hereditary enemy), were leagued. The Triple Alliance was serviceable to Germany only in case of continental war, when armies and the possession of the country separating Russia from France would be an advantage. If her diplomacy was intended to remind England that Germany could exert the balance of power in the Eastern Question, and draw from Russia and France satisfactory assurances on their side, it was justifiable in international politics as an act of self-defense.

True, there was Japan still to be reckoned with, the only nation whose army was as convenient for Eastern operations as her navy. The new Oriental power was in the best position for effective decision. She expressed herself openly as the friend of the United States, at the moment her ministers perceived the popular enthusiasm with which the proposition of "Anglo-American alliance" was received. England, at least, had been guilty only of negative unfriendliness. But from Russia, Germany, and France wounds had come. The position of Japan, therefore, operated to hold Germany stiff-necked to the last.



CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FOURTH.

DEWEY, AGUINALDO, AND AUGUSTI.

THE REMARKABLE STORY OF YOUNG AGUINALDO, LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES—RISING FROM A SERVANT TO BE THE POPULAR IDOL, AND AMBITIOUS OF IMPERIAL POWER AND HONORS—ACCOUNT OF HIS CRAFTY PROCEEDINGS WITH THE AMERICANS AND SPANIARDS—PROCLAIMS HIMSELF PRESIDENT-GENERAL OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC—AUGUSTI AND HIS INTRIGUES AND DEPOSITION FROM OFFICE—DEWEY AND HIS CAREFUL DIPLOMACY AND RESERVE—THE DECLINE OF AGUINALDO'S POWER—GENERAL MERRITT'S ARRIVAL AND PREPARATIONS FOR ASSAULT.

I.

THE victory of Dewey over Montojo, brilliant as it was, fruitful of such great possibilities, arousing such world-wide interest, and causing vast changes in international relations, was enforced by the victory of Sampson's fleet and Shafter's army at Santiago. The splendid valor and endurance of the United States army and the unsurpassed skill of Sampson's squadron swept away, as by a breath, the scornful idea of Europe that Dewey's great performance was accidental.

THE STORY
OF GENERAL
AGUINALDO,
INSURGENT
LEADER

In his turn he was to display at Manila the qualities of tenacious courage, endurance, silence, and power, in himself and his officers and sailors, in no less degree than Shafter concentrated and exhibited with his American soldiers before Santiago.

The Germans were only irritating and annoying. Dewey's great task of dealing with the Spaniards and the Malayan native insurgents was one in which he was to exhibit the highest abilities of statesmanship, diplomacy, generalship, and executive judgment. In destroying the Spanish fleet and capturing Cavité stronghold, he had executed the lightest of his tasks, even though that alone astonished the world.

Without sufficient force to maintain order or secure life and property in Manila, he could neither conquer it nor demand its surrender.

He was 7,500 miles from his nearest home port, and no preparation had been made to reënforce or support him with ships or troops. There was nothing to do but await these aids.

Foreseeing this possibility he had conferred at Hong Kong with the insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, whom he encouraged by the offer of arms, ammunition, and support, to return to the island of Luzon and organize native troops to seal up Manila in the rear, and hold the city in siege until American troops could arrive.

Aguinaldo was at this time the central figure of the revolutionary movement, brave, intelligent, ambitious. The agreement with him must be made without making promises that the United States could not redeem. It was not a part of the character of a man of Admiral Dewey's mold to deceive. He could only assure Aguinaldo that the United States Government would give protection to the islands and to the people, and that the faith and purposes of the American people were known of all men.

The details of the understanding have not been made known, but Aguinaldo took the field immediately after the naval battle, and organized his army.

Thus, Admiral Dewey, with 2,000 men and his ships, was to hold under control the open enemy and the impenetrable but ostensible friend. The Spaniard and the Malay are opposing extremes of the same type. The Spaniard is the highest development of trained, cultivated, and cold unscrupulousness; the metaphysician of duplicity. The Malay is the most dangerous natural type of superstitious craft and cruelty; without education, he is a fatalist whose purpose never extends beyond the immediate object. The *Mestizos*, cross-breeds of these extremes, may be imagined. With inherited adaptability to the trained guile of one and with the unerring instinct of opportunity and swift action of the other, they possess subtle duplicity and absence of fear peculiar to them.

From this half-breed race sprang Aguinaldo, the child of a thrifty peasant, ambitious for his son. The stories related of Aguinaldo's origin, youth, ambitions, and adventures, are numerous; all have the flavor

of superstitious, half-barbarous tradition—stories that, with slight changes, are related of all the heroes of wild and uncontrollable peoples. It seems quite sure, at least, that his father confided him to a benevolent and kindly old Jesuit priest when Emilio was a child, with the hope that the boy might find a place in the religious establishment. He was the servant of this priest, who, observing the unusual intelligence and quickness of the boy, stepped aside from the rule of the government and performed the mission of his sacred office—he gave to the young Aguinaldo the best education he could. The pupil learned rapidly and was eager for knowledge. The old priest thought he saw in his character an instrument of good influence over the wild natives, and continued to teach him, hoping to induct his pupil into orders.

But the church had no place in the dreams of Aguinaldo. He mastered all he could learn in the priest's house and familiarized himself with the clerical offices and manners. When he could learn no more, he concluded to go to Hong Kong and study medicine. There he saw another world, of Europeans and subtle Orientals, of broad and changing ideas and objects. Of pleasing address, agreeable, and open in manner, with ready adaptability to circumstances, he was soon well known and enjoyed excellent opportunities for acquiring the polish as well as the Oriental pretenses of that society.

As there has always been a state of revolution in the Philippines, a Junta was in perpetual existence, with headquarters at Hong Kong. There embittered exiles and hunted leaders met, and from them Aguinaldo became infected with that mysterious brain taint, peculiar to genius and ambition—the restless and boundless desire to do great things and be a leader of men.

He was intellectually superior to the members of the Junta, and was popular with his people because of his attainments. He took the threads of the raveled revolution in hand, knitted them together into a new plan, and was sent to Luzon to set on fire the hearts of the oppressed. His youth, his dauntless courage, his ready wit, his superior knowledge of the world, soon made him the popular idol. The revolution sprang up in every province where Spaniards could be looted

and massacred. Captain-General Augusti offered \$20,000 for the head of Aguinaldo. It was usual. The bribe had been offered many times during four hundred years of Spanish rule. It was in the direction of economy. If a native or *Mestizo* traitor yielded to the temptation and brought in the desired head, it always happened that the claimant was proved guilty of some previous act of treason to Spain. It was more practical to punish treason than to reward treachery. The claimant was usually executed after a rapid trial, and the reward was saved. The families of attainted subjects could not inherit, and the money could not be paid to the dead man. Thus, bookkeeping was simplified, and the treasury profited.

A story is recorded of Aguinaldo's first revolution that illustrates the character of the government and the natives. It may not be true; it reads very like that fiction of which it is said truth is stranger. Yet, it must be remembered that in China and the Philippines much obviously false in other countries may be peculiarly true.

The story runs that when Aguinaldo and 4,000 or 5,000 of his supporters were hidden in a swampy retreat, the Governor-General, Señor Don Basilio Augusti y Davila, offered his reward for Aguinaldo. Within a week he received a note from the insurgent chief, saying: "I need the sum you offer very much, and will deliver the head myself."

Ten days later the southeast typhoon was raging. It was raining as it can rain only in the Orient, a sheet of black water flooding the earth. The two sentinels at the Governor-General's gate made the usual reverent sign as a priest entered, who asked if his Excellency was within and unengaged. They answered "Yes," to both questions. Don Basilio did not turn his head as some one entered. It was his secretary, he supposed, come to help prepare an eloquent statement upon the condition of the colonies. It was not the secretary, but a priest, who said: "Peace be with you, my son."

The cleric locked the door, and dropping his cloak, cried: "Do you know me?"

Don Basilio did not know him. It was Aguinaldo, also a twenty-inch *bolo*, a native knife—answering to the Cuban *machete*,—sharp as

a razor, carried by every Malayan in time of trouble. With it he can lop off an arm with a single stroke.

"I have brought the head of Aguinaldo," the chief said, touching the edge of his jewel-hilted *bolo* to ascertain its condition, "and I claim the reward! Hasten, else I shall have to expedite the matter myself."

Don Basilio was entrapped. He had to open his desk and count out the sum in Spanish gold. Aguinaldo punctiliously wrote a receipt, coolly counted the money, and walked backward toward the door. He suddenly opened it and dashed out, just ahead of a pistol bullet that cut his locks on the temple. Captain-General Polavieja offered Aguinaldo and Atachio, his lieutenant, a pardon and \$200,000 each, to quit the colony. They accepted and got the money, only to learn that they were both to be assassinated the next night at a *fiesta*. The two men who had undertaken the deed were found dead, stabbed to the heart, in their own beds. On the *kris* handle was a bit of paper with a line saying: "Beware of the Malay's vengeance."

Aguinaldo was then twenty-five years old. He and his lieutenant soon discovered that the revolution was doomed. Such revolutions are always doomed when the oppressor charges up against and draws the sinews of war in taxes from the insurgents. In accordance, therefore, with Oriental custom, the two leaders agreed to accept the bribe and deprive the insurrection of its leadership. True, they were leaving their followers by hundreds to cruel execution and the grind of the taxgatherer; but that was the custom. Four hundred years of Spanish colonial rule teaches much.

The amount of the bribe offered was variously reported at from \$100,000 to \$500,000. In the Orient the nudity of virgin Truth is looked upon as an impropriety, dangerous to public morality. She is represented, therefore, as bearing butterfly wings, brilliant with many colors, draped in a scarf woven from the delicate threads of vivid imagination, and the great temple of her resort and worship is described as extending far beyond the municipal limits and even penetrating the suburban additions of the city of Utica.

The acceptance of the bribe was justified to the faithful by the promise that the sum was to be applied to purchasing arms and munitions to be used when the flame of faith should rise again, when the natives should have saved up fresh means for the struggle.

This, then, was the young revolutionary leader with whom Admiral Dewey was now to deal. Twenty-eight years old, alert, confident, with boundless ambition and the determination to find his way to leadership and power past every obstacle that duplicity could evade or pitiless treachery and cruelty could remove.

He had a personal feud with General Augusti, and could be trusted to seal up Manila inland. He had a great respect for the American Admiral, who had so swiftly destroyed from the face of the ocean the naval power of Spain. But the genuine devotion of his heart was expended upon Don Emilio Aguinaldo, and the honors and fortune he could see awaiting himself. The description of the man—myth or truth, half fact or half fancy, whatever the reports may be—deserves the setting of Italy in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when guile and poison went hand in hand with brute mastership and the bloody sword.

II.

THE story of the siege of Manila will not be told until some of those who can shall have escaped the consequences of telling it, by death in a natural manner. The mysteries involved in the ostensible jealousies and feuds between Governor-General Augusti, the Archbishop of Manila, and the Vice-Governor Jaudenes, the negotiations between Spaniards and Aguinaldo's emissaries, the secret arrangements with the German Admiral, the miraculous restoration of Augusti's family by the insurgent leader,—apparently through motives of humanity,—these are incidents that can, in narration, produce only the effect which one who is stone deaf must experience as he views the passing scenes of an acted drama.

THE NUT TO BE
CRACKED IN
MANILA CITY

It was about two weeks after the naval battle when Aguinaldo landed on Luzon and issued a proclamation to the natives, admitting

that he had surrendered two years previously because all resources were exhausted; but he had returned now to punish Spain for failing to keep her promises to him; that he brought aid and arms for the struggle.

All the provinces around Manila at once rose in insurrection and joined Aguinaldo. Governor-General Augusti issued a proclamation offering \$25,000 reward for the head of Aguinaldo.

Within two weeks the insurgent army had flocked into the country around the capital, and, acting under Aguinaldo's shrewd plans, began, on May 28, a simultaneous assault upon Imus, Cavité province, and Bakoor. The steady advance of the insurgents along the coast was supported by the American gunboat *Petrel*, and the Spaniards in the outlying districts took refuge in Manila. The insurgents soon held five important positions within ten miles of Manila, and in capturing them killed five hundred Spaniards. The Spanish outposts were reenforced by the addition of 4,000 troops, but on May 31 they were forced back along the whole line by hand-to-hand fighting of the most desperate character, in which the aggregate loss of the enemy was upward of a thousand men. The fighting lasted seventy hours. A typhoon raged fiercely during the whole time and the torrential rain rendered the rifles of the contestants almost useless. The insurgents almost invariably fought at close quarters and used their knives with terrible effect.

Malibon, Tarlac, and Bakoor were in possession of the insurgents, who also made an attack upon Santa Mesa and Malate, on June 1. Aguinaldo, who had been rendered more desperate and daring by the price put upon his head, was most anxious to make a rush upon Manila at once, but Admiral Dewey refused, from a humanitarian point of view, to permit this, fearing that the passions of the semi-civilized natives might lead them to excesses. The Admiral, therefore, insisted that Aguinaldo wait until the arrival of the United States troops. In pursuance of that policy he forbade the insurgents to cross the Malate River, seven miles south of Manila, and Aguinaldo established his headquarters at Cavité, where his prisoners were brought in.

It was expected that troops would arrive from San Francisco not later than June 15, and Aguinaldo was patient in expectation of their

arrival. He adopted the humanitarian policy that Dewey had not only proclaimed but practiced, and issued orders to his army, forbidding them, under pain of severe penalties, to destroy or injure the lives or property of any foreigners, or of Spanish non-combatants. He also indicated his desire to establish a native administration under an American protectorate, holding a dictatorship, with an advisory council, until the islands were conquered. Then a Republican Assembly would be called.

A singular incident of war occurred in the early actions. The swift descent of the insurgents upon the Spanish towns resulted in placing in the hands of Aguinaldo as prisoners the wife and children of General Augusti, who had offered a price for Aguinaldo's head. They were treated with great respect, and held as hostages to secure proper treatment of native prisoners in Spanish hands for a time. Admiral Dewey conveyed to Aguinaldo a suggestion of the moral effect to be produced by returning the helpless captives to Augusti and relieving the distress of all. Accordingly, the Augusti family was conveyed to Manila harbor and placed in the hands of the German Admiral, who took them secretly into the city to the Governor-General. Whatever explanation of their return was made by the Germans or believed by Augusti, the Spanish dispatches declared that the members of the family had succeeded in effecting their escape from the insurgents and, after encountering distressful hardships, were able to board a German war ship and were smuggled into Manila. The Spanish account of any fact affecting their pride is usually surprising to others.

The successes of the insurgents were so complete and rapid that the first week in June saw Manila entirely invested, with constant skirmishing in the suburbs. The water supply fell into insurgent hands, but Dewey gave instructions that it must not be cut off because of the great distress it might cause the helpless non-combatants and foreign residents. Their successes inflamed the insurgents. They leaped to the conclusion that they were masters of the situation. It was boldly declared that the independence of the Philippines was achieved and a republic would be established. At Singapore a delegation of

the Junta called on the American Consul-General and presented an address, thanking him for sending Aguinaldo to the Philippines, congratulating Admiral Dewey, expressing a desire for the establishment of a native government in the Philippines under American protection, deprecating the restoration of the islands to Spain or their transference to any other power, and declaring that the natives were able to govern themselves.

Meanwhile, Augusti had forwarded dispatches to Madrid, declaring that defense was almost hopeless in the absence of supplies and munitions. He asked for plenary powers in dealing with the situation. These were granted to him. The authority meant that he was free to negotiate with the insurgents with boundless promises of autonomy and liberty. Shortly afterwards Augusti reported that his native troops were deserting and even his Spaniards were disheartened and were surrendering themselves under promises made of the security of their lives and safety.

General Prima de Rivera, formerly Governor-General of the Philippines, made a fierce speech in the Cortes, in which he exposed the fact that the Spanish Government had dealt foully with the colonial government. He declared that when he took charge there was a surplus of \$5,000,000 in the treasury. He reported it and asked permission to fortify and strengthen his defenses, because the Americans were preparing at Hong Kong. The government replied to him that there was no prospect of war with the United States and the surplus was dissipated in Spain. He charged the government with abandoning Augusti.

At this time the plenary powers held by Augusti began to affect the situation at Manila seriously.



AUGUSTI
EX-GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES

III.

ADMIRAL DEWEY found himself in a network of Spanish guile, native craft, and foreign hostility. German, French, and Russian vessels were to be distrusted. British and Japanese sympathy existed, but could not be displayed. The backbone of resistance in the city was in the Archbishop of Manila.

CRAFTY IN-
TRIGUES BY
AGUINALDO

It was known that on May 1, after Montojo's fleet was destroyed, Augusti had hoisted the white flag of surrender in Manila. His soldiers were ordered to be in readiness to march out and lay down their arms. If the white flag was observed by Dewey, he did not dare accept the surrender under the circumstances. His force was too small.

When the Archbishop learned that the white flag was raised, he held a council with the Vice-Governor, Señor Don Ferruni Jaudenes, and deposed Augusti. The yellow flag of Spain was unfurled again, and the Archbishop issued his pastoral appeal against the accursed and savage Americans. But Augusti was restored—though by what process was not understood.

With plenary power bestowed upon him, negotiations now began between Spaniards and insurgents. Advised by the Germans, it was said, encouraged by government promises of assistance from Cervera's fleet, from Camara's fleet, from troops, Augusti sought to win Aguinaldo over by warning him that the Americans were only using him to hold the Spaniards in check until their troops could arrive, when he would be worse off than under Spanish autonomy. Or, that, if the Spanish reinforcements arrived first, the Americans would be destroyed and the insurgents abandoned.

Aguinaldo replied that he had guarantees from the Americans. The Archbishop urged him to test the guarantees and see if he were not being deceived. The Americans were conscienceless mercenaries, whose hand would be more remorseless than that of Spain. Augusti warned him that the foreign war ships would not permit the

Americans to land their forces, that Europe had determined not to permit the United States to gain a colony in the East.

Aguinaldo's personal secretary, Legardo, was busily employed in these negotiations, as the go-between. Atachio, the lieutenant of Aguinaldo, who was to share the former bribe, and had charged that it had not been employed for revolutionary purposes, but that Aguinaldo had misused it for personal purposes, was now on the island. He was not a pleasant person to have about if Aguinaldo should conclude to make terms with Spain. Atachio was arrested, charged with a treasonable act, and imprisoned. Sandigo, another insurgent leader, conceded by general consent to be actuated by disinterested patriotism alone, who possessed fine executive ability and true political foresight, was in Atachio's confidence, and distrusted Aguinaldo. He did not hesitate to say that the leader was only looking out for personal wealth, power, and honors. Sandigo, also, was arrested upon a pretense, and sent to prison.

Atachio "disappeared." It was said that he had been shot for treason; that he had escaped and deserted to the enemy; that he had been deported because of his jealousies, and as a benevolent act of his old comrade who did not wish to take his life.

The news came to the Americans. They could not ascertain what had become of Atachio or of his brother, his cousin and two nephews. They discovered Sandigo, imprisoned in a house, awaiting death. They talked with him and visited him daily. Aguinaldo could not risk executing his vengeance under the circumstances. With the hard, impassive, unscrupulous craft of his race, he had removed all the enemies possible on the first days of his occupation. Twenty-three priests in a monastery at Cavité fell into his hands the first day he took possession. They, too, "disappeared."

But Aguinaldo had ostentatiously practiced magnanimity to some foes. Their lives were spared, and he had 4,000 or more Spanish and native volunteer prisoners at Cavité. His army was large and could be greatly augmented. He was credited with having 100,000 guns and some field pieces captured from the Spanish.

He was rendered uneasy by the warnings of future hostility on the part of Americans, and he concluded to test the good faith of Dewey. He declared publicly the independence of the Philippine Islands, announced the intention to organize a republic, and organized a Provisional Government, of which he was President. He was to be distinguished by the privilege of wearing a collar of braided gold, as the Spanish governors were. His proclamation was issued in these words:—

DON EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAURY,

President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines and General-in-Chief of Its Army:—

In conformity with the precepts in the decree of this government, dated June 23 ult., and the instructions which accompanied it, I proclaim as follows:—

ARTICLE 1. Señor Don Baldomero Aguinaldo is appointed Secretary of War and Public Works; Señor Don Leandro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior and branches comprehended therein; Señor Don Mariani Trias, Secretary of the Treasury and the annexed branches.

The conduct of the Bureau of Foreign Relations, Marine and Commerce, will be in charge provisionally, for the present, of the Presidency, until there is appointed a Secretary who is considered more apt.

ART. 2. The gentlemen named will assume charge of their respective offices, previously having solemnly taken, on the day designated for that purpose by the President, the following oath: "I swear by God and my honor to carry out the laws and decisions and to fulfill faithfully the duty I voluntarily accept, under the penalties established for the same. So may it be."

This oath will be taken before the President and the dignitaries who are invited for this solemn act, the interested person placing his right hand on the New Testament.

ART. 3. The directors and chiefs of provinces and villages on receiving their respective titles will take a similar oath before the President and the Secretaries of the government.

The prominent counselors, as well as the delegates and sub-chiefs, will take the oath before the chief of the province and the chiefs of the villages previously invited to the solemn act.

ART. 4. In the reports and similar documents presented to the authorities and in official correspondence, there will be employed before the name of the official the title "Señor" or "Maguiñor" (Tagalo), according to the character and importance of the same. When the official is not so addressed the personal title "Usted" will be used when directed to an inferior or to an equal, but when addressed to a superior the title "Xorot ros" will be employed.

ART. 5. The Secretaries are empowered to sign "by order of the President" such resolutions or decisions as are of small importance and those which expediency requires should be put into effect; but final decrees and resolutions will be confirmed by the President and the Secretary.

ART. 6. The chiefs of provinces are permitted to use as distinctive of their office a cane with gold head and silver tassels. On the upper part of the cane there will be engraved a sun and three stars.

The chiefs of villages may carry a similar cane, but with black tassels. The sub-chiefs, also, may carry a cane with silver head and red tassels.

The provincial counselors are authorized to wear a triangular badge of gold, pendent from a collar and a chain of the same metal; on the badge there shall appear an engraved sun and three stars. The delegates will wear a similar badge, but of silver; also the chain.

ART. 7. The President will wear as a distinctive mark a collar of gold from which depends a badge similar to those heretofore described, and also a whistle of gold. The Secretaries will wear a similar collar with the badge, and the directors, also, but of silver.

The President will carry, also, a cane with head and tassels of gold.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT,


EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Dated at BAKOOR, *July 5, 1898.*

Aguinaldo had been told that the first American reënforcements would arrive not later than June 15. They did not reach Cavité until June 30, and there was but one brigade of troops under General Anderson. Aguinaldo was suspicious of the strength of the Americans, and was not unwilling to set himself up between the United States, Spain, and Europe as a factor to be reckoned with.

He respected Admiral Dewey, who had not been open to negotiation or discussion and who had made no sign. He had seen what Dewey's squadron could do on the water; and when the Admiral had warned him that if his troops undertook to enter Manila they would be decimated by the guns of the war ships, he had acknowledged the force of the argument. But now that American soldiers were encamped between his lines and the ships he felt easier.

He was invited to attend the Fourth of July celebration by the troops, but replied that he was "indisposed." He sent his military band.



WEAVING IN THE PHILIPPINES

The "indisposition" was, perhaps, the preoccupation of preparing the announcement dated July 5, of the provisional republic of the Philippines.

The Americans were still reticent. He was puzzled by such unresponsiveness to his clearly expressed intention to forestall their purposes.

But Aguinaldo exhibited no lack of confidence, if he felt any. He became haughty, reserved, cautious, as becoming his high office. When the American commissaries and quartermasters asked the natives for supplies, they answered that they could not comply with the request without permission from "the President-General." It was difficult to secure horses, bullock-carts, and wagons, for transporting supplies. Aguinaldo did not inconvenience himself to obtain them.

The patience of Chief-Quartermaster Jones was exhausted. He must prepare quarters for an army division, soon to arrive, and delay was perilous. He visited Aguinaldo's headquarters at Bakoor, whither they had been removed. The orderly announced that the General was "indisposed." Major Jones waited two hours and called again. The orderly politely said the General was asleep and nobody dared awaken him when he was asleep.

Major Jones left abruptly and wrote a terse and very plain letter which he sent to Aguinaldo by an orderly who was instructed to see that it reached the young Dictator. It notified him that if all the transportation and assistance needed was not promptly furnished by the natives, the American soldiers would at once seize everything needed without permission. "We should regret very much," the letter concluded, "to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.

"I will await your reply."

The convenience of the American army was not as important to "the President-General" as was the ultimate American purpose. He sent an aide at once to General Anderson to inquire if the letter of Major Jones was authorized.

General Anderson replied that it was authorized, and, in fact, ordered. He added the remark that when an American commander was indisposed or asleep it was the rule to have some one in authority ready to transact matters of importance.

Then the craft of Aguinaldo was exercised. He formally replied to the letter next day. He expressed surprise that there should have been any suggestion of unwillingness on the part of the Filipinos to aid the Americans, for the Filipinos knew that the Americans "did not desire a colony," and were there only to drive out the Spaniards and turn the islands over to the Filipinos for government. The Filipinos would be only too glad to help the Americans, but they could not furnish so much transportation, because they did not have it. In conclusion, he asked for a definite statement of the American intentions.

The receipt of his letter was acknowledged, with the statement that it would be referred to General Merritt upon his arrival.

Then transportation was furnished, but in many crafty ways Aguinaldo sought to get a definite expression of purpose, and to obtain letters addressed to him as "President." General Anderson informed him that the Americans could give no recognition to his government or his office without authority from the President of the United States.

During these proceedings the insurgents were continually assaulting the fortifications around Manila, and the Spanish garrison was worn out with sleepless guard, poor food, and exposure to the drenching rains. Persons coming out of the city reported famine as fast approaching. Horses were being butchered for food, and the distress was great. There were dissensions in the army over the question of surrendering. The Captain-General, Augusti, was determined to surrender as soon as the Americans advanced. Some of the subordinate



SUGAR CANE GRINDING IN THE PHILIPPINES

officers who wanted to fight to the last, were reported as having secretly drawn lots to determine which should kill Augusti if he surrendered, and the plan for his assassination was reported complete. The volunteers had refused to leave the walls of the city, and nearly all the regulars had been sent into the trenches and outworks.

IV.

ON JULY 23, Major-General Merritt, Military-Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the United States army for the Philippines, arrived with 4,000 troops. Informing himself at once of the military and political conditions existing, he decided to have no communication with Aguinaldo or his provisional government, but to deal with the Spanish holders of the island and the obstacles in the way of the capture of Manila. He made an inspection of the camps and of the prisons at Cavité, where some of Aguinaldo's prisoners were confined. They were emaciated, wan, and starving. They had sold every button, medal, ornament, and nearly all their clothing, to purchase food. They were served with rations from the United States commissariat and cared for.

FINAL INVEST-
MENT OF THE
CITY COMPLETED

The brigades were moved up nearer to Manila, and the heavy battery, which had been presented to the United States by Mr. John Jacob Astor, of New York, was placed in effective position. The road from Bakoor to Manila was occupied up to the village of Malate on the river of the same name where the Spaniards had thrown up intrenchments.

This movement thrust Aguinaldo's troops aside. They had been occupying the position and carrying on an intermittent artillery and rifle duel with the Spaniards within the walls. The poor marksmanship of the Spaniards sent their shells and bullets over the insurgents and into the American ranks. General Merritt sent instructions to Aguinaldo to remove his men, or to make them cease the exchange of firing, because it accomplished no object and endangered our

troops. The insurgents were ordered away and the Astor battery was placed within a thousand yards of the walls of Manila.

The country all around Manila was reconnoitered and mapped for use in the event of assault. Preparations advanced rapidly, and with the precision of well-ordered purpose. Aguinaldo grew uneasy. If Manila passed under American control there would be no foothold for an insurgent army. What was to become of Aguinaldo's troops and their arms? He relaxed his pride and practiced the cunning of humility. He wrote to General Merritt and begged the privilege, as a reward for his troops, that on the day of capture or surrender, they be permitted to march through Manila. The triumph of passing through the streets they had assisted in conquering, would repay them for the sacrifices they had made to assist the Americans against the power of Spain.

General Merritt meditated over the political effect of this request, the prestige and glory it would confer upon Aguinaldo, and the possibilities it offered for future troubles, and took it under advisement only.

Aguinaldo was averse to having his men disarmed after Manila should be taken. He made the suggestion that there might be formed several regiments of Filipinos, officered by Americans, and kept as part of the regular force of Americans as long as the United States maintained a military force in the islands. The suggestion brought up vividly the action of the Filipinos in going over by whole regiments to the Spaniards in rebellions. It would be difficult to find American officers who would voluntarily take such a command. They remembered the great Indian Mutiny, and discouraged a repetition of the betrayals and massacres that were practiced by native regiments against their British officers around Calcutta.


In the city Governor Augusti was disheartened. He was constantly urging his government to authorize him to capitulate. The government refused, and replied that Camara's fleet was on its way with succor. But Augusti was a Spaniard, and did not believe the government. He persisted in his demands, and expressed the fear that if he did not

capitulate to the Americans the insurgents would storm the city and loot it with awful massacre.

Spain cared little for such an argument. She was hoping by some trick to save the Philippines in the negotiations for peace, then plainly within political view.

Augusti resigned; or was deposed—which? Jaudenes was appointed Governor, with the implacable Archbishop at his back to lend him advice and strength.

At this time great events were occurring on the other side of the world.



CHAPTER THE TWENTY-FIFTH.

THE INVASION OF PORTO RICO.

YELLOW AND MALARIAL FEVERS INVADE THE CAMPS OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS NEAR SANTIAGO
— A "ROUND ROBIN" AND THE PROTEST THAT CAUSED THE FIGHTERS TO BE BROUGHT
HOME—GENERAL MILES, WITH THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS, INVADES PORTO RICO, LAND-
ING AT GUANICA—YAUCO AND PONCE WELCOME OUR SOLDIERS AND ARE GLAD
TO BE IN THE UNITED STATES—THE TWO MOVEMENTS THAT WERE TO
UNITE AND CAPTURE SAN JUAN, THE CAPITAL—INTERRUPTED BY
THE PEACE PROTOCOL, BUT VERY SUCCESSFULLY UNDER WAY
—GENERAL MILES REGARDS THE PEOPLE FAVORABLY—
SIGNIFICANCE OF PORTO RICO'S READY SURRENDER.

I.

THE fall of Santiago was to be followed by the fall of Spain. Dewey's victory at Manila had opened vast possibilities of internationalism to the United States and set in motion all the political influences of the world. The victory of Sampson and Shafter at Santiago had confirmed the permanence of American power and put an end to all possible machinations by continental Europe. Just as it had unnerved Augusti at Manila, it had unnerved Captain-General Macias of Porto Rico, and filled Spain with mortal despair.

The surrender of Santiago was obtained none too soon. It was a piece of good fortune. Immediately after the Spaniards turned over their arms, the American troops were sent into camp on the hilltops north of the city where the cool atmosphere, it was hoped, would enable them to recuperate and resist disease. It was too late. Three weeks of fighting and constant exposure in trenches, without tentage and on short rations, followed by the sudden relaxation of nervous tension in inaction, rendered them particularly susceptible to the diseases peculiar to the country and the season. Yellow fever, malarial fever, and other camp maladies began to appear. Nearly 75 per cent. of the army was soon unfit for duty. August 1, fifteen days after the surrender,

General Shafter reported 4,239 cases of sickness and fifteen deaths, while many others of his men were weak and ready to succumb.

A conference was held by the officers at Santiago which resulted in the preparation of a petition or protest called a "Round Robin," addressed to General Shafter, which was as follows:—

We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern seacoast of the United States; that it can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not epidemic; that there are a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.

We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move into the interior and that there are not facilities for such a move, if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

This army must be moved at once or perish. As the army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.

J. FORD KENT,

Major-General, volunteers, commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.

J. C. BATES,

Major-General, volunteers, commanding Provisional Division.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Major-General, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

SAMUEL S. SUMMER,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding First Brigade, cavalry.

WILLIAM LUDLOW,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

ADELBERT AMES,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

LEONARD WOOD,

Brigadier-General, volunteers, commanding the city of Santiago.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT,

Colonel, commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

General Shafter had called the conference, and the "Round Robin" was transmitted to him by Colonel Roosevelt, with the following letter of explanation:—

In a meeting of the general and medical officers, called by you at the palace this morning, we were all, as you know, unanimous in view of what should be done with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire command north at once. Yellow fever cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it. But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial fever. Not a man has died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and so shattered as to be ripe for dying like sheep when a real yellow fever epidemic, instead of a fake epidemic like the present, strikes us, as it is bound to if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August and the beginning of September.

Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the toothache. All of us are certain as soon as the authorities at Washington fully appreciate the conditions of the army, to be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human probability mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly season, will die.

This is not only the trouble from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the standpoint of the military efficiency of the flower of the American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick list, large though it is, exceeding 4,000, affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army. Not ten per cent. are fit for active work. Six weeks on the north Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere, where the yellow fever germ cannot possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting cocks, able as we are and eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the Fall, even if we are not allowed to try Porto Rico.

We can be moved north, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country, although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved north or to Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we face bullets. But there is no object in it. The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in our present weakened condition; and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have found by actual reconnoissance. Our present camps are as healthful as any camps at this end of the island can be.



FORTIFICATION, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO

I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely, and who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving, so far as lies in me, to avert a doom as fearful as it is unnecessary and undeserved.

The "Round Robin" caused a great deal of excited comment in the United States, owing to the fact that such proceedings are rare in armies, and to the additional fact that the public had not suspected the existence of the conditions exposed. The government gave orders that the official letters must not be permitted to pass outside the United States by cable or telegraph, lest the information give encouragement to Spain.

The cavalry of Wheeler's division at Santiago was immediately ordered to Montauk Point, Long Island, U. S. A., and preparations were at once made to bring the infantry home. Five regiments of "immunes," Southern soldiers that had once suffered from yellow fever, and were considered safe from a second infection, were ordered to Santiago for garrison duty, under command of Brigadier-General Hood, son of the famous Confederate Commander.

The return of the troops from Cuba was attended by many difficulties, and involved much suffering to the sick and wounded.

II.


SWIFTLY following up the Spanish collapse at Santiago, General Nelson A. Miles, General-in-Chief of the army, sailed with part of the Fifth Army Corps from Santiago to Porto Rico nine days after the surrender. He was accompanied by Major-General James H. Wilson, of volunteers, and was reënforced later with fresh troops from Newport News under Major-General John R. Brooke, U. S. A. No opportunity was to be permitted for Spain to recover the shock of her losses.

INVASION OF THE
ISLAND OF
PORTO RICO

The squadron under Commodore Watson, intended to pursue Camara's ships, was now enlarged to a fleet, which Admiral Sampson

was to command, with orders to prepare for immediate attack upon the Canary Islands and a descent upon the Spanish fortified seaports to find Camara's hiding ships and destroy them. The announcement caused great fear throughout Spain, and once again her cabinet sought to arouse Europe to combine against the entrance by American ships upon European waters for war purposes—urging the step as a retaliatory act against the Monroe Doctrine. But the European Powers did not display any intention to act after an exchange of notes. The appearance of a British squadron at Gibraltar was considered ominous to the proposed interference.

The island of Porto Rico, which was discovered in 1493, and has ever since been under Spanish rule, is one hundred and eight miles in length and about forty miles wide. It is a most healthful and delightful country, with mountain ranges and many streams. Forty of these are navigable for a short distance from the coast. The climate in the interior is particularly mild and salubrious. It contains an area of about 3,600 square miles and 800,000 inhabitants. It is fourth in rank, according to size, of the Greater Antilles group, but in prosperity and density of population it is first. It is one of the few tropical islands and countries where the white population outnumbers the black. The commercial capital and largest city is Ponce, situated three miles inland from the port of the same name on the southern coast. The city rests on a rich plain, surrounded by gardens and plantations. There are hot springs in the vicinity, which are much frequented by invalids. Along the beach in front of the port are extensive depots, in which the products of the interior, forwarded through Ponce, are stored for shipment. The last enumeration gave to Ponce a population of 37,545, while San Juan, the capital on the north coast, had only 23,414 inhabitants. Ponce has a number of fine buildings, among which are the town hall, the theatre, two churches, the Charity and the Women's asylums, the barracks, the Cuban House, and the market. The road between the city and the seaside is a beautiful promenade. Cuba is thirteen times larger than Porto Rico, but its population was not more than double the latter before Weyler exterminated



THE PLAZA, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO

a third of the native Cubans. Besides Ponce and San Juan, the largest towns on the island, are Arecibo (30,000 inhabitants), Utuado (31,000), Mayaguez (28,000), San German (20,000), Yauco (25,000), Juana Diaz (21,000), and there are some ten other towns with a population of 15,000 or over. In the past fifty years about half the population has gravitated into and about the towns, particularly those of the seaboard. The inhabitants live in comfortable houses, and many have sufficient means to purchase all the comforts of the world.

Porto Rico has always been lightly touched by the blighting hand of Spain. It has been regarded as a part of Spain, rather than a colony, and for the past twenty years it has been politically a province of the Spanish Kingdom. The Spanish Government has had little to do directly with internal improvements in the island, and kept her heavy hand off the people, so that there was opportunity for the spirit of enterprise to develop. As a consequence Porto Rico has about one hundred and fifty miles of railroad, and as much more under construction; and a system of wagon roads leading to all the important trading centers that surpasses anything of the sort seen in most parts of Spain itself. The portions of railroad parallel to the coasts are long sections of a line that will ultimately make the entire circuit of the island, with short branches to all the seaports and the inland market towns.

This beautiful island abounds in sugar, coffee, tobacco, honey, and wax, which have enriched the people. A very large part of the trade has been with the United States, whose corn, flour, salt meat, fish, and lumber were imported in return for sugar, molasses, and coffee. The natives have little taste for the sea and most of the foreign trade has been carried in foreign bottoms. Porto Rico is rich in natural blessings, and, for a tropical region, very healthful.

The capital, San Juan, was the best fortified city of Porto Rico, occupying there the relative position that Havana occupied in Cuba. When General Miles started his expedition the expectation was that it would effect a landing at Fajardo, on the northeastern coast. After this ostensible purpose had been well published, his convoys

and transports suddenly arrived off the harbor of Guanica on the southwestern coast at daylight on the morning of July 25.


The small Spanish garrison in a blockhouse on the beach was utterly surprised when Commander Wainwright of the *Gloucester* ran into the harbor and with his small guns opened fire. The Spaniards attempted to reply but were soon driven off and a party of marines landed and hoisted the American flag over the blockhouse. None of the Americans was injured, but the Spanish lost several killed and wounded.

The troops of the expedition, numbering some 3,500, were disembarked in the afternoon without difficulty or opposition. The harbor is the best in the island, although the country about is low and swampy. Guanica is the port outlet for several towns near the coast. That part of Porto Rico has never been entirely loyal to Spain, perhaps because it was in sympathy with the eastern province of Cuba. East of Guanica are the towns of Yauco and Ponce, the former not more than five miles distant, and thence a railroad leads to Ponce.

Marching towards Yauco on the 26th there was a skirmish with the enemy, in which the Americans had four men wounded, and the Spaniards lost sixteen killed and wounded. When our troops entered Yauco they were received with enthusiasm and joy, not wholly unmixed, however, with some anxiety. Francisco Megia, *alcalde*, or mayor, of the town, had issued in advance a proclamation to the public, to prepare the population for the crisis. It was in these terms, which accepted annexation as an accomplished fact:—

CITIZENS:—To-day the citizens of Porto Rico assist in one of her most beautiful festivals. The sun of America shines upon our mountains and valleys this day of July, 1898. It is a day of glorious remembrance for each son of this beloved isle, because for the first time there waves over it the flag of the Stars, planted in the name of the government of the United States of America by the Major-General of the American army, General Miles.

Porto Ricans, we are, by the miraculous intervention of the God of the just, given back to the bosom of our mother America, in whose waters nature placed us as people of America. To her we are given back, in the name of her government, by General Miles, and we must send her our most expressive salutation of generous



STREET SCENE, SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO

affection through our conduct toward the valiant troops represented by distinguished officers and commanded by the illustrious General Miles.

Citizens: Long live the government of the United States of America! Hail to their valiant troops! Hail Porto Rico, always American!

YAUCO, Porto Rico, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

On the same day the *Massachusetts*, *Dixie*, *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Gloucester* had appeared before Ponce to blockade the port and prepare to bombard it when the troops arrived from Guanica, ten miles west. Instead of meeting with resistance, the city authorities sent a delegation to call on Commander Higginson of the *Massachusetts*, and welcome the American forces to peaceful occupation. The population was enthusiastic over the Americans, and when General Miles and his soldiers arrived by rail from Guanica, he entered an American city from which the Spanish garrison had fled without stopping to look back. In the streets the whole population had assembled as for a patriotic celebration. The buildings were decorated with the flags of all nations except Spain. The ceremony of welcoming the conquerors was interesting and unusual.

General Miles, who had come with the army from Guanica, and General Wilson, who had come with the war ships, were met at Ponce port by arrangement, and a delegated escort drove them in carriages into the city proper, to the Casa del Rey, where the civil governor, Toro, and the mayor, Ulpiano Colon, awaited them. A guard in front of the building forced a way for the American Generals, and through the cheering crowd they walked into the building, where they were presented to the local officials.

Governor Toro said the citizens of Ponce were anxious to know if the municipal officers and system that had been in vogue would be continued temporarily. He was assured that municipal affairs would not be disturbed for the time being, and that the same local officers would serve. But it was explained that the local authorities would be responsible to General Wilson as Military Governor, who would keep the city under a form of martial law oppressive to none.

After the conference Mayor Colon said he was glad the Americans had come, because the island would now enjoy prosperity and peace, and the best citizens wanted the Americans to take possession.

The political prisoners were released at once. Redolf Figeroa was saved in the nick of time from being shot by the Spaniards. He was charged with having cut the telegraph wire between Ponce and San Juan the previous night. His purpose was to prevent the authorities in Ponce from sending to San Juan for reënforcements. He had been led from his cell to be executed, but when our ships entered the harbor, the Spaniards, in their excitement, let him go, and Figeroa escaped. Some men who had been political prisoners for years were released.


The popular demonstrations continued all day. The natives were all in gala dress, and "open house" was kept for all Americans. Kindness and hospitality were unbounded. This outburst was not entirely the artifice of fear.

Three days before, Captain-General Macias, the Spanish Commander-in-Chief, had cabled to the Madrid cabinet that Porto Rico could not be defended. He said the populace was inclined to the Americans and could not be depended upon, and that his handful of 12,000 or 15,000 troops could not make an effective resistance.

This information caused the Sagasta government's pretenses of war to collapse. Its most favored possession, Porto Rico, favorable to the enemy, Cuba inevitably lost, its fleet destroyed, its treasury bankrupt, and its expected friends in Europe unable to take a step, there was but one thing to do, if the Philippines were to be saved by hook or crook. That one thing necessary was to sue for peace.

On the 26th of July, therefore, the Spanish Government made overtures for peace. While General Miles was waiting in Ponce peace negotiations were pending, but there was to be no halt in the prosecution of his campaign.

The great central trans-Porto Rico highway runs from Ponce northeasterly to San Juan, through the towns of Juan Diaz, Coamo, and Aybónito, where it goes almost eastward to Cayey, there to take a winding course to the north as far as Caguas, where it turns west to Aguas



STREET SCENE IN MAYAGUEZ, PORTO RICO

Buenas, and then goes decidedly north to San Juan through Guayanabo and Rio Piedras, making in all a distance of about eighty-five miles. The distance from Ponce to San Juan in a straight line is only forty-five miles. The highway is a fine military road. Major-General Wilson was appointed Governor of Ponce, and the troops started next day for Juana Díaz. In two days, under American tariffs, the custom-house at Ponce yielded a revenue of \$14,000. The natives were asking for American flags to hoist over the large buildings, a clear indication of the state of settled feeling about the new relations.

The campaign in Cuba lasted nineteen days, and was conducted upon military lines which were impossible at Santiago. When the Spaniards withdrew along the line of the great military road between Ponce and San Juan they destroyed the bridges, obstructed the roads, and fortified strong positions in the mountain passage, and then were surprised to find that one column of our army was sweeping around the west end of the island, capturing the principalities and towns, while another had passed over the mountains by a trail which the Spaniards had supposed impassable, and, therefore, had not fortified or guarded. The first the Spanish knew of the march of the American army was the appearance of a strong brigade within twenty miles of the northern coast, at the terminus of the railroad connecting San Juan with Arecibo. The actual objective of both movements was to capture San Juan, where the greatest force of the enemy gathered by retreat. There were not more than half a dozen encounters with the enemy, all mere skirmishes. The troops on the west coast, under General Brooke, were all regulars, while the main column that moved along the military road was composed of volunteers. These acted with courage and spirit throughout the whole march, and displayed the temper that would quickly convert them into veteran soldiers.


The campaign was ended without either movement being completed. But both were well in hand, and there is no doubt that they would have been thoroughly carried out to success. A few days more and General Schwan and General Henry, with their divisions, would have effected junction at Arecibo, ready for a flank movement on the

capital in rear of the Spanish forces operating around Aybonito. These would have been driven from the latter position by General Wilson; and while there might have been found many points for a stand by the enemy, the only possible outcome would have been precipitate retreat by the Spanish to San Juan, or their capture.

"The island of Porto Rico," said General Miles, on his return, "was fairly won by the right of conquest, and became a part of the United States. The sentiment of the people was in no sense outraged by the invaders, but, on the contrary, was successfully propitiated. A people who have endured the severity of Spanish rule for four centuries hail with joy the protection of the Great Republic. One of the richest sections of country over which our flag now floats has been added and will be of lasting value to our nation, politically, commercially, and from a military or strategic point of view. The possession of that island also rendered any further resistance of the Spanish forces in Cuba hopeless."

General Miles remained in Porto Rico as long as he deemed his presence necessary for carrying out his instructions, and returned bringing with him nearly 5,000 troops no longer required. There were about 12,000 troops left on the island for garrison purpose, a number considered ample for the duty.

The remarkable welcome given to Americans in this island might well be considered the deathblow to Spanish colonial rule. The least harassed of all Spain's possessions, the people were glad to escape her clutches. It was not surprising that Spanish soldiers in Cuba were eager to surrender and autonomist officials in some towns begged to have their municipalities included in Toral's surrender. At Manila it was not so much surrender to Americans that was dreaded, as the expectation of terrible retaliations from the insurgent natives who had been so cruelly oppressed. There had been no Porto Rican revolutions in recent times. But Cuba and the Philippines had written their histories in their own blood.



CALLE DE SUÑER, MAYAGUEZ, PORTO RICO

CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SIXTH.

PEACE.

SPAIN AT LAST BEGS FOR TERMS UPON WHICH PEACE MAY BE REACHED—THE UNITED STATES DEMANDS THE FREEDOM OF CUBA, CESSION OF PORTO RICO AND ALL SPANISH ISLANDS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, ONE OF THE LADRONES, AND RESERVES THE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PHILIPPINES—
SPAIN REQUIRES DELAY, OF COURSE, BUT ACCEPTS THE
TERMS—PEACE PROTOCOL SIGNED AUGUST 12—
MANZANILLO, CUBA, BOMBARDED THE
SAME DAY AND A SKIRMISH
IN PORTO RICO.

I.

FOR several weeks Spain had been seeking peace by every means but the proper one. She had appealed to Europe for a mediator, but the continental countries had no stomach for the business and coldly advised her to turn to the United States. The American Ambassadors at Paris and London were unofficially sounded, and they returned the answer that the President would not permit any intervention or mediation for peace through any third nation, and that the only channel of communication was between Madrid and Washington. Spain's guile was exhausted. The United States had kept to a straight line of conduct that permitted no complication.

SPAIN BEGS
FOR PEACE,
AT LAST

When war opened Spain requested the French Ambassador and the Austrian Minister to take charge of the interests of Spanish subjects resident in the United States. When these diplomats reported the arrangement for approval, the President replied that it would give him great pleasure to receive either of those gentlemen, but he could not consent that both might act. It was an opening wedge through which misunderstanding might arise and thus permit protest and appeal. He begged them to arrange for a single representative. It was finally arranged that M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, should act,

and that Austrian consuls should represent the interests of Spanish subjects at points only where no French consuls were stationed, but that their representations should come through the hands of the French Ambassador.

The American Ambassador at London, Colonel John Hay, was instructed to inform the Spanish authorities that it was the intention of this government not to recognize in any manner the right of Europe to mediate or interfere in the affairs of the United States, and that the only proposal for peace which could be received must come from Spain direct through any agent the Spanish Government would designate and furnish with the necessary authority.

The "honor of Spain" could find no means of escape from the path of honesty. Porto Rico was slipping away; a great fleet of battleships, cruisers, torpedo destroyers, scouts, and a dynamite engine was ready to set sail under Sampson, to invade her home ports. The game was up.

On July 26 the French Ambassador called on the Secretary of State at Washington and presented a note from the Spanish Foreign Minister embodying overtures for peace. He was conducted to the Executive Office and had a conference with the President. The proposition was a surprise, not because it was unexpected, but because it came so soon. Spanish dilatoriness is so well known that speedy action in this instance was an indication of acute distress.

The overture did not embrace any distinct proposition but asked the United States for a statement of the terms upon which it would be willing to cease hostilities. Instead of suggesting terms the Spaniard was attempting to place the United States in the embarrassing position of taking the first steps to obtain peace. Moreover, it would force our government to show its purpose concerning the territory already conquered or under process of seizure, and permit Europe to ponder the terms and estimate the consequences upon its various interests. Under the circumstances the President informed M. Cambon that he would not reply to the note until he could consult with his cabinet.



M. JULES CAMBON

THE FRENCH MINISTER WHO CONDUCTED THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SPAIN

Only the day before our troops had landed in Porto Rico, and the delay would not affect United States action. The Spanish note said the first thing hoped for was a cessation of hostilities. But the army operations and naval preparations went on vigorously.

The cabinet conferred upon the terms to be offered. There was no variance of opinion upon demanding the evacuation of Cuba, the cession to the United States of the island of Porto Rico and all other Spanish islands in the Western Hemisphere, and the holding of one of the Ladrone Islands. It was quickly determined to ask no indemnity in money for the cost of war, since it was obvious that Spain could not pay, and it was useless to waste time over an empty clause.

The whole interest centered upon what disposition was to be made of the Philippines. The sentiment of the United States was not definitely known, and the President frankly announced that he was desirous of having popular opinion. He was determined to reserve a coaling station, at least, and perhaps the bay and city of Manila and its province. His purpose was to make a statement of demands to Spain that would be unequivocal and which would not be modified. The cabinet, it was understood, was divided upon the desirability of holding all the Philippines.

The answer to Spain's inquiry was handed to the French Ambassador on Saturday, July 30. Its terms were not made known in form to the public, but were fairly outlined. The most important feature in the communication was the demand that Spain must signify acceptance or rejection of the terms offered without delay. It was the firm determination of our government that the propositions should not be used for the purpose of inciting European suggestion or international political activity. It was intimated that failure to answer affirmatively within a reasonable length of time, or an attempt to temporize in the hope of securing a modification of the demands, would be accepted by the government as sufficient cause for declining to continue the negotiations.

The demands were substantially as follows: The withdrawal of all Spanish military and naval forces from Cuba, and the relinquishment

of Spanish sovereignty in that island; similar action with regard to Porto Rico, with the additional provision that Spain should cede that island to the United States; no responsibility to be imposed on the United States for financial obligations contracted by Spain on behalf of Cuba and Porto Rico, which are to be held to include all outlying possessions of Spain in the Western Hemisphere; the United States to maintain control over all other territory where the American flag has been raised; the city and harbor of Manila to be occupied by the United States until a peace commission should decide upon the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. The immediate acceptance of these terms would be construed by the United States as sufficient guarantee of Spain's good faith in proposing an arrangement of peace terms, and would authorize the President to appoint commissioners to treat with commissioners designated by Spain to consider and arrange a treaty of peace, reserving all rights to make demands of any character. In substance the United States demanded that before any terms of peace should be considered, Spanish authority in the Western Hemisphere should be relinquished, leaving Cuba in the hands of this government as a trustee, and absolutely ceding Porto Rico, Manila, and one of the Ladrone Islands. The United States did not agree to let Spain have any part of the Philippines, nor make any promises whatsoever.

These demands were received by the Sagasta government with expressions of disappointment. They claimed that too much was demanded, in spite of the fact that everything had been lost. They wanted the Cuban and Porto Rican bonds saddled upon the islands, or, at least, a part of them. Spain had also guaranteed \$40,000,000 of Philippine bonds in 1897. There were more than \$500,000,000 of securities guaranteed by Spain involved in the alienation of her colonies under the terms. Still, as these bonds had been issued for the benefit of Spain and not for the advantage of the colonies, it was but the return of her own selfishness to punish her.

The Sagasta cabinet had, also, to take notice of Spanish opinion of the demands. Spain was lifeless, and the public was apparently

prepared to have peace accepted at any price. But the political leaders must be appeased and committed, since Spain was in throes that might provoke a revolution of terrible proportions. All the leaders, except General Weyler, conferred with Señor Sagasta. Weyler wrote a curt note in reply to the invitation, saying he was surprised that Señor Sagasta desired to consult with him concerning peace when he had not been consulted regarding war. He added that the nation had been disappointed in what it was entitled to expect in its leaders, namely, success in war.

There was some reason to believe that the American demands were communicated to the Pope as the basis for requesting his offices and power in restraining the Spanish clergy from assisting Don Carlos, if the pretender should attempt to lead a revolution upon the pretence that the Alfonsine dynasty would dishonor Spain by the concessions.

After much delay and distress the Spanish cabinet agreed on August 7, to accept the demands of the United States, the agreement containing an expression of protest against the cession of Porto Rico, as being largely in excess in value of any money indemnity that could be reasonably expected, and against any final demand that Spain must yield the Philippines. These two colonies now suddenly appeared to be of vast importance.* The expression was not, however, contentious in tone.

*If the French people are gratified at the arrangement they are helping to promote, by which the United States will secure Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, the nation is very easy to please. Cuba might have belonged to France. It did not become an accomplished fact mainly owing to the greed and the irresistible desire on all occasions of Louis Philippe to drive a hard bargain. The proceedings were throughout kept a secret. The affair happened as long as sixty-one years ago; in January, 1837. At the beginning of that month, Aguado, the well-known Spanish banker, requested a strictly private and absolutely secret interview of Talleyrand, which was granted. Aguado, it turned out, proposed to introduce a secret envoy from Queen Cristina, the great-grandmother of the present King, Alfonso XIII. Cristina was in greater money difficulties than usual, and offered to sign away Cuba for the sum of thirty millions of reals [About \$3,000,000, a sum that seems absurd. — AUTHOR.], with Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands thrown in for another ten millions. After comparatively short negotiations, the King, Talleyrand, and Señor Campuzano, Cristina's unwilling envoy, it should be said, met in private conference in a small apartment at the Tuileries. Only Talleyrand's secretary and Aguado were admitted to

On the 9th of August, the Spanish Government had cabled its acceptance of the terms to the French Ambassador at Washington, but the text of the document was not given to the public. M. Cambon presented it to the President, who ordered the preparation of a peace protocol to be signed by both governments. When this was drawn up, the French Ambassador transmitted it to Madrid, where it was accepted as satisfactory.

It was twenty-three minutes past four o'clock on the afternoon of Friday, August 12, 1898, one hundred and twelve days since the first act of war, on April 21, when the Honorable William R. Day, Secretary of State, and M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, authorized by his own government to act for the government of Spain upon official request, signed the protocol, under which hostilities were to cease, pending the final results of peace negotiations.

witness the signing of the deeds, for it had already come to that, in the hurry imposed by the dread of the whole affair leaking out and coming to the knowledge of Lord Palmerston, at that time the only European statesman of whom both Talleyrand and his royal master stood in awe.

The provisions of the contract were read over by Señor Campuzano, who looked absolutely grief-stricken, and at the end of each article or clause there was a short interval, during which the club-footed diplomatist and the citizen-king conferred in whispers. The cession of Cuba led, however, to few observations; it was practically smooth sailing; the price had been debated and settled beforehand; and, finally, the signatures were all duly appended. Not so smooth was the discussion of the articles relating to the cession of Porto Rico and the Philippines. Louis Philippe, on the pretext that the transfer of the latter islands would be so obnoxious to England as possibly to lead to a war, demanded a reduction of three millions of reals on the purchase money. "Seven millions of reals is my final offer; if it be not accepted the contract had better be flung into the fire," he said somewhat peremptorily, pushing the document across the table.

Talleyrand was about to interfere, for he liked neither haste nor violence, but, before he could open his lips, the Spanish envoy sprang to his feet so suddenly as to overturn the chair on which he was seated, which rolled across the floor. Oblivious or indifferent at that moment to the presence of majesty, he leant forward, seized both the documents, twisted them together, and, looking Louis Philippe straight in the face, said deliberately: "Your Majesty is right, the contract is of no use; it is only fit to be thrown into the fire." And, suiting the action to the words, he strode across the apartment, kicked the burning logs on the hearth with his boot, forced the papers between the incandescent embers, and stood stock-still until the charred wisps told him that all the documentary evidence of the proposed nefarious transaction had forever vanished.—Mr. A. D. VANDAM (author of "An Englishman in Paris"), in *Illustrated London News*, September 10, 1898.

The text of the agreement, for diplomatic reasons, was reserved. The substance made public by the State Department, was as follows:

SUBSTANCE OF THE PROTOCOL.

Article 1. That Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

Article 2. That Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and an island in the Ladronez, to be selected by the United States, shall be ceded to the latter.

Article 3. That the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

Article 4. That Cuba, Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies shall be immediately evacuated, and that commissioners, to be appointed within ten days, shall, within thirty days from the signing of the protocol, meet at Havana and San Juan, respectively, to arrange and execute the details of the evacuation.

Article 5. That the United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace. The commissioners are to meet at Paris not later than October 1.

Article 6. On the signing of the protocol, hostilities will be suspended and notice to that effect will be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

There was ready, awaiting the President's signature, a proclamation directing immediate cessation of hostilities by the army and navy of the United States against Spain. Cable messages were at once dispatched to every commanding officer of the army and navy, in the field and on the sea, conveying the necessary orders, with instructions, also, to make it known to Spanish forces not in position to learn the fact otherwise.

II.

PEACE was proclaimed, but the war was not over. While the signatures were attaching to the protocol, Captain Goodrich of the United States cruiser *Newark*, supported by the *Suwanee*, *Osceola*, *Hist*, and the converted Spanish gunboat *Alvarado*, was opening a bombardment of Manzanillo, which Commander Todd of the *Wilmington* had attacked a short time before. He had demanded the unconditional surrender of the town, which was refused.

LAST NAVAL
ACTION
IN CUBA

At 3:45 P.M. Aug. 12 the bombardment began, and was maintained for half an hour, when the Americans saw a white flag on a Spanish gunboat lying at the wharf. The *Suwanee* was sent in under a truce flag, and firing ceased. The *Suwanee* grounded on her way into the harbor, when within five hundred yards of shore. Suddenly the whole water front was ablaze with the fire from the Spaniards, and a number of shots were fired from the blockhouses. The Americans answered fiercely, and after about fifteen minutes slowly drew off. The Spanish fire then slackened, but followed the gunboats out. No one was hurt on our gunboats, but much indignation was expressed because of the firing upon a truce flag. One shot went through the *Suwanee's* flag.

Meantime, the Cubans in the rear of the town began to fire on the Spaniards from the north. They had no artillery, but their rifle fire finally grew so annoying to the enemy that they answered it with field pieces, which soon caused the Cubans to cease firing. At six o'clock the American war ships anchored for the night, but the *Newark* continued to harass the Spaniards through the darkness. It was the intention to renew the bombardment the next morning; but before the firing was begun the Spaniards sent off two officers in a small boat, under a flag of truce, to announce to Captain Goodrich that the peace protocol had been signed. They bore a dispatch for Captain Goodrich from General Greely, Chief of the Signal Service. The Spaniards made an effort to send it off to the *Newark* during the previous night, using a

white light instead of a white flag in the darkness. Not understanding the meaning of the light, the boat was fired upon and returned to the shore as quickly as possible. As soon as it was light enough in the morning to see the flag of truce, the message was again sent off.

An artillery engagement occurred on the same day at Aybonito, Porto Rico, in which one American officer was killed and four privates were wounded.



CHAPTER THE TWENTY-SEVENTH.

ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF MANILA.

ELECTRICITY NOT QUICK ENOUGH TO STOP ADMIRAL DEWEY FROM TAKING MANILA—MILITARY ADVANCES UPON THE CITY WALLS—THREE NIGHTS' BATTLE BEFORE MALATE, IN WHICH SPANIARDS ARE REPULSED, WITH HEAVY LOSSES, BY OUR VOLUNTEERS—DEWEY AND MERRITT DEMAND ITS SURRENDER AND MAKE A THEATRICAL ASSAULT ON AUGUST 13, IN ORDER TO APPEASE THE "HONOR OF SPAIN"—THE AUTHORITIES ANXIOUS TO SURRENDER—ESCAPE OF GENERAL AUGUSTI ON A GERMAN SHIP—AMERICANS OCCUPY THE CITY—THE ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION—THE GLORIOUS RECORD OF ADMIRAL DEWEY REVIEWED—DEATH OF CAPTAIN GRIDLEY OF THE "OLYMPIA."

I.

WHEN the peace protocol was signed at Washington on Friday, August 12, at 4:23 o'clock, P. M., the time at Manila was a few minutes past midnight Friday morning.


The cable messages instantly hurried to Admiral Dewey and Major-General Merritt might reach Hong Kong cable office within a few hours, before noon, Friday, at Hong Kong. But Manila was more than 700 miles distant, three days, by steamer.

THREE NIGHTS OF FIGHTING AT MALATE

The Spanish Government had arranged for a fast steamer to be in waiting at Hong Kong, for the purpose of receiving the proclamation of peace and hurrying with it to Manila at utmost speed. If this programme was perfectly executed, the Spanish steamer might reach Manila about noon on Monday, August 15. But even in that event it would discover that Manila had surrendered unconditionally to the American army and navy on the previous Saturday, at half-past two o'clock in the afternoon. The electric telegraph, united with Spanish steam power, was not equal to the task of forestalling Dewey.

The arrival of General Merritt, the increasing uncertainty of Aguinaldo's final purpose, the good condition of our troops, and the desire

to conquer the city as soon as good order could be preserved and the growing distresses of non-combatants alleviated, had resulted in moving our soldiers nearer to the city. They had intrenched themselves along the beach on the highway from Bakoor to Manila. There was an old Capuchin chapel in the center of the line, situated upon a knoll. Two field guns were planted on each side of the chapel. Our soldiers were only seven hundred and fifty yards from the Spanish trenches.



Malate is three miles south of Manila. The dotted line shows the outer investment of the city by the insurgents. The black line from Malate to Manila is the highroad to the city, along which our line was extending when attacked.

At ten o'clock in the night of July 31, a heavy fire from the Spanish line opened upon the Americans, who were taken by surprise, since the enemy had not actively resisted any of our operations theretofore.

Our trenches were occupied that night by the Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers and Utah Artillery Company Volunteers. The Spanish firing was surprisingly accurate, and a hail of bullets fell among the Americans. Our pickets on the right were driven in and reported

that the enemy was advancing to flank us along the road, at which point the trenches ended. There were trees, bushes, and high grass about the right extreme of the line, however. The Spaniards advanced down the road swiftly, pouring in a continuous fire, and finally getting in position to flank and enfilade the American line. The Pennsylvanians, as all volunteers are prone to do before the baptism of experience, had gone into trench duty with light ammunition. Their cartridge belts were emptying rapidly, and a courier was hurried to General Greene asking for reënforcements and ammunition.

The Utah battery was at work with veteran coolness and precision. The Pennsylvania reserves were ordered up and went to the right of the line to repel the attack. They had to cross an open field, swept by Spanish fire. It was the only way of going to the objective point, and the brave volunteers crossed the death trap with unflinching courage.

At this time, also, two platoons of Battery K, Third Artillery, regulars, under Lieutenant Krayenbuhl and Lieutenant Kessler, all acting as infantry, came up to the rescue. The Pennsylvanians, with ammunition almost exhausted, were firing at will, irregularly. Lieutenant Krayenbuhl drew his revolver and gave warning that he would kill the first man who fired without orders.

That was the stern action needed to steady the volunteers. The regulars began their volley firing with perfect discipline, and the Pennsylvanians quieted into steady fighting.

Reënforcements came rushing up. Battery H, of the Third Regulars came flying up to the trenches along the road which the Spanish occupied. The Americans ran in double column and sprang into the trenches.

Private McIlrath of Battery H, hoping to encourage steadiness among the volunteers, leaped on the parapet of sand bags and walked up and down, encouraging them. He was shot in the head, fatally. Captain Hobbs took his place, and the Americans were soon steadied down to deliberate, hard fighting.

The Spanish guns at Malate were doing much damage, and in the confusion of the night it was thought at headquarters, in the rear, that our advance would be driven in. General Greene sent two battalions of the First California Volunteers to the front at double-quick. As they had not before been to the new trenches, they dropped into the old Spanish trench and began to pour volleys into our own troops ahead. There was no casualty, but a great disaster was barely averted.

As soon as the mistake was discovered, the Californians dashed ahead into the fight with all the more purpose to drive back the real enemy. Private J. F. Finly, of Company C, of the Californians, especially distinguished himself. He took eight cart loads of ammunition through a terrific fire in the open fields to the Pennsylvanians. One native driver was shot in the leg, and a pony was killed. The cart tops were riddled. When the pony was killed, Finly pulled the cart himself and delivered the ammunition. As he returned across the field, he found two wounded men and took them in the cart to the hospital. Then he returned to the front with ten carts for the wounded.

The Spaniards were beaten back to Malate with considerable loss. The Americans lost about eighteen killed and forty-five wounded.

Fighting was resumed the next night and the third, but the Americans were now prepared and reserved their fire. Several were lost in the second and third skirmishes. A correspondent of the *London Times*, who was present in these engagements, cabled to his paper: "I was impressed by the nonchalant demeanor of the Americans on the fighting lines. They were like high-spirited youths pic-nicking, while groups were lying on the second line playing cards. Had the Spaniards, who were unaccountably non-aggressive during the American landing and advance, dropped shrapnel from the Malate fort they would have wrought terrible havoc, one house, forming a conspicuous mark, being within easy gun range."

The insurgents were now forced inland on the right of the American lines: They opened fire on the Spaniards, and the latter replied

briskly. Aguinaldo's men caused the Americans considerable trouble. Information was received that a party of California volunteers engaged in felling timber had been arrested by insurgents. Under General Greene's instructions Colonel Smith ordered out an armed detachment, which released the prisoners and brought the offending insurgents to Camp Dewey. General Greene sent a message to Aguinaldo saying that if the Americans were further molested he would disarm all the Filipinos.

There was some belief that in the night firing the insurgents had turned their weapons against our troops, but the fact was not established.

On July 31 five transports arrived with more troops from San Francisco, and on August 4 the monitor *Monterey* arrived in the bay as a benediction to the American war ships.

II.

**DEWEY AND
MERRITT
CAPTURE
MANILA**

THERE were now troops sufficient, together with the guns of our fleet and the marines, to justify Admiral Dewey and General Merritt in preparing to attack Manila itself. A week after the new troops had disembarked, Dewey and Merritt united in a demand upon the authorities to surrender. General Augusti, singularly enough, answered the demand, and declined. It was on that day, according to Spanish authorities, he was deposed or had resigned.

Manila was invested in the rear by insurgents, south by United States troops and heavy field guns, and the fleet formed in the harbor. Although the Spanish authorities asked and expected the Americans to protect them from the insurgent rabble, the "honor of Spain" demanded a sacrifice of lives. Destitution and distress prevailed, and resistance was hopeless; but the "honor of Spain" must again be sealed in blood. The American troops were scarcely in condition to attack, and not much resistance was looked for. Neither Dewey nor Merritt expected the Spanish to fight. Their information was to

the effect that there was a division in Manila, one faction ready to surrender, the other in favor of holding out. The American commanders believed that a perfunctory resistance only would be made, but both were prepared to make a strong assault, if necessary. The ultimatum expired at noon on Tuesday, August 9.

Monday afternoon the Spanish requested, through the Belgian consul, another day to remove the non-combatants and the sick and wounded. This was granted. The Belgian consul had been active in endeavoring to effect an arrangement between the Americans and Spanish, to prevent further fighting and bloodshed. As soon as he delivered the ultimatum he removed his family to a supply ship, and remained on board with them. He reported on Tuesday afternoon that the Spaniards were determined to make, at least, a show of resistance. Accordingly, the fleet prepared to begin a bombardment at noon on Wednesday.

Tuesday morning the war ships of the neutral countries began to take positions to observe the assault. The arrangement exhibited the national sympathies clearly. Four British ships, then on the station, the *Immortalité*, flagship, *Iphigenia*, *Linnet*, and *Swift*, and the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa*, came across the bay and anchored beside the American ships. The German cruisers, *Irene* and *Cormoran*, went to Mariveles with the ships on board which the foreign residents had taken refuge. The other German war ships, the flagship *Kaiser*, the *Kaiserin Augusta*, and the *Prinz Wilhelm*, with the French flagship *Bayard* and cruiser *Pascal*, moved a little north of their former positions and anchored together. These manœuvres caused general comment throughout the fleets.

Our ships were stripped and cleared for action on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning, and the crews were called to general quarters.* Suddenly the Admiral signaled "Action postponed."

*And then occurred a wonderful sight, which the world had not seen and may not see again. The smaller British vessels steamed away, but the big, white *Immortalité*, said to be the largest armored cruiser in the world, headed down the bay and came within two or three blocks of the flagship, the *Olympia*, and stopped. Then her flag was dipped and from her deck, loud and clear, her band played "The Star Spangled Banner."—*Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Charles L. Jewett, Judge Advocate General.*

It was explained that General Merritt had declared the army not ready, for lack of preparation. This was mere pretense, however. M. André, the Belgian consul, anxious to prevent useless loss of life, had been permitted to negotiate with the Spanish authorities, and succeeded in arranging a plan under which the resistance would be so slight that hard fighting would be unnecessary.

Flag-Lieutenant Brumby carried an order to the *Concord* and *Petrel*, lying before the Pasig batteries, that they were not to fire unless attacked. The Spanish wished to have a theatrical exhibition, surrender to the Americans, and be saved from the insurgents. Dewey and Merritt were not averse to saving life, and, it was ordered that no damage should be done to the city, but that the shots should be confined to outer military positions alone.

Such was the position on Saturday morning, August 13. The day was hazy and misty, with frequent downpours of squally rain.

At 9:30 the American ships, with battle flags flying, received the signal for attack from the *Olympia*, from which two puffs of smoke shot out, sending two shells at Malate. They fell short on the beach. These were followed by two great roars from the *Monterey*, and cheers sprang up from all the ships. All the ships then joined in and all the shots were directed against Malate, and all fell short. There were no signs of surrender. The "honor of Spain" was not to be appeased with smoke. Yet no Spanish guns made reply.

The *Monterey*, a mere plank on the water, with no freeboard, steamed in under the very guns of the shore batteries, tempting a shot, but none came. Rain was falling so mistily as to cloud the bay.

The ships now tried for the Malate fort in good faith, and the clouds of dust and dirt that arose were proof that our gunners were as skillful as ever. Then they ceased for awhile, but the Spanish flags still flew over the city, especially from the lofty spire of the Archbishop's cathedral.

In the meantime, the American army on shore advanced two brigades against the Malate fort. It was captured with the loss of eleven Americans killed and thirty-nine wounded. Capturing the fort, they

drove the Spaniards back along the beach into the city, and finally occupied the deserted places of the enemy on the Lunetta parade.

At about 11 o'clock the *Olympia* signaled "cease firing," and then set the international signal for the enemy demanding surrender. The Spaniards made no reply from Manila, and Admiral Dewey grew suspicious of Spanish treachery. He signaled his ships to "close in," and there was prospect of serious work ahead. M. André, the Belgian consul, had been trusted by both sides, and his communications had all been verbal. The question arose whether there was misunderstanding or Spanish treachery. M. André was called on board the *Olympia*, and declared that there might be misunderstanding, but he did not believe there was treachery.

Again the signal was made, "Do you surrender?" but no reply came. Then a launch, bearing a flag of truce and the Belgian flag, went toward Manila with M. André, Lieutenant Brumby, and Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier on board to consult the Spanish authorities. They were gone a long time, during which the Admiral signaled the fleet to eat dinner. As he had breakfasted in Cavité he was now dining at Manila.

The launch returned from the city at 2 o'clock, and half an hour later the *Olympia* signaled, "The enemy surrenders." The harbor was filled with the cheers of the sailors.

Two battalions of the Second Oregon Regiment, who were on a steamer, now started ashore. The steamer went in beside the breakwater, on which the troops landed, and marched on land. General Merritt had already gone on shore in a small boat. Flag-Lieutenant Brumby, with a great flag, went in a small boat to haul down the Spanish colors. He took with him two apprentice boys.

When they reached the staff in front of the cathedral, a great crowd of Spaniards gathered around them. As the Spanish flag came down, many men and women in the great crowd assembled shed tears. Just as the Stars and Stripes were hoisted in place of the red and yellow flag of Spain, a regimental band at the head of our troops, marching from Camp Dewey, started "The Star Spangled Banner." It was a coincidence, for the band was around a corner and could not

see the flag-raising. There was tremendous cheering by the Americans when the flag rose over the building, and a burst of delight could be heard aboard the ships in the bay from which they were echoed. Then the guns on the *Olympia* boomed out a national salute to the new sovereignty in the Philippines. The *Charleston* followed, and then all the American fleet followed in order, even the *Callao*, that three months before boasted allegiance to the flag now replaced by a better. The clouds cleared away, and the sun set in a burst of brilliant beauty.

Major-General Merritt had landed with an Oregon company for escort. They saluted the flag when it was hoisted, and the Oregon volunteers guarded the streets all night and received the surrender of the Spanish arms. The enemy was permitted to surrender with the honors of war, the officers retaining their side arms. When the Oregon troops reached the Captain-General's palace, where General Merritt made his headquarters, they found the plaza filled with Spaniards. Between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers gave up their arms, which consisted mostly of Mauser rifles. Twelve thousand stands of arms were taken and millions of rounds of ammunition. Enough new Mauser rifles were captured to arm nearly all the American regiments. Three magazines were found stored with powder.

Despite the promises made, Spanish treachery could not entirely renounce its opportunity. After retreating from their lines they made a cowardly guerilla fight, hiding in the brush and in gardens, and shot at Americans as they advanced. The two American brigades advanced together, General Greene's moving along the beach and main road against Malate, while General McArthur advanced along the Cingalon road from Pasai. General McArthur had a hot fight at Cingalon. The Astor battery distinguished itself by its bravery. It lost two men killed and several wounded. The batteries shelled the Spanish out of a blockhouse on the outer line. The Spaniards then retreated to Cingalon, where they hid in houses and behind a barricade, making a stubborn resistance. The Astor battery advanced two guns, to within seventy-five yards of the barricade, and then charged the Spaniards with pistols.

III.

THAT night Manila was under martial law. The California Red Cross Society was permitted to care for the sick and wounded of both sides. The troops marched in with perfect order in the afternoon, and guards were placed before the house of every foreign resident to prevent looting by disorderly mobs. General Merritt had refused to permit Aguinaldo's army to take part in the assault, in order that no lives might be sacrificed to rage. No insurgent was permitted to enter after the surrender, without first delivering up all his weapons.

THE OCCUPATION
OF MANILA BY
OUR FORCES

These were the acts of protection accorded by Americans, whom the Archbishop had described as heartless, immoral, cruel, and treacherous people.

General Merritt issued next day a proclamation, announcing the establishment of a military government in Manila. It was printed in Spanish and English. After setting forth the progress of the war, it announced that the United States Government had directed him, as Governor, to declare that Americans had not come to wage war on the people, but to protect all in their personal and religious rights. There would be a military occupation of the island of Luzon, but, until further notice, all laws would continue in effect, as relating to personal rights, local societies, and crime, unless they conflicted with the necessary military laws as might be determined by the General commanding.

The laws would be administered by the ordinary tribunals and officers who would accept the authority of the United States. Churches and places of religious worship would be protected, and all public properties, works of art, and libraries. The people would not be interfered with as long as they preserved the peace. All ports would be held by the land or naval forces until the United States declared them open for the trade of neutral nations on payment of the prescribed rates of duty.

The same day the commissioners selected to draw up the articles of capitulation met. They were, on the part of the United States, Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, Captain B. L. Lamberton, U. S. N., Lieutenant-Colonels Charles A. Whittier and V. E. H. Crowden. For Spain, Nicolas de la Pena, Auditor-General, Colonel Carlos Reyes, and Major José Maria Olaguen. The articles follow:—

1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate, with the city and defenses, with all honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers and subject to control of the aforesaid United States authorities until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations. All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property. All public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

3. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organization, and full lists of public property and stores, shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

4. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces, and of their families, and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington. Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them. The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city, or when the American army evacuates.

5. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid, as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain. All the funds of the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

6. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.

The articles were authorized on behalf of Spain by General Jaudenes, "acting General-in-Chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines." Augusti had disappeared. He had been reported as deposed and as having resigned. The Spanish Government declared that he had been

removed on August 8, for being averse to holding out until the protocol was signed. The government had made desperate efforts to prevent American possession, its dispatches reaching Augusti through German channels, it was said. Augusti did not know the protocol had been signed when the city surrendered, and, perhaps, not daring to assume the authority of the capitulation, he fled.

Then Spain claimed that Augusti had sent in his resignation, but denied that it had been accepted; Jaudenes, therefore, had no right to surrender any territory except that of Manila, of which, alone, he was Military Governor.

The "honor of Spain" was displaying itself brilliantly in the final episode of war.

The United States did not contend that the surrender included more than the city and its suburbs. The whole Philippines question was open. Besides, the capture had been accomplished after the signing of the peace agreement, which ceded the occupation and holding of Manila and the harbor until otherwise determined upon.

The American losses in the fighting amounted to about forty killed and one hundred and fifty wounded, the wounds being slight. The Spanish losses were very heavy, and the prisoners were found to be emaciated with hunger and worn out with sleepless nights in the trenches deluged with rain.

IV.

IT WAS one hundred and four days after Admiral Dewey destroyed the fleet off Cavité that Flag-Lieutenant Brumby broke out the Stars and Stripes over Manila. Although the capture of Manila was merely an exhibition, Dewey's ships had spent only twelve hours in conquering the key of the East.

**WHAT DEWEY HAD
DONE THAT
MADE HIS GLORY**

It was a record of glory and of duty well done, besides an exhibition of pluck, sound capacity, and judgment that no naval officer has ever surpassed. He had fought the Germans and the insurgents with firm

diplomacy and courage, and the Spaniards with metal. He had defeated all of them equally.

There was one incident, however, which could not be foreseen. Before the white flag of surrender was hoisted, General Augusti went to a launch of the German war ship *Kaiserin Augusta* and was taken aboard, the vessel sailing for Hong Kong before the bombardment concluded. Augusti escaped under cover of the mist. The United States paid no attention to him nor to the Germans. One Spaniard more or less was not significant, and one incivility more or less from the German fleet was not a matter for surprise or comment.*

Our fleet had not lost a man killed during the whole period of blockade and battle.

But there was one deeply regretted loss. Captain Charles Vernon Gridley, of the *Olympia*, who fought his ship so splendidly at Cavité, did his duty at the cost of his life. He was dangerously ill at the time, but determined to take his part against the advice of his physician. He went through the long preliminary voyage to Manila and fought the good fight, when he ought to have been in bed.

*During the blockade, the American ships were furnished with fresh meat from a refrigerating steamer chartered by the government in Australia. The American sailors, therefore, fared much better than their brothers of the foreign fleets lying off Manila. These had to get their supplies from the city, and as provisions were rather low toward the end of the blockade, they did not fare very well, having to live on buffalo meat, at a dollar a pound. As soon as our flag was raised, the English gave it a national salute, while the Germans, French, and Russians have not yet done so, as they are waiting for instructions from their governments. Immediately after the English fired the salute, our Admiral hoisted an international signal with an English flag, meaning, "Send for fresh meat." The signal was immediately answered by the foreign fleets, and it was some moments before the Germans, French, and Russians found that the signal was to the English only. They were very angry when they found their mistake, and are sorry they did not salute the flag, as they are still living on buffalo meat, while the English are enjoying mutton and fresh beef.—*Letter from an officer at Manila.*

The Germans have never given the ordinary courtesies of salutation, while the English recognize Manila Bay as an American port, and put up the Stars and Stripes on the foremast as they come in. One of the latest incidents that struck me at Manila was the salute fired by Admiral Dewey in acknowledgment of the courtesy of an Englishman just coming in. The flagship then was the *Baltimore*, and she raised a great white thunder cloud, through which the red flashes of the guns played like the lightning.—*Remark credited to Mr. Murat Halstead, in an interview.*

After the destruction of the Spanish fleet he collapsed and was invalided home, by way of Hong Kong. He died at sea, returning to San Francisco, less than a week after he had started. Captain Gridley was buried at Erie, Pennsylvania, his home, on July 13, with the honors of war. He was a native of Indiana and had been thirty-eight years in the navy at the time of his death. He had nearly reached the rank of Commodore. He was the first and only naval officer of high rank whose death was the actual result of war. He was fifty-three years old, and a very handsome, agreeable, and courageous officer.

To a friend in Hong Kong he said, "I think I am in for it; but I could not leave my ship on the eve of battle, after waiting all these years to serve my country as well as it deserved. And, knowing what will soon happen, I would do it again to-morrow without hesitation." These are heroic words. It was the presence of such men in his fleet that made Admiral Dewey, in his report, speak so highly of the patriotism and courage of his officers and crew.

It is no wonder that George Dewey came out of the war the popular hero of the United States, his name lustrous with glory; that glory fixed by his modesty and quiet reserve. No naval officer has ever written his name higher on the roll of honor in the history of any country or impressed himself so deeply in the hearts and upon the memories of his own people.



CHAPTER THE TWENTY-EIGHTH.

FIGHTING LEADERS OF THE NAVY.

ANECDOTES OF DEWEY FROM BOYHOOD TO IMMORTALITY AT MANILA—THE SCHOOL-TEACHER WHO RAWHIDED HIM INTO GOOD BEHAVIOR—WHAT THE SAILORS THOUGHT OF HIM ON ALL OCCASIONS—SAMPSON, THE MOST UNASSUMING OFFICER IN THE SERVICE—SCHLEY AND HIS FIGHTING RECORD—THE MEETING HE HAD WITH A GERMAN AT VALPARAISO—A STORY OF "FIGHTING BOB" EVANS—AMERICAN GUNNERS AND SAILORS—TARGET PRACTICE MAKES THEM PERFECT.

I.

OUR fighting leaders in the Spanish-American War were past the prime of middle age. Fighting Generals and fighting Admirals have usually been young men in all the wars of history — Alexander and Cæsar; Napoleon, triumphant at twenty-five, established at thirty-one, and master of Europe at thirty-seven; Washington, commanding the American armies at forty-four; Wellington defeating Napoleon when both were forty-six; Nelson winning Trafalgar and death at forty-seven; Grant Commander-in-Chief of the Federal millions at forty-one. Opposite the list is the single name, in modern times, of von Moltke, who was seventy when he led the German hosts against France, yet who was considered too old for the task which he so splendidly accomplished. Of the leaders of the Spanish-American War not one was under fifty-eight, and none more than sixty-three. At the latter age those in the regular service are usually retired as "superannuated." Among the seven in active command of fighting forces there was little of the spirit of superannuation, but more the dash and intrepidity of vigorous youth. Dewey, Sampson, and Schley; Miles, Shafter, Wheeler, and Merritt; these were seasoned veterans of a previous war who proved to be young enough to carry a world-covering war impetuously to a

A ROLL CALL OF
SEASONED VET-
ERAN LEADERS

triumphant close in a little more than a hundred days. There were young heroes, but they were not commanders. There were Hobson and Blue and Gridley, and in the ranks hundreds of young men of the stuff of which great leaders are made.

II.

ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY's conduct in battle and blockade, his unflinching courage and coolness amidst the encompassing perils of diplomatic treachery and the ceaseless provocations of the German fleet at Manila, made him the undisputed hero of the war, and will give him brilliant and lasting fame in history. As has been recorded elsewhere, he is of good Puritan stock, of the strong and persistent old Dewey family of Vermont, the members of which have been successful in professions, scholarship, business, and finance, for generations. The Admiral's brothers are excellent representatives of the family traits, as were their father and their grandfather. It is a typical American family of moderate competence, plain habits, and strong nature. It is a stock worthy to have produced Admiral Dewey.

ADMIRAL
GEORGE DEWEY
OF MANILA

Nobody has ever written better history than Plutarch and Herodotus, and they wrote theirs in anecdote. The earliest anecdote we have of Admiral Dewey is related by Major Pangborn, for many years a well-known journalist in New Jersey, but who was in early life a school-teacher. Upon graduating from college he undertook the management of a district school, at Montpelier, that had been in rebellion against all teachers for some time. Young Dewey was the ring-leader of the "irreconcilables." At the head of his boyish insurgents he had driven away several teachers, and had stood one on his head in a snowbank. The school seemed unmanageable.

When Major Pangborn appeared on the first day of the new session, the first scene that met his eyes was young Dewey, perched up in a tree, throwing stones at small boys. The teacher ordered him to come down. Dewey's reply was that the teacher could himself go down

to a certain tropical climate unmentionable, and he remained in the tree. School went on smoothly that day, but there were indications that trouble was coming. The teacher provided himself with a nice rawhide whip, which he tucked away over the door, and then placed several sticks of good hickory on the top of the pile in the old wood-box.

Next day another boy who was disorderly was told to take his seat. He did so, and seven of the big boys joined him on his bench. Then Dewey stepped up and coolly informed the teacher that they were "going to give him the best licking he ever had."

"Go to your seat!" commanded the teacher, who was not so big physically as either of the two boys mentioned.

Dewey struck out, and the next instant the rawhide was playing catch-and-go all over him. The other "biggest boy" entered the fight, and was promptly laid low by a blow from one of the hickories.

Dewey by this time was lying on the floor, howling with pain, but sensibly ready to make peace. The other boy was unconscious. Major Pangborn had quelled the mutiny and conquered the school. He took Dewey home to his father, and reported that he had brought him his son, "somewhat the worse for wear, but ready for school work."

"Thank you," replied Dr. Dewey; "I think George will not give you any more trouble. He will be at school to-morrow."

The father of the other boy tried to get a warrant for the arrest of the schoolmaster, but there was not a magistrate in the county who would issue one. They agreed that if anybody had been found who could govern that school, he was the man for the place.

Young Dewey remained at school. He soon became a good scholar, and, under his friend's tuition, fitted for the Annapolis Academy. Years after these events he often visited Major Pangborn at his home in Boston. On one of these visits, Dewey, then a naval lieutenant, said to him: "I shall never cease to be grateful to you. You made a man of me. But for that thrashing you gave me I should probably now be of very little account." The swiftness and irresistible

force of Major Pangborn's attack may have had its influence upon the famous pupil at Manila.

Dewey was a Lieutenant in the Federal navy during the Civil War, and during that period received the actual training for hostile operations that he could not exhibit until thirty-three years later. He was on the *Mississippi* when New Orleans was captured. The vessel sank the Confederate ram *Manassas*, and met the same fate shortly after. In attempting to run past the batteries at Port Hudson, March 15, 1863, she was thrown aground by an accident to the leading ship. The batteries had her under direct range and riddled her with shot. Seeing that the ship could not be saved, her commander ordered the crew to abandon her. Captain Smith and his chief subordinate, Lieutenant Dewey, displayed true courage throughout, and were the last to leave the ship. "It is in such trying moments," said Admiral Porter, in his official report, "that men show of what mettle they are made, and in this instance the mettle was of the best." But there was more than "mettle" in Dewey. One of the crew of the *Mississippi* called attention to one incident that he believed was an innovation in fighting a man-of-war at night. "Dewey gave orders," he said, "before we went into action, that the decks of the *Mississippi* should be whitewashed (see the smartness); that gave the guns' crews a chance to see the running gear of the guns—8-inch. It was all lights out that night."

He was with Farragut at Mobile, and bore himself always with perfect courage and quiet modesty.

After the war, there came thirty-three years of humdrum duty, which tires the temper and nature of men more than dangerous action. In the navy he was greatly admired by his men; and his common sense, natural sense of justice and fairness "between man and man," won their affection. He was always kindly to the sailors "forward," and it was said of him that he could get along with any man except a liar. He could see or hear what he thought he ought to see and hear, but was generally unobservant of petty, natural irregularities.

Here are some newspaper anecdotes of him taken from the gossip that followed his victory at Manila, which convey a sense of personal portraiture of a man such as Dewey of Manila might naturally be:—

“Dewey is a man with big, piercing eyes,” said a messenger in the Navy Department, at Washington, who made a cruise with him. “He’s what I’d call a little fellow as to height, but he surely looked bigger’n a Dutch frigate when he stood on his side of the mast and you were up in front of him. But he was a tender-hearted man on the cruise when he and I were shipmates. He’d try not to see or hear things that he didn’t want to see or hear. None of us knew him, ‘up forward,’ I mean as a commander. Some of us had been shipmates with him when he was a deck officer, and had never got the worst of it at his hands. But we weren’t sure how he’d stack up as a skipper. We weren’t long in finding out. We had to sailorize all right, but there wasn’t much brigging with Dewey. He didn’t like to see a man in double irons on his tours of inspection. We hadn’t been to sea with him very long before we got next to how he despised a liar. One of the petty officers went ashore at Gibraltar, got mixed up with the soldiers in the canteens up on the hill and came off to the ship paralyzed with drink. He went before Dewey at the mast next morning, and gave him the ‘two-beers-and-sunstruck’ yarn.

“‘You’re lying, my man,’ said Dewey. ‘You were very drunk. I, myself, heard you aft in my cabin. I will not have my men lie to me. I don’t expect to find total abstinence in a man-of-war crew. But I do expect them to tell me the truth, and I am going to have them tell me the truth. Had you told me candidly that you took the drop too much on your liberty, you’d have been forward by this time, for you at least returned to the ship. For lying, you get ten days in irons. Let me have the truth hereafter. I am told you are a good seaman. A good seaman has no business lying.’

“After that there were few men aboard who didn’t throw themselves on the mercy of the court, and none of us ever lost anything by it. He’d have to punish us in accordance with regulations, but he

had a great way of ordering the release of men he had to sentence before their sentences were half worked out.

"Dewey was the best liberty-granting skipper I was ever ship-mates with. He hated to keep quarantined men aboard when the good-conduct men were flocking off to the beach. One fine Christmas day in Genoa harbor all the men entitled to shore liberty lined up at ten o'clock in the morning to answer muster before taking the running boats for the shore. There were about forty of us, myself among the number, who were quarantined aboard for having raised Cain ashore,

HOW DEWEY WON AT MANILA.—A veracious newspaper of Ross County, Ohio, published an explanation of the battle of Manila that may prove of interest to those who are not experts in naval tactics and construction. "On Saturday night," said this veracious historian, "John Bridges's store was crowded with men who wanted to hear a description of the battle, by Daniel Doble, and an explanation of some things that were not understood.

"Whut I can't git through my noodle," said Pontius Anderson, "is how none o' th' Spanish cannon balls didn't go right through our boats jest th' same as our balls went through theirs.

"Simple enough," said Daniel Doble, "'cause our boats is made o' soft metal an' theirs made o' brittle. Ev'ry time old Dewey hit a Spanish boat her sides cracked jest like they wuz glass, but when a ball hit Dewey's it was diffrent. Th' metal bein' soft, it closed over th' balls when they struck, not leavin' a hole, jest th' same uz ef you threw a marble int' a pan o' dough.

"Them Spaniards is sharp, though, an' they ketched ont' th' thing, an' ef they'd ketched on sooner mebbey Dewey'd had a hard time. They seen th't soft metal was th' best, so they het up their boat, th' last one they had. Th' hotter it got th' better it wuz, an' they het 'er way up. Old Dewey seen th' balls frum his boats wuzn't doin' no hurt, an' he seen th' trick, so he yelled out t'his Captains, "'Don't shoot nothin' but heavy balls!'" They kept pepperin' away with big balls till th' Spanish boat wuz so full o' lead she sunk uv'er own weight.

"Them Vermont fellers is great fer tricks, I tell you. Dewey's sailors waded t' shore an' got in single rank, Indian file. Th' Spanish Gen'ral seen whut Dewey wuz doin' an' he sez: 'Whut's good fer Yanks is good fer Spanish,' an' he drewed his men up in Indian file th' same way. That was jest whut old Dewey was waitin' fer; there was twixt twelve an' fifteen thousan' Spaniards, an' they made a line more'n six miles long. 'Fire!' sez Dewey, when he seen 'em, an' bang went 'is gun, th' biggest one he had with 'im, one th't carried twelve miles. That ball went chasin' down the line, knockin' them Spaniards over like they was tenpins. Th' first three seconds a mile o' Spaniards fell. Th' heads was knocked clean off'n ev'ry one o' them. Course th' ball was gittin' weaker ev'ry minute, an' when it struck th' second mile it had drapped till it ketched 'em in necks. Th' third mile o' Spaniards got hit in th' breast, an' th' fourth mile right in th' stummicks. Then th' Spanish seen whut was goin' on, an' they begun t' drap t' th' ground, but it didn't do no good, fer th' ball wuz gittin' spent an' drapped too. It mowed down close an' killed ev'ry Spaniard deader'n a last year's bird's nest, whereas, ef they hadn't drapped they'd only lost their legs an' feet."

in Nice, a few weeks before. Our quarantine was for three months, and it wasn't half run out on this Christmas day. Dewey stood at the break of the poop, with his hands on his hips, watching the liberty party line up. We fellows that couldn't go were standing around the gangway, smoking our pipes, and looking pretty down in the mouth, I guess. The big liberty party—there were a couple of hundred men in the batch—finally got away, and the ship was practically deserted, except for us quarantined fellows. Dewey watched us for a while out of the tail of his eye. We were leaning over the side, watching the receding running boats with the big liberty party. Dewey went up on the poop and walked up and down, chewing his mustache, and every once in a while shooting a look at us men up forward. Finally, he walked down the poop ladder and straight forward to where we were grouped.

“You, boys, hop into your mustering clothes and go on off to the beach. I'll let you have a couple of the running boats when they return. Come back with the other men when you get ready. Don't raise any more trouble ashore than you can help.’

“There wasn't a man in the gang of us that didn't want to hug little Dewey for that, and you can gamble that we gave him a ‘cheer ship’ that rang around the harbor of Genoa. We all got marked in the log as ‘clean and sober,’ too, when we got back to the ship, for we weren't going to do any cutting up on Dewey after the way he'd treated us.”

From a bandmaster on board the *Pensacola*, in 1887, when she was lying at Manila, with Dewey in command, comes another anecdote illustrating the same quiet trait of kindness for his men and the dauntless patriotic courage displayed in his attitude toward Prince Henry of Prussia, for discourtesy to the United States. While the *Pensacola* gunboat was at Manila, a number of sailors went on shore and engaged in a street brawl. An alarm was turned in, but the sailors succeeded in escaping to their ships. The next morning the Spanish Captain of the port came out to the *Pensacola* to complain to Captain Dewey of the action of his sailors.

“What can I do?” asked Dewey.

"Why, your men raised a riot on shore, and you can assist me in arresting and punishing them," was the reply.

The American Captain was very courteous in the expression of regret that sailors of the *Pensacola* should be lawless while on shore leave, but could see no way in which he might assist his visitor in searching out the guilty ones.

The reply of Dewey angered the port Captain, who said, somewhat peremptorily: "You certainly can parade your crew before me, in order that the rioters may be identified."

Looking aloft, and pointing to the Stars and Stripes waving at the masthead, Dewey made reply: "The deck of this vessel is United States territory, and I'll parade my men for no foreigner that ever drew breath."

The man described in these anecdotes, from boyhood to maturity, can be easily understood in the incident attending the fate of Captain C. V. Gridley of the *Olympia*, who went into action at Manila a sick man, and died a month later. Before the squadron sailed, every officer and man was examined as usual for his physical fitness. The surgeons "condemned" Captain Gridley, who was in very poor health. Commander Lamberton was assigned to his place, but Captain Gridley pleaded with Dewey against being relieved on the eve of battle. He succeeded, and Lamberton was made Chief-of-Staff to the Admiral. When the battle opened Captain Gridley wanted to stay on the bridge with Dewey, but the Admiral ordered him to the safer position in the conning tower, on the ground that it would be inexcusable if both commanders of the ship should be killed. And Dewey remained on the bridge, while, from the conning tower, Gridley fought ship for the last time, and came home a corpse, but leaving a splendid memory to his family and his country.

The part that good fortune plays in the lives of the best of men is well illustrated in Admiral Dewey's service record. When the irreconcilable differences with Spain were growing rapidly, the command of the Asiatic squadron lay between Commodore Howell and (then) Commodore Dewey. Both made efforts to avoid selection for the good

professional reason that the Atlantic Ocean and Cuban waters seemed to offer the best opportunities for service in war. Commodore Howell, by seniority, received the command of the European station, and Dewey went unwillingly to Hong Kong. It was difficult to secure a staff to accompany him, not because officers were not glad to serve under him, but because the service was believed to be out of the way of glory. But, once there, Dewey saw the importance of seizing and holding Manila, and, with one blow won immortality, and with a second closed the war so gloriously begun.

It is also interesting to know that a man of such kindly, firm, and sensible character, who endears himself to rough sailors and the great world alike, does not look the portrait drawn. Never did so dauntless a fighter look less one; never did such a sailor's "shipmate" look so unlike one. Naval officers, spending much time abroad, where the details of uniform dress, of scrupulous observance of etiquette, and niceties of manner and address are official formulas, have been looked upon as smartly-dressed idlers, mainly of that much-abused yet harmless type of man described as a "dude." But Dewey, in respect to his apparel, his precise manners and scrupulous perfection of address and "good form," was the dude of dudes. One who writes of him as from personal knowledge,* says: "In person Dewey is not the naval hero of popular imagination. He is slight, of medium height, with finely chiseled face, and hair sprinkled with gray, while his firmly set lips and clear eye would mark him as a gentleman and a man of the world. While in service at Washington he was a club man and fond of society, one of those who rarely appeared after dinner except in evening dress; just the kind of a fellow, in short, that the agitator has in mind when he inveighs against the 'dudes' of the navy who are pensioned on the government and haunt the drawing-rooms of the capital. He is quiet in manner, sparing and incisive in speech, courteous in bearing, and decisive in action. In all these qualities he does not differ greatly from other naval officers who have

* L. A. Coolidge, *McClure's Magazine*, June, 1898.



REAR-ADMIRAL W. T. SAMPSON, U. S. N.

been trained in the same school." It is said of him that in the Civil War he always went into action in full dress, wearing kid gloves.

Finally, it must be said, that he was sixty when he became so famous; that he deserved his fame by his work; that he bore it with modesty; and to such men Americans yield unstinted honor and admiration.

III.

REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM T. SAMPSON, who stepped from a Captaincy to his Rear-Admiralship at Santiago, is the son of a small farmer of New York, and was entered at Annapolis Academy and maintained by the sacrifices of his father—sacrifices most nobly justified and rewarded in the character and achievements of the son. He was graduated at the beginning of the Civil War, and was a Lieutenant when the war ended. He was second officer on the monitor *Patapsco*, when that vessel was blown up by a torpedo in January, 1865, in Charleston harbor. He was commended by his superior officer as deserving "highest praise" for his "cool intrepidity." He has been known in the navy as a thorough master of ordnance, possessing the highest executive capacity, great courage, and patience. He is described as being a serious and stern man, lacking in suavity and therefore in popularity; but, as all naval officers usually are, a gentleman, unassuming, and possessing sagacity and excellent judgment. He was always scrupulous to avoid mere courtesy honors, and while a bureau chief in the Navy Department (in the temporary occupancy of which every officer is usually addressed as "Commodore") he was careful to remind callers that he was a captain only and preferred to be so addressed. It was such accurate distinction between fact and figment that gave to his insistence that it was the fleet under his command which won the battle off Santiago the immediate support of all high authorities. His lack of popularity was apparent in the lack of responsive applause, but that it was Sampson's victory will be the undoubted verdict of history.

ADMIRAL SAMP-
SON OF SANTI-
AGO

IV.

COMMODORE (now Rear-Admiral) WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY, commanding the Flying Squadron, whose admirable gallantry in the battle off Santiago was conspicuous, was born in Maryland, and graduated from Annapolis about the same time that Dewey and Sampson did, and saw service in the Civil War. His intrepidity and dash were tested in many engagements and skirmishes, and he became known as an officer who loved fighting. He is one of the few who have seen actual service between 1865 and 1895. He was Lieutenant-Commander of the United States ship *Benicia* when, in 1871, she attacked a fort on Salee River in Korea, for the purpose of chastising the Koreans for the mistreatment of Americans. In 1884 he was commander of the expedition sent to the Arctic regions to attempt a rescue of the Greely exploring party. The selection was determined by his fearlessness and resourcefulness. He set out on one day's notice, and arrived at Sabine Point in time to rescue the seven survivors, who would have been dead twenty-four hours later. He was also in Valparaiso harbor, Chili, in 1891, when some of his sailors ashore were set upon by a mob, and one was killed and five injured. The American bluejackets were arrested, and Schley demanded their release. Upon this being refused, he sent word to the authorities that if the men were not released at the dock within a specified time, he would open fire on the city. He immediately cleared decks for action, and notified the foreign ships of his purpose, and requested their withdrawal out of range. It is a coincidence that all but the Captain of a German war vessel promptly complied. The German sent the surly reply that he would not move. Schley instantly returned the warning that if his demand on the Valparaiso authorities was not complied with, he intended to bombard; that there remained less than an hour of time, and if the German chose to maintain his position he was at liberty to do so, but if he chanced to find himself between the American and the shore batteries during hostilities, he must be prepared to accept all the shots that the position might

ADMIRAL SCHLEY
OF THE FLYING
SQUADRON



REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.

render it necessary to stop.* Then the German moved out; and Schley's bluejackets were returned to him in safety. It was a year later that some Chilian revolutionists sought refuge on the *Baltimore*, Captain Robley D. Evans's ship, at Valparaiso. There were three Chilian men-of-war in the harbor. The Admiral came on board the *Baltimore*, and notified Captain Evans that if the refugees were not surrendered, his three ships would follow the *Baltimore* out of the harbor and sink her. Captain Evans conveyed the warning to his guests, and told them to decide for themselves—he was ready to protect them at all hazards. They concluded to remain with him, and Captain Evans so informed the Chilian Admiral, adding that as long as they chose to stay he would protect them.

"Very well," replied the Admiral; "your ship will be sunk half an hour after you leave the harbor."

"That may be true," Captain Evans is reported to have calmly answered, "but the *Baltimore* will make you a hell of a lot of trouble for half an hour."

And he, too, had his way, and kept his refugees.

V.

To MEASURE out the merit of individuals in the war is an impossible task, but among the men who went in unknown to the public and came out resplendent in heroism for duty well done, Captain Clark of the *Oregon* stands boldly out. She was the greatest ship of the seas, the best sailer, the hardest fighter. And Captain Clark was worthy to command the great

OFFICERS, MEN,
AND GUNNERS
OF THE NAVY

*Dewey sent a similar message to Von Diederichs at Manila, requesting the Germans to arrange their anchorage in such manner that they would not interfere with firing, if necessary. He received a similarly surly answer, to which Dewey made reply that it was of little consequence to himself if the Germans got in the way, but if they persisted they must expect to receive all shots, accidental or otherwise, that the Americans might find necessary to direct assault, if one were made. The Germans moved away. The German people are most courteous and kindly, but the autocracy created by militarism has made German army and naval officers the most insolent in the world. They usually yield to force and determination, however.

vessel whose journey of 15,000 miles to enter battle startled the world. Captain Gridley of the *Olympia* is another, Captain Evans of the *Iowa*, Commodore Phillip of the *Texas*, Lieutenant Wainwright of the *Gloucester*, Commander Todd of the *Wilmington*, and Lieutenant Gleaves of the *Cushing*, proved to be men of independent resources and undoubted bravery. The American naval officer in the war proved to be a man of uniform high ability. Not one turned back from his duty or evaded any post of danger. The *personnel* of our navy is to-day not surpassed in any navy of the world. And the men behind the guns were the best yet shown in modern naval warfare.

A month after Manila the world was amused by an article in an English review, from the pen of a member of Parliament more celebrated for sensational eccentricities of opinion than for good sense, in which the assertion was made that Dewey's ships were manned with English gunners who were promised five hundred dollars per month each to enlist, because American gunners were notoriously incompetent. The Navy Department gave out an analysis of the muster rolls showing that there were but eight English-born men on Dewey's ships, and not one a gunner. Further, that the muster roll of the sailors of the American navy proved that ninety-five per cent. were native-born Americans. The writer of the article seemed to be entirely ignorant of the fact that in every sea fight between America and England, the Yankee had proved to be superior to his British cousin in marksmanship.

Writers on the subject attribute our superiority to target practice, of which the American gunner gets more than in any other navy. Two kinds of target practice are required, sea practice and record practice. Sea practice is carried on six times each year and record practice once. Every vessel is required to carry out these instructions. This refers to normal times, for in the past year there has been three times the amount of target practice called for. This was because the government anticipated trouble with Spain. For purposes of sea practice a regulation target, anchored or not, or any suitable mark not smaller than a regulation target, may be used. Target practice may range between

eight hundred yards and three thousand yards or even higher, but is seldom beyond three thousand yards, and it is required that the speed of the ship shall not be less than eight knots when her batteries are opening fire. Sea practice is intended to simulate as nearly as practicable the conditions of actual battle, and the work of observing the fall of shots is not allowed to interfere unduly with a spirited and continuous fire. The ships are stripped, battle hatches are down, and sometimes forced draught is put on in order to simulate a chase, during which the batteries of some vessel are opened at the little target. At night there is frequently target practice with the aid of searchlights, but this is required only once a year.

At two sea practices annually the ship is cleared for action, and the men are stationed as in actual battle, with necessary officers, aids, and quartermasters in the conning tower, and all other officers at their stations. Ammunition is supplied in the manner that would actually be necessary in battle, and, except in case of emergency, orders are given by the means that would be employed in battle. Inducements, in the shape of prizes, are offered by the department to enlisted men to become expert gunners. In proportion to the extent of the navy the United States spends more money annually on target practice than any other service. Great Britain devotes a great deal of attention to it, but France and Germany give comparatively little. The Spanish have never spent much time at target practice because, their officers said, "it was simply throwing money in the sea." But their real shooting threw a great deal more "into the sea."



CHAPTER THE TWENTY-NINTH.

FIGHTING LEADERS OF THE ARMY.

THE ALMOST ROMANTIC CAREER OF GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, COMMANDING THE ARMY—
FROM A LIEUTENANT AT TWENTY-TWO TO A MAJOR-GENERAL AT TWENTY-FIVE—
GENERAL MERRITT'S RAPID RISE IN THE CAVALRY ARM AT THE SAME TIME—
THE SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY AS DESCRIBED BY FOREIGNERS—A
VIVID DESCRIPTION OF THE CHARGE AT SAN JUAN—THE
LONDON "TIMES'S" DESCRIPTION OF OUR MEN.

I.

THE biography of Major-General Nelson A. Miles, commanding the army of the United States, when it shall be written, will be one as striking as a page of romance. Especially so will it be to Americans, who honor their free institutions, because they provide no royal road to success, but maintain a free highway along which natural capacity may find its way to all the honor it can achieve. General Miles's life is the romance of free democracy. When the Civil War began Nelson A. Miles was a clerk in a Boston business house, and twenty-two years old. At his own expense he recruited a company of volunteers, and offered their services to the government. The offer was accepted, but he was thought too young to be commissioned as their Captain, and was, instead, appointed a Lieutenant.

**MAJOR-GENERAL
MILES, COM-
MANDING
THE ARMY**

Without protest he went to the front in that capacity. In three months the Lieutenant of twenty-two was Colonel of a regiment, a post he had won by gallantry and capacity; in three years the young man, then twenty-five, was Major-General, commanding a corps of 25,000 men, forming part of the line besieging Richmond, and it was to him that General Lee communicated his purpose to arrange for a surrender of the Confederate forces.




MAJOR-GENERAL NELSON A. MILES

General Miles was not a West Point graduate, but he was a graduate of the university of experience—studied in the tents and trenches and demonstrated his problems on the field of battle. In the Civil War he was three times wounded, four times brevetted for personal bravery in action. He had fought Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson, and was in every battle fought by the Army of the Potomac, but one, and a wound restrained him on that occasion. In every action he distinguished himself as a commander. There are few careers more suggestive of the glamour of romance than that of this young man who between his twenty-second and twenty-fifth year was rejected as a Captain because of his youth, and became a Major-General of the largest and most active army corps in the Richmond campaign, and to whom the fortune of war brought the offer of surrender of the Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate armies.

After the war was over General Miles was transferred to the regular army, and was sent to what was then the Far West, to subdue the hostile Indians. There he earned great renown as “the Indian Fighter” against the Comanches, Sioux, Nez Percés, Apaches, and other tribes, led by such Chiefs as Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Spotted Tail, Chief Joseph, and Geronimo, all daring fighters and skillful in tactics.

No man in the army of the United States has won and deserved more commissions than General Miles. They represent every grade from Lieutenant of Volunteers to Major-General in the regular establishment commanding all the armies of the United States. He has received votes of thanks of four legislatures, State and Territorial. In addition to a congressional medal of honor, the people of Arizona gave him a jeweled sword; for General Miles finally subdued the Indian tribes and retired them to their reservations, where they now live in peace and quiet, whereas they had been a continual menace to our frontier ever since the settlement of the West began.

General Miles has been called “The Winner of Bloodless Victories.” It is used to his honor by those who know him, and his record of preserving the life and health of his troops, and in derision by his enemies. In the Cuban invasion, as one of the war board, he insisted



upon disregarding the mere theatrical idea of assaulting Havana, where great loss of life must inevitably follow, and proposed the Santiago campaign; that is, he suggested the southern coast as the most healthful point for the first foothold and to let Havana wait for a cooler and more propitious season. These tactics he pursued in Porto Rico, and his orders have always been to preserve the health of troops, and to make war by the tactics that will result in least sacrifice of life.

He is a member of the International Peace Society and, like all good soldiers, regards war as the last resort when nothing can be used but force. He is about sixty years old, a gentleman in education, manner, taste, and habit, as well as by birth. He represented the United States army at the Jubilee of Victoria, and in the Greco-Turkish War.

Personally, General Miles is a very agreeable and unassuming gentleman; as an officer of the army he is celebrated for his careful observance of appearances, and in all aspects of his official position he looks as he is the General commanding the American army.

II.

A GRADUATE of West Point Military Academy, Major-General Wesley Merritt was distinguished during the Civil War as a most successful cavalry leader. He, like General Miles, became a corps-commander before he was twenty-seven. He was graduated a year later than General Joseph Wheeler, and the two men were on opposing sides and of opposing temperaments. General Wheeler, ardent, fiery, yet tenacious, quick to pursue advantage or to retreat from error; General Merritt cool, contemplative, and working out the problem carefully before achieving his task. General Merritt served with Generals Sheridan and Custer. He has won all his honors by courage and ability, and possesses the temperament that inspires confidence in his troops.

It was the possession of the faculties of order, fine regulation, and coolness that singled him out to command the Philippines' army of invasion, and to be Military Governor of the conquered territory.



MAJOR-GENERAL WESLEY MERRITT
COMMANDING THE U. S. FORCES AT MANILA

For the same reason he had hardly secured a foothold before he was instructed to proceed to Paris to advise the United States peace commissioners respecting the Filipinos and the problems of government affecting the Philippine Islands. General Merritt was about sixty years old when he was sent on these important missions.

III

Among the leaders who were expected to fight in Cuba, none was more conspicuous than Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, of Virginia, who was commissioned to command the seventh army corps at the beginning of the war. General Lee had attracted national attention to himself by the courageous manner in which he bore himself toward Captain-General Weyler and afterwards toward Captain-General Blanco, while serving as Consul General of the United States at Havana. A graduate of West Point Academy, a cavalry leader of distinction in the Confederate army during the Civil War, a member of Congress, Governor of Virginia,—he had borne distinguished honors with credit to himself and his State. He was appointed Consul General by President Cleveland and had so emphasized the quality of his ability that he was continued at the post by President McKinley. It may be said, in fact, that General Lee's position at Havana transcended in importance that of a minister, and it was his open, brave and determined stand that put an end to the oppression laid upon American citizens in Cuba. It was intended that General Lee should lead the assault against the city of Havana in the autumn; but the sudden collapse of the war, following upon the splendid actions of the navy, rendered assault upon Havana unnecessary. There could be no doubt, however, that if opportunity had come to him, General Lee would have distinguished himself as he had in all other positions of responsibility.

OTHER LEADERS
AND THE MEN
THEY LED

Accounts of General Shafter and General Wheeler have been given in a previous chapter on the surrender of Santiago, as well as of other

brave and courageous leaders, such as Kent, Hawkins, Lawton, Chaffee, Wood, and Roosevelt. The men they led were worthy of the leaders. Descriptions of them by English correspondents will be interesting.

A correspondent of the London *Daily Mail*, who witnessed the charge at El Caney, thus described it: "When the afternoon came,—I lost exact count of time,—there was still a jumble of volleying over by Caney. But in front our men were away out of sight behind a ridge far ahead. Beyond there arose a long, steepish ascent, crowned by the blockhouse upon which the artillery had opened fire in the morning.

"Suddenly, as we looked through our glasses, we saw a little black ant go scrambling quickly up this hill, and an inch or two behind him a ragged line of other little ants, and then another line of ants at another part of the hill, and then another, until it seemed as if somebody had dug a stick into a great ants' nest down in the valley, and all the ants were scrambling away up hill. Then the volley firing began ten times more furiously than before; from the right beyond the top of the ridge burst upon the ants a terrific fire of shells; from the blockhouse in front of them machine guns sounded their continuous rattle. But the ants swept up the hill. They seemed to us to thin out as they went forward; but they still went forward. It was incredible, but it was grand. The boys were storming the hill. The military authorities were most surprised. They were not surprised at these splendid athletic daredevils of ours doing it. But that a military commander should have allowed a fortified and intrenched position to be assailed by an infantry charge up the side of a long exposed hill, swept by a terrible artillery fire, frightened them, not so much by its audacity as by its terrible cost in human life.

"As they neared the top the different lines came nearer together. One moment they went a little more slowly; then they nearly stopped; then they went on again faster than ever, and then all of us sitting there on the top of the battery cried with excitement. For the ants were scrambling all round the blockhouse on the ridge, and in a moment or two we saw them inside it. But then our hearts swelled



MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE

up into our throats, for a fearful fire came from somewhere beyond the blockhouse and from somewhere to the right of it and somewhere to the left of it. Then we saw the ants come scrambling down the hill again. They had taken a position which they had not the force to hold. But a moment or two and up they scrambled again, more of them, and more quickly than before, and up the other face of the hill to the left went other lines, and the ridge was taken, and the blockhouse was ours, and the trenches were full of dead Spaniards.

"It was a grand achievement—for the soldiers who shared it—this storming of the hill leading up from St. Juan River to the ridge before the main fort. We could tell so much at 2,560 yards. But we also knew that it had cost them dearly."

A correspondent of the London *Times* thus described the American soldier's outfit as compared with others:—

"In the way of clothing the American private carries a complete change of underdrawers, undershirts, socks, laced boots, and uniform trousers. My particular private was carrying a double allowance of socks, handkerchiefs, and underwear. He had a toothbrush and comb. That is the heavy marching order knapsack. For light marching, which is the usual manner, the man begins by spreading on the ground his half tent, which is about half the size of a traveling rug. On this he spreads his blanket, rolls it up tightly into a long, narrow sausage, having first distributed along its length a pair of socks, a change of underwear, and the two sticks of his one tent pole. Then he brings the ends of this canvas roll together, not closely, as in the German army, but more like the ends of a horse-shoe held by a rope, which at the same time stops the ends of the roll tightly. When this horseshoe is slung over the man's shoulder it does not press uncomfortably upon his chest. The total weight is distributed in the most convenient manner for marching.

"The packing of the man's things is strictly according to regulation, excepting only the single pocket in his knapsack, where he may carry what he chooses, as he chooses. His light canvas haversack is much like the English one, and his round, rather flat water

flask is covered with canvas. It is made of tin, and the one I inspected was rusty inside. It would be better if of aluminum. In the haversack is a pannikin with a hinged handle that may be used as a saucepan. Over this fits a tin plate, and when the two are covering each other the handle of the pannikin fits over both by way of handle. It is an excellent arrangement, but should be of aluminum instead of a metal liable to rust. The most valuable part of this haversack is a big tin cup that can be used for a great variety of purposes, including cooking coffee. It is hung loose at the strap of the haversack. Of course, each man has knife, fork, and spoon, each in a leather case.

"The cartridge belt contains one hundred rounds, which are distributed all the way around the waist, there being a double row of them. The belt is remarkably light, being woven all in one operation. It is of cotton and another material, which prevents shrinking or loosening. The belts have stood admirably the test put upon them for the last six days, when it has rained every day, on top of the ordinary heavy moisture usual at sea in the tropics. The test is the more interesting from their having been previously in a very dry country. Officers and men alike unite in praise of this cartridge belt. The particular private whom I was inspecting said he now carried one hundred as easily as he formerly carried fifty. This belt rests loosely on the hips, without any straps over the shoulders. It is eminently business-like in appearance. The hat is the gray felt of South Africa, Australia, and every other part of the world where comfort and cost are consulted. No boots are blacked on expeditions of this kind. The men who form in line for guard duty have their tunics well brushed, but that may be due to extraneous assistance.

"For fighting purposes, then, the United States private has nothing to keep clean excepting his rifle and bayonet. He carries no contrivances for polishing buttons, boots, or the dozens of bits of accoutrement deemed essential to a good soldier in Europe. In Spain, for instance, the private, though he may have nothing in his

haversack, will, nevertheless, carry a clumsy outfit of tools for making his uniform look imposing.

"Now, as to discipline in the American army, I cannot speak at present, for the war is yet too young. It may, however, be worth noting that in this particular regiment, while most complete liberty was allowed the men all the twelve days of the rail journey from San Francisco to Tampa, not a single case of drunkenness or any other breach of discipline was reported. Among the one hundred and five men on this boat there has not in the past seven days been a single case of sickness of any kind, or any occasion for punishing. The firing discipline during the three times we have been under fire has been excellent, the obedience of soldiers to their officers has been as prompt and intelligent as anything I have seen in Europe; and as to coolness under fire and accuracy of aim, what I have seen is most satisfactory. The men evidently regard their officers as soldiers of equal courage and superior technical knowledge. To the Yankee private 'West Pointer' means what to the soldier of Prussia is conveyed by noble rank. In my intimate intercourse with officers and men aboard this ship I cannot recall an instance of an officer addressing a private otherwise than is usual when a gentleman issues an order. I have never heard an officer or non-commissioned officer curse a man. During the engagement of Cabañas the orders were issued as quietly as at any other time, and the men went about their work as steadily as bluejackets on a man-of-war."



CHAPTER THE THIRTIETH.

INTERESTING FACTS ABOUT WAR.

THE NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, AS SUMMED UP BY A NAVAL EXPERT—VALUE OF ARMOR AND GUNS, AND THE DANGER OF WOOD—TORPEDO BOATS PROVED TO BE OF MUCH LESS EFFICIENCY THAN EXPECTED—ABOVE ALL, ONLY THE BEST OF MEN MUST FORM FIGHTING CREWS—COST OF MANY MODERN WARS IN TREASURE AND BLOOD—INDEMNITIES PAID BY THE CONQUERED NATION.

I.*

THIS battle [of Santiago] will be accepted by some naval experts as the only modern one that can be counted on for theoretical conclusions of value to the builders of war ships. In the Yalu River the inequality of the two sides in character caused students to hesitate about drawing many inferences from it. It is true we have only emphasized the Yalu lessons in many respects, but I think we can go ahead with the two together, one checking the other, to say positively that we have learned something.

NAVAL LESSONS
OF THE WAR
WITH SPAIN

To go back a bit, the ineffectiveness of a fleet against land batteries is demonstrated, I think, by our bombardment of San Juan and Santiago. We failed to reduce their works. We silenced them all right enough. As we gained in skill we were able to drive the gunners away very quickly. But their silence was only temporary, even when the batteries were weak and the conditions all favorable to our ships; when our guns numbered twenty to one.

Everybody knows by this time that the batteries guarding Santiago harbor are on the bluffs, some of them two hundred feet above the water line. This unquestionably makes them harder to hit, but it likewise increases the difficulty of their aim. We found out the

*The entire article from the *New York Commercial Advertiser*, July 16, 1898, by an officer of the battleship *Iowa*.

difference in the latter respect when the same gunners (probably) came out in the ships. The first broadside from Cervera's squadron was much more effective than the fire of the shore batteries, and this, despite the fact that the range during the bombardment was often less than at the opening of the sea fight, when the Spaniards fired so well.

The ability of a watchful and efficient fleet to ward off hostile torpedo boats has been fully brought out. Here we have remained for months blockading a port in which there were always two torpedo boats. Our ships lay sometimes as close in as a mile off the entrance. And several attempts were made by the destroyers to attack us. None of them got out without being seen, and always they were driven back. Our readiness was the thing. In South American wars torpedo attacks have been successful several times, and the torpedo boats were nowhere near as swift and powerful as the Spanish destroyers *Furor* and *Pluton*. It is safe to say that we have shown that if a man-of-war is ready at all times to open up instantly an efficient rapid fire, that ship has little or nothing to fear from torpedo boats.

With the rapid-fire guns a modern vessel can throw a storm of shell into an enemy. A torpedo boat with her "paper" sides might as well sink herself before starting, so certain is she of destruction. There must be swarms of these boats to have any prospect of success against a modern ship of any size, even when the circumstances are most favorable for the attack. Searchlight tactics and the great service that they can do were well brought out off the blockade. Without the searchlights our fleet could not have kept the Spaniards penned up. Illuminating as we did, night after night, the entrance of the harbor, by swinging the lights slowly from side to side over all the water, nothing could have escaped unseen by the picket boats. Then, too, the light was of great service in indicating to the crews manning the guns just where to direct the fire. Since it was an invariable rule never to throw the beam of a searchlight on one of our own vessels, there could be no doubt left in the mind of the gun pointer as to the hostile character of the approaching vessel. It eliminated

all the delay and liability of error to which any verbal orders are so liable.

The necessity of a secondary fleet, as it might be called, was also shown. The number of important and hazardous missions was so great for these smaller vessels that they were more constantly on the go than the proverbial fashion butterfly in the height of the season. The work of these dispatch boats was most exhausting, and care should be taken that they be given great credit for their efficient and valuable services. Indeed, these smaller craft are noted for the lack of space aboard for "idlers."

It is obvious, of course, that a large supply fleet is indispensable. A ship cannot run without fuel, and in war times the boilers seem to eat up coal. Nor can a crew, no matter how brave, fight as well hungry as they can on a full stomach. "It is hard work fighting on cracker hash," so let there be plenty of supply ships. Our repair ship *Vulcan* was an indispensable adjunct, and so, of course, was the ammunition supply ship. After each engagement every ship brought her ammunition supply up to the limit, no matter how little she had used. The hospital ship possesses to a fleet not only the obvious use that makes it a necessity; it gets out of sight the wounded men, and it is a comforting thing to know it is near at hand.

Perhaps one of the most important lessons is the advantage of smokeless powder. With the incessant firing of our ships there was always smoke hanging round some part of the ship's batteries, though we had a gentle breeze, and the enemy was to windward of us. Fire from the guns had to be slackened again and again, and I doubt if the *Colon* could have escaped with so little punishment if the smoke from the few minutes of firing at the leading ships had not left a cloud which, combined with the firing of the smaller quick-fire guns, prevented the pointing of the heavier guns. Of course, with a quick-fire gun, any temporary lifting of the smoke will give plenty of time to deliver a fire, but with the slower firing turret guns the view must be unimpeded for some time. The smoke from our guns did the enemy no harm either, as some part of the ship was almost bound

to protrude, and with this assistance his guns could be laid. Both sides were even in this, however, since, with the exception of the *Colon*, none of the Spanish ships had smokeless powder. The *Colon* did not have any heavy guns in her turrets, as they had not been completed. Wash deck gear, it is said, filled up their turrets, but the turrets could not have been so small as that would imply.

The teachings of Mahan about men were fully borne out. The great lesson of the war is the importance of the *personnel*. Poor men make poor ships. No matter how brave and efficient the officers may be, they cannot fight well with a poor crew. Thirty men, however alive, cannot infuse their knowledge and enthusiasm into five hundred others. The officers may make the men stand up at the guns and prevent them from jumping overboard, by closing the half-ports, and by other means, but they cannot cause other than real men-of-war's men to put up a good fight. No wonder that the crews of some of the Spanish ships wanted to jump overboard on coming out of the harbor. All the men were conscripts, and six hundred had been impressed just before the departure of the fleet from the Canaries. It is said that all the jails there were opened and the male factors taken aboard the Spanish ships. You can force a man aboard a ship, but you can't force him to fight.

Our men had another advantage. They had had gun practice. Most of the gunners were on personally affectionate terms with their guns, had made bull's-eyes with them, and not only ached to train them on the enemy, but had such confidence in their marksmanship that fear was out of the question. The crews simply knew they could lick the other fellows, and their whole interest was in their own ships, not in those of the enemy. The Spaniards are not cowards, yet their impulse from the first was to dive out of their ships. They felt sure of defeat.

I value, too, the moral effect on the men of large ships. That also gives confidence. The resistance of thick armor was illustrated in some instances. Battle is a better test than the conditions of the proving ground. On the *Colon's* 6-inch armor the nose of quite a good-sized projectile was found sticking, and a large 12-inch common

shell had exploded on it without doing any damage. However, on the *Vizcaya* a large shell had entered well aft in the cabin and had passed right through, tearing off a plate on the other side; she was not armored. On the *Iowa* two large shells struck well forward at the water line, but on the unarmored part of the ship. The first, a 6-inch, did not even perforate the cofferdam, but, though it pulverized the cellulose, it is still in the cofferdam, the inner side of which it did not penetrate. Moreover, as it did not explode, the rotating band being recovered entire, though separated from the shell, it presumably was an armor-piercing shell. Surely it must have had little velocity. This is the more surprising, as the Spanish ships all had the long, high-power English guns. Still the blow probably was an oblique one. The other big shell also struck the water line, just a few feet aft of the first one, and made a clean hole in the cofferdam. Striking a hatch well amidships, it exploded, but the pieces seem to have been carried along, most of them going through the chain locker, which is right abreast the hatch. There are seven good-sized holes through it, besides any number of dents. The chain locker happened to be empty, so the pieces passed through into the midship chain locker, where they were caught by the chain. One of them passed through the after side of the chain locker and struck the base of the turret. Most of the pieces were picked up around the deck in the immediate vicinity and in the chain locker, showing that the force of the bursting charge must have been slight. One of the pieces gave the arc of the base of the shell, which proved to be a 12-inch. The ship was struck by a number of other smaller shells, once on a stanchion aft, probably any number of times on the armor, and scars made by two small-arm bullets were discovered on the muzzle face of one of the after 12-inch guns. Everything would tend to emphasize the superiority of armored ships over unarmored ones. Such a riddling as some of the Spanish ships received could not have been inflicted on any of our ships that were engaged.

Everything goes to prove the value of the battleship. The power it has to keep off torpedo boats and rapid-fire fusilade, and the

confidence a battleship inspires in the crew, all go to show the value of the type.

The importance of having no woodwork aboard, and making the most perfect provisions against fire, cannot be overestimated. Fire was what destroyed the Spanish fleet, and not only the fire from our ships but that aboard their own. Now, they had little wood aboard any of the vessels, yet no one of them was under fire more than a few minutes (about fifteen) before smoke could be seen rising from the decks. It seems even the cork paint burned. One fire on the *Vizcaya* was extinguished, but others started quickly, both forward and aft. The water mains were shot away, and the fight had to be given up. Something must be done to protect these mains hereafter in every fighting ship. Fire and smoke always have the worst possible effect on the crew, and, owing to the great number of hatches and compartments on the ship, flames are the harder to discover and fight. It was found simply impossible to keep fighting both the fire and the ship, the gun-fire slackening up immediately the alarm was given. So clear did this become that whenever the flame and smoke could be seen from our fleet it was felt that all was up with that ship, and the tendency was to direct our gun fire on some other ship. Without an exception every ship that was on fire was soon headed in for the beach. It is a fallacy to think that fire drill is all a matter of form on a steel ship. So quickly and rapidly does the fire spread that it seems that even the steel itself must be burning. The importance, also, of keeping watch in every compartment for fire was shown.

There was the greatest difficulty during all the action in getting messages to and from the different parts of the ship. The noise and concussions were too great to allow of the use of any kind of voice tubes, and messengers are slow and unreliable, and in danger of being killed. A serious error was made by the messengers on one ship. An order which was intended for the secondary battery only was taken to the turret. The messenger told the officer in one of the 12-inch turrets to point on the torpedo boats, and a chance at the *Colon* was missed. Unless some better means of communication is invented,

officers shut off as they are from any direct orders must be left to act largely at their own discretion. This, at times, would be most unfortunate, as in the sighting hoods of the turrets, especially, the view is so limited that it is often difficult to keep even the target in sight, much less to have the complete range over the horizon that is so necessary for proper gun control. Then, too, in case of accident, some method of reporting promptly to the Captain is needed.

This fight probably gave a severe blow to the use of conning towers. So far, I can learn of no case where they were used during the engagement, the Captain preferring not to cramp himself and be confined in such narrow quarters, where he could see so little of what is occurring. Every one has to rely chiefly on his eyes for a knowledge of how the fight is going, and in the conning tower the range of view is about as limited as in the sighting hood.

It was also shown that a practical battle range finder has yet to be introduced. Those in use are so delicate that they cannot withstand the discharge of the guns. They get out of order in action, so that the old method of angling on the masthead height of the enemy has to be relied on. Even the range indicators, simple as they seem to be, were completely thrown out by the gun blasts, and every one, to a greater or lesser extent, had to use his own judgment in giving the range, and without smokeless powder the opportunities for a prompt correction of range were rare. I do not think the old fork system of establishing the range has gone out for good.

A full knowledge of the nature of the blasts from the different guns is valuable to the crew, and to the designers of the ships it will be all-important. Some of the rapid-fire guns suffered so from the blasts of the turret guns that the gun crews were actually blown away from their stations. In other cases the smoke of the firing was so great that the gun pointers were blinded by it. The taste and the smell of the gunpowder were so objectionable that many of the gun crews found it necessary to wrap towels about their mouths. If this is the case with ordinary old brown cocoa powder, it must be much worse with the smokeless. Indeed, it would be a necessity to

have the fumes from the smokeless powder made harmless in some way, otherwise it will be impossible to keep any of the guns manned during a rapid fire. This suggests the use in the shells of some explosive giving forth poisonous fumes.

Another interesting thing brought out by the action was the extremely short time the Spanish ships were under our fire before something happened that demoralized the crews. It would show that every man on the ship must be so trained in his duties that he knows exactly what to do in case of accident, for there will be no time to wait and summon assistance.

The value of cofferdams was conclusively shown by the swelling up of the cellulose so that it closed the 6-inch hole. To be sure the hole was only occasionally submerged, and the cofferdam itself was not penetrated.

One of the great dangers to be avoided was shown to be splinters. A great number of the wounded was laid out by splinters rather than by the fragments of shot or shell. Steel splinters are very bad. If one could get a ship that was absolutely splinter-proof and fire-proof, it would be a long stride in the direction of the ideal—something “unsinkable and unlickable.”

II.*

IN THE earlier wars of the century some notable precedents have been made from which an idea may be formed of the size of the bill shortly to be made out by the United States against Spain. The principle followed has been that, both in territory and in cash, the defeated nation is liable to pay for its experience. A far-off but famous illustration of this principle is found in the terms of peace dictated by the allied powers of Europe to France, after the fall of Napoleon at Waterloo. Not only were

**COST OF WARS
AND INDEMNITIES PAID**

*Entire article from the *New York Sun*, July 24, 1898.

various pieces of French territory appropriated, but her important frontier fortresses were held for five years by an "army of occupation," which the French treasury was made to pay and support.

As a result of the three wars between Great Britain and China, (1840, 1857, and 1860), the Chinese government, besides ceding Hong Kong to the victorious British, and opening several of her ports to trade, was made to pay an indemnity amounting in all to about \$35,000,000. In the case of the war between the United States and Mexico, when the terms of peace were dictated by our government, compensation was taken wholly in territory. Mexico was too poor at that time to have paid a cash indemnity equivalent to the cost of the war, which was about \$100,000,000. So we took California and New Mexico instead of money, and considered the bargain so good that we paid \$15,000,000 to the Mexican Government, as an additional consideration for the transfer.

Although not strictly a war indemnity, that paid by Great Britain on account of the depredations of the *Alabama* during our Civil War, is of timely interest as exemplifying the extent to which claims for compensation may be built up and cut down. As originally put forward, the American claims practically comprised every item in the expense of the war from the day on which the *Alabama* put to sea. The prolongation of the war was attributed entirely to her, and she was, therefore, made responsible for this, as well as for the loss suffered by American commerce through its transference to foreign vessels and the increased rates of maritime insurance. The Geneva tribunal, however, decided that such indirect results of the *Alabama's* depredations could not be included in the bill, and awarded an indemnity of \$15,875,000 as an equivalent for the injury actually done to the United States through the fault or negligence of England.

The recent war between China and Japan was terminated by the peace of Shimonoseki three years ago. By the treaty China agreed to pay Japan a sum equivalent to \$175,000,000. In addition, she ceded the island of Formosa to her conquerors, recognized the independence of Korea, and consented to open four new treaty ports.

The war between Prussia and Austria, in 1866, was rounded off by the payment of a notable indemnity by the vanquished Austrians. In addition to the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia and the exclusion of Austria from the German Bund, the treaty of Prague, which terminated the war, provided for the payment by Austria of an indemnity of 40,000,000 Prussian thalers, or about \$30,000,000. From this amount, however, deduction was made of 15,000,000 thalers, representing Austrian claims on Schleswig-Holstein, and 5,000,000 thalers as an equivalent for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in Austria, pending the conclusion of peace.

The heaviest war indemnity of modern times was, of course, that paid by France at the close of the war with Germany. The hostilities lasted over eight months, and the total cost of the war was estimated at \$1,580,000,000. Besides the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, France had to pay Germany five milliards of francs (\$1,000,000,000), in installments, which were allowed to extend over three years. The original demand of Germany was six milliards, or \$200,000,000 more. M. Thiers strove in vain to save Metz, but it was to his exertions that the reduction in the amount of the indemnity was due.

The cost of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 has been estimated at \$945,000,000. Between the declaration of war by Russia and the treaty of San Stefano nearly eleven months elapsed. By this treaty the Porte admitted itself indebted to Russia in the sum of 1,410,000,000 rubles (about \$725,000,000) as indemnity for the losses and expenses of the war. The items in the account were as follows:—

Four hundred and sixty million dollars for war expenses; \$205,000,000 for damage done to the south coast of Russia, her export commerce, industries, and railways; \$55,000,000 for injuries caused by the invasion of the Caucasus, and \$5,000,000 for injuries suffered by Russian subjects and establishments in Turkey. In consideration of the financial embarrassments of the Ottoman Empire, the Czar consented to accept in substitution for about three-fifths of the total sum the various territorial cessions sanctioned by the treaty of

Berlin. This left a balance of \$225,000,000 due to Russia by Turkey, and a part of it is still unpaid.

The latest and most lenient war indemnity was that levied by victorious Turkey on Greece last year. The Sultan was obliged by the Great Powers of Europe to cut it down to \$20,000,000, which was not a fourth part of what it actually cost him.

A few comparative figures, taken from official records, will serve to put the great increase in the cost of war as now conducted, with all the modern improvements, in a clear light. Our war for independence lasted eight years, and its cost is officially recorded as \$135,000,000, using round figures. There were about 310,000 troops engaged in that war—one-third more than have been called out in the present conflict with Spain. It follows that, accepting Mr. Dingley's estimate of \$500,000,000 a year as the cost of the present war, it is going to cost three times as much to fight Spain for one year in 1898 as it cost to fight Great Britain for the eight years from 1775 to 1783. The War of 1812, which lasted two years and eight months, cost the United States a little over \$107,000,000, and to carry it on we put in the field 576,000 troops, nearly three times as many as we have now under arms.

The Mexican War, which lasted two years and three months, cost the American people \$100,000,000, and 112,000 troops were engaged in it. If the number of the troops who carried our flag victoriously to the capital of Mexico had been doubled they would have about equaled the number of the army now in the field against Spain, and the cost of their two years and three months of operations would have been about \$200,000,000. From this it is a plain deduction that, with the same number of men under arms, a year of war in 1898 is about five times as expensive as was a year of war in 1846.

The cost of our great civil conflict has been put down at \$6,189,929,909, but that estimate includes all expenses growing out of the war, as well as the actual cost of the military and naval operations. The direct outlay of the United States Government in carrying on the war for four years was \$3,400,000,000, and in the course of the struggle

2,859,132 Union troops were engaged. It is estimated that the number of troops actually engaged on the Union side averaged 2,326,168 for three years. Hence, it appears that the direct cost of the war, counting it on this three years' basis, was about \$1,466,000,000 a year. But Mr. Dingley has told us that it will cost \$500,000,000 to keep 200,000 men fighting Spain for one year, which is more than one-third as much as it cost the government to keep 2,326,000 men fighting the Confederate States for the same length of time.

It is easy to understand why modern warfare is so much more costly than the old-fashioned kind, if we turn to a few of the leading items in the military and naval expenditure of our time. The average cost of a first-class battleship is \$3,000,000. The cost of the *Maine*, which was a battleship of the second class, was \$2,500,000. An armored cruiser of the *Brooklyn* type costs \$3,000,000. An armored ram like the *Katahdin* costs \$1,000,000. A double-turreted monitor costs about \$1,500,000. A single-turreted monitor costs about \$500,000. A protected cruiser costs all the way from \$1,000,000 to \$2,700,000; the *Charleston* cost the former, and the *Columbia* the latter sum. An unprotected cruiser of the *Detroit* type costs \$600,000. An unarmored gunboat like the *Concord* is worth \$500,000. A composite gunboat of the *Newport* class costs \$230,000. A dynamite gunboat like the famous *Vesuvius* is worth \$350,000. A torpedo boat of the *Farragut* pattern costs \$225,000.

We have not lost any of our vessels in the war with Spain. The *Maine*, destroyed in Havana harbor before the war began, is the only item of this kind that will figure in the coming bill of costs. The *Maine* cost about \$2,500,000 to build. A more serious item will be compensation for the lives of the two hundred and sixty-six American sailors that were destroyed with her. This may well justify a claim of \$5,000,000 more, to be distributed among the surviving families of the men who were thus treacherously killed. Other items in the bill will cover our general war expenses of all kinds; for coal used at sea, for transportation of our soldiers by land and by sea, for war supplies of all kinds, for the pay of our soldiers and sailors, and for the losses

sustained by the interruption and disturbance of our trade and commerce, not only with Cuba, but with other parts of the world.

The Quartermaster's department has estimated that \$44,000,000 will be needed to pay the transportation charges alone of our armies now engaged in fighting Spain for six months. The Navy Department's latest estimate of the cost of furnishing our fleets in time of peace with all their necessary equipment—of which coal is the leading article—was nearly \$1,500,000 a year. The exigencies of war have certainly doubled it. This has nothing to do with the cost of guns or the ammunition or the torpedoes. It covers only such things as coal, hemp, wire, anchors, cables, chains, nautical instruments, lamps, bunting, and other things that come strictly under the head of "ships' equipments."

The high cost of modern ordnance and ammunition will also help swell Spain's indemnity bill. A complete supply of ammunition to fill once all the vessels sent to sea against Spain costs about \$4,750,000. One battleship's full supply of shot and shell costs about \$400,000. Every time one of our monster 13-inch guns is fired the charge costs \$1,500; a great many of these charges are already included in our little account against Spain. The smaller guns are fired at a cost running all the way from \$200 up to \$1,000 for each charge. The guns themselves are costly, too. The bill for one hundred high-power steel guns for seacoast defenses, built at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, is \$3,500,000—averaging \$35,000 apiece.

Mr. Dingley's estimate of \$500,000,000 as the cost of our war operations against Spain for a year covers all these things, and is probably a calculation well within the actual expenditure. Even though Spain sues for peace quickly, it is not possible for our government to avoid a large portion of this estimated outlay, as the troops have been called out and contracts of all kinds have been made for months ahead.

III.

THE cost to the United States of the war with Spain cannot yet be known. The actual expenditures during hostilities and the expenditures in prospect may be estimated with something like accuracy. But there always follows a train of consequential expenditures for the payment of claims, pensions, etc., which cannot be foreseen. The first money appropriated for the war was the \$50,000,000 put into the hands of the President for national defense, without debate or a single opposing vote, on March 9. Of this the President gave to the navy nearly \$30,000,000, to the War Department nearly \$20,000,000. Small sums went to the Treasury and State Departments. New vessels were purchased for the navy, at a total cost of \$17,750,000, before war began. The auxiliary cruisers *Harvard* and *Yale* were chartered at a rental of \$2,000 per day, the *St. Louis* and *St. Paul* at \$2,500 per day. To fire one 13-inch armor-piercing shell costs \$560; to fire an 8-inch shell costs \$134. Many thousands of the latter and hundreds of the former were discharged during the war. Secretary Long estimated that the cost of supplying the vessels of our navy with complete ammunition, sufficient for one prolonged battle, would be \$6,521,985. All might be fired in one day. Admiral Dewey carried one million dollars' worth of ammunition to Manila when he passed Corregidor Island. Every time his fleet passed before Montojo's squadron, delivering broadsides, it cost the government at least \$100,000. In three hours he burned up \$500,000 of ammunition, and sunk \$10,000,000 of Spanish property. The same amount was expended by Sampson's fleet in sinking Cervera's ships, valued at \$16,500,000.

COST OF THE
SPANISH-
AMERICAN WAR

Assistant Secretary of War Vanderlip, in an article in *McClure's Magazine*,* from which these facts are taken, says:—

As a matter of fact, only \$98,000,000 was paid out by the Treasury Department, on account of the army and navy, during the actual continuance of the war, from

* October, 1898.

March until August 12, when the Protocol was signed. The following statement will show these expenditures in detail, and will give a graphic idea of the immensely greater expenditure for the army than for the navy, although in the present war the navy accomplished the greater results:—

1898.	WAR.	NAVY.	TOTAL.
March.....	\$ 600,000	\$ 2,400,000	\$ 3,000,000
April.....	1,200,000	9,800,000	11,000,000
May.....	12,000,000	7,000,000	19,000,000
June.....	16,500,000	6,500,000	23,000,000
July.....	29,500,000	5,500,000	35,000,000
August 12.....	5,500,000	1,500,000	7,000,000
	<u>\$65,800,000</u>	<u>\$32,700,000</u>	<u>\$98,000,000</u>

The actual Treasury outlay for the war he estimates at about \$361,000,000. "The government," he adds, "actually paid out an average of \$860,000 for each day of the Spanish-American War. To this must be added, however, an estimate of fifty per cent. of accounts not yet presented for settlement, which will bring the total up to approximately a million and a quarter a day. And this maximum of expense continued for several weeks after the close of the war, the subsistence of troops and their transportation remaining very much the same as if an actual state of hostility still existed. . . . Accepting the statistics of Mulhall as to the National Treasury cost of our own Civil War, each day of that war cost the Federal Government an average of \$2,476,760. It will thus be seen that, unless when all accounts are rendered a much different result from that anticipated appears, the daily cost of the Spanish-American War was only about fifty per cent. of that of the Civil War. It must be remembered, however, that there were millions of men in the field during the latter struggle, where only a quarter of a million were engaged in the Spanish-American War, and if actual figures could be given of the cost of the late war based upon the number of men engaged, it would probably be found that the cost of fighting has not been reduced with the introduction of improved arms and ships."

Mr. Charles A. Conant* gives the following interesting table of appropriations on the war account, voted by Congress:—

* Article in the *American Review of Reviews*, September, 1898.

APPROPRIATIONS MADE DURING THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH CONGRESS TO MEET EXPENSES INCIDENT TO THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

For the national defense, act March 9, 1898	\$50,117,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies, act May 4, 1898	34,625,725.71
Naval appropriation act, May 4, 1898 — amount of increase over preceding naval appropriation act	23,095,549.49
Fortification appropriation act, May 7, 1898 — amount of increase over act as passed by House	5,232,582.00
Naval auxiliary act, May 26, 1898	3,000,000.00
Additional clerical force, War Department, auditors' offices, etc., act May 31, 1898	227,976.45
Life-saving Service act, June 7, 1898	70,000.00
Army and navy deficiencies act, June 8, 1898	18,015,000.00
Appropriations in act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, June 13, 1898	600,000.00
Army, navy, and other war expenses for six months, beginning July 1, 1898, in general deficiency act	228,604,261.46
Expenses of bringing home remains of soldiers	200,000.00
Total	\$361,788,095.11

He also prepared a very interesting table showing the difference between army and navy warrants drawn during corresponding months of peace and war, in 1897 and 1898:—

FOR THE ARMY.*

FOR THE ARMY.*			
MONTH.	WARRANTS DRAWN IN 1898.	WARRANTS DRAWN IN 1897.	EXCESS IN 1898.
March	\$ 5,159,571	\$ 3,046,108	\$ 2,113,463
April	6,228,814	4,287,020	1,941,794
May	17,093,596	4,314,955	12,778,640
June	19,723,804	2,486,016	16,237,788
July	84,774,158	10,736,758	74,037,400
August 1-18	14,315,000	2,782,000	11,533,000
Totals	\$97,269,937	\$27,952,852	\$69,317,085
FOR THE NAVY.			
March	\$ 5,941,448	\$ 2,694,885	\$ 3,246,563
April	12,556,932	2,744,079	9,812,853
May	9,093,577	2,537,576	6,556,001
June	9,506,021	3,563,922	5,942,099
July	8,514,279	2,998,809	5,515,470
August 1-18	4,490,000	1,739,000	2,751,000
Totals	\$49,402,252	\$16,277,321	\$33,125,031
Aggregates	\$146,692,189	\$44,230,073	\$102,462,116

* The warrants drawn for the War Department in July, 1897, were abnormally large because the sum of \$6,047,330 was drawn for river and harbor improvements. The amount thus drawn in July, 1898, was less than \$2,000,000, so that the real excess of expenditures on account of the military service is \$4,000,000 greater than appears in the table. The drafts for river and harbor improvements are always large in July, because disbursing officers then inaugurate their accounts for the new fiscal year with ample balances.

Mr. Conant estimates the actual cost of the war at between \$250,000,000 and \$281,000,000 over and above the peace footing.

The United States demanded no money indemnity from Spain. It will receive Porto Rico instead—without counting the Philippines possibility or the eventual contingency of the annexation of Cuba. These would prove sources of large revenue, but would, for a long time, necessitate heavy garrison expenditures.

So that, counting not lives, or pensions, or anything future, the cost of our war with Spain will prove to be about \$300,000,000.



CHAPTER THE THIRTY-FIRST.

ASPECTS AND INCIDENTS.

THE WORK OF WAR CORRESPONDENTS AND REPORTERS—ENORMOUS COST OF THE SERVICE—
NO WAR IN HISTORY EVER SO PROMPTLY AND FULLY DESCRIBED—MATERIAL FOR HISTORIANS—INCIDENTS AND ANECDOTES OF SOLDIERS IN THE CAMP, IN BATTLE,
AND IN HOSPITALS—HOW SOME HEROES DIED AND OTHERS SUFFERED—
NAVAL ANECDOTES—ACTS OF GREAT BRAVERY—BOWERY MUSIC
AT GUAM—AGUINALDO'S FINE BAND—SPANISH AND
AMERICAN SAILORS CONTRASTED.

I.

Two or three days after Sampson's fleet had moved out of Key West to blockade Havana, the cable brought from Berlin a report that the German Emperor was "greatly amused at the idea of a fleet of war ships going to battle accompanied by a fleet of newspaper dispatch boats." It is fortunate that amusement, like happiness, is purely a relative joy. The German Emperor was to see the fleet of dispatch boats forward reports of the progress of the war (subsequently confirmed by acknowledgments of his own military and naval observers), that proved beyond doubt the superiority, in mettle and capacity, of men reared under the influence of a free press, over those stunted by the existence of a truckling press, held in terror by fear of prosecutions for free speech. He was to read in the leading papers of his own empire—edited by men who were not afraid to speak the truth, that his own fine standing armies, formed by conscription and under compulsion, were not better than the armies of the United States formed by volunteer enlistments, making up in quick intelligence and initiative what his own soldiers learned through despotic drill, and long service rendered with indifference. Also, that his reserves were not better than our volunteers.

The "fleet of dispatch boats," which so amused the Emperor, was the navy of modern journalism, not less wonderful in its perform-

THE NEWSPAPERS
AND THEIR
REPORTS
OF THE WAR

ances than the fighting navy. Its land forces, the war correspondents with the army, composed a worthy arm of the great establishment of trained journalism.

It remained for the newspapers of the United States to demonstrate to international journalism, through their employes, the same superior vigor, courage, endurance, and success in the labors on sea and land that our army and navy demonstrated against the antiquated and incompetent mechanisms and ideas of war put forth by a country restrained of free speech and manacled with ignorance.

§ Never before in the world's history was the progress of a great war so completely and so promptly described. It seemed as if American journalism, responding to the desire of the enormous clientage it had established, mobilized its forces concurrently with army and navy to make war on all the precedents of journalistic achievement. On land and sea the American newspaper reporter was everywhere. He was an army in himself. He stood on the bridge of the *Olympia* at Manila with Dewey, and was complimented for his accuracy of statement and his courage; he stood by Schley on the *Brooklyn*, raced with Sampson on the *New York*, and watched the battle on the *Oregon*. He went into the fight at Las Guasimas with the cavalry heroes, and stormed El Caney with Lawton, being, in fact, the first man in the fort.

Who can doubt the heroism of Hobson? But was it more, in truth—apart from its setting—than that of Marshall, the correspondent, who, shot through the spine at Las Guasimas, dictated his report of the battle to a colleague, while death seemed to wait on his sentences? Was it more than that of Creelman, who forced the fort at El Caney and met a bullet for his pains, and who, suffering agonies of pain, asked to be kept conscious until he could dictate his notes to his employer? These actions have been equaled by journalists everywhere, but they have never been surpassed.

More than these incidents, which illustrate the courage, audacity, and determination of the reporter, was the extraordinary spectacle of an unfettered press giving news, opinions, and speculations from the front as openly as if it were discussing local news at home. Except

for a short time, and with respect to specific information, there was no censorship. It was the test of a free press. Plans of battle, faults of execution, complaints of every sort were made public. If there remain any secrets of the campaign in Cuba it must be because no experienced correspondent or raw novice thought the affair worth the telling.

Perhaps there was much inaccuracy of detail, error of judgment in trusting rumor as fact, some mistaken "enterprise," if not, indeed, actual dishonesty in the haste and difficulty of the news service. Even the press harbors its due proportion of incompetents and rascals whose faults intrude everywhere; but the substantial foundations of accurate reports of battles, marches, truces, and casualties, occurring from day to day, were confirmed to the shame of fraud. But were there not also similar errors in official military and naval reporting—more than are known, perhaps, mercifully covered up in the archives at Washington. Generals and Admirals are not more infallible than reporters. But the reporter's mistake is open to the whole world to be tested and revised. His accuracy is measured against all the information the world may possess. Are not General Wheeler and General Kent brave, efficient, and honest leaders? But if the world depended upon their reports of San Juan for knowledge of the battle, the result would be a blank. Five hundred separate persons, perhaps, have described the battles of San Juan and El Caney. There are five hundred very different descriptions in details, but in the essentials the story is the same in all. No American naval officer off Santiago knew in what order the Spanish ships came out of the harbor until five days after the battle, when the Spanish survivors cleared up the confusion. Yet the morning after the great fight the American papers contained all the material facts correctly, the errors being those of mere detail. Nine hours before the President received Admiral Sampson's official dispatch, announcing the victory, the news of the fight was in the hands of every daily newspaper in America.

No war ever left such a wonderful mass of material for historians. It is not only the great newspapers and the news-gathering associations

that are to be considered. These sent experienced correspondents and observers capable of describing and understanding great events, but there was also a real "army" of correspondents of the "home papers." Every regiment and company had its enlisted reporter or correspondent, whose letters to the town or village paper will lend a new interest to the history of war. And all these reported the opinion of the general movement or the great events. Then, all the newspapers were deluged with private letters from soldiers to their families at home. The intelligence of the United States was writing the history of the war which it was prosecuting. Only the archives of the Navy, War, and State Departments are to be opened to complete the material.

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, himself a correspondent at the front, in an article describing how war news was reported,* gives these interesting ideas of the difficulty and cost: "When actual war [with Spain] was approaching," he writes, "a more extended service became necessary, and each of several newspapers acquired a veritable fleet of vessels, three, or four, or five, to patrol the waters of the West Indies. These newspaper dispatch boats were swift-going steamers, capable of making from twelve to fourteen knots an hour, and carrying crews of a dozen men or more, with several correspondents on each. Two dispatch boats, representing New York newspapers, were private yachts, fitted with dynamos, powerful searchlights, and a hundred and one other conveniences. Until war had been declared the whole cargo of these vessels in their trips between Havana and Key West, was a little package of copy that a man might carry in his vest pocket, and yet they were exceedingly expensive, as shipowners exacted from \$5,000 to \$9,000 a month for the use of each boat, and the newspapers were required to bear the additional expense of fire, marine, accident, and war insurance, which the alarmed underwriters of New York had fixed at the enormous rate of eight per cent. a month. One New York newspaper paid \$2,200 a month insurance on

**McClure's Magazine*, September, 1898.

a single vessel, and it had five boats in service. But besides these expenses the newspapers had to buy their own coal and supplies at war-time prices, and pay the salaries of the correspondents who directed the boats. One managing editor showed a salary list for a single week, including only war correspondents. It amounted to \$1,463.51, and the best-paid correspondent hailing from New York is said to have received \$10,000 a year.

"Every time a dispatch boat made port in Havana harbor a rapacious Spanish officer swooped down upon it and collected all manner of fees—health-office fees, customhouse fees, and fees for clear water to use in the boilers, to say nothing of pilotage charges—a total of from \$70 to \$125 a day for this purpose alone. At the Key West end of the voyage there were still further charges, rendered necessary by the inevitable medical certificate and the pilot hire. Expenses were paid in cash, and the correspondents found it necessary to go loaded down with all they could carry."

Sometimes a single paper received 5,000 words a day by cable from Key West, and as the rate from Key West to New York is five cents a word, this made an additional expense of \$250 a day for this single item. This in the face of the fact that after a dispatch was received it was often crowded out by more important news. Every message received by cable from Hong Kong cost \$1.60 per word.

The result of all this vast expenditure, of the labors of reporters, whose perils, exposures, hardships, and endurance were not less than those of the fighting forces, was that the American people knew the progress of the war by the hour. The newspapers kept the government itself informed far in advance of its own sources of information, in many instances.

The newspaper press came out of the war not less broadened than the nation itself.

II.

THE newspapers were filled with anecdotes and personal incidents, pathetic and humorous, both of the army and navy. They impart the true color of life to the game of war and illustrate the heroism of the obscure as well as of the leaders. A Red Cross nurse in the hospital at Siboney during the battle of Santiago, wrote: "A striking feature of the first day's engagement was the number of men wounded in the head, arms, and upper part of the body—the unerring aim of Spanish sharpshooters concealed in trees. Some of these cases—the most severely wounded—were taken into the Red Cross hospital, where they would receive the most skillful and gentle nursing. Two days of steady strain began to show on the Sisters. But nobody thought of meals; the one thing was to feed and nurse the four hundred and seventy-five wounded and sick men. Human endurance, however, had its limit, and unless the Sisters could get a little rest they would give out. I went on duty for twenty-four hours, and at night, with the assistance of one man, taking care of twenty-three patients—fever, measles, and dysentery cases, and three badly wounded men.

"Among the latter were Captain Mills, of the First Cavalry, and William Clark, a private in the Twenty-fifth Infantry regulars. They were brought over from the hospital tents and placed on cots on the little porch, where there was just space enough to pass between the cots. Their wounds were very similar, in the head, and of such a character as to require cool applications to the eyes constantly. Ice was worth its weight in gold, for the lives of these men, as well as of others, depended chiefly on cool applications to the eyes, with as uniform temperature as possible. We had one small piece of ice, carefully wrapped in a blanket. There never was a small piece of ice that 'went so far.' If I were to tell the truth about it nobody would believe it. Never in my life, I think, have I wished for anything so much as I wished for ice that night. It was applied by chipping it in small pieces, or bits, put in thin dry cotton cloth, folded over

ANECDOTES AND
INTERESTING
STORIES
OF THE ARMY

in just the right size, and flat, to place across the eyes and forehead—enough of it to be cold but not heavy on the wounds. The ears of the sick are strangely acute. Whenever the sick men heard the sound of chipping ice they begged for ice water—even the smallest bit of ice in a cup of water was begged for with an eagerness that was pitiful. I felt conscience-smitten. But it was a question of saving the eyes of the wounded men, and there was no other way. To make the ice last till morning, I stealthily chipped it off so the sick men would not hear the sound.

“At midnight a surgeon came over from his tent ward with a little piece of ice, not larger than his hand. I do not know his name, but it does not matter—it was inscribed above. ‘This is all we can spare,’ he said. ‘Take it. You must keep these wounds cool, at all hazards. I have another case, very like these, wounded in the head. I want to bring him over here, where he will be sure of exactly the same nursing. His life depends on the care he will get in the next twenty-four hours. Have you a vacant cot?’

“There was not a vacant cot, though we could make room for one on the porch if he could find the cot. He thought he could, and went back, taking the precious bit of ice that he really needed more than we did. In the course of half an hour the surgeon returned to say it was impossible to get a cot anywhere, and the wounded man must be left where he was in the tent—at least until morning.

“And so it went on through the long night—the patient suffering of the sick men, the heroism of the wounded—all fearing to give any trouble, desiring not to do so, and grateful for the smallest attention. The courage that faces death on the battlefield or calmly waits for it in the hospital is not a courage of race or color. Two of the bravest men I ever saw were here, almost side by side, on the little porch, Captain Mills and Private Clark, one white, the other black. They were wounded almost at the same time and in the same way. The patient suffering and heroism of the black soldier was fully equal to the Anglo-Saxon. It was quite the same—the gentleness and appreciation. They were a study—these men, so widely apart in life, but here so strangely

close and alike, on the common ground of duty and sacrifice. They received precisely the same care. Each was fed like a child, for with their bandaged eyes they were as helpless as blind men. When the ice pads were renewed on Captain Mills's eyes the same change was made on Private Clark's eyes. There was no difference in their food or beds. Neither ever uttered a word of complaint. The nearest to a regret expressed by Captain Mills was a heavy sigh, followed by the words:—

“‘Oh, we were not ready—our army was not prepared.’

“Of himself he talked cheerfully—strong and hopeful. ‘I think I shall get back with the sight of one eye,’ he said. That was all. In the early part of the night he was restless—his brain was active—strong and brave as he was. The moonlight was very bright—a flood of silver light, seen only in the tropics. Hoping to divert him. I said: ‘The moonlight is too bright, Captain. I will try to put up a little screen, so you can get to sleep.’ He realized at once the absurdity and the ludicrous side, and with an amused smile replied: ‘But you know—I can’t see the moon.’

“I said it was time to get more ice for his head, and half stumbled across the porch, blinded by tears. When told who his nearest neighbor was, Captain Mills expressed great sympathy for Private Clark and paid a high tribute to the bravery of the colored troops and their faithful performance of duty. Private Clark talked but little. He would lie, apparently asleep, until the pain in his head became unbearable, then he would try to sit up, always careful to keep the ice pad on his eyes over the bandage. ‘What can I do for you, Clark?’ I would ask. ‘Nothing, thank you,’ he would answer, ‘it’s very nice and comfortable here. But it’s only the misery in my head—the misery is awful.’”

Sergeant McInerney of Company E, Ninth Infantry, is credited with having fired the shot that disabled the Spanish General Linares. The Sergeant was peeping over the edge of the trench Saturday morning, the second day before Santiago; near him stood his Lieutenant. The Ninth had received orders from its Colonel not to fire unless so ordered.

"Lieutenant," said the Sergeant, "there's a Spaniard on a white horse with staff officers around him. I think he's a general officer. The distance is 1,000 yards. Can I pick him off?" The word was passed along, and permission came back. McInerney rolled his cartridge over his tongue (a soldier's superstition), and loaded his rifle. Then, resting his rifle on the edge of the pit, he aimed and fired.

"I undershot just 100 yards," said he, drawing another cartridge from his mouth, "but it didn't scare him."

When McInerney's rifle cracked again he cried, "I got him," and the officer on the white horse fell over with a shot in his shoulder. It was General Linares, the Spanish commandant.

Before McInerney could get under cover a Mauser clipped the dirt an inch from his ear. "A little too far to the right," he cried, waving his right arm as though he were a target marker on a rifle range.

One of the volunteers before Santiago had an excessive fondness for liquor, that at times rendered him unmanageable. One day while in camp in Florida the Colonel of his regiment called him into his tent for the purpose of talking to him like a father, as he had known him for years.

"Now, look here, John," said the Colonel kindly, "what do you mean by this sort of thing?"

"I mean to quit, Colonel," he responded.

"You've said that a million times. You ought to be ashamed of yourself. You are a man of more than ordinary intelligence, you have nice people at home, you are of a good family, you are quick to learn the duties of a soldier, you are clean, you look well, you keep your accoutrements in fine condition, you are obedient, you are always willing to take your share of the hardships, you never complain, and, in fact, you are a model soldier with one exception."

"What's that, Colonel?" asked John, just a shade leerily, it must be confessed.

"You will get drunk."

"Is that all, Colonel?"

"That's enough, isn't it?"

John steadied himself by the Colonel's table.

"Now, Colonel," he said—all volunteers have a way of talking to their superiors—"if I'm all these good things that you say I am, why not let the drinking go with the balance? You don't expect to get all the cardinal virtues for \$13 a month, do you?"

It was in the canteen at Camp Wikoff that a reporter heard this anecdote from a regular:—

"Talk about your Generals, Chaffee's the old boy for my money. I found out what he was at El Caney. My company was at work digging trenches and while we were finishing up one the Spaniards began to fire and the bullets sang their little tunes pretty nigh to our heads. Well, there was a kid in the company that couldn't have been over eighteen. Never ought to have let him enlist at all. He was always complaining and kicking, and at the first fire down he went flat on his face and lay there. One of the men kicked him, but he didn't stir. Then along came Chaffee, cool and easy, and sees the kid.

"'Hello, there!' says Chaffee. 'What's the matter, you fellow down there? Get up and fight with your company.'

"'No, I can't,' whines the kid.

"'Can't?' says Chaffee, jumping down into the trench and hauling the boy up. 'What's the matter with you that you can't? Are you hurt?'

"'No, sir,' says he. 'I'm scairt. I'm afraid of getting hit.'

"'Well, you're a fine soldier,' says the General. Then he looked at the boyish face of the kid and his face kind of softened. 'I suppose you can't help it,' he said. 'It ain't so much your fault. I'd like to get hold of the fellow that took you into the army.'

"I suppose any other General would have sent the kid to the rear in disgrace and that would have been the end of it; but Chaffee stood there with the bullets ki-yiying around him beside the boy, who had crouched down again, and thought, with his chin in his hand. By and by he put his hand on the boy's shoulder.

“‘There isn’t as much danger as you think for,’ he said. ‘Now, you get up and take your gun and fight and I’ll stand here by you.’

“The boy got up shaking like a leaf, and fired his first shot pretty near straight in the air.

“‘That’s pretty high,’ says the General. ‘Keep cool and try again.’

“Well, sir, in three minutes that ‘scairt’ kid was fighting like a veteran and cool as a cucumber, and when he saw it the General started on.

“‘You’re all right now, my boy,’ he said. ‘You’ll make a good soldier.’

“‘God bless you, sir,’ said the youngster. ‘You saved me from worse than death,’ and he was pretty close to crying when he said it.

“After a while the order came to retire from the trench, and we just had to collar that kid and haul him away by the neck to get him to retreat with his company. And, at that, he’d got a bullet through the fleshy part of his shoulder an hour before. In the rest of the fights there wasn’t a better soldier in the company, and not only that, but we never heard a grumble or a kick from him from that day.”

Here is the story of “Old Hoss” at Camp Wikoff: In the middle of the main roadway from the railroad station across the point is a little grassy rise where the wagon trails divide to reunite a few rods further on. A rough wooden cross stands upright there. It marks the last resting place of a veteran of the Sixth Cavalry, who fell there and was buried where he fell. On the cross is the inscription:—

“RATTLESNAKE BILL,
A HORSE.”

The Sixth are mourning Rattlesnake Bill almost as they would a man of the regiment, for he was a part of it before half of them enlisted. Years of service had weakened his frame, but not his spirit, and as one of the equine veterans he was treated with special consideration. Yesterday a trooper rode him down to the station, where he

found a message requiring his immediate return. He urged the old horse to extra speed with voice and rein,—spurs never were needed for Rattlesnake Bill,—and the animal answered with the best there was in him. But Montauk roadways turn and twist over a hundred little rises and descents, that break the wind and torture the spirits. The sandy dust was fetlock deep. Clouds of it blew into the straining nostrils of the horse, and his breath came harder and harder. Once or twice he looked around appealingly, but this was a case of haste, and his disciplined spirit set the wearied muscles firmly to the task at the word of command. On a roadway where nearly half the cavalry horses go at a gallop not an animal passed him, until he reached the hill where the roadway curves just before it splits at the grassy mound. Then three colored cavalrymen went tearing by.

“Get on, Bill,” urged his rider. “What’s got you, lettin’ a lot of skates like that go by you?”

Up went the old horse’s ears, and with a short whinny he leaped forward, stumbled, staggered, plunged blindly up the little slope and fell. In an instant the trooper was at his head.

“What’s the matter, Bill, old boy? Come, boy, get up.”

Bill lay with half-closed eyes, panting. A little group of infantrymen came up, and looked on while the trooper patted the animal’s neck and talked to him.

“Come up now, boy!” cried the rider. “Come on, Bill!”

For the last time the brave old horse answered the word of command, got his forelegs under him, struggled half way up, then, with a moan like that of a suffering human being, fell back. The trooper sat down and took the great head on his knees. Bill whinnied brokenly, nestled his soft nose into his master’s hand, stretched out, and was dead. The man’s head drooped over, and the face was buried in the heavy mane. The infantrymen silently turned and walked away, the owner of the flask forgetting, or not caring to reclaim it. Presently there came along a detachment of Sixth Cavalrymen. They dismounted and joined their grief-stricken comrade. All their efforts could bring no sign of life from the horse.

They left a guard of honor beside the body of Rattlesnake Bill until sunset. That night ten men of the Sixth ran the guard, and with pick and spades, which they had borrowed from the engineers, dug the veteran's grave and buried the horse. His rider set firmly in the ground the wooden cross with its penciled inscription, the men, uncovering, and walking away in silence.

Sergeant Ousler of the regulars told some stories of the action at Las Guasimas. "That story about Assistant Surgeon Church, the young Washington medico of the Rough Riders, who dressed a fallen man's wound away out ahead of the line, amid a hail of Mauser bullets, has been published," said he, "but the coolness of that young fellow wasn't even half described. While he was making an examination of his wounded comrade, paying no attention to the whistle of the bullets, a young private of the Rough Riders, who had been a college mate of Church at Princeton, yelled over to him from a distance of about twenty feet—he was in with a half a dozen fellows doing sharpshooter's work from behind a cluster of bushes—to ask how badly the patient was hurt. The young surgeon looked over his shoulder in the direction whence the private's voice proceeded, and he saw his former chum grinning in the bushes.

"'Why, you whelp!' said Church, with a comical grin on his face, 'how dare you be around here and not be killed!'

"Then he went on fixing the wounded man, and he remained right there with him until the arrival of the litter, that he had sent to the rear for.

"In my cavalry outfit there was a fellow with whom I soldiered out West four or five years ago. He was a crack baseball pitcher, and he would rather play ball than eat, any time. He got a Mauser ball plumb through the biceps of his right arm early in the engagement. I never saw a man so darned mad over a thing in my life. The wound pained him a good deal, but it wasn't the pain that hurt him so much. I met him at the rear after the scrap was over. He had tried to go on shooting with his carbine, but he couldn't make it go with his left hand and arm alone, and so he had to drop back.

He was alternately rubbing his arm and scratching his head when I came across him.

“‘Hurt much?’ I asked him.

“‘Hurt, nothing!’ said he, scowling like a savage; ‘but did you ever hear of such luck as this, to get plugged right in my pitching arm? Why the devil didn’t they get me in the neck, or somewhere else, anyhow? I’ll never be able to pitch another game, I’ll bet \$2, for these muscles are going to contract when the hole heals up,’ and he went on swearing ‘to beat the band’ because the Spaniards hadn’t let him have it ‘in the neck, or somewhere else.’

“One of the fellows in the Rough Riders, an Oklahoma boy, got a ball clean through his campaign hat, which was whirled off his head, and fell about five feet away from him. He picked up the hat, examined it carefully, and said:—

“‘I’ll have to patch that up with sticking plaster, or I’ll get my hair sunburnt.’ The fun of it was that his hair was about the reddest I ever saw.”

Another regular of the First Cavalry related an incident of the advance on San Juan. “There was a young fellow near me,” he said, “behind a tree trunk, one of those stunted little trees. It was big enough to cover his body, because he was about as thick as a lath. His name was Charlie Jacob, and his father was United States Minister to Colombia at one time, and is now a rich and prominent man at Louisville, in Kentucky.* Young Jacob was just a boy in heart, though he was twenty-one. When the war came he enlisted among the very first in the old First Cavalry. His hands were made for kid gloves, and his feet for patent leathers, and he was as tall and thin as they can make ’em without breaking. Well, we tried putting work onto him, but he seemed to like it, and was so full of singing, joking, and skylarking that it was’nt three weeks before we all got to taking work off him. He never bragged, and he never kicked; soldier-work was fun for him. When he was standing behind the

*The Honorable Charles D. Jacob, a distinguished citizen of Kentucky.

tree there, his Sergeant started on a rush ahead for a clump of brush in sight. He hadn't got twenty feet past young Jacob's tree when a bullet or two socked him in the legs and he fell. Shrapnel and Mausers were coming hot, when young Jacob put down his gun and made about two jumps to the Sergeant, and stooped over to lift him up and bring him back to cover. He was asking where the Sergeant was hit and gathering him up, when two bullets struck him, one in the head. He didn't live but a few hours.

"The Sergeant said, 'You oughtn't to have done it, Charlie.'

" 'I couldn't help it,' said Charlie.

"His hands were soft, but he had a strong heart in him, and went into fighting like he went into playing. When we buried him next day we laid a brave soldier away, and thought of his happy disposition that had cheered us so much. There was some crying, I tell you, used as we were to such things."

Edward Marshall, the correspondent, badly shot at Las Guasimas, describes the Mauser bullet and its effect.* He could not find a better way to describe the sound of the Mauser bullets that were singing around the Rough Riders in that fight than by the letters "z-z-z-z-z-eu," adding that the cracks of the rifles sounded for all the world like the explosion of a lamp in a drawing-room. "The noise of the Mauser bullet traveling through the air is not impressive enough to be really terrifying until you have seen what it does when it strikes. It is a nasty, malicious little noise, like the soul of a very petty and mean person turned into sound. Its beginning and its ending are pitched a little lower than its middle. Its beginning is gradual, but its ending is instantaneous. I saw many men shot. Every one went down in a lump without cries, without jumping up in the air, without throwing up hands. They just went down like clods in the grass. It seemed to me that the terrible thud with which they struck the earth was more penetrating than the sound of guns. Some were only wounded; some were dead.

* *Scribner's Magazine*, September, 1898.

"Once I thought I had found a coward. A man was running wildly toward the rear. I stopped him and asked him what he was running away from. He restrained himself with difficulty from brain-ing me with his carbine. He had torn off the sole of one shoe, and the accident hampered his movements. He was running wildly about in a temperature not less than one hundred and three degrees, searching for a dead man to take a shoe from. He was running so that he could get quickly back to where the firing was. I showed him the dead man and helped him to take the shoe off. He was very grateful, and after he had once more gained protection for his foot he started on the double-quick for the firing line."

III.

IN AN account of the sea fight at Santiago by George E. Graham, a press correspondent on board the *Brooklyn*,* he describes some acts of great courage and how they were performed. "Up forward on the gun decks," he writes, "was a six-pounder that in this close forty-minutes' action had been doing valiant work. As they were putting in a cartridge the shell loosened from the casing and became wedged. This was on the side near the enemy, but there was not a moment's hesitation. Out on the gun's muzzle crawled Corporal Robert Gray, of the Marine Corps, a rammer in his hand ready to drive the shell out. The gun was hot, and he could not retain his hold; so he dropped down to the sea ladder. Over his head was the frightful blast and draft of the big gun, while around him pattered the shot of the enemy. He failed in his attempt, and gunner Smith then tried it, but he too failed. It looked as though the gun would have to be abandoned, but Private MacNeal, of the squad, asked permission to make an attempt, and was allowed to try it. Clinging to the hot gun, with death by water assured if he dropped or was knocked off by the concussion,

ANECDOTES AND
INCIDENTS FROM
THE NAVAL LOG

* In *McClure's Magazine*, September, 1898.

and the enemy firing at him, he got the rammer in the muzzle and rammed out the shell, amidst cheers from his comrades. I watched these men closely. None of them showed the slightest sign of heroic exhilaration. It was evidently to them a duty of the commonest sort. A few minutes later a 6-inch projectile smashed into a compartment just below them. They laughed at the gunner's aim when they found nobody hurt. Five minutes later I photographed a man at the after masthead fixing up one of the battle flags, the halyards of which had been shot away. The fire was deadly about him. He would not give his name.

Mr. C. S. Clark, in the *United Service Magazine*, recounted an extraordinary exploit by an officer named Gillis on the torpedo boat *Porter*: "The torpedo had been fired from the destroyer *Pluton*, and, with force almost expended, was coming slowly but surely toward the anchored torpedo boat *Porter*. Gillis sprang overboard, swam to the torpedo, turned the nose away from the *Porter*, and screwed up the firing-pin tightly so that it would not operate. Then, treading water, he saluted Lieutenant Fremont and reported: 'Sir, I have to report I have captured a torpedo.' 'Bring it aboard, sir,' replied Fremont; and Gillis actually did so, swimming with it to the ship and fastening tackles to it."

From a very finely written and spirited description of the capture of Guam Island, in the Ladrões group, in the New York *Sun*, is taken this amusing incident of the visit of the American soldiers and sailors to the house of the head of the police in Agaña: "Vincente Diaz produced cigarettes and cigars, of Manila make, and a bottle of hell-fire aguardiente of his own distillation. Then from some mysterious inside nook he brought out a new and shiny accordion. He gave it to a vacant-faced and bashful young man and commanded him to play. The Americans joined in the demand at once, and asked for a dance. But Diaz replied that the Chamorros had no dances. The boy tried the accordion a while and began to play. The first bar made every American in the room cock his ears and stare at his neighbor. No weird, fantastic music of any sort could have surprised them. They expected

that. They would have called it native and been well pleased with it. But this was familiar. It wasn't exactly as they remembered it, 'but as the song grew louder' it developed unmistakably into the 'New Bully,' and when it struck the chorus the whole crowd joined with a roar in yelling:—

When I walk that levee roun'
I'm lookin' for dat bully, 'n' he mus' be foun'.

"The applause that followed this performance so astonished the young artist that he stopped playing. When he was persuaded to go on again he played 'Ta-ra-ra-boom-de-ay,' amid the wildest cheers. The reception the Americans gave his music surprised him very much.

"There were loud inquiries as to where he learned the tunes, but this was the only question, almost, that the Diazes could not answer. They 'guessed' that it was from a whaler, and probably they guessed right. But the 'New Bully' is not so very old, and it was mighty queer to hear it ground out on an accordion under a cocoanut-palm thatch in Guam, when it was just the other day that May Irwin was singing it in New York."

The same correspondent gave an account of Aguinaldo's military band, at Cavité, which will surprise those who know so little of the Far East. "A wonderful band," he wrote, "marched up the muddy Calle de San Francisco from Aguinaldo's headquarters this morning, and for an hour serenaded General Anderson with playing that would set the music-lovers of New York wild with excitement. The average Filipino does not present the appearance of a musician or a music-lover. But for his bright, intelligent eyes he would look like a stupid Patagonian sheep-herder. There are few musical instruments in the native villages. Once in a while one runs across an old tin-pan-toned cracked piano horribly out of tune, and two or three places have harps. But this band, composed entirely of Filipinos, is worthy to rank with the bands of the world. It was the famous military band of Manila, where it used to furnish classic music on the Lunetta when

the aristocratic Spaniards went out for their evening drive or promenade. And occasionally, or oftener, it was turned out to play while a few dozens of the musicians' people were shot for the edification of the multitude, on the charge of sympathizing with insurrection or some other trumped-up accusation.

"In Manila there were seventy-two members. Sixty of them managed to get away with their instruments and music. This morning forty-eight played on the little plaza in front of General Anderson's headquarters. And such playing! It was recompense for every discomfort, every vexation, every disappointment, every hardship of seven thousand miles in a troop ship, the last five thousand at half steam in a tropic sea. You shut your eyes and heard the orchestra of the Royal Opera at Vienna, the great Budapest Band, the famous military band in Berlin, the Boston Symphony at its best, Seidl's finest work, anything in the world. With never a note in front of them, they played what you liked, any part of any opera, the grandest music ever written, or a simple Strauss waltz or a folksong. And the bass drummer was the leader. You will never hear a bass drum really played until you hear that Filipino do it. He makes a bass drum talk, sing, cry, shout. It fits the mood and movement of the music. It is subordinate or dominant, soft, subdued, or loud and roaring; it laughs and chuckles like a thing alive; it raves and protests like an angry soldier, and all in perfect harmony and sympathy with the rest. The ambition of the average bass drummer is to develop the muscles in his arms. He pounds the uncomplaining drum as if he were swinging clubs for exercise. But with this Filipino it is a science and an art, and he is master of both. It is a curiously organized band—one bass drum, two snares, a lyre, five tubas, eleven saxophones, big and little; eleven clarinets, eight cornets, one ballad horn, and four altos and tenors. They played songs from 'Faust,' and I sat again in the Metropolitan Opera House and heard and saw the vast audience get to its feet with frantic cheers when Calvé and the two de Reszkes finished the prayer song. They played, but no telling describes what they played."

From two articles on the subject* are extracted some comparisons of American and Spanish seamen on war vessels:—

“A man-of-war commander in the American naval service seldom knows what one-half of the men of his crew are capable of doing until the man’s respective capabilities are revealed by incidents that happen aboard ship. There are some curious instances of how men forward, down on the rolls as ‘laborers’ or ‘clerks,’ have shown their hands, and made decided hits in emergencies. One night about three years ago, when most of the officers, including the surgeon, of a gunboat lying in San Francisco harbor were ashore attending a social function, a newly shipped coal heaver, whose occupation on the rolls was that of a laborer, fell down the hatchway ladder from the main deck to the machine shop. There was no one in the machine shop at the time. The coal heaver with his legs, the right one badly broken, dangling in the air, walked on his hands from the machine shop up forward to the sick bay, where some of the bluejackets picked him up and deposited him on a couch. The coal heaver told the men that his leg was broken, and one of them rushed to report the case to the officer of the deck.

“The officer of the deck sent for the apothecary. The apothecary told the officer of the deck that he didn’t have the skill to set broken legs. A big, indolent marine, a recruit, whose only capability thus far had seemed to consist in the getting on the outside of three very heavy ‘squares’ a day, heard the excitement from his hammock where he was dozing. The big marine tumbled out of his hammock, went to the sick bay, and set the coal heaver’s broken leg in a style that aroused the admiration of the surgeon when he returned to the ship after midnight. All hands wondered how the coal heaver had managed to walk on his hands from the machine shop forward to the sick bay, until he admitted that he had been a professional acrobat ashore, and that he had shipped in the navy because the circus with which he last traveled had gone to pieces in San Francisco, leaving him stranded in the hardest town in which to go broke in the Western Hemisphere. The big, indolent marine, who set the coal heaver’s broken leg, had to admit to the surgeon that he had been graduated in surgery years before, and had done his tour in several famous English hospitals before he drifted into sea-soldiering.

“‘How did you happen to enter the marine corps?’ inquired the surgeon.

“‘Rum,’ laconically replied the marine.

“One afternoon, down in Honolulu harbor, Admiral Beardslee, in command of the Pacific squadron from the flagship *Philadelphia*, was in a quandary because of the unexpected arrival a day ahead of time of the Australian steamer that was to carry the fleet’s mail to San Francisco. The Admiral had a voluminous report to make on the situation in Honolulu—this was during the last Hawaiian revolution—and he had only three hours in which to draw up the report, for the Australian steamer

*From the New York *Sun*, May 22, and June 5.

could not, of course, wait. The Admiral came out of his cabin and told the officer of the deck at the gangway to send ashore with all haste for somebody who could take rapid dictation on a typewriting machine. A young landsman, who had been a good deal of a muff at 'sailorizing,' overheard the Admiral giving this order, and he walked up to Beardslee, knuckled his forehead in the usual manner, and volunteered to do the work. The Admiral looked at the landsman without much confidence in his gaze.

"What kind of a typewriter do you handle?' he asked the recruit.

"Any kind,' was the reply.

"The Admiral took the landsman recruit aft and began to dictate trial stuff to the bluejacket. The bluejacket rattled the copy off in a style that opened the Admiral's eyes. Beardslee dictated his report to the lightning swift bluejacket typewriter, the words hardly falling from his lips before the landsman had them down pat. The Admiral took the pages one by one. There wasn't a mistake in spelling, punctuation, or paragraphing. The copy was absolutely clean, although the Admiral had dictated at the rate of ninety words a minute. The Australian steamer carried Beardslee's report, and the landsman was immediately rated Admiral's yeoman, or private secretary. A yeoman is a sixty-dollar-a-month chief petty officer. The bluejacket had been a court stenographer in New York.

"A bluejacket who put in a three-year's enlistment as a deck hand took his discharge from the navy a couple of years ago while his ship was at Yokohama, Japan, and got a job as a shipping clerk. A few weeks after he went to work ashore one of his shipmates was arrested and locked up, charged with stabbing a jinriksha Jap. The sailor was tried before the Consular Court, but before his trial came off his ship left Yokohama for China. The ex-bluejacket conducted his shipmate's defense before the Consular Court, and he conducted it so ably and with such a fine knowledge of law that his man-of-war's man client was acquitted. The ex-bluejacket lawyer had been in his day the junior partner in a well-known firm in St. Louis. Rum, injudiciously mixed with politics and cards, had got him over the side of a man-of-war with a hammock and ditty bag, but he went in as a 'laborer.'

"When the officers of one of our cruisers on the Mediterranean station were giving a dance aboard one night about a year ago, the ship's dynamo broke down and all the lights on the ship went out at once. The swell congregation of American tourists and foreigners was in the midst of a waltz on the main deck at the moment of the extinguishment of the lights, and the women fell into a panic. The officer of the deck galloped to the dynamo room, where he found the chief gunner's mate, who used to be the chief electrician aboard our war ships, in despair. The dynamo was in such a condition that its custodian, whose course in electricity had been of a hurried and superficial sort, reported that it would require a week anyhow to patch it up. The machinists were called forward, but machinists are not supposed to have much knowledge of electrical apparatus, unless they have been specialists ashore with that kind of gear. They shook their heads.

"Then a bluejacket, who had shipped aboard in New York City a few months before, when the cruiser started on her Mediterranean trip, turned up in the dynamo room. He sized up the dynamo with the eye of a man who knew dynamos down to the ground; and while the officers and chief gunner's mate and machinists stood by watching him wonderingly, he made a few little adjustments with a wrench, and the dynamo started to whirl, the ship immediately becoming a blaze of light again. The landsman was down on the rolls as a laborer. But he had put in an apprenticeship of seven years at Mr. Edison's electrical works, and he is about the most valuable electrician—a chief petty officer—in the navy to-day. He is serving with one of the fleets in Cuban waters."

The contrary of these pictures of skill and intelligence is presented by the Spanish sailors:—

"Naval officers of the United States service, in common with officers of the British navy, have often marveled over the lack of expertness exhibited by Spanish officers in handling modern ships, but they have always dwelt particularly upon the apparent stupidity of the Spanish man-of-war's men forward. There is nothing ashore or afloat to equal the stolidity, indifference, slouchiness, and general incapacity of the Spanish bluejacket. Nor is the wonder great that the Spanish bluejacket is so poor a seaman, so inferior a gunner, so sluggish a performer of the thousand and one chores aboard ship of which a good man-of-war's man has the knack. Four-fifths of the Spanish bluejackets are men who had never been at sea before being impressed into the naval service. Impressed is the word, for the difficulty the Spanish navy has experienced during the past decade or two in getting enough men to man the ships is well known to those who make a study of naval matters. 'Impressed' is almost too well-sounding a phrase with which to express the fashion the Spanish naval recruiters have of getting bluejackets. The term should rather be 'shanghaied.' The Spanish law forbids the conscription of naval recruits in time of peace. But if you ask any Spanish man-of-war's man how he happened to take on in an outfit wherein he received so little consideration, the reply is apt to be: 'I was drunk.' It is asserted that a majority of the Spanish sailors are men from inland Spain. The Spanish merchant sailors, the men living in Spanish ports, who are of age for service aboard war ships, know too well the cruelties and hardships inflicted upon men forward in their country's naval service to put themselves in the way of being trapped into it.

"Spanish sailors forward are ill-treated habitually by their officers. This is not a prejudiced or an exaggerated statement. It is literally true. The officers of the Spanish navy are, for the most part, younger sons of good families, who have gained their billets not by ability or through competition, but through the intercession of their people at the court. The incapacity of many of them is laughable; their cruelty is notorious. From the very day that a Spaniard is enlisted in the ship's

company of one of his country's war vessels,—enlisted voluntarily or involuntarily,—he is made to feel that he is no better than a beast. For the slightest infraction of regulations he is punished in a fashion that makes bluejackets in navies like our own or that of Great Britain flush with anger. The central and consuming idea of the Spanish naval officer is that all hands forward are his servants. There is absolutely nothing of this in the American navy. Once in a while when an American ship is at sea for a considerable period in tropical waters, and all hands, fore and aft, are wearing white uniforms, an officer will pay a mess attendant for scrubbing one of his uniforms and hanging it out on the scrub-and-wash line. The officer who requests a man to do anything like this stands by to have the man refuse. It is the man's privilege to refuse outright to perform such a task for money or otherwise, but if he accepts the job he is well paid for it. In the Spanish navy every man forward, from the chief petty officer down to the unrated landsman, stands by for a trick as valets for all the officers aft. They are not asked to wash the officers' linen; they are not requested to blacken the officers' shoes or pipeclay their belts—they are commanded to do these things, and tasks more menial, more repugnant to men of self-respect; and the slightest indication of hesitancy on the part of a blue-jacket is visited by heavy punishment. When a Spanish officer 'gets it in' for a chief petty officer for any real or fancied cause, he does not immediately undertake to secure the petty officer's disrating. Instead, he begins systematically to humiliate him. He calls him vile names in the hearing of the unrated bluejackets, and not infrequently kicks him. He calls him aft—especially when the petty officer is showing a party of women visitors about the ship—and orders him to blacken his shoes, right in sight of all hands and all the visitors on the main deck.

"The stanchion punishment is employed for the most trivial offenses in the Spanish navy. The bluejacket who breaks his liberty by a few hours knows that he is in for the stanchion lash when he returns aboard. The Spanish sailors who deserted their ships by the score in New York at the time of the centenary celebration in 1889, were most of them liberty breakers who, after having got a whiff of freedom, could not muster up the nerve to return to their ships to get the stanchion lash. The man who is twenty minutes late in returning from his leave of absence from a Spanish man-of-war gets as many cat-o'-nine-tail blows on his bare back, while his wrists are securely lashed to a stanchion, as the officer of the deck cares to have inflicted upon him. It all depends upon the state of the liver of the officer of the deck. . . . To reduce the matter to its smallest term, a Spanish man-of-war is simply a floating hell for the bluejackets, and the idea of the officers of the Spanish navy expecting men to put up a good fight for any sort of cause, after having had a taste of the kind of treatment they get aboard ship, is a matter a bit beyond the comprehension of the American mind."

These descriptions account for the difference between the "men behind the guns."

CHAPTER THE THIRTY-SECOND.

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS BY THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN FOR ALL PURPOSES—PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS—SPANISH DELAY AND DIPLOMATIC PRETENSE
RESULT IN SLOW PROGRESS—VAIN EFFORTS AND HOPES FOR INTERVENTION BY
GERMANY—THE GERMAN EMPEROR INTRUDES, BUT WITHDRAWS QUICKLY—
TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE AS VERBALLY AGREED UPON NOVEMBER 28, 1898—THE UNITED STATES RECEIVES VAST COLONIAL TERRITORY UNDER THE TERMS—THE POLICY OF
EXPANSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC.

I.

PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS

UNDER the terms of the peace protocol, the President and the Spanish ministry each selected five members to meet in Paris on October 1, 1898, to negotiate final terms of peace between the two countries. The members of the commission were as follows:—

For the United States.

THE HON. WILLIAM R. DAY,
Ex-Secretary of State, of Ohio.
THE HON. WILLIAM E. FRYE,
U. S. Senator from Maine.
THE HON. CUSHMAN K. DAVIS,
U. S. Senator from Minnesota.
THE HON. WHITELAW REID,
Of New York.
THE HON. GEORGE GRAY,
U. S. Senator from Delaware.

For the Kingdom of Spain.

SEÑOR MONTERO RIOS,
President of the Senate.
SEÑOR ABARZUZA,
SEÑOR GARNICA,
GENERAL CERERO,
SEÑOR VILLA-URRUTIA.

The commissioners began their sessions in Paris, October 1, under the friendly and hospitable auspices of the French Government.



HON. WM. R. DAY,
PRESIDENT AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION.

Commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba by Spanish officials were appointed as follows:—

By the United States.

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES F. WADE,
ADMIRAL WM. T. SAMPSON,
MAJOR-GENERAL MATTHEW C. BUTLER.

By Spain.

GENERAL GONZALES PARRADO,
CAPTAIN PASTOR LANDERA,
THE MARQUIS OF MONTORO.

The corresponding commissioners for the island of Porto Rico were the following:—

For the United States.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN R. BROOKE,
ADMIRAL WINFIELD S. SCHLEY,
BRIG.-GENERAL WILLIAM W. GORDON.

For Spain.

ADMIRAL VALLARINO,
GENERAL ORTEGA,
SEÑOR SANCHEZ DELAGUILA.

The local commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico met late in September and their duties were dispatched with commendable promptitude. Porto Rico was in possession of the military authorities of the United States within a few weeks. Major-General Brooke was commander of the army of occupation, with Brigadier-General Guy Henry as commander at Ponce. In November General Henry succeeded General Brooke.

In Cuba the situation was more difficult to relieve. The number of Spanish soldiers to be transported to Spain, the diseased conditions at Havana and other important points, and the natural desire of the Spanish Government to maintain the *status quo* until the Peace Commission could dispose of questions affecting ultimate liability for the Cuban bonded debt, made it, in some sense, entirely proper that more deliberate action should be permitted to the Spanish members of the commission. Every ship that sailed from Cuba to the Peninsula, with its complement of Spanish troops for repatriation, was ravaged by disease and death. Spain's army was worn out by despair, lack of pay and food, and by exposure. On the transports the deaths ranged from thirty to sixty per 1,000 on the homeward voyage.

The flag of United States possession was raised over Ponce in Porto Rico on November 18, but the Cuban commissioners agreed upon January 1, 1899, as the date for Spanish sovereignty to cease in that island, and the condition of the troops and the people caused an agreement, through sympathy, to permit the transportation of troops home to proceed at times and under conditions most favorable to the demands of humanity. Late in November, Captain-General Blanco resigned, and returned with his staff to Spain, leaving to his successor the duty of making the final surrender.

World-wide interest, however, centered upon the negotiations of the Peace Commissioners at Paris. The members were received with governmental honors and courtesies. France placed at their disposal special apartments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with formal ceremonies of a hospitable character the American and Spanish bodies were entertained separately and then introduced to each other. After these preliminaries began the difficult task of arranging the methods of procedure, which enabled Spain to interpose with the inevitable and almost interminable delays peculiar to Spanish diplomacy and the national character. For the United States the Honorable William R. Day was president, for Spain Señor Montero Rios, a politician of great acuteness, experience and courage, devoted to his country.

The United States demanded that all negotiations should be conducted by interchanges in writing, without formal or official verbal debate or comment. To this Spain assented with reluctance, since it deprived her of some excuses for delay, and of opportunity to make sympathy.

It would be useless to attempt to follow the course of the negotiations in the absence of all direct and official reports of their actual nature. But the general purpose of the Spanish commission soon became apparent. It was to haggle over every point set out in the protocol, with the object of getting the best terms possible, and to avoid liability for the enormous debts Spain had laid upon Cuba and the Philippines, which were represented by Spanish bonds, owned

mostly in Spain and France. The greater part of the debt, it was understood, had been incurred to benefit Spain, or to suppress revolutions, during which official corruption had diverted much of the funds from the intended purposes.

The decided refusal of the United States to assume the Cuban debt, or to guarantee its payment by any future government of Cuba, and its decision to require a full renunciation of Spanish sovereignty in the island unconditionally, was the first opportunity Spain sought for an appeal through diplomatic channels to the sympathies of Europe. It was intimated that holders of these bonds in other countries must look to Cuba or the United States for their payment, for the reason that Spain would be unable to meet enormous claims secured alone by the pledged revenues of her colonies, if these colonies were now to be torn from her. The mingled plea and threat brought no response. It was then intimated that the Spanish members would be compelled to resign rather than sign a treaty containing such a concession. They would not dare to face their countrymen, it was said, after signing it. The Americans persisted in the demand, and Spain yielded with protestations of helplessness.

Thus, through every step of the construction of a clear and definite agreement based upon the demands of the United States as set forth in the protocol, the efforts of Spain's representatives were concentrated upon obtaining by diplomatic *priesse*, some precedent, however slender or doubtful, with which she might, in the end, hope to throw upon the conquering nation the burdens of debt and mismanagement piled up by the conquered. Resistance was long drawn out, and appeals for delay to the United States were made and granted. The time gained by the delays was utilized by the Spanish Government in representing to Europe that Spain was a helpless, crushed and defenseless nation, pleading against despoilment by a cruel enemy that threatened all Europe with the advantages to be gained by achieving its designs in the East.

In France feeling began to run high against the United States; but, the French Government, as the host of both negotiating bodies,

was bound. Moreover, the exciting change of popular feeling regarding the Dreyfus conspiracy, the awakening of distrust of the army, and the sudden clash with England over the Fashoda incident (during which both governments made rapid and imposing naval preparations), put out of possibility any hope of assistance from that quarter.

During the tension the Queen Regent of Spain conferred upon President Faure, of France, M. Delcassé, Foreign Minister, and M. Cambon, French Ambassador to the United States, royal decorations, presented with great public ceremony. These honors could be received, but the French Government could not repay her neighbor with even hope.

There was yet a last chance. To the German Emperor, ardent for colonial expansion, dreaming of absolutism, looking to an ocean force commensurate with his military establishments, Minister Sagasta held out a tempting apple. There had been some sort of understanding, it was known, between Germany and Spain regarding the Caroline Islands in the Pacific, upon which Germany based a claim in abeyance. The German Emperor also longed for the Sulu group, southwest of the Philippines.

When the third article of the protocol was reached, involving the "government" and "disposition" of the Philippines, the keen but questionable character of Spanish diplomacy was revealed in an unexpected manner. The Spanish commissioners maintained that the terms of the protocol did not imply a demand from the United States for, nor the possible acceptance by Spain of a cession of Spanish sovereignty in the islands. Spain, they admitted, was ready to discuss the government and disposition of the Philippines, but "disposition" did not mean "possession." Possession of Manila by the United States, it was argued, was gained after the peace protocol had been signed. The United States was holding Manila by agreement only, not by force. The surrender by the Spanish officials to Dewey and Merritt, they urged, was voided by the prior effect of the protocol. Article third of that agreement referred to what general "disposition" might

be made of the islands by agreement, and did not imply "possession" by the United States.

The diplomatists of Europe were refreshed in their occupation of following maze lines in intricate convolutions by this delicate, yet strong distinction between the American and Spanish construction of the article. The United States Government was entirely prepared for this.

President McKinley made the semi-official announcement that he had made the final preparation and draft of the protocol with his own hand, and after conference with M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, that the word "possession" was written in the draft proposed, and the word "disposition" was substituted for it at the request of M. Cambon, who explained that he asked it only because the word "possession" when translated into the Spanish language, conveyed a harsh idea that would wound the susceptibilities of the Spanish public and render the task of Sagasta's government more difficult. The word "disposition" when translated into the Spanish tongue, he explained, would be equivalent to "possession," and M. Cambon gave his personal guarantee of honor that it should be so understood and construed.

The President instructed the American commissioners to communicate his information to the Spanish commission, and to declare to Spain that the United States Government could not permit any impeachment of or attack upon the honor and sincerity of the French Ambassador.

This simple blow at the technical argument Spain had built with elaborate care, destroyed instantly the possibility of evasion. The French Ambassador stood between the President and the Spanish Government, and France, which had instructed and permitted her ambassador to act, must answer for his acts.

The Spaniards yielded, but ungraciously, declaring their helplessness. They demanded that the question be submitted to arbitration. At this time the German Emperor, about to return home from his visit to Jerusalem, where his actions had attracted universal attention,

announced his purpose to proceed to Berlin by way of Gibraltar, and, with the Empress, to touch at several Spanish ports. There were unofficial intimations that instead of merely "touching" at Cadiz, he would spend two days at Madrid, visiting the Queen Regent. Spanish papers hinted that he was coming to "advise" the government and that he would be proposed and accepted as the desired arbitrator. His share in the spoils would be, of course, a great gain of strength for German interests in the East. This suggestion of intervention excited Europe, but it had no effect upon the United States. The American commissioners made demands upon the Spaniards for agreement as to possession before proceeding to terms. The Spaniards wavered, pleaded for delay, and waited upon the nod of the German Emperor. That ruler then announced his intention of returning to Berlin by way of Austria, declaring that his proposed touching at Spanish ports had been construed to have a political significance entirely absent from his intention. In order that the United States and Spain might not misunderstand him he abandoned the proposed route by way of Spain. It was reported that his change of purpose was caused by very earnest representations from the British foreign office and from the Queen herself.

The conspicuous intrusion into Spanish-American affairs of the vigorous and peculiar personality of William II., through his diplomatic and naval establishments at Manila, and earlier at Havana, made it seem possible that he might lend himself to a test of American determination. His attitude was irritating and his purposes were not entirely apparent. But the young, self-confident, and spectacular ruler gained from the struggle the first diplomatic advantages, by securing an alliance with England covering Asiatic and African privileges of importance.

The withdrawal of William II. as a possible intervener left Spain without apparent hope. The "possession" of the Philippines was conceded.

The next demands of the United States probably caused surprise to Germany quite as much as to Spain. They were that the Sulu

Archipelago must be considered as part of the Philippine group; that a naval station must be ceded to the United States in the Caroline Islands; that the sovereignty of the Island of Guam in the Ladrone Islands must be transferred to the United States; in return for all of which the United States Government would agree to make no claim against Spain for indemnity in money to repay the cost of the war; in addition, recognizing and estimating the value of the territory thus ceded by Spain, the United States would pay to the Spanish Government the sum of \$20,000,000 in cash, besides providing favorable terms for the continuance of Spanish commerce in the colonies alienated by war.

The demand for the Sulu Islands had not been expected. These had been a cause of dispute between Spain and Germany, but the sovereignty had been finally settled upon Spain some years ago. The Spanish Government by a decree of the Cortes had formerly annexed the group to the Philippines. During the war with the United States the Spanish Government had secretly revoked this decree and attached the Sulu group directly to the home government. The United States denied the validity of a retroactive decree and held the islands to be attached to the Philippines. The Spaniards yielded and thus one of the German Emperor's coveted prizes was lost.

With a persistence that pleaded poverty one day, and haughty defiance the next, but which was yet always animated by the spirit of shrewd haggling for monetary advantage over the American "pigs" and "money-worshipping shop-keepers," the Spanish recoiled from the proposition of only \$20,000,000 in return for the great territory alienated. They declared it was a shameful sum to offer; the commissioners would not put their names to a treaty involving such a petty stipulation, insulting to Spanish pride. Was Spain a beggar, they asked, that mere alms should be thrown to her? The Spanish Government and the Spanish politicians resented what they described as a paltry offer, with characteristic outbursts of patriotic pride. Well, yes, they declared, let us accept and sign;

America has the power of a brute and uses it to despoil us; we yield to her brutality with our pride and honor undimmed. Let us sign her own disgraceful proposition to remain for all time a testimony of her brutality to a helpless nation which has only honor to defend itself. But never shall the price of our despoilment pass into the hands of Spain. Let us sign the treaty but refuse with scorn the money of the "Yankee pigs."

This fine dramatic episode did not melt the Americans and it naturally followed that at the next session the Spaniards pleaded for \$100,000,000 instead of the offered twenty millions. The American commissioners refused to increase the bonus, and the Spaniards discovered that they must accept, and quickly, or that an ultimatum would be issued, to be followed by the withdrawal of the United States representatives and the descent of an American naval force upon the Canaries and the coasts of Spain.

On November 28, therefore, the Spanish commissioners formally agreed to the construction of the protocol in detail as described, accepting the twenty millions of bonus without resentment, and relinquishing Cuban sovereignty. The main points of the treaty verbally agreed to were as follows:—

- 1.—Cession of Porto Rico to the United States.
- 2.—Relinquishment of the Sovereignty of Cuba, unconditionally.
- 3.—Cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States (including the Sulu Archipelago).
- 4.—Cession of the Island of Guam, in the Ladrone group, to the United States.
- 5.—Payment to Spain by the United States of \$20,000,000 as a balance fairly due in settlement.
- 6.—Relinquishment by the United States of all claim for money indemnity for the cost of war.

II.

HE WHO has followed the story of the war with Spain as here related, from the declaration of hostilities by the Congress at Washington to the agreement upon the terms of the treaty of peace by the Joint Commission at Paris, can have perused it to little purpose if he has not been impressed by the momentous changes effected through its result. Never was conflict of arms so out of proportion to its consequences, both with respect to its origin and its incidents. That war rarely ends where it began, or leaves the respective combatants where it found them, is an oft-repeated truism; but, as a rule, some basis for calculation, some estimate of chances, is given the more observant and astute among statesmen and soldiers. Here there was none; for what prescience, what discernment—even foreseeing Manila—could believe it possible that within less than half a year a total revolution would be worked upon the sentiment of the people of the United States and the policy of their government.

THE FUTURE
OF THE
REPUBLIC

If Dewey had but sailed away, or if he had not sailed at all, what a difference we should have witnessed in the conditions with which the republic has had to deal! Far and away beyond the wisdom of the educated few, the rude instincts of the unlettered many, unconsciously leapt at the truth; we could neither render back to Spain the fruit of Dewey's victory, nor abandon it as a temptation to the rapacity of other nations, nor turn it over to domestic anarchism. For evil, or for good, we had become the custodians of a rich possession and a great responsibility. With Alaska upon the North Pacific, with California upon the South, and Hawaii out to sea—to say nothing about Cuba and Porto Rico in the South Atlantic—we found ourselves face to face with the Colonial problem which England had met and solved quite a hundred years before. There appeared no honest way out of this; and, by a kind of impulse, the mass of Americans—with many of their leaders against them—brushed away precedents and theories and in tones which could not be

misunderstood erected a new gospel in place of the preachments of the sages of other days. This declared that where the blood and treasure of the nation have carried the flag, there the flag shall stay; that what Great Britain has done with profit America may attempt with safety; that that which was good for a struggling people, fringing the Eastern Atlantic seaboard, no longer suffices a nation stretching from ocean to ocean across the North American continent; and that, conceiving and taking into the account the developments of the intervening century, the new departure adopted by the Great Republic in 1900 will be no greater in its risks to liberty and law than was the departure adopted by the Young Republic in 1800, when, disregarding the counsels of the statesmen who had made the Constitution, the people followed Jefferson upon a career of achievement, the ruinous character of which was freely and loudly proclaimed.

It is indeed easy to find arguments against the proposed policy of national expansion, and its opponents have been neither idle nor uninventive. Beginning with the assumption that a colonial establishment was not contemplated, or provided for, by the original instrument and the structural fabric under which we have enjoyed so many years of prosperous life as a nation and as a people to end with the dread prophecy of imperialism, it has included all the incidents of hazard and danger which an affectionate and provident father might submit to a son about to start upon a journey to unknown lands, or to engage in an enterprise beyond the parental experience and reach of vision. Pointing to the Chinese exclusion bill it is asked why we should be seized so soon with the desire to embrace the mongrel hordes of the Hawaiian Isles and the Philippine Archipelago? Pointing to the unsolved problems of State and municipal government at home, it is asked how we can expect anything but disaster in undertaking the government of millions of half-civilized barbarians alien to our blood, institutions and language? Taking lessons of ancient history, it is set up that these things can only be done through the army and navy, that the augmentation of the military power is ever a menace to liberty, and

that, once embarked upon a colonial policy beyond sea and a system of satraps and proconsuls masquerading as governors, generals, and the like, appointed by the central power at Washington, and too far away to be held to a very strict accountability, it will be only a question of time when the great republic of North America will go to keep historic company with Greece and Rome.

It will hardly be denied by thoughtful men that these are weighty considerations if we are to be influenced by the lessons of human experience as they have come down to us from time immemorial. But, on the other hand, it is pleaded in rebuttal, that nations, like individuals, cannot escape the dilemmas of which life is made up; that the quandary of to-day becomes the opportunity of to-morrow; and that back of nations, as of individuals, there is a divinity that shapes their ends, rough-hew them how they may. It is shown that suddenly, unexpectedly, this hand has interposed to bring upon us conditions undreamed of indeed, but carrying with them obligations and duties not wholly displeasing to our national and personal aspirations. We must go forward, or backward, and, with entire honor and self-respect we cannot go backward. Why did Dewey win his immortal victory in Manila Bay? But, why was the *Maine* blown up in Havana harbor? We cannot ignore Cuba with all that it implies. We are already in undisputed possession of Hawaii and Porto Rico. Why balk at the Philippines? The philosophy that prefers to be killed for a sheep than a lamb joins its forces to those of the philosophy that would not take two bites at a cherry; and herein we have the self-complacent optimism and the self-confident thrift of the national character working out the destiny of the nation through the principle of taking what it pleases Heaven to send and of counting the costs afterward.

The argument advanced by the intrepid American optimist to meet the ill omens advanced by his equally sincere and undoubting fellow-countryman, the American pessimist, runs somewhat in this wise: "The old order has passed away. A new order has come upon the scene. The bucolic Republic of Franklin and Jefferson is gone. The

'splendid government' dreaded by Washington and Jackson is here. But circumstances alter cases. Modern invention has not merely revolutionized human conditions the world over, but it has centralized power the world over. It has brought the nations into such close propinquity and collision that the future becomes largely a matter of the survival of the fittest. The President of the United States is in the possession of powers not contemplated by the extremest theories of Hamilton and Adams. He has but to touch a button in Washington and the conspirators in Havana are arrested before they have had time to disperse from their place of meeting to their several homes. He may send troops in five hours where Frederic and Napoleon could not have sent them in five weeks. Even the Philippine Archipelago is not so distant from the Golden Gate as San Francisco was from Washington when California was admitted to the Union. As for alien races, we have them in the Indian and in the African, and the very obligation of providing for these remote peoples may, under God, help us to find some better method for the adjustment of those problems that are nearer home. Overproduction is the most serious danger that threatens us. We must find wider markets. Idle, yet willing, labor has germinated the seeds of discontent. We must make it outlets for its superfluous energies. The world moves, and it is moving toward the Orient. Europe finds a vent in Africa. America cannot afford to be indifferent to Asia. The sea-front of human activities may, within the coming century, be transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific. We must prepare to take our place in the procession—if need be, at the head of the procession—of the nations. The lion has not yet lain down with the lamb; and, until he does so, mutton is good to eat. The millennium has not yet made its advent; and, until it does so, that arbitration only stands which is effected by the sword. The danger of militarism and the martial spirit need not be gainsaid. It is a danger we must risk. But let us hope that mankind has made progress in arts as well as in arms; that America in the dawn of the twentieth of the centuries is not as Rome in the zenith of the first; and that—forewarned against imperialism—we shall be able to attend to Cæsar when we get to

him. In a word, eighty millions of people cannot be passive; they cannot escape the world's movement; and, sufficiently admonished by the isolation of China and its consequences, come what may, the people of the United States prefer to follow the lead and example of England. The die was cast when Dewey raised the Stars and Stripes on the other side of a world, never too large and all too narrowing, and, for weal or woe—rallying under the banners alike of Christianity and Republicanism—America is embarked upon the shoreless ocean of modern civilization, carrying in her own ships her own ideas and wares, marked, quoted, and signed to the furthestmost ends of the earth."

Thus stands the debate between the friends and the foes of National expansion. Which will vindicate the wisdom of its forecast it is for time to discover. The right and the wrong of the argument belong to the hereafter. But that the victory of circumstance lies with the advocates of the new departure in National policy, and that, as composite parts of the Great Republic, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines are already assured, must be obvious to the careful student of historic parallels and prevailing tendencies.

The simple American, who loves his country and is loyal to its best traditions—the counsel of the fathers like words of Holy Writ imbedded upon his understanding—the music of the Revolution, like a pastorelle of Arcadia, ringing in his very soul—can only look upon these changes with dismay. To him they seem but chaos come again. It is like the ruthless razing of the home of his childhood—the uprooting of the blessed roof-tree itself. Alas, such is the common lot of man! It is the destiny of Nations. And yet, be they of little faith of good hope still! *Sursam Corda!* Thus far the Republic has survived every danger which has in times past assailed the governments of the world; the struggle for existence; the foreign invasion; the disputed succession; geographic friction; civil strife; and it is at this moment stronger than ever it was, its faith renewed, its credit intact and its primacy known of all men. Let us believe that the untoward events of the war with Spain were

brought about for some all-wise purpose by the Supreme Ruler of men, and that that hand which has led American manhood through every emergency to the one goal of the American Union, has in store for that Union even greater uses and glory than irradiated the dreams and blessed the prayers of the God-fearing men who gave it life.



APPENDIX
OF INTERESTING DOCUMENTS

APPENDIX.

REPORTS OF THE NAVAL COMMANDERS ON SANTIAGO.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK,"
FIRST RATE, OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, }
July 15, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with and the destruction of the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, off Santiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898:—

Second—The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 A. M., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31, and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.

Third—The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows: The flagship *New York* was four miles east of her blockading station, and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my Chief-of-Staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward in the following order:—

The *Indiana* about a mile and a half from shore; the *Oregon*, the *New York's* place; between these two the *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Brooklyn*, the latter two miles from the shore, west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from two and one-half to four miles—the latter being the limit of day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles. The *Massachusetts* had left at 4 A. M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the *Iowa* and *Texas*. The auxiliaries, *Gloucester* and *Vixen*, lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the *Gloucester* to

the eastward, and the *Vixen* to the westward. The torpedo boat *Ericsson* was in company with the flagship, and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning *Vizcaya*. I inclose a diagram, showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described above.

Fourth—The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor at a speed estimated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: *Infanta Maria Teresa* (flagship), *Vizcaya*, *Cristobal Colon*, and the *Almirante Oquendo*. The distance between these ships was about eight hundred yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed. Following the *Oquendo* at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer, *Pluton*, and after her the *Furor*. The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

Fifth—The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday "quarters for inspection." The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, "Enemy's ships escaping"; and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The *New York* turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, "close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels," and gradually increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots and was rapidly closing on the *Cristobal Colon*. She was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the *Gloucester*.

Sixth—The Spanish vessels upon clearing the harbor turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the *Brooklyn* and *Texas* had, at the start, the advantage of position. The *Brooklyn* maintained this lead. The *Oregon*, steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The *Iowa* and the *Indiana* having done good work and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the *Vizcaya* was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The *Vixen*, finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column, and remained there during the battle and chase.

Seventh—The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the *Gloucester* excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht *Corsair*—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the *Pluton* and *Furor*, the *Gloucester* was slowed, gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed and was able to close to short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the *Gloucester* was under the fire of the Socapa battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor, the careers of the *Furor* and the *Pluton* were ended and two-thirds of their people killed. The *Furor* was beached and sunk in the surf; the *Pluton* sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battleships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and the *Texas*, yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the *Gloucester's* battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the *Gloucester* did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the *Infanta Maria Teresa*.

Eighth—The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards—all steering in the same direction and in formation—removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships, which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in passing, and the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and the *Oquendo* were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement; it was afterward learned that the *Infanta Maria Teresa's* fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach—the *Infanta Maria Teresa* at about 10:15, at Nima, six and one-half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the *Almirante Oquendo* at about 10:30 A. M., at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

Ninth—The *Vizcaya* was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the *Cristobal Colon* had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The *Vizcaya* was soon set on fire and at 11:15 she turned in shore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago the *Indiana* had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the *Iowa* was signaled to “resume blockading station.” The *Iowa*, assisted by the *Ericsson* and the *Hist*, took off the crew of the *Vizcaya*, while the *Harvard* and the *Gloucester* rescued those of the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and the *Almirante Oquendo*.

This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

Tenth—There remained now of the Spanish ships only the *Cristobal Colon*—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the *Vizcaya* went ashore, the *Colon* was about six miles ahead of the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon*, but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* came the *Texas*, *Vixen*, and *New York*. It was evident from the bridge of the *New York* that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12:50 the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* opened fire and got her range—the *Oregon's* heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1:20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, and ran ashore at Rio Tarquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the *Brooklyn*, went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up on the *New York*, received his report, and placed the *Oregon* in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible; and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the *Resolute*, which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose Chief-of-Staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The *Cristobal Colon* was not injured by our firing and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and, despite all efforts, she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the *New York* bodily up on the beach—the *New York's* stem being placed against her for that purpose—the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment—and sank in shoal water, and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

Eleventh—I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the *Cristobal Colon*.

Twelfth—It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade—there

being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 1, the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the coming of dark nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained, with fair conclusiveness, that the *Merrimac*, so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as follows: To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro—dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere,—they threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel and held it steadily there. This lightened up the entire breadth of the channel, for half a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches, and, at a little distance further out, three small picket vessels,—usually converted yachts,—and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was, at least, a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish Admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside the searchlight ship with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The *Massachusetts*, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning. I inclose, for the information of the department, copies of orders and memorandums issued from time to time, relating to the manner of maintaining the blockade.

Thirteenth—When all the work was done so well, it is difficult to discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the Commodore in command on the second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. The fine speed of the *Oregon* enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the *Cristobal Colon* did not give up until the *Oregon* had thrown a 13-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battleship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history

of vessels of her class. The *Brooklyn's* westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with telling effect. The *Texas* and the *New York* were gaining on the chase during the last hour, and, had any accident befallen the *Brooklyn* or the *Oregon*, would have speedily overhauled the *Cristobal Colon*. From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed, the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an average speed—from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Tarquino—of 13.7 knots. Neither the *New York* nor the *Brooklyn* stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes—or four miles in the chase.

Fourteenth—Several of the ships were struck, the *Brooklyn* more often than the others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the *Iowa*. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the *Brooklyn*. It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor, at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battleships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the *Almirante Oquendo*, especially, had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere pierced, and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen.

Fifteenth—The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding officers are inclosed.

Sixteenth—A board appointed by me several days ago has made a critical examination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the result of our fire and the military features involved, and of reporting upon the chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the board will be speedily forwarded.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear-Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT, }
WASHINGTON, D. C. }

COMMODORE SCHLEY'S REPORT.

NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET, SECOND SQUADRON,
UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP "BROOKLYN," }
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, July 6, 1898.

SIR: *First*—I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the squadron under your command which came under my observation during the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898:—

Second—At 9:35 A. M. Admiral Cervera, with the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, *Cristobal Colon*, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, came out of the harbor at Santiago de Cuba in column, at distance, and attempted to escape to the westward. Signal was made from the *Iowa* that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. This vessel was the farthest west, except the *Vixen*, in the blockading line; signal was made to the western division as prescribed in your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron, and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3,000 until the *Vizcaya* was destroyed, about 10:50 A. M. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.

Third—About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began, two vessels, thought to be the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*, and since verified as such, took fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron, and were forced to run on the beach some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo-boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship.

Fourth—The *Vizcaya* and *Colon*, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, continued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed and engaged in a running fight with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon*, until 10:50, when the *Vizcaya* took fire from our shells. She put her helm to port, and, with a heavy list to port, stood in shore and ran aground at Asseraderos, about twenty-one miles west of Santiago, on fire, fore and aft, where she blew up during the fight. Observing that she had struck colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The *Oregon* having proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the *Brooklyn*, together with the *Texas* and another vessel which proved to be your flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the *Colon*, which had run close in shore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.

Fifth—This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and other ships, and soon the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were within long range of the *Colon*, when the *Oregon* opened fire with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close

to the *Colon*. A moment afterward the *Brooklyn* opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the *Colon*, now in range of the *Brooklyn's* and *Oregon's* guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun, and struck her flag at 1:15 P. M., running ashore at a point some fifty miles west of Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as was also the *Texas* and *Vixen*. A little later, after your arrival, the *Cristobal Colon*, which had struck to the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon*, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command.

Sixth — During my official visit a little later, Commander Eaton, of the *Resolute* appeared, and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near Altares. Your orders to me were to take the *Oregon* and go eastward to meet her, and this was done by the *Brooklyn*, with the result that the vessel reported as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser *Infanta Maria Teresa*, seeking the Commander-in-Chief.

Seventh — I would mention for your consideration that the *Brooklyn* occupied the most westward blockading position with the *Vixen*, and, being directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery at a range of fifteen hundred yards from the ships and about three thousand yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range. I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you for such action as you may deem proper the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and the skillful handling of their respective vessels, of Captain Phillip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my Chief-of-Staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation, and whose coolness, promptness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the *Indiana* and the *Gloucester*, but, as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation.

Eighth — Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the *Vixen*, acted with conspicuous courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns, nevertheless he was close into the battle line under heavy fire, and many of the enemy's shots passed beyond his vessel.

Ninth — I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my Flag-Lieutenant James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aide, who were constantly at my side during the engagement, and who exposed themselves fearlessly in discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behavior of my secretary, Lieutenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the fourth division with splendid effect.

Tenth—I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the engagement of Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory.

Eleventh—The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieutenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simpson, Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster, and the junior divisional officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty, contributing to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces.

Twelfth—The officers of the medical, pay, and engineer and marine corps responded to every demand of the occasion and were fearless in exposing themselves. The warrant officers, boatswain William L. Hill, carpenter G. H. Warford, and gunner F. T. Applegate were everywhere exposed in watching for damage, reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.

Thirteenth—I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew than that of the *Brooklyn*. During the combat lasting from 9:35 until 1:15 P. M., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern, and over the ship.

Fourteenth—The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred prisoners with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at 800 men.

Fifteenth—The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars show that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halliards were shot away and nearly all the signal halliard. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down, at the close of the action, it fell to pieces.

Sixteenth—I congratulate you most sincerely on this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.

Seventeenth—I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding officer and a drawing in profile of the ship, showing the location of hits and scars; also a memorandum of ammunition expended, and the amount to fill her allowance.

Eighteenth—Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the Captains, viz.: Captain Eulate, of the *Viscaya*, and the second in command of the *Colon*, Commander Contreras, I have learned that the Spanish Admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the *Brooklyn*, and the *Viscaya* to ram her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be increased,

as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of your squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the *Viscaya's* action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

Nineteenth—I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the leak small.

Twentieth—I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat of July 3, 1898.

Twenty-first—I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark and the *Oregon*. Her speed was wonderful, and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,

Commodore United States Navy, Commanding Second Squadron,
North Atlantic Fleet.

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE, }
NORTH ATLANTIC STATION.

CAPTAIN CLARK'S REPORT.

UNITED STATES SHIP "OREGON," FIRST RATE, }
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898. }

SIR: *First*—I have the honor to report that at 9:30 A. M., yesterday, the Spanish fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. They turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our ships replied vigorously. For a short time there was an almost continuous flight of projectiles over this ship, but when our line was fairly engaged and the *Iowa* had made a swift advance as if to ram or close, the enemy's fire became defective in train as well as range. The ship was only struck three times, and at least two of them were but fragments of shells. We had no casualties.

Second—As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break through and escape to the westward, we went ahead at full speed, with the determination of carrying out to the utmost your order: "If the enemy tries to escape the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels, or force them to run ashore." We soon passed all of our ships except the *Brooklyn*, bearing the broad pendant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were

following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns as well as the six upon them, with telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships, she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abeam she, too, was making for the beach. The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to sixteen knots, and our fire, added to that of the *Brooklyn*, soon sent another, the *Vizcaya*, to the shore in flames. Only the *Cristobal Colon* was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might escape, but when we opened with our forward turret guns, and the *Brooklyn* followed, she began to edge in toward the coast, and her capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag came down, and the *Brooklyn* signaled, "Cease firing," following it with "Congratulations for the grand victory; thanks for your splendid assistance."

Third—The *Brooklyn* sent a boat to her, and when the Admiral came up with the *New York*, *Texas*, and *Vixen* she was taken possession of. A prize crew was put on board from this ship under Lieutenant-Commander Comewell, the executive officer, but before 11 P. M. the ship, which had been filling in spite of all efforts to stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as the crew left she went over on her side.

Fourth—I cannot speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct of all on board this ship. When they found the *Oregon* had pushed to the front and was hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy's vessels if they could be overtaken and would engage, their enthusiasm was intense.

Fifth—As these vessels were so much more heavily armored than the *Brooklyn*, they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and, consequently, I am persuaded that but for the way the officers and men of the *Oregon* steamed and steered the ship and fought and supplied her batteries, the *Colon*, and perhaps the *Vizcaya*, would have escaped. Therefore, I feel that they rendered meritorious service to the country, and, while I cannot mention the name of each officer and man individually, I am going to append a list of the officers with their stations that they occupied, hoping that they may be of service to them should the claims of others for advancement above them ever be considered.

Very respectfully,

C. E. CLARK,
Captain United States Navy, Commanding.

CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT.

UNITED STATES SHIP "IOWA," FIRST RATE,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 4, 1898. }

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement with Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July:—

First—On the morning of the 3d, while the crew were at quarters for Sunday inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 9:31 coming out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Signal, "Enemy's ships are coming out," was immediately hoisted and a gun fired to attract attention. The call to general quarters was sounded immediately, the battery made ready for firing, and the engines rung full speed ahead.

Second—The position of this vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was the usual blockading station off the entrance of the harbor; Morro Castle bearing about north, and distant about three or four miles. The steam at this time in the boilers was sufficient for a speed of five knots.

Third—After sighting the leading vessel, the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, Admiral Cervera's flagship, it was observed that she was followed in succession by the remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the *Vizcaya*, *Cristobal Colon*, and *Almirante Oquendo*. The Spanish ships moved at a speed of about eight to ten knots, which was steadily increased as they cleared the harbor entrance and stood to the westward. They maintained a distance of about 800 yards between vessels. The squadron moved with precision, and stations were well kept.

Fourth—Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel, fires were spread and the *Iowa* headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9:40 the first shot was fired from this ship at a distance of about 6,000 yards.

The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily diminished. A number of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 and 4,000 yards. The range was rapidly reduced to 2,500 yards, and, subsequently, to 2,000 and to 1,200 yards.

Fifth—When it was certain that the *Maria Teresa* would pass ahead of us, the helm was put to starboard and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across the bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to starboard and she received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800 yards. The *Iowa* was again headed off with port helm for the third ship, and as she approached the helm was put to starboard until our course was approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position, at a range of 1,400 yards, the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, was poured into the enemy's ship.

Sixth—About 10 o'clock the enemy's torpedo-boat destroyers, *Furor* and *Pluton*, were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the Spanish squadron. At the time that they were observed, and, in fact, most of the time that they were under

fire, they were at a distance varying from 4,500 to 4,000 yards. As soon as they were discovered, the secondary battery of the *Iowa* was turned upon them, while the main battery continued to engage the *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, and *Maria Teresa*.

The fire of the main battery of this ship, when the range was below 2,500 yards, was most effective and destructive, and, after a continuance of this fire for perhaps twenty minutes, it was noticed that the *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo* were in flames, and were being headed for the beach. Their colors were struck about 10:20, and they were beached about eight miles west of Santiago.

Seventh—About the same time (about 10:20), the fire of this vessel, together with that of the *Gloucester* and another smaller vessel, proved so destructive that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (*Pluton*) was sunk and the *Furor* was so much damaged that she was run upon the rocks.

Eighth—After having passed, at 10:35, the *Oquendo* and *Maria Teresa*, on fire and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and fire upon the *Vizcaya* until 10:36, when signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having been discovered that the *Vizcaya* had struck her colors.

Ninth—At 11:00 the *Iowa* arrived in the vicinity of the *Vizcaya*, which had been run ashore, and, as it was evident that she could not catch the *Cristobal Colon*, and that the *Oregon*, *Brooklyn*, and *New York* would, two steam cutters and three cutters were immediately hoisted out and sent to the *Vizcaya* to rescue her crew. Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large number of officers and men of that ship's company and in placing many of them on board the torpedo boat *Ericsson* and the auxiliary dispatch vessel *Hist*.

Tenth—About 11:30 the *New York* passed in chase of the *Cristobal Colon*, which was endeavoring to escape from the *Oregon*, *Brooklyn*, and *Texas*.

Eleventh—We received on board this vessel from the *Vizcaya*, Captain Eulate, the commanding officer, and twenty-three officers, together with about two hundred and forty-eight petty officers and men, of whom thirty-two were wounded. There were also received on board five dead bodies, which were immediately buried with the honors due to their grade.

Twelfth—The battery behaved well in all respects.

The dashpot of the forward 12-inch gun, damaged in the engagement of the 2d, had been replaced the same day by one of the old dashpots, which gave no trouble during this engagement. This ship was struck in the hull, on the starboard side, during the early part of the engagement, by two projectiles of about six-inch caliber, one striking the hull two or three feet above the actual water line and almost directly on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship between frames nine and ten, and the other piercing the side and the cofferdam between frames eighteen and nineteen.

The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of cofferdam A 41-43. The hole made by it was large and ragged, being about sixteen inches in longitudinal direction. It struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated the

cofferdam partition, bulkhead A 41-43-45-47. It did not explode, and remained in the cofferdam.

The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam ^{at} A 105, the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of the cofferdam on the berth deck in compartment A 104. The projectile broke off the hatch plate and coaming of the water tank compartment, exploded, and perforated the walls of the chain locker. The explosion created a small fire, which was promptly extinguished. The hole in the side, made by this projectile, was about five feet above the water line and about two or three feet above the berth deck. One fragment of this shell struck a link of the sheet-chain, wound around the 6-pounder ammunition hoist, cutting the link in two. Another perforated the cofferdam on the port side, and slightly dished outside plating.

These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance.

Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper bridge and smoke stacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles struck the hammock nettings and the side aft.

There are no casualties among the ship's company to report. No officer nor man was injured during the engagement.

After having received on board the ship's crew of the *Vizcaya*, my vessel proceeded to the eastward, and resumed the blockading station in obedience to the signal made by the Commander-in-Chief about 11:30.

Upon returning upon the blockading station the *Gloucester* transferred to this vessel Admiral Cervera, his Flag-Lieutenant, and the commanding officers of the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Pluton*, and also one man of the *Oquendo's* crew, rescued by the *Gloucester*.

Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John E. Lewis and five men belonging to the *Massachusetts* were on board the *Iowa* when the enemy's ships came out. They were stationed at different points and rendered efficient service.

The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men could have done more gallant service.

I take pleasure in stating to you, sir, that the coolness and judgment of the executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, deserves and will, I hope, receive a proper reward at the hands of the government. The test of the executive officer's work is the conduct of ship and crew in battle—in this case it was simply superb.

The coolness of the navigator, Lieutenant W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieutenant F. K. Hill, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are worthy of the greatest commendation.

Other officers of the ship did not come under my personal observation, but the result of the action shows how well they did their duty.

I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen, but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.

In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete victory achieved by your fleet. Very respectfully,

R. D. EVANS,

Captain United States Navy, Commanding.

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE, }
NORTH ATLANTIC STATION. }

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ADMIRAL SAMPSON, CAPTAIN
TAYLOR, AND COMMANDER EATON.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON filed in the Navy Department copies of letters that had passed between himself and Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, regarding the part taken by the latter in the action of July 3, off Santiago.

UNITED STATES SHIP "INDIANA," }
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, August 6, 1898. }

ADMIRAL: The report of Commodore Schley on the battle of July 3, as published, gives credit in the seventh paragraph to four ships, and mentions by name their Captains, Philip, Evans, Clark, and Cook, and adds: "The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the *Indiana* and the *Gloucester*, but as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation."

Second—In your report, as published, you make but a slight mention of the *Indiana*, stating that "the *Iowa* and *Indiana*, having done good work and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me," etc.

Third—The result of these reports is that the Captains of all the vessels of the line of battle except the *Indiana* have received personal mention in the official report before the department, while the two smaller vessels have also had distinctive mention, either from the Commander-in-Chief or the second in command.

Fourth—If the official record should be referred to in future, it will appear from its general tone that the *Indiana* was less deserving than all of her consorts. Leaving out my personal interest in the matter, it is right that I should consider the officers and crew of the ship; and I speak for them as well as for myself when I submit to you, Admiral, that the above combination of reports will place the ship, in the opinion of the department and the country, markedly below all the other vessels of your squadron. I respectfully submit, sir, that this is injustice to the *Indiana* and her officers and crew.

Fifth—I can say, without disparagement of any other vessel, that during the first hour of the fight the *Indiana's* gun fire contributed to the destruction of the

Oquendo and the *Teresa* more than that of any single vessel of our squadron except one, and equaled hers. I do not know why the second in command failed to observe the *Indiana* during this period of our hottest action. I saw the *Brooklyn* quite plainly.

Sixth—An examination of these reports with reference to the *Indiana* will, I believe, convince you, sir, that they do produce the effect of putting the *Indiana* below all the other vessels of the squadron. If it be your opinion, sir, that this is the case, and that all the vessels, from the *Brooklyn* to the *Vixen*, rendered services as much more valuable than the *Indiana's* as the published report of the Commander-in-Chief and the second in command, taken together, would indicate, then I must accept it for myself and the ship. If, on the contrary, that be not your opinion, I urge respectfully that such steps be taken to remedy this injustice as may seem wise to you. Very respectfully,

H. C. TAYLOR,

Captain United States Navy, Commanding.

TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE, }
NORTH ATLANTIC STATION.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON replied as follows:—

UNITED STATES SHIP "NEW YORK," }
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, August 8, 1898. }

SIR: I am greatly obliged that you have called my attention to what appears to have been an injustice to your ship, and of course, your crew, for the part which they took in the action of July 3, and, also, for the very proper manner in which you have presented it. I think, however, that you will agree with me that in submitting such a report to the Secretary of the Navy, where so many officers are vitally interested and justly proud of their ships, it is no easy task to do so without apparently bestowing praise unjustly. It requires very careful consideration of the report from every point of view to avoid misunderstanding.

Second—The position of the ships of the squadron must be carefully considered to fully appreciate what it was possible for each vessel to accomplish under the circumstances in which she was placed. Those that were to the westward of the escaping enemy were certainly better placed for stopping the enemy, and also better placed for delivering their fire, than the vessels to the eastward, which was the blockading station of the *Indiana*.

Third—No distribution of the fleet could completely predict and provide against every variation of such a sortie, nor do I consider that any commanding officer deserved either credit or blame because the ship under his command was faster or slower than another ship, or carried a heavier or lighter battery, but, rather, that the commanding officer was blameworthy when he failed to put his ship

in the proper place for destroying the enemy, just in proportion to the advantage which he possessed in speed, battery, or position over his neighbors.

Fourth—Each commanding officer, in my opinion, was personally responsible for the good use which he made of the tools with which he had to work. I certainly did not intend to criticize you, nor to bestow less praise upon the *Indiana* than was bestowed upon any other ship of the squadron.

Fifth—The fact that the commanding officer of the *Indiana* was signaled to return to blockade duty at the mouth of the harbor, after she had so gallantly contributed to the destruction of the Spanish ships, was only a necessary precaution which the Commander-in-Chief felt obliged to take to prevent disaster to the large number of transports which were left in that vicinity when the fleet started in pursuit of the enemy. There were still some armed vessels remaining in the harbor of Santiago—at least two, and we did not know, then, how many more—which could have come out, in the absence of the fleet, and produced great havoc among the troop ships, which were defenseless in the absence of an armed vessel.

Sixth—This explanation, together with your letter, will be sent to the department, with the request that it may be attached to and form a part of the original report.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER UNITED STATES SHIP, "INDIANA," }
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. }

COMMANDER EATON, of the *Resolute*, also contributed his observations of the *Indiana's* part in the great battle, in the following frank letter to Admiral Sampson:

U. S. S. "RESOLUTE," NAVY YARD, NEW YORK, }
September 3, 1898. }

SIR: I consider it my duty to lay before you the following report of the events witnessed by myself in the action of July 3, 1898, off Santiago:

The *Resolute*, which I commanded, lay just east of the *Indiana*, distant from her one thousand feet, and about two and six-tenths miles from the Morro, when the *Maria Teresa* was sighted.

The *Indiana* had been near the Morro, but about 9 o'clock circled to the eastward with a port helm, leaving the *Resolute* within the arc of the circle described by the fleet. The *Resolute* was then turned under a slow bell and stopped when the *Indiana* was due west of us, and just outside the circle of fighting ships. The *Gloucester* was to the northward and eastward, nearly off Aguadores.

As the *Maria Teresa* appeared the Iowa fired a 6-pounder and hoisted signal. Within a few seconds of this shot (not more than five or ten) all the Spanish batteries opened, and at the same instant the port broadside of the *Maria Teresa*

was discharged. It seemed to me then that all or nearly all of these shots and shells were fired at the *Indiana*, and as the *Resolute* lay directly in line the water around the *Indiana* and the *Resolute* was alive with the fall of projectiles.

Before the *Vizcaya* appeared the *Indiana* opened fire with her heavy guns, and, with screws whitening the water astern, was heading for the Morro.

As the *Vizcaya* came out I distinctly saw one of the *Indiana's* heavy shells strike her abaft the funnels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a burst of flame, which for the moment obscured the afterpart of the *Vizcaya*.

The *Vizcaya* fired her port battery apparently at the *Indiana*, for many of the shells struck about and beyond the *Resolute*, which was then headed east.

The *Cristobal Colon*, as soon as she was clear off Morro point, fired her first broadside at the *Indiana*.

The *Oquendo*, in coming out, also fired her first broadside at the *Indiana*, and I could see some of the *Indiana's* shells strike the *Oquendo* as she steamed south.

Following close astern on the *Colon* and *Oquendo* came the destroyer *Furor*, and I distinctly saw her struck by an 8-inch or 13-inch shell from the *Indiana*, which was followed by an explosion and flames aboard the *Furor*.

During all this time the *Indiana* had been steaming ahead, and I roughly estimated that she was then about 3,000 yards from the *Oquendo* and the *Furor*.

The *Resolute* was nearly in line with the *Indiana*, and I could clearly follow the course of the *Indiana's* projectiles.

The other ships engaged, except the *Oregon* and occasionally the *Brooklyn*, which showed at times to the southward, but were most of the time hidden by other vessels (the *Resolute* being by this time well to the windward) were hidden in smoke.

From the position of the ships engaged it appeared to me that the *Indiana* was the first to close with the escaping enemy, and, though I could see the *Teresa* and *Vizcaya* sweeping across her course, it was apparent that the *Indiana's* shells were the first to reach them. This was due, first, to the *Indiana's* proximity, and, second, to the fact that the *Indiana* had a fair beam target on each ship as it came out.

The *Oregon* had this in a less degree, and the other vessels engaged seemed to have all fired their first shells when the Spanish ships were four points on.

In addition to the heavier shells noted as striking the enemy, we could count many lighter projectiles from the secondary battery exploding on board, and as the *Indiana's* fire was incessant I took these to be from her guns.

The Spanish officers who were prisoners from the *Colon* and the *Vizcaya* have since told me that the fire from the *Indiana* and the *Oregon*, as they (the Spaniards) passed from the harbor, was deadly in its destructiveness, and that although the *Colon* escaped with small injury, due to her greater speed, and being in a measure covered by other ships, the *Vizcaya* was hopelessly crippled before she had gone a mile from the Morro.

I have ventured to address you this letter, as I had exceptional opportunities for observation during this part of the engagement, and it has seemed to me that the very important part taken by the *Indiana* in the first part of the action should be laid before you.

Very respectfully,

J. G. EATON,

Commander, Commanding. To the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces,
North Atlantic Station.

LETTER FROM CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK "SUN"—SIR: In your issue of July 29, a correspondent asks: "Why did Nelson, second in command, receive the credit for Copenhagen, if Schley is not to have it for Santiago?"

A better knowledge of history would have shown the essential differences between the two cases, and have saved the question. At Copenhagen, Nelson did not merely do the fighting, the entire conception of the method of attack was his, and by him was *forced*—the word is not too strong—upon a reluctant Commander-in-Chief. When the latter had yielded his consent, the separate and decisive attack was made by Nelson, commanding a detachment from the main fleet, all the movements of which detachment, including the positions in the order of battle, were prescribed by him. With the preliminary dispositions and subsequent conduct of this detachment, his Commander-in-Chief, Parker, had nothing to do, although within signal distance, beyond making the since historic signal to "withdraw from action," which Nelson refused to obey. It is to be added that, although Parker was not formally censured,—as far, at least, as I know,—he was recalled to England as soon as the accounts of the battle were received there, Nelson being left in command in his place. A stronger implied censure than the recall of a Commander-in-Chief after such a victory is difficult to imagine.

At Santiago all the dispositions prior to action, and for over a month before, were made by the Commander-in-Chief. A number of orders, issued from time to time by him, for the enforcement of the close watch of the harbor's mouth, were published in the *Washington Post* of July 27, and, I presume, by other journals, as well. There is very strong ground for believing that Cervera's attempt to escape by day instead of by night—the incident of his conduct which has been most widely censured and is most inexplicable—was due to the fact that the United States ships kept so close to the harbor mouth at night that a dash like his, desperate at best, had a better chance when the ships were at day distance. This was so stated, substantially, to Admiral Sampson by the Captain of the *Colon*. If so, the merit of this, forcing the enemy

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to action under disadvantageous conditions, — and it is one of the highest achievements of military art, — belongs to the Commander-in-Chief. *It was the great decisive feature of the campaign, from start to finish.* Few naval authorities, I imagine, will dispute this statement.

It will be noted, also, by comparing the report of Admiral Sampson, stating the disposition of the ships, with the report of Captain Cook, commanding the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship, that the United States ships chased and fought in the order, from left to right, established by Sampson. There is in this no particular merit for the latter, beyond that in placing the two fastest ships, *Brooklyn* and *New York*, on the two flanks, he had made the best provision for heading off the enemy, which the *Brooklyn* so handsomely effected. But the fact that the ships chased as they stood shows that it was unnecessary for Schley to make a signal; and in truth, from first to last, the second in command needed to make no signal of a tactical character, and made none, so far as is shown by his own report, or that of the Captain of the ship. That is, the second in command exercised no special directive functions of a flag or general officer while the fighting lasted. In this, there was no fault, for there was no need for signals; but the fact utterly does away with any claim to particular merit as second in command, without in the least impairing the Commodore's credit for conduct in all possible respects gallant and officer-like. So far as plan is concerned, the battle was fought on Sampson's lines; and, to quote Collingwood before Trafalgar, "I wish Nelson would stop signaling, for we all know what we have to do." The second in command, and the Captains before Santiago all knew what they had to do, and right nobly they all did it.

But the distinctive merit of the series of events which issued in the naval battle of Santiago is that, so far as appears, Cervera was forced to fight as he did on account of the unrelenting watch, through more than a whole moon, including its dark nights, maintained by Admiral Sampson. The writer has been told by a naval officer whose name he has no authority to mention, but who would be recognized as one of the most efficient of his mature years, and who had been off Santiago during part of that eventful month, that he regarded Sampson's watch of the harbor as the decisive feature in the great result. This neither ignores the merits of the Captains nor of the "man behind the gun." Captains and the men behind the guns may be of the best, the Colonels of the regiments and the privates of land warfare the same, but vain are their valor and their skill if the Commander-in-Chief be wanting in either. "Better an army of stags led by a lion than an army of lions led by a stag."

The phrase of the *Washington Post*, meant for a sneer, "Admiral Sampson wishes the American people to believe that . . . things could not have happened otherwise, even if Admiral Sampson had been seventy, instead of seven, miles away," expresses an exact truth. With the wise and stringent methods laid down and enforced by the Admiral, it would not in the least have mattered, as things happened, with such ships and such Captains, had the Commander-in-Chief and the second in command, either or both, been seventy miles away. It is exactly with the fleet as with the

single ships. The merit of each Captain was not only, nor chiefly, that he handled and fought his ship admirably on the day of battle. His greatest merit was that, when he took his ship into action, she was so organized and trained that, had he himself been absent or struck dead by the first shot, the ship would none the less have played her full part efficiently in the fight, under her second in command.

Few things in the observation of the writer have been more painful than the attempt of a portion of the Press and of the public to rob Sampson of his just and painfully won dues. During the night hours of July 2-3, when there is strong reason to believe that Cervera, despite the full moon, wished to come out, the Commander-in-Chief, with the whole of his force, lay close to the harbor's mouth, and the Spanish attempt was deferred till day, when it might be supposed from their usual practice that the besieging vessels would be more distant, and, perhaps, off their guard. At 4 A. M., when day began to break, the *Massachusetts*, commanded by one of the most spirited officers in the service, silently withdrew to coal at Guantanamo, forty miles away. Half an hour before the enemy was discovered coming out, the flagship *New York* also proceeded east. In doing this the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, was obeying a specific and direct order of the Navy Department, to confer personally with the Commander-in-Chief of the army. To this was owing that, to use the words of Sampson's dispatch, the flagship "was not at any time within range of the heavy Spanish ships." Upon this circumstance, mortifying as a mere disappointment, that the ship, though pushed to her utmost speed, could not retrieve her original disadvantage of position,—incurred in obedience to the orders of the Navy Department,—has been raised the shameful outcry, designed to deprive an eminent officer of the just rewards of his toils.

The injustice is, with many, doubtless unintentional and unwitting. The same excuse can scarcely be made for the charge that the Admiral has grudged praise to his subordinates. Some Washington papers have been particularly vicious in this matter, and the *Post* of that city, in an editorial of July 31 to that effect, is guilty, in quoting from one paragraph of Sampson's dispatch, of suppressing these following words in the succeeding paragraph: "The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan [of blockade] and put it into execution. The *Massachusetts*, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning." Again, as regards the action: "When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the Commodore in command of the second division, the Captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battleships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts." If higher praise is expected, the only reply that can be made is that it is, historically, rarely given. When individual men are

named, unless some conspicuous and unusual deed compels it, those passed over feel slighted; while, if each who has done his duty is individually named, all distinctive effect is lost. Those who doubt may examine the dispatches of men like Nelson and Farragut.

It would be improper to conclude without saying that there is not the slightest proof that Commodore Schley is, in the least, responsible for the malicious attempts made to depress Admiral Sampson with a view to exalt the second in command. On the contrary, when they came to his ears he telegraphed to the Navy Department (on July 10) his "mortification" at the fact, handsomely attributing the victory to the force under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic station; "to him the honor is due." More than this, there is no occasion for him to say, nor need he have said anything but for the obligation forced upon him by the indiscreet and ungenerous clamor of those posing as his friends, from whom he might well pray to be saved.

So far as precedents may properly influence opinion in a matter of this kind, it is interesting as well as instructive to notice two other instances in the career of Nelson, for he was usually a second in command and was prone to come to the front, as at Copenhagen, not by the absence of his superior, but by his own initiative. At Cape St. Vincent, Nelson, — not being second, but third or fourth, — of his own motion, without orders, took a step during the course of the battle which was a leading cause of its success, and threw upon his own ship the largest single share in the whole fighting. Nevertheless, although for this he received ample recognition, official as well as public, the greater reward by far was rightly adjudged to his chief, whose ship was much less exposed, but to whose previous dispositions and action it was owing that Nelson had the opportunity he so well improved.

At the Nile, Nelson, in seniority of flag rank upon the station, was again only third or fourth, but he was in sole command of a large detachment, 2,000 miles away from his nearest superior. The battle, therefore, was fought solely "off his own bat;" the decision to fight, the methods, and the actual fighting, were all his own. Nevertheless, although the Commander-in-Chief was absent, in a very full sense of the word, the fact that Nelson was not a Commander-in-Chief was held, unjustly, I think, to diminish his claim to reward. The reward, quite inadequate to the achievement, was "the highest," wrote the First Lord of the Admiralty, "that has ever been conferred upon an officer of your standing who was not a Commander-in-Chief." This decision, therefore, was based on precedent, and throws light on British practice and opinion — and in naval matters no nation has had a wider experience — as to the relative responsibilities and claims of Commanders-in-Chief and flag officers junior to them.

A. T. MAHAN,

Captain (Retired) United States Navy.

WASHINGTON, August 5.

LETTER OF SECRETARY LONG.

THE Secretary of the Navy received several letters violently attacking Admiral Sampson. The following is a copy of his reply to one of them:—

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, August 5, 1898. }

MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your letter, and hasten to assure you that what you say about Admiral Sampson is so unjust that it can only be pardoned on the ground of your ignorance of the whole matter. You have no appreciation of the responsibilities that have been upon Admiral Sampson, of his very superior attainments as an officer, and the splendid work he has done in preparing for the naval victory which was the crowning accomplishment of his efforts for weeks and weeks before Santiago. Justice is always done in the long run. But when you indulge in such unfounded criticism I cannot forbear to protest, as I should feel bound to do if you had referred in similar terms to any other of our deserving officers.

Admiral Sampson was selected for the command of the North Atlantic squadron because the department, in the exercise of its best judgment, with an eye single to the public interest, believed that he was specially fitted for the place. Admiral Sicard, who held the command, having become incapacitated for duty, by reason of sickness, was necessarily withdrawn by order of the department, and Sampson was next in command. These two are especially accomplished ordnance officers, having been each at the head of the Ordnance Bureau and having devoted themselves to that branch of naval science. Sampson is a man of the very highest professional attainments, solely devoted to his duty. He never pushes himself forward, and when you accuse him of anything on that score you do most cruel injustice to a man who has never sought favor or applause in any other way than by the simple discharge of his duty.

Second—The movement on Porto Rico was not a movement for its capture. The department, which has very rarely interfered with the movements of Admirals commanding squadrons, did, however, make one express order, and that was that our battleships should not be exposed to the risk of serious injury from the fire of any fort. At that time the Spanish fleet was strong; its whereabouts and destination were unknown. The primal necessity was to meet and crush its ships, and to secure for us the domination of the sea. The *Oregon* had not arrived, the *Maine* was destroyed, and no naval authority would justify the unnecessary risk of the destruction of any of our battleships, except in battle with the enemy's ships. The movement to Porto Rico was to meet, if possible, the fleet of Cervera, which was then expected. Cervera, undoubtedly, learning that our fleet was at San Juan, changed his destination to

Santiago. Our movement to Porto Rico thus became a reconnoissance and fulfilled its purpose. There was no intention at this time of taking Porto Rico, as the army was not then ready to coöperate.

Third— With regard to sending our ships into the harbor of Santiago, Admiral Sampson was acting under the explicit orders of the department, not to expose his armored ships to the risk of sinking by mines; and the wisdom of this course, I believe, is universally acknowledged by naval authorities. He waited, as he should have done, the coöperation of the army. How effectually under this coöperation the result was accomplished is now matter of history. There are few more graphic scenes than must have been presented at 4 o'clock, on the afternoon of the 14th of July, when Shafter, with his troops, ready to assault Santiago, awaited the reply of the Spanish commander to the demand for surrender. Sampson's fleet was at the mouth of the harbor, drawn up in line and ready to bombard, as it had been for days previous, and the signal officer stood on the heights ready to wigwag the signal for firing. Happily, instead of this signal, came the good word that the Spanish had surrendered to this combined readiness for attack.

Fourth— Please bear in mind the variety and weight of the responsibilities which were upon Admiral Sampson for the month prior to the great battle which destroyed Cervera's fleet. He was commanding officer of the whole squadron, charged with the blockade of the whole Cuban coast, charged with the detail of all the movements of ships, charged with clerical correspondence with the department and other officers, and specially charged with preventing the escape of Cervera. Remember that this man, whom you so sweepingly accuse, was devoting his days and nights to these duties. If you will read the orders issued by him, beginning with June 1, you will find that the most thorough precautions had been taken to prevent the escape of Cervera; that our fleet was kept constantly in line, so far from the entrance at night and so far by day; that the most rigid care with searchlights and every other appliance was taken every night; that the commanding officer of every vessel knew his post and his duty in case of an attempt to escape, so that, when that attempt came, the movement to prevent it, by the attack of our vessels upon the outcoming Spaniards, went on like clockwork; as at Chattanooga, every movement of that great battle was carried out, although General Grant was neither at Missionary Ridge nor Lookout Mountain.

I can well understand why the friends of other officers should be so enthusiastic and earnest, as I am, in giving them the credit they so richly, every one of them, deserve, for their glorious work. I cannot conceive of anybody so mean as to detract, by a single hair, from their merit. But I cannot understand why such a bitter feeling is manifested, in many quarters, toward Admiral Sampson, when all these officers, subordinate to him, in their reports, clearly and cordially recognize the fact that, although at the beginning he was, by orders from Washington, going to confer with General Shafter, yet the battle was fought under his orders, and that the victory was the consummation of his thorough preparation. For myself, I know no

predilection for any one of these gallant men. I would crown every one of them with laurels. I want them all to have their just deserts. Every one of them deserves unstinted praise; not one of them deserves anything less than full measure for that day's work. And, therefore, I can think of nothing more cruel than a depreciation of the merit of the faithful, devoted, patriotic Commander-in-Chief, physically frail, worn with sleepless vigilance, weighed with measureless responsibilities and details, letting no duty go undone; for weeks with ceaseless precautions blockading the Spanish squadron; at last, by the unerring fulfillment of his plans, crushing it under the fleet which executed his commands; yet now compelled in dignified silence to be assailed as vindictively as if he were an enemy to his country. I am sure that no one more deprecates such an attack than the officers of the fleet—Commodore, Captains, and all. Among them all is peace; whatever disquiet there may be elsewhere, the navy is serene. I am reminded of Mrs. Beecher Stowe's beautiful verse:—

"Far, far beneath, the noise of tempests dieth,
And silver waves chime over peacefully;
And no rude storm, how fierce soe'er it fleth,
Disturbs the Sabbath of that deeper sea."

Yours truly,
JOHN D. LONG.



CRUISE OF THE BATTLESHIP "OREGON."

ACCOUNT WRITTEN BY HER CHIEF ENGINEER.

UNITED STATES SHIP "OREGON,"
BLOCKADING SANTIAGO DE CUBA, }
June 22, 1898.

KNOWING the great interest you take in all matters pertaining to our navy, and the especial interest with which you have followed our remarkable race for the scene of war, I am sure you will be pleased to have a more or less full account of our recent voyage, together with some general data. I will, therefore, start this account, making it from time to time as opportunity offers.

The *Oregon*, you know, is a first-class coast defense battleship of about 10,000 tons displacement at the so-called normal draught. In this condition, however, she has only a certain limited amount of stores on board and only four hundred tons of coal. When she goes to sea, with her bunkers full of coal, all stores and all ammunition on board, her actual displacement is something over 12,000 tons, and her draught of water is then over twenty-seven feet, and she was, of course, in this latter condition when we started out from San Francisco, having on board at that time about 1,500 tons of coal, all bunkers being practically full.

The ship is driven by twin screws, worked by triple expansion engines, the engines being placed in separate water-tight compartments, and the tops of the cylinders come well below the protective deck. There are four large main boilers, double-ended cylindrical, each boiler in a separate water-tight compartment, and, of course, also well below the protective deck. These boilers are each fifteen feet in diameter, eighteen feet long, and have eight furnaces, four in each end. The dimensions of each furnace are three feet diameter, and length of grate five feet six inches, giving a grate surface for each furnace of seventeen and a quarter square feet, or 552 for all main boilers.

We all knew, of course, that we had a remarkably fine ship, but before starting out we felt some little anxiety as to our ability to keep the machinery fully up to its work during such a long cruise. Nothing approaching it had ever before been attempted by a heavy battleship. Fortunately, we had just come out of dry dock in Bremerton (and our trip should really be considered as starting from that point rather than from San Francisco) and were only nine or ten days in San Francisco before starting for Callao—just long enough to fill our bunkers and magazines. Our machinery, both engines and boilers, were then in excellent condition, everything having been thoroughly overhauled by our own people while in dry dock, so it was not necessary to do any great amount of work in San Francisco.

Having finally filled up with coal, ammunition, and stores we left on March 19, and proceeded under three boilers direct for Callao, which port we reached on the

morning of April 4, having expended, during this run of sixteen days, nine hundred tons of coal, leaving six hundred tons still in our bunkers. This we consider a remarkably efficient performance, having averaged 4.24 knots per ton of coal. The revolutions of the engines during this run were remarkably steady, averaging seventy-five revolutions per minute for day after day without a variation of a tenth of a revolution.

On two different occasions one of the boilers in use began to leak slightly around the back ends of some of the tubes. On both occasions we immediately started fires in the idle boiler, and allowed those in the leaking boiler to die out, and as soon as possible the boilermaker was sent in to reexpand the tubes. During all this time the water in the boilers was perfectly fresh, our evaporators and distillers having a capacity of 5,000 gallons a day, which was sufficient for all purposes, including the necessary make-up feed for the boilers.

On the afternoon of March 27 smoke and gas were discovered to be coming out of one of the coal bunkers. This bunker was over half full at the time, having probably between sixty-five and seventy tons in it. There was nothing to do but dig for the fire, as it was evidently down somewhere in the body of the pile. So we started in, working a couple of men in the bunker for about ten minutes at a time, and then sending in a couple more to relieve the first. After about two hours' work the fire was reached, only about a shovelful of live coal being found, but probably a couple of tons so hot that it was giving off smoke and gas. After about four hours' steady work all the dangerous coal had been removed, and no further trouble was encountered. We had to call for assistance from the deck force to help us out in carrying the coal away, as we kept up the speed of the ship the whole time; but our own men did all the work in the bunker itself. Naval Cadet Jenson, one of our engineer cadets, was temporarily relieved from watch duty and put in charge of the fire gang, and the way he went at it, never paying the least attention to the excessive heat and foul air and gas in which he was working, was wonderful to see.

On arriving at Callao we found that our coal had been ordered for us by the *Marietta*. The lighters had all been loaded, and were brought alongside as soon as we let go the anchor.

Then began some real work. I started in on the starboard engine and Reeves on the port engine, and we overhauled connections, scraped in brasses where necessary, examined, cleaned, and repaired air pumps, circulating pumps, wiped out and oiled all the main cylinders and valve chests. Fortunately for me, my engine was in pretty good shape, needing only a slight amount of keying up here and there. Reeves, however, found one of his main cross-head slippers so badly cut and scored that it was deemed best to remove it and put in place a spare one, which we carried on board. This sounds easy, but it required twenty-four hours' continuous work, as it had to be fitted exactly, the face carefully scraped to a true surface; and, finally, the guides nicely adjusted.

In the meantime the firemen and coal passers were engaged in trimming the bunkers, under the supervision of our two cadet engineers, who took twenty-four hours' watch at a time.

When we arrived here it was evident that war with Spain was inevitable, but war had not yet broken out. However, every precaution was taken to guard against any treachery on the part of Spanish sympathizers. The ordinary number of sentries was doubled and these men were armed with ball cartridges, ammunition was gotten up for the rapid-fire guns, and the steam launches were manned with armed crews and kept patrolling around the ship all night, to warn off and prevent any strange boats from approaching. These precautions were observed whenever we were at anchor in any port during the whole trip.

All our coal was finally on board by the afternoon of April 7, and out we started again, using three boilers and averaging something over eleven knots per hour until the evening of the 9th, when the fourth boiler was put on and the average speed increased to about thirteen knots, and this was kept up until the evening of the 16th, when we reached Port Tamar, just inside the entrance of the Straits of Magellan. We had a few leaky tubes in one boiler a day or so after leaving Callao, and, of course, stopped them as soon as possible. Soon after this, in some way which we have never been able to determine, a small amount of salt water got into our boilers, just enough to cause the density of the water to become about what it would be if one-quarter of it were sea water. This, of course, meant a certain amount of scale, but fortunately the amount was so small that it merely served to make our tube ends tight, without being enough to cause any bad effects on the boilers. At all events, from that time until long after our arrival off Santiago we did not have another leaky tube.

We spent the night at anchor in Port Tamar, and the next morning started out with the intention of making Sandy Point by dark. This, of course, required a semi-forced draught run, what is known technically as "assisted draught"; that is to say, the forced draught blowers are run, but the firerooms are not closed up air-tight, as under full forced draught. We ran our blowers at such a speed as to give an air pressure of one-quarter of an inch of water, and were thus able to run the engines at a speed of 107.3 revolutions per minute, giving the ship a speed through the water of 14.6 knots per hour. As a matter of fact our speed from point to point along the shore was much greater, as there was a very strong current running through the straits in our favor.

While at Callao we had heard that a Spanish torpedo boat was at Montevideo, and we thought it just possible that she might attempt to intercept us in the straits, lying behind one of the numerous high points and darting out on us. So the rapid-fire gun crews were kept at their guns, ready for instant work. However, we saw nothing of her.

Sandy Point was reached in the evening, and the next morning (April 18) began our usual work — coaling ship, cleaning, repairing, and overhauling machinery.

Of course, the only way to keep the ship going, was to turn to at every opportunity and do everything possible in the time allowed; but it was beginning to tell on all of us. We all had to stand watch at sea, and as soon as port was reached, all hands of the engineer's force had to go at the work and keep it up, going for every little thing that showed the least sign of wear, and not waiting even for it to show, but hunting for things of which there was the least probability of their becoming out of order. But all hands stood the strain well.

We remained at Sandy Point until the morning of April 21, leaving with about 1,200 tons of coal in our bunkers. The *Marietta* accompanied us from Sandy Point to Rio, or rather until the morning of the 30th, when we increased our speed to about fourteen and a half knots an hour, in order to arrive in port during the afternoon, leaving the *Marietta* to follow in later. The run from Sandy Point to Rio was without incident, and was at a slower speed than our previous runs, on account of the *Marietta*.

It was at Rio that we received the news that war was on with Spain, and at the same time a rumor of Dewey's victory at Manila reached us. We also received a long cablegram from Washington, informing us that Admiral Cervera's squadron of four heavy armored cruisers and four seagoing torpedo boats had left for Cuban waters, and we were advised to avoid them if possible. We remained at Rio until May 4, doing what repairing we could and filling up with coal, taking something over a thousand tons. During our stay in this port we were not allowed to visit the shore. Here, too, we found the *Nichteroy*, which had been bought by an American firm and was flying our flag, and which was to be convoyed by us to the United States. However, she was not allowed to leave port with us, so we stood up the coast a few miles to wait for her. She joined us the following evening, but her boilers were in such bad condition that it was decided not to waste time with her, so she was left in charge of the *Marietta*, and we went ahead, arriving at Bahia on the evening of the 8th. Here we put on our war paint and made arrangements for refilling our bunkers, but on the evening of the 9th a cablegram was received from Washington, ordering us to leave, so out we went immediately, heading for Barbadoes, which was reached at about 3 o'clock on the morning of May 18. Here we took 240 tons of coal and left the same evening, standing well to the eastward, and finally reached the Florida coast at Jupiter Light on the evening of the 24th, reporting our arrival to Washington. Orders came back to proceed to Hampton Roads if in need of repairs, otherwise to Key West. There was no hesitation as to which direction to take under these orders, and, finally, Key West was reached on the morning of the 26th, thus completing the most remarkable and successful performance ever undertaken by a battleship.

I have since heard that there was great anxiety among our own people at home on account of this ship and that foreign nations were watching our run with great interest, while many doubted our ability to successfully accomplish it.

In the first place the machinery of this ship was beautifully and strongly built, and, above all, was erected in the ship with the greatest care and thoroughness. Great

credit is therefore due to her builders and to the inspectors who supervised the work. From the day she went into commission the greatest care has been taken to keep everything up as nearly to perfection as possible. On the discovery of the least defect in any part, it has been remedied immediately. Whenever a run has been made, no matter how short it may have been, on reaching port again the cylinders and valve chests, air pump valves, etc., have been carefully examined, cleaned, and oiled. The most careful attention has been paid to the condition of the boilers, and every endeavor has been made to avoid the use of salt water in them; that, indeed, is the point to which our success is largely due. Every leak, however small, in the boilers themselves, in the steam pipes, in the engines or in the condensers has been stopped just as soon as possible, and thus only has it been possible to keep down the amount of water necessary for make-up feed to such a point that our evaporators have been able to furnish it, in addition to the water required for all other purposes.

The following is a summary, in tabular form, of our runs, showing at a glance the number of knots run, the speed of the ship in knots per hour, the consumption of coal, and the knots run per ton of coal. The data in this table are taken from the time of getting fairly under way, the time while entering and leaving port being eliminated. The coal, of course, does not include that used while lying in port, but includes coal consumed for all purposes while at sea.

	Distance, Knots.	Time, Hours.	Speed, Knots per Hour.	Coal, Tons.	Knots Run per Ton of Coal.
Bremerton to San Francisco.....	827.7	72	11.49	221.0	3.74
San Francisco to Callao.....	4,076.5	371	10.99	962.0	4.24
Callao to Port Tamar.....	2,529.9	212	11.93	785.0	3.22
Port Tamar to Sandy Point.....	132.0	9	14.55	66.0	2.00
Sandy Point to Rio de Janeiro....	2,247.7	223	10.06	657.0	3.42
Rio to Bahia.....	700.0	*	*	288.0
Bahia to Barbadoes.....	2,229.0	193	11.55	620.0	3.59
Barbadoes to Jupiter.....	1,683.9	142	11.86	478.5	3.3
Jupiter to Key West.....	280.0	27	10.37	77.9	3.6
Totals.....	14,706.7			4,155.4	

*Speeds variable. Data unreliable.

C. N. OFFLEY.

THE TREATY OF PEACE.

NEGOTIATED AT PARIS BY THE AMERICAN-SPANISH COMMISSIONERS,
DECEMBER 10, 1898.

THE United States of America and Her Majesty, the Queen-Regent of Spain, in the name of her August Son, Don Alfonso XIII., desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States, William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States; and Her Majesty, Queen-Regent of Spain; Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate; Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of the kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels; and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Divisions, who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:—

THE FULL TEXT
OF THE
TREATY

ARTICLE I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over all title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may, under international law, result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

ARTICLE II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.

ARTICLE III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:—

A line running from west to east along or near the 20th parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the 118th to the 127th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the 127th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of 4.45 north latitude, thence along the parallel of 4.45 north latitude to its intersection with the meridian

THE CESSION
OF THE
PHILIPPINES

of longitude 119.35 east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude 119.35 east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude 7.40 north, thence along the parallel of latitude 7.40 north to its intersection with the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the 10th degree parallel of north latitude with the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of \$20,000,000 within three months after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

ARTICLE V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

RESTITUTION OF WAR PRISONERS

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the commissioners appointed to arrange for evacuation of Puerto Rico and other islands in the West Indies under the protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, live stock, and materials and supplies of all kinds belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain if a satisfactory agreement between the two governments on the subject shall be reached.

ARTICLE VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The government of the United States will, at its own cost, return to Spain, and the government of Spain will, at its own cost, return to the United States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article.

ARTICLE VII.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either government or of its citizens or subjects, against the other government that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

**ALL WAR-TIME
CLAIMS
WAIVED**

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

ARTICLE VIII.

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty Spain relinquishes in Cuba and cedes in Puerto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the right and property of their inhabit-

ants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills, and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

ARTICLE IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory, they may preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain by making before a court of record within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance, in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

ARTICLE X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

ARTICLE XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty, shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

ARTICLE XII.

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, shall be determined according to the following rules:—

PENDING LITIGATION PROTECTED First—Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals or in criminal matters before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final and shall be executed in due form

by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.

Second — Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined, shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending, or in the court that may be substituted therefor.

Third — Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

ARTICLE XIII.

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other ceded territory, at the time of exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE XIV.

Spain will have the power to establish consular offices in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

ARTICLE XV.

The government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other nation the same treatment in respect **PRIVILEGES** of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues **OF SHIPPING** and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels not engaged in the coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either government to the other.

ARTICLE XVI.

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will, upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty, the Queen-

Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier, if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-Eight.

[Seal]	WILLIAM R. DAY,
[Seal]	CUSHMAN K. DAVIS,
[Seal]	WILLIAM P. FRYE,
[Seal]	GEORGE GRAY,
[Seal]	WHITELAW REID,
[Seal]	EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS,
[Seal]	B. DE ABARZUZA,
[Seal]	J. DE GARNICA,
[Seal]	W. R. DE VILLA-URRUTIA,
[Seal]	RAFAEL CERERO.

RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED

ON APRIL 11th, 1899, President McKinley's proclamation announcing the formal and official termination of the war between the United States and Spain was issued at Washington. The ceremonies connected with the ratification of the Peace Treaty took place at the White House in presence of the Cabinet and officials of the Administration representing the United States and M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, representing Spain. At the meeting, the protocol of exchange of ratifications was signed and peaceful relations with Spain were restored. As an indication of the friendly resumption of relations with the Madrid Government, the Hon. Bellamy Storer, late U. S. Minister to Belgium, was appointed minister to Spain. On May 1st, warrants for the \$20,000,000 due to Spain under the terms of the Peace Treaty were handed to the French Ambassador. The following is

THE PRESIDENT'S RATIFICATION OF PEACE PROCLAMATION:

WHEREAS, A Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, Don Alfonso

XIII., was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898, the original of which convention, being in the English and Spanish languages, is word for word as follows:

(Here the full text of the treaty, already printed, is included.)

AND WHEREAS, The said convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments were exchanged in the city of Washington on the 11th day of April, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 11th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President:

JOHN HAY, Secretary of State.







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